Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 5661 Cal
Judgement Date : 15 November, 2021
Form J(2)
In the High Court at Calcutta
Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
Present : The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Bibek Chaudhuri
IA No.:CRAN/1/2019 (Old No. : CRAN/583/2019)
in
CRA 45 of 2019
Nurai Sk. @ Nurul Sk.
-Vs.-
State of West Bengal
For the appellant : Mr. Navanil De, Adv.
Ms. Ayantika Roy, Adv.,
Mr. Subhrajit Dey, Adv.
For the respondents : Mr. Narayan Prasad Agarwala, Adv.,
Mr. Pratick Bose, Adv.
Heard & Judgment on : 15.11.2021.
Bibek Chaudhuri, J.:
Way back in 2002 when Protection of Children from Sexual
Offences Act, 2012 did not see the light of the day, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court through the Hon'ble Y. K. Sabharwal, J. in
Criminal Appeal No. 1975 of 1996 (State of Rajasthan -Vs.- Om
Prakash) observed, "it is necessary for the Courts to have a
sensitive approach when dealing with cases of child rape. The
effect of such a crime on the mind of the child is likely to be
lifelong. A special safeguard has been provided for children in
the Constitution of India in Article 39 which, inter alia,
stipulates that the State shall, in particular, direct its policy
towards securing that the tender age of the children is not
abused and the children are given opportunities and facilities to
develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and
dignity and that the childhood and youth are protected against
exploitation and against moral and material abandonment".
At the same time, one should not forget that
administration of justice is not one way traffic. On the basis of
the case and counter case based on facts and evidences, both
oral and documentary, administration of criminal justice is to be
imparted. The duty of the Trial Court in assessment of evidence
on record in its true spirit cannot but be over emphasized
because the Trial Court is the basic structure of administration
of justice upon which the superior forums are standing. If the
basic structure is without any base, the super structure will not
only fall, but it will cause denial of justice to an innocent
person.
Bearing the above basic principle in mind, let us now dwell
upon the facts and circumstances involved in the instant appeal.
The appellant was convicted and sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for two years with fine and default clause for
committing offence under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code.
He was further sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for
two years and to pay fine of Rs.10,000/- with default clause for
committing offence under Section 354A(2) of the Indian Penal
Code. For offence under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code
he was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year
with fine and default clause. The appellant was further
sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for four years and to
pay fine of Rs.10,000/- with default clause for offence
punishable under Section 8 of the POCSO Act. He is also
sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and to
pay fine of Rs.10,000/- with default clause for committing
offence under Section 12 of the POCSO Act.
All the sentences were, however, directed to run
concurrently.
According to the prosecution, the victim girl was returning
from school on 24th August, 2017 at about 4.10 p.m. and on her
way back to home, the accused dragged her 'orna' and
proposed her to marry. He also threatened her to cause injury
by throwing acid on her body if the victim girl refused to accede
to his proposal.
The materials-on-record further shows that both the
victim and the accused reside in the same locality. After the
incident, FIR was not lodged immediately, though the local
police station is situated at a stone throw distance from the
house of the victim. Only on 26 th August, 2017, the FIR was
lodged by the uncle of the victim. In the FIR, no allegation was
made against the appellant that he pulled the hand of the
victim. On the contrary, it was stated that the accused pulled
the 'orna' of the victim and threatened her that he would cause
injury to her if he did not agree to the proposal of marriage
given by the accused to her.
In evidence the victim girl as P.W. 1 stated on oath that
the incident took place on 27th of a particular month in the year
2017 at about 10.30 a.m. when she was going to her school
with her friend, Rimi. Thus, at the time of recording evidence of
P.W. 1 the date and time of incident was wrongly stated by the
victim girl. The prosecution noticing grave lacuna in its case
filed an application for recalling P.W. 1 after about two months
of her deposition for the first time in Court. In the evidence
dated 13th July, 2018, the deposition of P.W. 1 was rectified and
she was made to depose that the incident took place on 24 th
August, 2017 at 4.10 p.m.
The eyewitness of the occurrence, namely Rimi who
accompanied the victim girl was not examined in this case. All
other witnesses heard the incident and their evidence being
hearsay in nature is of little relevance. Learned Trial Judge on
appreciation on evidence held that the specific act of the
accused of dragging the 'orna' of the victim girl and insisting
her to marry him was done with intent to outrage her modesty
with sexual intent. The learned Trial Judge held that the
accused has caused her sexual assault and harassment by
physical contact by pulling her hand and advance unwelcome
and explicit sexual overtures to marry him. Therefore, the
learned Trial Judge held the accused guilty for committing
offence under Sections 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act. He also
held that the specific act of the accused in the nature of sexual
harassment within the meaning of Section 354 A (1)(ii) of the
Indian Penal Code.
