[Cites 20, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
M/S Echjay Forging Industries Pvt. Ltd. ... vs Mr. Vasant Krishna Ghadge And Ors. on 26 March, 2026
Author: Amit Borkar
Bench: Amit Borkar
2026:BHC-AS:14382
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Sayali
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.10074 OF 2016
1. Echjay Forging Industries Pvt Ltd
(Formerly known as Echjay Forgings
Pvt. Ltd) Kanjur Village Road, Kanjur
(E) Mumbai:- 400 042
Digitally
2. Deepakbhai M. Doshi
signed by
ATUL
ATUL
GANESH
M/s. Echjay Forging Industries Pvt Ltd
GANESH KULKARNI
KULKARNI Date:
2026.03.26 (Formerly known as Echjay Forgings Pvt
12:14:18
+0530
Ltd) Kanjur Village Road, Kanjur (E)
Mumbai: 400 042. ... petitioners
V/s.
1. Vasant Krishna Ghadge,
C/o Krishna Vithoba Gurav, Gurav
Chawl, New Amar Bharat Seva Mandal,
Sainath Nagar Road, Behind KVK High
School, Ghatkopar (W),
Mumbai 400 086.
2. Mr. Krishna Vithoba Gurav,
Gurav Chawl, New Amar Bharat
Seva Mandal, Sainath Nagar Road,
Behind KVK High School,
Ghatkopar (W), Mumbai 400 086.
3. Mr. Anilkumar Nanda Naik
C/o Krishna Vithoba Gurav,
Gurav Chawl, New Amar Bharat Seva
Mandal, Sainath Nagar Road, Behind
KVK High School, Ghatkopar (W),
Mumbai 400 086.
1
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4. Mr. Sachin Gangaram Mahadik,
C/o Krishna Vithoba Gurav,
Gurav Chawl, New Amar Bharat Seva
Mandal, Sainath Nagar Road,
Behind KVK High School,
Ghatkopar (W), Mumbai 400 086. ... Respondents
Mr. Avinash Jalisatgi with Ms. Divya Wadekar and Mr.
Mulanshu Vora, for petitioners.
Mr. Shafi Kazi, Mr. T. V. Louis, Mr. Biju Joseph, & Mr.
Vishal Sapre i/b KLT Law Associates, for respondents.
CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
RESERVED ON : MARCH 13, 2026
PRONOUNCED ON : MARCH 26, 2026
JUDGMENT:
1. By the present writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227
of the Constitution of India, the petitioners call in question the
legality and validity of the order dated 20 July 2016 passed by the
Industrial Court, Mumbai in Complaint (ULP) No. 248 of 2013.
The petitioners seek issuance of a writ of certiorari, or any other
appropriate writ, order or direction, for calling for the record and
proceedings of the said complaint and, upon examination thereof,
for quashing and setting aside the impugned order.
2. The facts giving rise to the present petition, in brief, are as
follows. Petitioner No. 1 is a private limited company, formerly
known as Echjay Forgings Pvt. Ltd., engaged in the business of
manufacturing and machining steel and steel alloy forgings at its
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factory situated at Kanjur Village Road, Kanjur (East), Mumbai.
The respondents were employed in the said factory. The petitioners
declared closure of the said factory and terminated the services of
the four respondents for the reasons set out in the notice of closure
dated 21 June 2013. Aggrieved thereby, the respondents filed
Complaint (ULP) No. 248 of 2013 before the Industrial Court,
Mumbai under Section 28 read with Items 9 and 1(c) of Schedule
IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention
of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. By its final judgment and
order dated 20 July 2016, the Industrial Court held, inter alia, that
the petitioners had engaged in unfair labour practices by effecting
an illegal closure and issued consequential directions against the
petitioners.
3. It is the case of the petitioners that pursuant to a Scheme of
Arrangement in the nature of a de-merger, sanctioned by this
Court by order dated 05 December 2014 in Company Scheme
Petition No. 432 of 2014 along with connected Company
Summons for Direction No. 758 of 2013 and Company Scheme
Petition No. 433 of 2014 along with Company Summons for
Direction No. 759 of 2013, all assets and liabilities pertaining to
the said factory stood transferred to petitioner No. 1. Petitioner
No. 2 is stated to be a Director of petitioner No. 1. At the relevant
time, the petitioners were engaged in manufacturing and
machining of steel and steel alloy forgings, and in or about the
year 2012, approximately 129 employees, including staff members,
were employed at the said factory. The petitioners contend that
owing to severe recessionary conditions prevailing globally and
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rising inflation, the financial position of petitioner No. 1 became
precarious. In these circumstances, a decision was taken to shift
and relocate the manufacturing activities from the existing
premises at Kanjur, Mumbai to Khalapur in District Raigad.
