[Cites 12, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Sumeet Rajaram Kadam vs M/S Sulzer Pumps India Pvt. Ltd on 26 March, 2026
Author: Amit Borkar
Bench: Amit Borkar
2026:BHC-AS:14402
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Shabnoor
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.12201 OF 2025
Sulzer Pumps India Private Limited,
a Company incorporated under the
Companies Act, 1956 having its registered
office at 9, MIDC, Thane - Belapur Road,
SHABNOOR Digha, Navi Mumbai 400708. ... Petitioner
AYUB
PATHAN
Digitally signed by
SHABNOOR AYUB
PATHAN V/s.
Date: 2026.03.26
12:12:45 +0530
1. Sumeet Rajaram Kadam,
aged 37 years, A1, 809, Siddharth
Nagar, B.S.U. P. Building Near Bhim Shakti
Chowk, Prabodhankar Thackeray Marg,
Kopri Colony, Thane (East) 400 603.
2. Kailas Mohan Gurav,
aged 33 years, 301, A - Wing, Sitabai Niwas,
Near Vittha Mandir, Sabe Road, Diva (East),
District Thane 400 612.
3. Ashvdeep Hari Bhalerao,
aged 35 years, Room No.03, B-Cabin Road,
Near Railway Quarters, Shivaji Nagar,
Gautam Wadi, Naupada, Thane 400 602.
4. Ganesh Dashrath Dohale,
aged 33 years, At Khuntal (Bungalow), Post
Saralgaon, Taluka Murbad,
District Thane 421 401.
5. Naresh Padmakar Rasal,
aged 33 years, at Khandape, Post Kolthan,
Taluka Murbad, District Thane 421 401.
6. Sopan Rajaram Chaudhari,
aged 39 years, At, Kokadpada, Post Vehale,
Taluka Kalyan, District Thane 421 601.
7. Maheshwar Dinkar Kocharekar,
aged 45 years, Shree Krushna Society, Room
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No.10, Babusaheb Juvekar Marg,
Bhandup ( East), Mumbai 400 042.
8. Nitin Vilas Waidhande, ,
aged 36 years, Room No.952, Navjeevan
Mitral Mandal, Anand Nagar,
Near Shivsena Shakha, Kopri Colony,
Thane 400 603.
9. Vinod Subhash Kurade,
aged 33 years, 408, Krishna Pride,
Behind Union Bank, Manpada Road,
Dombivli (East), District Thane 421 201.
10. Sanket Mahendra Gade,
aged 33 years, Shanti Nagar Vasahat,
Near 12 Bungalow, Kopri Colony,
Thane (East) 400 603.
11. Vaibhav Manohar Gurav,
aged 35 years, Room No.26, New Siddharth
Nagar, Railway Chawl, Near Shankar Mandir,
Kopri Colony, Thane (East) 400 603.
12. Sunil Shankar Ghanekar,
aged 41 years, Tambe Chawl, Gokuldas Wadi,
Khopat, Thane (West) 400 601.
13. Uppal Gurulal, VP-IR,
Admin - CSR, M/s. Sulzer Ppumps India Pvt.
Ltd., 9-MIDC, Thane Belapur Road,
Dighe, Navi Mumbai - 400 708.
14. Amit kumar Sirohi, AGM-HR IR,
M/s Sulzer Ppumps India Pvt.
Ltd., 9-MIDC, Thane Belapur Road,
Dighe, Navi Mumbai - 400 708. ... Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.12908 OF 2025
1. Sumeet Rajaram Kadam,
aged 37 years, A1, 809, Siddharth
Nagar, B.S.U. P. Building Near Bhim Shakti
Chowk, Prabodhankar Thackeray Marg,
Kopri Colony, Thane (East) 400 603.
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2 Kailas Mohan Gurav,
aged 33 years, 301, A - Wing, Sitabai Niwas,
Near Vittha Mandir, Sabe Road, Diva (East),
District Thane 400 612.
3. Ashvdeep Hari Bhalerao,
aged 35 years, Room No.03, B-Cabin Road,
Near Railway Quarters, Shivaji Nagar,
Gautam Wadi, Naupada, Thane 400 602.