Let me now appreciate the evidence on record as well as
legal position as well as penal provisions contained in statutes
independently.
In a criminal trial date of occurrence, time of occurrence
and place of occurrence are the most vital pieces of evidence
which the prosecution is bound to prove beyond any shadow of
doubt. If there is a deviation of the above-mentioned three
facts, the entire case remains doubtful because the Court is
every reason to hold that no such incident took place at the
given time in the given manner at the given place and the
accused is entitled to get benefit of doubt. It is needless to say
that the victim girl who was a student of Class-XII, on the date
of examination, might forget the date of occurrence but it is
heard to believe that she also would forget the time when the
incident took place. In her examination-in-chief, she stated
that while she was going to school with her friend, the incident
took place. Subsequently, she was recalled and stated that
while she was returning home from school on 24 th August,
2017, the incident took place at about 4:30 p.m. In view of
such discrepancies, it is open for the Court to consider the
prosecution story with pinch of salt.
In the FIR, the uncle of the de facto complainant never
stated that the accused dragged the hand of the victim.
Statement of the victim under Section 164 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure was recorded after 10 days of occurrence on
4th September, 2017. In the said statement, the victim
introduced that she was pulled by her hands.
It is needless to say that a statement under Section 164 of
the Criminal Procedure Code is not a substantive piece of
evidence. The evidence that is led by the witness in Court on
oath. Substantive piece of evidence and a statement under
Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can only be used
for corroboration or contradiction. Such statement under
Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should not be
taken into consideration where the victim tried to exaggerate
the incident.
Section 8 of the POCSO Act is the penal provision of
sexual assault. Section 7 defines sexual assault which runs
thus: -
"7. Sexual assault. - Whoever, with sexual intent
touches the vagina, penis, anus or breast of the child or makes
the child touch the vagina, penis, anus or breast of such person
or any other person, or does any other act with sexual intent
which involves physical contact without penetration is said to
commit sexual assault."
Similarly, Section 12 is punishment for sexual harassment
and the specific acts constituting sexual harassment are defined
in Section 11 which is reproduced below:-
"11.Sexual harassment. - A person is said to commit
sexual harassment upon a child when such person with sexual
intent-
(i) utters any word or makes any sound, or makes any
gesture or exhibits any object or part of body with
the intention that such word or sound shall be
heard, or such gesture or object or part of body
shall be seen by the child; or
(ii) makes a child exhibit his body or any part of his
body so as it is seen by such person or any other
person; or
(iii) shows any object to a child in any form or media
for pornographic purposes;
(iv) repeatedly or constantly follows or watches or
contacts a child either directly or through
electronic, digital or any other means; or
(v) threatens to use, in any form of media, a real or
fabricated depiction through electronic, film or
digital or any other mode, of any part of the body
of the child or the involvement of the child in a
sexual act; or
(vi) entices a child for pornographic purposes or gives
gratification therefor."
Even assuming that the appellant has committed the
alleged act of dragging 'orna' and pulling hand of the victim and
proposed her to marry, such act does not come within the
definition of either sexual assault or sexual harassment.
At best for the act of the accused, he may held liable for
committing offence under Section 354 A read with Section 506
of the Indian Penal Code.
For an offence under Section 354 A(1)(ii), the prescribed
punishment is rigorous imprisonment for a term which may
extend to 3 years or with fine or with both.
For the offence punishable under Section 506 of the Indian
Penal Code, the offender shall be punished with imprisonment
of other description for a term which may extend to 2 years or
with fine or with both.
From careful evidence on record, I find that no other
charge is proved against the accused.
For the reasons stated above, the instant appeal is
allowed in part.
The appellant is held not guilty from the charge under
Sections 354, 354B and 509 of the Indian Penal Code. The
appellant is also held not guilty for the charge under Sections 8
and 12 of the POCSO Act.
The appellant is, accordingly, acquitted from the above
charge, set at liberty and release from bail bonds.
The instant appeal is dismissed in part and the order of
conviction and sentence passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Kandi in Sessions Trial No.06(3)/2018 arising
out of C. Special No.111 of 2017 is partly affirmed so far as it
relates to conviction and sentence passed by the learned Trial
Judge for committing offence under Sections 354(1)(ii) and
Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code.
The appellant be released from Correctional Home if he
served out sentence for the offence punishable under Section
354A(1)(ii) and Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code.
Let a plain copy of this judgment be sent to the Trial Court
immediately along with lower court record.
The parties are at liberty to act on the server copy of the
judgment.
(Bibek Chaudhuri, J.)
Srimanta/Mithun A.Rs. (Court)
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