Accordingly, a notice dated 10 February 2012 was displayed in the
factory informing all employees of the proposed relocation. By the
said notice, a Voluntary Retirement Scheme was also introduced
for the employees.
4. The said notice was challenged by the employees by filing
Complaint (ULP) No. 142 of 2012 before the Industrial Court,
Mumbai alleging unfair labour practices, along with an application
for interim relief. By an interim order dated 23 August 2012, the
learned Member of the Industrial Court directed the petitioners,
inter alia, to provide work to the employees at the Mumbai factory.
The petitioners challenged the said interim order by filing Writ
Petition No. 8850 of 2012 before this Court. The learned Single
Judge admitted the petition and granted a stay to the operation of
the Industrial Court's order dated 23 August 2012. The employees
thereafter preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 854 of 2012. The
Division Bench allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the
learned Single Judge, and remanded the matter for fresh
consideration. During the pendency of the said proceedings, the
workmen joined a trade union known as Akhil Bharatiya
Asanghathit Shramik General Kamgar Union. After prolonged
negotiations, an amicable settlement was arrived at between the
petitioners and the workmen represented by the said union.
Similarly, the staff members constituted a Staff Committee and
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entered into a separate but similar settlement with the petitioners.
Under both settlements, the workmen and staff members expressly
stated that they were not willing to continue employment at the
Khalapur unit and agreed to relinquish their rights to employment
or re-employment. It was agreed that they would voluntarily resign
from service, and in consideration thereof, the petitioners would
pay monetary compensation and other benefits. It was further
agreed that such resignations would take effect from 19 June
2012. Except for the present four respondents, all remaining 125
workmen and staff members accepted the terms of the settlement
and executed the same. The petitioners paid all dues in accordance
with the settlement to those who accepted it. The present
respondents did not accept or sign the settlement. It is the case of
the petitioners that all other employees had either resigned or
were deemed to have resigned with effect from 19 June 2012.
Those employees who had accepted the settlement filed a purshis
dated 07 March 2013 before the Industrial Court in Complaint
(ULP) No. 142 of 2012 seeking withdrawal of their names, which
was allowed and their names were deleted from the proceedings.
According to the petitioners, after 18 June 2013, only the present
respondents continued in employment. In view of financial
constraints and the alleged impossibility of continuing operations,
the petitioners decided to permanently close the factory and issued
a notice of closure. The services of the respondents were
terminated by issuing individual termination letters on account of
closure, and they were paid all statutory dues. It is further
contended that the average number of employees during the
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twelve months preceding the closure was less than 100, and
therefore, the provisions of Chapter V-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 were not attracted.
5. The petitioners contend that since the services of all
employees concerned in Complaint (ULP) No. 142 of 2012 had
come to an end, the said complaint had become infructuous and
was accordingly disposed of by the Industrial Court. The
respondents did not challenge that order. Thereafter, on 29 July
2013, the respondents filed Complaint (ULP) No. 248 of 2013
before the Industrial Court, Mumbai under Section 28 read with
Items 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the ULP Act, challenging the
closure and termination of their services. Interim reliefs were also
sought. The respondents filed documents along with a list. The
petitioners filed their written statement and supporting
documents, including a list dated 30 July 2013. Upon an
application made by the respondents seeking production of
documents, the petitioners produced muster rolls for the relevant
period and filed a purshis explaining their inability to produce
certain other documents. Subsequently, original muster rolls and
additional documents were also produced. Respondent Nos. 1 and
2 entered the witness box, while the other respondents did not
lead evidence. On behalf of the petitioners, one Mr. K. K.