4. Ganesh Dashrath Dohale,
aged 33 years, At Khuntal (Bungalow), Post
Saralgaon, Taluka Murbad,
District Thane 421 401.
5. Naresh Padmakar Rasal,
aged 33 years, at Khandape, Post Kolthan,
Taluka Murbad, District Thane 421 401.
6. Sopan Rajaram Chaudhari,
aged 39 years, At, Kokadpada, Post Vehale,
Taluka Kalyan, District Thane 421 601.
7. Maheshwar Dinkar Kocharekar,
aged 45 years, Shree Krushna Society, Room
No.10, Babusaheb Juvekar Marg,
Bhandup ( East), Mumbai 400 042.
8. Nitin Vilas Waidhande, ,
aged 36 years, Room No.952, Navjeevan
Mitral Mandal, Anand Nagar,
Near Shivsena Shakha, Kopri Colony,
Thane 400 603.
9. Vinod Subhash Kurade,
aged 33 years, 408, Krishna Pride,
Behind Union Bank, Manpada Road,
Dombivli (East), District Thane 421 201.
10. Sanket Mahendra Gade,
aged 33 years, Shanti Nagar Vasahat,
Near 12 Bungalow, Kopri Colony,
Thane (East) 400 603.
11. Vaibhav Manohar Gurav,
aged 35 years, Room No.26, New Siddharth
Nagar, Railway Chawl, Near Shankar Mandir,
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Kopri Colony, Thane (East) 400 603.
12. Sunil Shankar Ghanekar,
aged 41 years, Tambe Chawl, Gokuldas Wadi,
Khopat, Thane (West) 400 601. ... Petitioners
Vs.
1. Sulzer Pumps India Private Limited,
a Company incorporated under the
Companies Act, 1956 having its registered
office at 9, MIDC, Thane - Belapur Road,
Digha, Navi Mumbai 400708.
2. Uppal Gurulal, VP-IR,
Admin - CSR, M/s. Sulzer Ppumps India Pvt.
Ltd., 9-MIDC, Thane Belapur Road,
Dighe, Navi Mumbai - 400 708.
3. Amit kumar Sirohi, AGM-HR IR,
M/s Sulzer Ppumps India Pvt.
Ltd., 9-MIDC, Thane Belapur Road,
Dighe, Navi Mumbai - 400 708. ... Respondents
Mr. Shreeyash U. Lalit with Ms. Shweta R. Rathod i/b
Elixir Legal Services, for the Petitioner in
WP/12201/2025 & for the respondents in
WP/12908/2025.
Ms. Jane Cox with Mr. Vinayak Suthar i/by Mr.
Ghanshyam Thombare for the respondents in
WP/12201/2025 & for the petitioner in
WP/12908/2025.
CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
RESERVED ON : MARCH 13, 2026
RESERVED ON : MARCH 26, 2026
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JUDGMENT:
1. The present Writ Petitions arise from a common set of facts
and involve substantially similar questions of law and appreciation
of evidence. Having regard to the identity of issues, it is considered
appropriate to dispose of all the petitions by this common
judgment. For the sake of convenience and clarity, the facts in Writ
Petition No. 12201 of 2025 are taken as the lead matter.
2. These petitions are filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, challenging the judgment and order dated
20 June 2025, hereinafter referred to as the Impugned Order,
passed by the Learned Member of the Industrial Court at Thane in
Complaint (ULP) No. 109 of 2022. By the Impugned Order, the
Learned Industrial Court has recorded a finding that the Petitioner
Company has indulged in unfair labour practices within the
meaning of Items 5, 6 and 9 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra
Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour
Practices Act, 1971. The Industrial Court has further directed the
Petitioner Company to grant permanency to Respondent Nos. 7 to
12, who are the original Complainant Nos. 7 to 12, with effect
from 6 May 2022, being the date of institution of the complaint. In
addition, the Petitioner Company has been directed to pay the
differential wages and allowances at par with permanent
employees in the corresponding category, within a period of ninety
days from the date of receipt of the said order.
