Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 5221 Cal
Judgement Date : 10 August, 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
Present :-
The Hon'ble Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya.
WPA 17454 of 2022
M/s. Rashmi Metaliks Limited & Anr.
Vs.
Enforcement Directorate & Ors.
For the petitioners : Mr. Sidharth Luthra, Adv.
Mr. Sandipan Ganguly, Adv.
Mr. Shyamal Ghosh, Adv.
Ms. Smriti Sinha, Adv.
Ms. Sutapa Sanyal, Adv.
Mr. Ayan Bhattacharya, Adv.
Ms. Subhangni Jain, Adv.
Mr. Siddhartha Datta, Adv.
Mr. Sakabda Roy, Adv.
Mr. Rohit Mukherji, Adv.
Ms. Trisha Mukherjee, Adv.
Ms. Surabhi Binani, Adv.
For the ED : Mr. Vipul Kundalia, Adv.
Mr. Anurag Roy, Adv.
Ms. Uneaza Ali, Adv.
Last Heard on : 03.08.2022.
Delivered on : 10.08.2022.
2
Moushumi Bhattacharya, J.
1. The petitioners pray for stay of two orders of freezing of the
accounts of the petitioner no. 1 dated 13th July, 2022. The orders of
freezing, both issued on the same day i.e. 13th July, 2022, were made
under Section 17(1-A) of The Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002
(PMLA). Six accounts in the name of the petitioner no. 1 with SBI and one
account with ICICI Bank were seized by the Enforcement Directorate (ED)
with a further direction that the funds lying in the said accounts shall not
be transferred or otherwise dealt with except with the prior permission of
the ED.
2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners places the factual
genesis of the matter from 2012 to the date on which the freezing orders
were issued and decisions of Single and Division Benches of this Court as
well as by the Supreme Court with reference to an ECIR case filed against
the petitioner no. 1 in 2012. Counsel submits that orders were passed by
which leave to file charge-sheets against the petitioner no. 1 was refused
and proceedings against the petitioner no. 1 were stayed by the Supreme
Court. Counsel also places relevant provisions of The PMLA with reference
to action initiated under Sections 17 and 17(1-A) of The PMLA.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the ED submits that the impugned
orders were passed upon incriminating material being found in three
premises of the petitioner no. 1 in a search made in the said three premises.
Counsel submits that all the statutory formalities for conducting the
search and seizure were complied with and further submits that the ED is
entitled to investigate in the affairs of the petitioner no. 1 as there is no
order of stay of such investigation. It is further submitted that The PMLA
contains procedural safeguards including a period of 30 days within which
the authority is under an obligation to file an application requesting for
retention of the property seized as well as an outer limit of 180 days for
provisionally attaching any property.
4. The adjudication of the present dispute involves and hence must be
made in two parts. The first part is concerned with the factual aspect of the
matter and the second is on the powers of the ED under Sections 17 and
17(1-A) of The PMLA.
5. In relation to the first part, it is relevant to note that both the
impugned orders of freezing dated 13th July, 2022 mention the "File
Number ECIR/KLZO/06/2012". This would mean that the impugned
orders were passed with reference to an ECIR case filed against the
petitioner no. 1 in 2012. Therefore, it becomes necessary to consider the
facts from 2012 to 13th July, 2022. The relevant facts have been stated in
detail in a Transfer Petition of 2015 made by the Union of India, Ministry of
Railways in the Supreme Court against several entities including the
petitioner no. 1. The Transfer Petition was filed for a comprehensive
hearing of numerous proceedings pending before the High Courts with
reference to a dual-pricing mechanism for iron-ore prescribing freight rates
for transportation of iron-ore supplies for domestic consumption as part of
the inflation management strategy of the government. The measure was
implemented vide a Rates Circular containing a set of instructions which
were subsequently find-tuned resulting in the prevalent Rates Circular 36
of 2009. In brief, the guidelines specified the list of documents which a
consignor/consignee was required to furnish to the Railways for
establishing its status as an authorised domestic manufacturing unit.
6. The Circular and the prevailing guidelines resulted in the Railways
issuing show-cause notices along with claims of penal charges on the
ground of evasion of freight by availing of lower rate of freight for
transporting iron-ore for domestic consumption and for utilization for
purpose other than the domestic use. These show-cause notices were
challenged by the parties mentioned in the Transfer Petition in different
High Courts including in this Court. The ensuing proceedings resulted in a
review petition filed by the first petitioner against an order of the Division
Bench dated 24.12.2014 by which the Division Bench rejected the
challenge to the 2009 Circular on the ground that the Railway Board has
the jurisdiction to issue the said Circular. The Union of India also filed a
civil suit being CS No. 311/2014 before this Court. Both these proceedings
find specific mention in the order passed by the Supreme Court on 14th
December, 2015 staying all further proceedings in all of such cases until
further orders. The cases mentioned in the order of the Supreme Court
include both the review petition being RVW 44/2015 as well as CS No.
311/2014 being the suit filed by the Union of India against the petitioner
no. 1. This Court has not been made aware of any further orders passed in
the Transfer Petition after 14th December, 2015. The stay of the
proceedings stated above is admittedly subsisting as on date.