Chandrakant, an ex-Cashier, was examined as a witness. Both
parties also filed written submissions in addition to oral
arguments. Upon consideration of the material on record, the
Industrial Court, by its judgment and order dated 20 July 2016,
held that the closure effected by the petitioners was illegal and
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amounted to an unfair labour practice under Items 9 and 10 of
Schedule IV of the ULP Act. The Industrial Court further directed
the petitioners to pay 50 percent of the wages to the respondents
from 21 June 2013 till the date of their superannuation, calculated
on the basis of their last drawn wages.
6. Mr. Avinash Jalisatgi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the petitioners, submitted that the respondents, by filing
Complaint (ULP) No. 248 of 2013 before the Industrial Court, have
challenged the action of the petitioners in declaring closure of the
factory and the consequential termination of their services. It is
contended on behalf of the respondents that such closure is illegal,
mala fide and amounts to unfair labour practices under Items 9
and 10 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade
Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. The
challenge to the closure is principally founded on two grounds,
namely, that the closure was effected in violation of the provisions
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that prior permission of
the State Government, as allegedly required, was not obtained.
Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the
Industrial Court, by the impugned order, has allowed the
complaint and, upon holding the closure to be illegal, has directed
the petitioners to pay 50 percent of the monthly wages to the
respondents till their respective dates of superannuation.
According to him, the said order is contrary to law, unsustainable
and liable to be quashed and set aside. He submitted, firstly, that
the Industrial Court has erroneously held that the petitioners
committed a breach of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act,
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1947. It is urged that for attracting Section 33, it must be
established that a proceeding of the nature contemplated therein
was pending before a Court or Tribunal, which was not the case
here. The pendency of proceedings under the ULP Act or a writ
petition would not attract Section 33. Reliance is placed on the
decision in Uttam B. Abhang vs. Durwani Karmachari Sahakari
Patsanstha Maryadit, Ahmednagar, 2015 LAB. I.C. 4132 . It is
further submitted that there was no specific pleading in the
complaint in respect of any alleged breach of Section 33. Secondly,
it is contended that the finding of breach of Section 18 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, which pertains to settlements, is also
misconceived. Elaborating further, learned counsel submitted that
settlements were entered into with 76 workmen and 49 staff
members, aggregating to 125 employees. None of these employees
have questioned the said settlements. All of them accepted the
terms, tendered resignation and voluntarily ceased employment. It
is submitted that the present four respondents, who did not accept
the settlements, have no locus to challenge the same. It is further
pointed out that these 125 employees filed affidavits before the
Industrial Court and sought deletion of their names from
Complaint (ULP) No. 142 of 2012, which was accordingly allowed.
It is thus contended that the legality of the said settlements could
not have been examined in the present proceedings arising out of
Complaint (ULP) No. 248 of 2013.
7. Learned counsel further submitted that the Industrial Court
has erred in holding that the petitioners violated the provisions of
Chapter V-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, particularly Section 25-
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O. He submitted that as per Section 25-K, Chapter V-B applies only
to industrial establishments employing 100 or more workmen on
an average per working day during the preceding twelve calendar
months. The Industrial Court has not recorded any finding that
this threshold was satisfied. It is contended that the burden to
prove that the number of workmen exceeded the statutory limit
lies upon the respondents, which burden they have failed to
discharge. Reliance is placed on Maharashtra General Kamgar
Union vs. Indian Gum Industrial Ltd. It is further submitted that
the petitioners produced muster rolls demonstrating that the
average number of employees during the period from 21 June
2012 to 21 June 2013 was approximately 85. It is also pointed out
that Respondent No. 1, in his cross-examination, admitted that the
statements regarding the number of employees in his affidavit
were based on instructions of his advocate and that he was unable
to substantiate the same. It is further submitted that the Industrial
Court has incorrectly held that the petitioners retrenched 129
employees. According to the petitioners, out of 129 employees,
125 had voluntarily resigned and left service prior to the closure,
and therefore, there was no question of their retrenchment. It is
also contended that such a case was never pleaded by the
respondents.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that in
proceedings under the ULP Act, where closure is under challenge,
the Industrial Court cannot examine the motive of the employer in
effecting closure. Reliance is placed on the decision in M/s. Indian
Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. vs. Their Workmen. It is contended that
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despite this settled position, the Industrial Court has erroneously
gone into the question of motive and recorded a finding that the
closure was effected with the intention of selling the factory land.