3. The factual background giving rise to the present petitions,
in brief, is that the Petitioner Company contends that the
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Respondents were engaged purely as casual workers, namely as
casual helpers or labourers, on a need-based basis. According to
the Petitioner, the nature of work assigned to them was inherently
casual and intermittent, and was dependent upon the operational
requirements of the Company. It is asserted that such engagement
was neither continuous nor permanent, but was strictly contingent
upon the availability of work from time to time. It is the specific
case of the Petitioner that the Respondents were, at all material
times, fully aware of the purely casual nature of their engagement.
The Respondents were engaged on a rotational and need-based
basis, and such engagement did not confer upon them any right to
continuity of service or regular employment. The Petitioner asserts
that the Respondents accepted these conditions without any demur
and continued to render services with full knowledge of the terms
governing their engagement. In support of the aforesaid
contention, reliance is placed on the definition of "Casual
Workman" as contained in Rule 3(2)(e) of the Model Standing
Orders set out in Schedule I of the Bombay Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders) Rules, 1959, which are applicable to workmen
engaged in manual or technical work. The said provision defines a
"Casual Workman" as one who is employed for work which is not
incidental to or connected with the main manufacturing activity of
the establishment and which is essentially of a casual nature. The
Petitioner has further submitted that during the year 2020, on
account of the nationwide lockdown imposed in view of the
COVID-19 pandemic, the Company was compelled to scale down
several non-essential operations, including activities involving
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casual and non-core work. As a result, the engagement of casual
workers, including the Respondents, was substantially reduced and
adversely affected. It is further submitted that at no stage during
the period of their engagement did the Respondents raise any
grievance or dispute regarding their status as casual workers. Their
continued acceptance of work on a need-based and rotational basis
is indicative of their acquiescence to the terms of engagement.
According to the Petitioner, the Complaint instituted in the year
2022 is an afterthought, motivated by a desire to seek
regularisation and attendant benefits which are inconsistent with
the original terms of engagement. The Respondents, who were the
original Complainants, instituted Complaint (ULP) No. 109 of
2022 before the Learned Industrial Court at Thane under Section
28 read with Items 5, 6 and 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and
PULP Act. By the said complaint, they, inter alia, sought directions
against the Petitioner Company to grant permanency to 73
workmen named in Annexure 'A', upon completion of 240 days of
service, together with consequential benefits.
4. Mr. Lalit, learned Advocate appearing for the Petitioner
Company, who was the original Respondent in the proceedings
before the Industrial Court, filed a Written Statement opposing the
Complaint. In the said Written Statement, various preliminary
objections were raised and the claims were contested on merits.
Being aggrieved by the Impugned Order passed by the Learned
Industrial Court, the Petitioner Company has instituted the present
Writ Petitions. The learned Advocate for the Petitioner submits
that, insofar as the question of maintainability of the Complaint in
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respect of Complainant Nos. 1 to 6 is concerned, the Learned
Industrial Court has itself recorded a finding that their principal
grievance relates to termination of services. However, despite
arriving at such a conclusion, the Learned Industrial Court has
proceeded to grant relief by directing that Complainant Nos. 1 to 6
be placed on a waiting list for future engagement as badli or
temporary workmen. It is submitted that such a direction is legally
untenable. It is further contended that the Respondents have
attempted to contend that Complainant Nos. 1 to 6 stand on the
same footing as Complainant Nos. 7 to 12 and are therefore
entitled to similar benefits of permanency. According to the
Petitioner, such a contention is not borne out from the record and
is contrary to the factual position.
5. The learned Advocate submits, in the first instance, that a
combined reading of Section 5(d) and Section 7 of the MRTU and
PULP Act makes it clear that the Learned Industrial Court does not
have jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes relating to discharge or
dismissal of employees. In the present case, it is an admitted
position that Complainant Nos. 1 to 6 were terminated prior to the
filing of the Complaint. Any grievance pertaining to such
termination would fall within the ambit of Item 1 of Schedule IV
and would, therefore, lie exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
Labour Court under Section 7 of the said Act. It is further
submitted that even at the stage of consideration of interim relief,
the consistent stand of the Complainants was that Complainant
Nos. 1 to 6 had already been terminated. The order refusing
interim relief was not challenged by the Complainants before this
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Court or before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is further submitted
that once it is established that the Learned Industrial Court lacked
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the issue of termination, it could
not have granted any ancillary or consequential relief in favour of
Complainant Nos. 1 to 6, including a direction to place them on a
waiting list. It is a settled principle that where the adjudicating
forum lacks jurisdiction over the principal issue, it cannot grant
incidental or consequential reliefs arising therefrom. In support of
this submission, reliance is placed on the decision in Nikhila
Divyang Mehta & Ors. vs. Hitesh Sangavi & Ors. , reported in 2025
INSC 485.