7. The above facts therefore begs the question as to the basis on which
the ED proceeded to initiate action under Sections 17 and 17(1-A) of The
PMLA for freezing the bank accounts of the petitioner no. 1. The ECIR case
of 2012 shows that the impugned orders can be traced to the 2009 Rates
Circular and the show-cause notices issued to the petitioner no. 1.
Significantly, the Summons produced by the parties also mentioned the
same ECIR case number of 2012. The Summons are of
February-September, 2014. Hence, the Summons were issued prior to the
stay order of the Supreme Court which was passed in 2015. It is also not
the case of the ED that the ED initiated action against the petitioner no. 1
or proceeded to take steps pursuant to any new case filed or show-cause
notices issued after 2012. The contention of the ED that the impugned
freezing orders were passed on incriminating material being found in the
premises of the petitioner no. 1 also does not reveal that the searches were
made pursuant to a new ECIR case filed against the petitioner no. 1 after
2012.
8. It can therefore reasonably be presumed that the ED took steps for
search and seizure and freezing of the petitioners bank accounts after 7
years from the date on which all pending proceedings were stayed by the
Supreme Court. It may also not be out of place to come to a finding that the
Rates Circular of 2009 is at the top of the pyramid of proceedings travelling
down through the sprouting of challenges to the Circular with the orders
passed by the Courts forming the base of the triangle.
9. This Court is therefore inclined to hold that the ED could not have
initiated any action against the petitioners during the subsistence of the
order of stay of the pending proceedings against the petitioner no. 1 by the
Supreme Court dated 14th December, 2015.
10. The second part deals with the position under The Prevention of
Money-Laundering Act, 2002, in relation to search and seizure under
Section 17 of the Act.
11. The pre-requisite for an authorised officer of a certain rank being
entitled to search and seize is that such officer has information in his
possession and a reason to believe, expressed in writing that a person:-
i) committed any act of money-laundering, or
ii) is in possession of any proceeds of crime involved in money laundering, or
iii) is in possession of records relating to money-laundering, or
iv) is in possession of any property related to crime.
Section 17(1)(a)-(f) delineates the measures which the authorised officer
can take for entering, searching and seizing any record or property subject
to the satisfaction of the four pre-requisites stated above. The
pre-requisites not only indicate that the authorised officer must have
reason to believe (reduced to writing) on the information in his possession
but also that the person in relation to the premises is guilty of an offence
defined in Section 3 of The PMLA - "money-laundering".
12. Section 3 entails a separate set of requirements and evidence
including that the person who is found guilty of the offence of
money-laundering has knowingly indulged or assisted in the commission
of an activity connected with "proceeds of crime" and has concealed,
possessed, acquired or used the same. The term "proceeds of crime" has
been defined in Section 2(1)(u) as any property derived directly or indirectly
by any person as a result of criminal activity related to a scheduled offence
as well as any property which is used in the commission of an offence
under The PMLA or any of the scheduled offences. Besides, commission of
an offence would only qualify as money-laundering if the offence generates
proceeds of crime and tainted property (Vijay Madanlal Choudhary vs.
Union of India; 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929).
13. Therefore, the search and seizure under Section 17(1) must also
satisfy the defining characteristic of "money-laundering" and "proceeds of
crime" as well as their respective procedural requirements as separately
stipulated in The PMLA. In other words, the power to enter and search any
place or to seize any record or property must be predicated by the
satisfaction of all the requirements under Section 17(1) which should find a
particularized statement in the written "reason to believe" component by
the authorised officer under Section 17(1). It is only on the fulfillment of the
conditions stipulated under Section 17(1) together with the satisfaction of
the conditions of Sections 2(1)(u) and 3 that the power to search and seize
is crystallized.
14. Section 17(1-A) is an alternative to Section 17(1) for facilitating the
measures which are required to be taken in the event search and seizure is
not practicable. Section 17(1-A) starts with the opening of an alternative
avenue to an authorised officer under Section 17(1) to make an order of
freezing a property where it is not practicable to seize the property. The
word (used four times) in Section 17(1-A), is the word "such". The word
"such" precedes "record/property" and "order" whereever used in Section
17(1-A). The qualification of property and records by use of "such" fixes the
sequence of steps which may be initiated by the authorised officer under
Section 17(1) followed by Section 17(1-A). This means that the officer must
a) Satisfy the pre-requisites of Section 17(1) stated in paragraph 13 above
b) Upon satisfaction of the conditions, enter the place and search and seize the property and
c) Come to a conclusion that seizing the property under Section 17(1) is not practicable
d) Record the reasons why it is not practicable to search and seize under Section 17(1)
e) Satisfy the reason/basis of the apprehension that the property may be transferred or otherwise dealt with unless such freezing order is passed.
Each of the above five conditions is required to be satisfied before
graduating from 17(1) to the next stage of action under 17(1-A).