It is further submitted that once the closure is complete and final,
no relief could have been granted by the Industrial Court. It is
pointed out that, as stated in the Additional Affidavit dated 24
December 2025, the factory is no longer in existence. The
petitioners have also placed on record details of the number of
workmen and man-days for the relevant period to demonstrate
that the average number of workmen per working day was 84.85,
which is below the statutory threshold. In support of the above
submissions, reliance is placed on the judgments in Maharashtra
General Kamgar Union vs. Indian Gum Industrial Ltd.2000 II CLR
509,, M/s. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. vs. Their WorkmenAIR 1968
SC 1002.
9. Per contra, Mr. Shafi Kazi, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondents, submitted that the alleged shifting of
the factory to Khalapur was merely a pretext and a device adopted
by the petitioners to circumvent statutory obligations. According to
him, the real intention of the petitioners was to dispose of the
factory premises at Kanjurmarg for development purposes, as is
evident from the Additional Affidavit dated 24 December 2025. It
is submitted that the land has been converted from industrial to
residential use and has been developed by constructing multiple
buildings comprising a large number of flats, most of which have
already been sold and occupied. It is contended that third-party
rights have been created, rendering the closure irreversible.
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According to the respondents, such conduct amounts to a clear
violation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and
demonstrates that the plea of financial difficulty was merely a
facade. It is further alleged that the settlements were engineered in
collusion with a so-called union and its office bearers, including
one Ms. Nasreen Shinde, and that the entire process was vitiated
by mala fides and lack of transparency. Learned counsel for the
respondents submitted that the material on record clearly
establishes that the closure was a mere camouflage adopted to
evade statutory obligations. It is contended that the action of the
management was taken in collusion with a union and in disregard
of orders passed in pending proceedings before this Court as well
as the Industrial Court. It is further submitted that the Industrial
Court has rightly held that the petitioners indulged in unfair
labour practices under Items 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the MRTU
and PULP Act. It is further submitted that the Industrial Court has
recorded a finding that the retrenchment of employees was in
contravention of Sections 18, 25-N and 25-O of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, and has accordingly granted relief of 50
percent wages to the respondents from 21 June 2013 till their
superannuation. Reliance is placed on the material forming part of
the record of the writ petition. It is thus contended that the
termination of services of the respondents under the guise of
closure is illegal, mala fide and unjustified. Learned counsel
further submitted that the alleged closure and retrenchment were
effected during the pendency of proceedings and in violation of
subsisting orders passed by competent courts. It is contended that
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the petitioners failed to comply with such orders or to seek proper
adjudication before taking such action. In these circumstances, the
closure and termination are liable to be held illegal and in breach
of statutory provisions. It is also contended that the petitioners
have failed to comply with Section 30(2) of the Industrial Disputes
Act, and that the plea of shifting of the factory cannot be sustained
in the absence of genuine intention to continue industrial activity.
It is therefore submitted that the writ petition is devoid of merit
and deserves to be dismissed. In support of the above submissions,
reliance is placed on the decisions in Mackinnon Mackenzie and
Company Ltd. vs. Mackinnon Employees Union,
MANU/SC/0188/2015, Oswal Agro Furane Ltd. & Ors. vs. Oswal
Agro Furane Workers Union & Ors., MANU/SC/0104/2005,
Yashwant Jagannath Ingawale & Ors. vs. Snowcem India Ltd. &
Ors., MANU/MH/0578/1999, and Pt. Mohanlal Sanatan Dharam
Public School vs. Harjit Singh & Anr., 2026 I CLR 334.
REASONS AND ANALYSIS:
10. I have carefully considered the rival submissions and the
material placed on record. The real dispute between the parties is
not difficult to understand. The petitioners say that the factory was
lawfully closed because the business had become uneconomic,
most of the workmen had already resigned under settlements, the
remaining strength was below the statutory limit, and therefore
Chapter V-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 had no
application. The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the
so called closure was only a cover, that the real purpose was to
hand over the land for development, and that the petitioners acted
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in breach of the labour laws and in collusion with a union. Both
sides have placed reliance on documents and on decided cases. But
the Court has to see whether the findings recorded by the
Industrial Court can stand on law and on facts.