6. It is further submitted that, without first adjudicating the
foundational issue as to whether Complainant Nos. 1 to 6
continued to be in employment of the Petitioner Company, the
Learned Industrial Court has erroneously proceeded to treat them
as badli or temporary workmen and has directed that they be
placed on a waiting list. Such an approach, according to the
Petitioner, is fundamentally erroneous and amounts to granting
relief in the absence of determination of essential facts. Once it is
held that the issue of termination could not be adjudicated by the
Industrial Court, there was no legal basis to treat the said
Complainants as continuing in service.
7. The learned Advocate further submits that the failure of the
Learned Industrial Court to determine the nature of work
performed by Complainant Nos. 7 to 12 vitiates the impugned
judgment. It is contended that while granting the relief of
permanency, the Industrial Court has not recorded any finding as
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to whether the work performed by the said Complainants was of a
permanent and perennial nature or merely casual. Reference is
made to Rule 3(2)(e) of the Model Standing Orders, which defines
a "casual workman" as one engaged in work not connected with
the main manufacturing process and which is essentially casual in
nature. Similarly, Rule 3(2)(c) defines a "badli workman" as one
appointed in the place of a temporarily absent permanent
workman. Further, Rule 4-C provides that permanency can be
conferred only upon badli or temporary workmen. It is therefore
submitted that it was incumbent upon the Industrial Court to
determine the correct classification of the workmen before
granting permanency, which exercise has not been undertaken.
8. It is further submitted that the impugned judgment suffers
from a complete absence of discussion and analysis of the evidence
on record. In particular, the testimony of CW-2, Sumeet Kadam,
who has admitted that work was assigned on a weekly basis and
varied across departments depending upon operational
requirements, has not been considered. Likewise, the evidence of
CW-3, Niranjan Mhatre, has also not been adverted to. The failure
to consider material evidence and to record reasons in respect
thereof renders the impugned judgment unsustainable in law.
Reliance is placed on the decision in CCT v. Shukla & Bros.,
reported in (2010) 4 SCC 785.
9. It is further submitted that while exercising supervisory
jurisdiction, this Court cannot supplement or substitute the
reasoning of the court below. The impugned order must be tested
on the basis of the reasons recorded therein. In the absence of
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cogent, independent, and sustainable reasoning, the impugned
order is liable to be set aside. Reliance is placed on the decision in
Jai Singh & Ors. vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi , reported in
2010 INSC 642. On these grounds, it is prayed that the impugned
judgment be quashed and set aside, or in the alternative, that the
matter be remanded for fresh adjudication in accordance with law.
10. Per contra, Ms. Jane Cox, learned Advocate appearing on
behalf of the Respondents, has submitted that the Complaint is
clearly maintainable under Section 21(1) of the MRTU and PULP
Act. It is contended that the said provision restricts individual
workmen from prosecuting proceedings only in a situation where
there exists a "recognised union" within the meaning of Section
3(13) of the Act. In the present case, it is submitted that no union
operating in the establishment has been granted recognition under
Chapter III of the Act. In the absence of a recognised union, the
embargo contemplated under Section 21(1) does not come into
operation, and therefore, the Complaint at the instance of
individual workmen is maintainable in law.
11. It is further submitted that the Petitioner Company has not,
in its pleadings before the Industrial Court, raised any contention
regarding the applicability of the Maharashtra Industrial Relations
Act, 1946. Any such plea sought to be raised at this stage is beyond
the scope of the present proceedings and cannot be entertained. In
any event, it is submitted that no material or evidence has been
placed on record to demonstrate that the industry in question is a
notified industry under the provisions of the said Act. On the
contrary, it is pointed out that the settlements entered into by the
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Company have been under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
which indicates that the said enactment governs the field.