15. Before reaching the power conferred under Section 17(1-A), the
authorised officer must also come to an informed finding that the exact
location of proceeds of crime or the documents relating to
money-laundering cannot be ascertained and hence the requirement to
enter and search the premises on a reason to believe (based on material in
his possession) that the proceeds of crime/documents may be located in
the place of search. Second, the finding must also include the
apprehension of resistance on the part of the person whose place is
proposed to be entered into and searched. This would be evident from
Section 17(1)(b) which includes forcible entry into the premises and
breaking open of the receptacle for exercising the power conferred by
Section 17(1-A).
16. These factors were taken into consideration by a Division Bench of
the Allahabad High Court in Motilal vs. Preventive Intelligence Officer,
Central Excise and Customs, Agra; (1971) 80 ITR 418 where Section 132(3)
of the Income Tax (IT) Act, 1961 was under consideration. Section 132(3) of
the IT Act is similar in import and purpose to Section 17(1-A) of The PMLA.
The conclusions of the Allahabad High Court were relied upon in
Commissioner of Income Tax, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Delhi vs.
Tarsem Kumar; (1986) 3 SCC 489. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court
in Shri L.R. Gupta vs. Union of India; 1992 (22) DRJ 1 also opined that facts
and circumstances must exist on the basis of which the belief under
Section 132(1) of the Income Tax Act can be formed and would include the
information with the Department that a person is not likely to produce the
documents voluntarily.
17. The impugned orders of freezing in the present case do not
discharge the onus of stating with reasons as to the necessity of passing
such orders or the basis for freezing accounts under Section 17(1-A) of The
PMLA. The Assistant Director, ED, simply notes :
".... for the purpose of investigation under PMLA, hereby make an order to
freeze the below mentioned property...... as it is not practicable to seize the
balance lying in the below mentioned accounts..."
What follows is even more cryptic;
"I further order that the funds lying in the above accounts ..... shall not be
transferred or otherwise dealt with except with the prior permissions of the
office of the Deputy Director, ED...... which shall result in the frustration of
the proceeds of crime or hamper the investigation under the (PMLA)."
18. The singular absence of statements of reasons or the basis of an
apprehension, factual or otherwise, for freezing the properties of the
petitioners is apparent from the impugned orders. The requirement of
satisfaction of the conditions stated in Section 17(1) before proceeding to
Section 17(1-A) do not contemplate parroting the words used in the
sections but a precise statement, in writing, reflecting the factors which
form the basis of the conclusion arrived at. A person reading the order
must be able to find the connecting link between the reason given and the
action taken. The view of the Court is bolstered by the specific conditions
under Section 17(1) as well as in Section 3 (Offence of money-laundering)
which demand that properly graded reasons must be stated in an order
justifying initiation of measures under Sections 17(1) and 17(1-A).
19. The impugned orders fall short at all levels of the statutory
requirements. The defence that the freezing orders were passed only upon
incriminating material being found in the three premises of the first
petitioner cannot redeem the situation since the impugned orders do not
contain any "reason to believe" which is a mandate for search and seizure
under Section 17(1) and for freezing orders under Section 17(1-A).
20. The discouragement of the Supreme Court with regard to passing
orders of stay of criminal investigation in Siddharth Mukesh Bhandari vs.
The State of Gujarat passed on 2nd August, 2022, relying upon Neeharika
Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra; (2021) SCC OnLine SC 315
was in light of the Gujarat High Court granting the very same interim relief
which was earlier set aside by the Supreme Court. In the recent judgment
of a 3-Judge Bench of Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary vs.
Union of India the expression "proceeds of crime", is described as the core of
the offence of money-laundering and has been defined as a portion or
whole of the property derived by any person as a result of criminal activity
relating to a stated scheduled offence. The Supreme Court drew a
distinction between possession of unaccounted property acquired by legal
means which may otherwise be actionable for tax violation but may not be
regarded as proceeds of crime unless the concerned tax legislation
prescribes such violation as an offence in the Schedule to The PMLA. The
Supreme Court also cautioned that the authorities under The PMLA
cannot resort to action against any person for money-laundering on an
assumption that the property recovered by them must be proceeds of crime
unless the same is registered with the jurisdictional police or pending
enquiry in a competent forum. More important, Vijay Madanlal Choudhary
carved out a further area of exception for a person named in the criminal
activity relating to a scheduled offence is finally absolved by a Court of
competent jurisdiction owing to an order of discharge, acquittal or
quashing of the criminal case against the person. An analogy can be drawn
to the present facts where the stay of proceedings ordered by the Supreme
Court on 14th December, 2015 is continuing till date.
21. The above reasons persuade this Court to hold that the impugned
orders cannot be sustained either in law or in fact. There shall accordingly
be an order of stay of the impugned freezing orders dated 13th July, 2022.
The respondents are directed not to act in terms of the said orders or take
steps in furtherance thereto. WPA 17454 of 2022 is disposed of in terms of
the above.
22. The prayer for stay made on behalf of the Enforcement Directorate
is considered and refused given the findings and observations made in the
Judgment.
Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be
supplied to the parties after fulfillment of requisite formalities.
(Moushumi Bhattacharya, J.)
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