11. The first matter which requires close attention is the very
foundation on which the Industrial Court has proceeded to hold
that the closure is illegal. The Industrial Court has referred to
Sections 33, 18, 25-N and 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act and
has treated the case as if all these provisions were attracted. This,
in my view, shows a somewhat mixed approach without first
examining whether the basic conditions for applying these
provisions were satisfied. Section 33 is not a general provision. It
comes into play only when there is a proceeding of the nature
specified in that section already pending before a competent Court
or Tribunal. It is not enough to say that some dispute or some
litigation is pending somewhere. The nature of the proceeding
must fall within the scope of Section 33. Here, what was pending
was a complaint under the ULP Act and at one stage a writ
petition. These cannot automatically be treated as proceedings
attracting Section 33. The petitioners are right in pointing this out.
12. There is one more difficulty. The complaint filed by the
respondents does not clearly plead how Section 33 is said to be
violated. There are no proper factual statements showing what
proceeding was pending, before which forum, and how the action
of closure was in breach of that provision. In law, a finding cannot
be recorded in vacuum. There must be pleading, then evidence,
and then reasoning. If the foundation itself is absent, the
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superstructure cannot stand. The Industrial Court, therefore, was
not justified in recording a finding of breach of Section 33 in the
absence of clear pleadings and proof. This part of the reasoning
cannot be sustained.
13. Coming to Section 18, which deals with settlements, the
situation on record is quite clear though the Industrial Court has
not properly appreciated it. Out of the total employees, as many as
125 persons accepted the settlement, tendered resignation and
took the benefits. This covers almost the entire workforce. These
persons did not challenge the settlement at any stage. On the
contrary, they filed affidavits before the Industrial Court in the
earlier complaint and got their names deleted. This shows that
they acted upon the settlement and accepted it as final. In such a
background, the present four respondents cannot be permitted to
question those settlements as if they are speaking on behalf of all
employees. They were not parties to those settlements. Their
grievance, if any, is confined to their own termination.
14. The Industrial Court, however, appears to have gone beyond
this and examined the validity of the settlements themselves. This
was not necessary in the present complaint. The scope of
Complaint (ULP) No. 248 of 2013 was limited. It was concerned
with the alleged illegality of closure and the termination of the
present respondents. The settlements with other employees had
already worked themselves out. Once the employees accepted
benefits and left service, that chapter had come to an end. It could
not have been reopened indirectly in these proceedings. By doing
so, the Industrial Court travelled beyond the scope of the
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complaint and entered into an area which was not open for
consideration at the instance of these respondents.
15. The issue relating to Chapter V-B requires even more careful
examination. This is because the entire case of illegality of closure
largely depends upon whether Section 25-O applies. But Section
25-O does not apply to every industrial establishment. It applies
only if the establishment employs 100 or more workmen on an
average per working day during the preceding twelve calendar
months. This is a clear statutory requirement. It cannot be
assumed. It must be established by evidence. In the present case,
the petitioners have produced muster rolls and have worked out
the average number of workmen as 84.85 for the relevant period.
This is a specific figure based on record. The respondents, on their
part, have not brought any convincing material to show that the
number was 100 or more. The burden to prove this fact lies on the
respondents because they are the ones who assert that Section 25-
O applies. The Industrial Court has not recorded a clear finding on
this aspect. There is no discussion showing how the figure of 100
was reached or accepted. In absence of such a finding, the
conclusion that there is a breach of Section 25-O becomes
unsustainable. The law requires the Court to first cross the
threshold of applicability. Only thereafter can it examine
compliance or breach.
16. The evidence of Respondent No. 1 further weakens the
respondents' case. In cross-examination, he has stated that the
figures mentioned in his affidavit regarding number of employees
were based on instructions from his advocate and he could not
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explain them properly. This is an important admission. It shows
lack of personal knowledge about a crucial fact. When such is the
position, the Court cannot rely upon such statements to hold that
the statutory requirement of 100 workmen was satisfied. The
Industrial Court has not properly weighed this aspect. The
argument of the respondents that there were originally 129
employees also does not carry the matter further. The law under
Section 25-K does not look at past strength at some earlier point of
time. It looks at the average number of workmen during the
immediately preceding twelve months. This distinction is
important. After the settlements and resignations, the strength of
the workforce reduced considerably. The petitioners have placed
material to show this reduction. The respondents have not
effectively rebutted it. Therefore, merely because at one stage
there were 129 employees, it cannot be presumed that Chapter V-B
continued to apply at the time of closure. The Industrial Court, in
my view, did not undertake this precise examination which the law
requires.