12. It is submitted that all the concerned workmen were
subjected to a uniform and continuing course of unfair labour
practice, inasmuch as they were engaged as casual workmen over
extended periods of time and were subjected to artificial breaks
and rotational employment, with the object of depriving them of
the benefits of permanency. On this basis, it is contended that the
Industrial Court has correctly recorded a finding that there exists a
common cause of action in favour of all the Complainants.
13. On merits, it is submitted that the mere nomenclature or
designation of the workmen as "casual" is not conclusive of the
true nature of their employment. The Industrial Court is required
to examine the actual nature of duties performed and the
surrounding circumstances. It is pointed out that the workmen
have specifically pleaded that they were engaged in work of a
permanent and perennial nature, which was directly connected
with the manufacturing activities of the establishment.
14. It is further submitted that the workmen have adduced
substantial oral as well as documentary evidence in support of
their case. Such evidence includes Provident Fund records and
bank statements covering the period from 2009 to 2022, which,
according to the Respondents, clearly establish that the workmen
rendered continuous service over several years. It is contended
that the said evidence has been duly proved in accordance with
law and demonstrates that the workmen were engaged in regular
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and uninterrupted work.
15. It is submitted that the Petitioner Company has failed to
rebut the documentary evidence produced by the workmen and
has not placed any material on record to substantiate its
contention that the work was of a purely casual nature. It is
further submitted that the failure on the part of the Company to
issue appointment letters or to maintain proper employment
records lends support to the case of the workmen. The practice of
giving artificial breaks is, according to the Respondents, a
recognised form of unfair labour practice falling under Item 6 of
Schedule IV. Such artificial breaks cannot be equated with lawful
termination of service. It is further contended that the jurisdiction
of the Industrial Court under Item 6 is wide enough to include the
grant of affirmative relief, including directions for continuation in
employment. It is further submitted that Section 30 of the MRTU
and PULP Act confers wide and plenary powers upon the Industrial
Court to grant appropriate reliefs with a view to effectively prevent
and remedy unfair labour practices. It is contended that the
impugned order is erroneous to the extent that it draws a
distinction between two sets of workmen who, according to the
Respondents, are similarly situated in all material respects. The
denial of permanency benefits to Complainant Nos. 1 to 6, solely
on account of artificial breaks, is alleged to be arbitrary and
discriminatory.
16. It is submitted that relegating the workmen to separate
proceedings before the Labour Court would defeat the object and
purpose of the MRTU and PULP Act and would lead to multiplicity
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of proceedings. On these grounds, it is prayed that the Writ
Petition filed by the Petitioner Company be dismissed, and the Writ
Petition preferred by the workmen be allowed, with appropriate
modification of the impugned order.
REASONS AND ANALYSIS:
17. I have heard the learned Advocates for both sides and I have
gone through the record with care. The matter raises both
questions of maintainability and questions on merits. The
pleadings show that the dispute is not a simple one. It concerns a
large number of workmen, the nature of their engagement, the
effect of alleged artificial breaks, and the power of the Industrial
Court to grant relief.
18. The first issue which needs careful consideration is about
maintainability of the Complaint under Section 21(1) of the MRTU
and PULP Act. The Respondents have taken a clear stand that the
bar created by this provision will apply only when there exists a
recognised union in the establishment. They say that in the present
case there is no such recognised union, and therefore individual
workmen are entitled to file and prosecute the Complaint. On a
plain reading of the provision, this submission appears to be
correct. The scheme of Section 21(1) shows that it is not a
complete bar against individual workmen. It is a conditional
restriction. The condition is the presence of a recognised union
under the Act. If such a union exists, then the law prefers that the
union should represent the workmen. But if no union is recognised
under Chapter III, then the workmen cannot be left without
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remedy. In such a situation, the law permits them to approach the
Court individually.
19. In the present case, the Petitioner has not been able to point
out any material to show that a recognised union exists in the
establishment. There is no document, no recognition order, and no
other record placed before the Court to support such a claim. In
absence of this basic requirement, the bar under Section 21(1)
cannot be invoked. If the Court were to accept the objection of the
Petitioner without such proof, it would mean denying access to
justice to the workmen without any legal basis. That cannot be
permitted. Therefore, the Complaint filed by the workmen cannot
be said to be not maintainable on this ground.
20. The next contention raised by the Petitioner is regarding the
applicability of the Maharashtra Industrial Relations Act, 1946.
This argument, when examined closely, does not help the
Petitioner. It is correct that if a particular statute governs an
industry, then the jurisdiction of Courts and the remedies available
to parties may change according to that statute. However, such a
plea cannot be raised in a vague manner or at a late stage. It must
be specifically pleaded before the Court of first instance and must
be supported by proper material. In the present case, no such clear
plea was taken before the Industrial Court. There is no foundation
laid in the pleadings. Apart from this, there is also no material
placed on record to show that the industry of the Petitioner is a
notified industry under the Maharashtra Industrial Relations Act.
This aspect is important, because the applicability of that Act
depends on such notification. In absence of such proof, the Court
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cannot proceed on assumption. On the other hand, the
Respondents have pointed out that the settlements entered into by
the Company were under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. This
conduct of the Petitioner Company shows how the Company itself
understood the legal position while dealing with its workmen. If
the Company was acting under the Industrial Disputes Act, it
cannot later turn around and say that another statute applies,
without any supporting material. Therefore, the attempt to rely
upon the Maharashtra Industrial Relations Act at this stage appears
to be an afterthought and does not affect the present proceedings.
21. The next issue is whether there exists a common cause of
action among the workmen. On this point, the Respondents have
made a detailed submission. According to them, all the workmen
were engaged as workers for long durations. They say that instead
of giving them continuous service, the employer introduced
artificial breaks and rotated them in different capacities, only to
avoid granting permanency benefits. If such a pattern is
established, then the grievance is not personal to one or two
workmen. It becomes a collective issue affecting all similarly
placed workers. When this submission is seen along with the
material placed on record, it appears that the Industrial Court was
justified in treating the matter as one involving a common cause of
action. The allegations are not different in nature. The method
adopted by the employer, as alleged, is also common. The effect of
such conduct is also similar for all the workmen. In such
circumstances, it would not be proper to split the matter into
individual disputes at the threshold stage. The law permits
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grouping of such claims when the foundation is the same.
Therefore, for the purpose of maintainability and for granting
appropriate relief, the approach of the Industrial Court in treating
the Complaint as involving a common cause of action does not call
for interference.
22. I now come to the real dispute on merits. The Petitioner has
taken a clear stand that all the concerned workmen were only
casual workers. But this submission, by itself, cannot be accepted
only because such a label is used. In labour matters, the Court
cannot decide the issue only on the basis of how the employer
describes the workman. The Court must see what kind of work
was actually done, how the engagement continued, for how many
years it lasted, and under what conditions the work was taken.
Many times, a worker may be called "casual" on paper, but in
reality he may be working daily, regularly, and on work which is
part of the main activity. Therefore, the label is not final. The
Court must find out the real position behind that label.
23. In the present case, the Respondents have clearly stated that
they were working in connection with the manufacturing process
and that their work was of a permanent and perennial nature. This
is supported it by producing Provident Fund records and bank
statements covering a long period from 2009 to 2022. These
documents show that payments were made over several years. This
indicates continuity. It does not appear to be a case of occasional
engagement. When such long records are placed, they cannot be
ignored as isolated documents. On the other side, the Company
has not produced strong material to contradict this position. If the
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employer says the work was casual, then it must explain how the
workmen continued for so many years and received regular
payments. In absence of such explanation, the version of the
workmen becomes more probable.
24. The Petitioner has argued that no appointment letters were
issued because the work was casual. This argument does not fully
support the Petitioner. In fact, it creates difficulty for it. When no
appointment letters are issued, the workmen are left without
formal documents and they are required to prove their case
through other records. That is what has happened here. The
workmen have relied on PF records and bank entries. If the
employer has not maintained proper records or has not issued
letters, it cannot later take advantage of that lapse. The burden
cannot be shifted in this manner. Rather, the absence of proper
records raises doubt about the employer's version. It gives an
impression that the true nature of employment was not properly
disclosed.