17. The finding regarding retrenchment of 129 employees also
suffers from similar difficulty. The petitioners' case is consistent
that 125 employees resigned voluntarily under settlements prior to
closure. If that is accepted, then those 125 employees cannot be
treated as retrenched. Retrenchment has a specific meaning in law.
It does not include voluntary resignation. The respondents have
alleged that the settlements were manipulated and not genuine.
But such a serious allegation requires strong and reliable evidence.
It cannot be accepted on mere suspicion or general statements.
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The record does not show material of that quality.
18. It is true that the respondents have raised allegations of
collusion with a union and have questioned the role of certain
persons. However, the Court has to act on evidence and not on
conjecture. When a large number of employees have accepted
settlement benefits and have themselves sought deletion from
proceedings, it becomes difficult to hold, without clear proof, that
all those acts were sham or forced. The Industrial Court appears to
have treated the entire sequence as if it was one composite act of
retrenchment affecting all employees. That approach overlooks the
distinction between voluntary exit and forced termination. On
facts, the two stand on different footing.
19. The question of motive has also been discussed by the
Industrial Court. It has observed that the closure was effected with
a view to sell the factory land. The respondents have relied upon
later developments such as change of user of land and construction
of residential buildings. These circumstances may raise doubt in
the mind. But the Court has to be careful. The legality of closure
must be judged on the basis of the situation existing at the time of
closure. Subsequent events may provide background, but they
cannot by themselves prove that the closure was illegal when it
was effected. If the business had become financially weak, if most
employees had already left, and if the statutory provisions
requiring prior permission were not applicable, then the closure
cannot be held illegal only because later the land was put to a
different use. The Industrial Court, in my view, has placed
excessive reliance on subsequent development of the property and
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has not sufficiently examined whether the legal conditions for
closure were satisfied at the relevant time. Suspicion cannot take
the place of proof.
20. The respondents have also argued that the petitioners acted
during pendency of proceedings and in disregard of earlier orders.
This submission also needs to be seen carefully. Pendency of
proceedings does not mean that every action of the employer
becomes prohibited. What has to be seen is whether there was a
specific legal bar and whether that bar was violated. If the
provisions like Section 33 or Section 25-O are not attracted, then
the mere existence of proceedings elsewhere does not make the
closure illegal. The Industrial Court has not clearly analysed this
aspect. It has proceeded more on a general sense of impropriety
rather than on strict statutory requirements.
21. The reference to Section 30(2) also does not advance the
respondents' case in absence of necessary factual basis. The Court
must first establish the facts which bring the case within that
provision. Without that, the conclusion cannot follow. The
reasoning of the Industrial Court does not show such a structured
approach.
22. Finally, the relief granted also requires scrutiny. The
Industrial Court has directed payment of 50 percent wages till the
date of superannuation. Such a direction is based on the
assumption that the closure was illegal and that the workmen were
wrongfully deprived of employment. If the basic finding of
illegality is not sustainable, the relief automatically loses its
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foundation. Moreover, it is stated that the factory itself is no longer
in existence. In such a situation, granting continuing wages till
superannuation becomes difficult to justify in law. The remedy
must be proportionate and based on correct legal findings. Here,
the relief appears to have been granted without a firm legal basis.
For all these reasons, the reasoning adopted by the Industrial
Court does not stand to proper legal scrutiny. The findings on
breach of statutory provisions, on retrenchment, and on motive are
not supported by adequate pleading, proof and correct application
of law. The conclusions, therefore, cannot be sustained.
23. In view of the foregoing discussion and reasons recorded
hereinabove, the following order is passed:
(i) The Writ Petition is allowed;
(ii) The Judgment and Order dated 20 July 2016 passed by
the Industrial Court, Mumbai in Complaint (ULP) No. 248 of
2013 is quashed and set aside;
(iii) Complaint (ULP) No. 248 of 2013 filed by the
respondents stands dismissed;
(iv) Rule is made absolute in the above terms;
(v) There shall be no order as to costs.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