25. The evidence of CW-2, Sumeet Kadam, is also important in
this context. He has admitted that work was given on a weekly
basis and that the work used to change depending upon
requirement of different departments. This shows that though the
work may not have been fixed in one department, the engagement
itself was continuing. The workmen were being called again and
again. This indicates continuity in a practical sense. It also shows
that the control of work remained with the employer and
depended on its needs. Such a pattern is not consistent with a
purely casual or one-time engagement. The evidence of CW-3,
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Niranjan Mhatre, also supports the case regarding the pattern of
employment. When such evidence is placed and there is no strong
rebuttal, the Court has to look at the overall picture. On such
consideration, the Industrial Court was justified in concluding that
the engagement was not merely casual in the ordinary sense.
26. The Petitioner has relied upon the definitions contained in
the Model Standing Orders. It is true that the law distinguishes
between casual, temporary, and badli workmen. These distinctions
are important. However, they cannot be applied in a mechanical
way. The Court must first decide, on facts, in which category the
workmen actually fall. Merely calling a worker casual does not
make him a casual workman in law. Similarly, a person working for
many years cannot automatically be treated as casual. The
classification must come from evidence. If the work is connected
with the main activity and is of a continuous nature, then the case
may go beyond casual employment. If the worker is filling in for a
temporary absence, then he may be a badli. Each category has its
own consequences. The Industrial Court was required to see these
aspects, and on the material available, it has come to a conclusion
that the workmen were denied proper status by use of a particular
method. That conclusion cannot be said to be without basis.
27. Much importance has been given by the Respondents to the
issue of artificial breaks. This aspect cannot be ignored. In labour
matters, it is known that sometimes breaks are shown in records,
but in reality the worker continues to work in the same
establishment. Such breaks are not genuine. They are created to
show that there is no continuous service. If such a practice is
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proved, it falls within unfair labour practice. The employer cannot
say that the worker was not in continuous service and at the same
time continue to engage him again and again after short gaps. The
Court must see the substance and not the form. If the service was
kept going through repeated breaks only to deny benefits of
permanency, then it becomes a case where the law must intervene.
The Industrial Court has treated this conduct as falling within the
provisions relating to unfair labour practice, and that approach
appears to be justified.
28. The Petitioner has argued that before granting permanency,
the Industrial Court should have first clearly classified the
workmen. This submission is correct in principle. However, its
application depends on the facts of the case. Here, the Court had
before it evidence showing long years of service, regular nature of
work, and use of artificial breaks. The case was not about one or
two individuals. It was about a group of workmen whose situation
was similar. Once the Court reached a conclusion that the
employer had adopted a method to deny them permanency despite
continuous work, it was open to the Court to grant appropriate
relief. The purpose of the law is to prevent such practices. If the
wrong is established, the relief must address that wrong in a real
way.
29. Section 30 of the MRTU and PULP Act gives wide powers to
the Industrial Court. These powers are meant to ensure that unfair
labour practices are effectively remedied. If the Court finds that
the employer has kept workers as casual only to avoid giving them
permanent status, then directing permanency is a form of
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correcting that wrong. The submission of the Respondents that
they should not be pushed into another round of litigation also has
substance. When the facts are already examined and the unfair
practice is found, it would not be proper to ask them to start again
in another forum.
30. The Petitioner's main strength in argument is in relation to
Complainant Nos. 1 to 6. From the record, it appears that even the
Learned Industrial Court has accepted that their real grievance was
about termination of their services. Once such a position is
accepted, it is no longer a complaint about conditions of service. It
enters into the area of discharge or dismissal. That area is
governed by a specific scheme under the law. Different forums are
given power to deal with different types of disputes. Therefore,
once it is seen that the dispute is essentially about termination, the
Court must first see whether it has the power to decide that issue.
If the law says that a particular kind of dispute must be decided by
a particular forum, then another forum cannot take up that issue
by giving it a different name. Calling it an incidental matter does
not change its real nature. The Industrial Court cannot indirectly
decide a termination dispute when it does not have direct
jurisdiction over it. Jurisdiction is fixed by law. It cannot be
expanded by adopting a different description of the dispute.
Therefore, once it is accepted that the main issue for Complainant
Nos. 1 to 6 was termination, the Industrial Court ought to have
stopped at that point and examined whether it had the authority to
proceed further.
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31. In this background, the direction given by the Industrial
Court to place Complainant Nos. 1 to 6 on a waiting list for future
engagement as badli or temporary workmen becomes difficult to
support. This direction appears to flow from the assumption that
they could still be treated as part of the workforce. But if their
services had already come to an end, and if the Court could not go
into the question of termination, then it could not have granted
such a further direction. The power to give additional or
consequential relief comes only when the main issue is properly
before the Court. If the main issue itself is outside jurisdiction,
then no further direction can be built upon it. Therefore, on this
aspect, the submission of the Petitioner requires acceptance.
32. At the same time, the argument of the Respondents that
Complainant Nos. 1 to 6 should be treated at par with
Complainant Nos. 7 to 12 cannot be accepted in a general manner.
It may be that their work pattern was similar at some earlier point
of time. It may also be that they were engaged in the same way.
But legal position does not depend only on similarity of facts. It
also depends on the nature of the dispute brought before the
Court. If one set of workmen is still in service and complains about
denial of permanency, and another set has already been removed
and complains about termination, then both stand on different
legal footing.
33. It was also argued that the entire complaint should be sent
to the Labour Court. The complaint does not deal only with
termination. It also raises a larger issue of unfair labour practice,
including long years of engagement, artificial breaks, and denial of
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permanency. So far as Complainant Nos. 7 to 12 are concerned,
their grievance clearly falls within the scope of the Industrial
Court. They are asserting that they were kept as casual workers
despite doing regular work. That issue squarely falls within the
provisions dealing with unfair labour practices. Therefore, there is
no reason to disturb the findings recorded in their favour,
especially when the evidence placed by them has not been
effectively countered by the Petitioner. The failure of the Petitioner
to bring strong rebuttal evidence assumes importance here. When
one side produces documents and oral evidence showing long and
continuous engagement, the other side must meet that case with
proper material. A mere denial is not sufficient. In absence of
convincing rebuttal, the findings of the Industrial Court in respect
of Complainant Nos. 7 to 12 do not suffer from any serious error.
Therefore, while interference is required in respect of Complainant
Nos. 1 to 6 on the ground of jurisdiction, the same is not
warranted for the remaining workmen.
34. Taking an overall view of the matter, it appears that the
impugned order deserves to be partly upheld and partly interfered
with. The finding recorded by the Industrial Court regarding unfair
labour practice, as well as the direction granting permanency to
Complainant Nos. 7 to 12, are supported by the evidence on record
and are in accordance with the scheme of the Act. However, the
direction in respect of Complainant Nos. 1 to 6, whereby they have
been placed on a waiting list for future engagement, cannot be
sustained. To that extent, the order cannot be allowed to stand.
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35. In view of the foregoing discussion and reasons recorded
hereinabove, the following order is passed:
(i) The Writ Petitions are partly allowed;
(ii) The impugned judgment and order dated 20 June 2025
passed by the Learned Member, Industrial Court at Thane in
Complaint (ULP) No. 109 of 2022 is set aside to the limited
extent it directs placement of Complainant Nos. 1 to 6 on a
waiting list for future engagement as badli or temporary
workmen;
(iii) The relief granted in favour of Complainant Nos. 1 to 6
stands quashed and set aside;
(iv) The impugned judgment and order is otherwise
upheld. The finding of unfair labour practice against the
Petitioner Company and the direction granting permanency
to Complainant Nos. 7 to 12, along with consequential
monetary and service benefits, are confirmed;
(v) The Petitioner Company shall comply with the
directions in respect of Complainant Nos. 7 to 12, as upheld
herein, within a period of ninety days from the date of this
order;
(vi) Rule is made partly absolute in the above terms. No
order as to costs.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
