[Cites 22, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Bhagwan Ragho Vinchurkar Deceased Thr. ... vs Dr. Sharadchandra Gopalrao Wadalkar ... on 16 March, 2026
2026:BHC-AUG:11210
1 cra 58.09
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 58 OF 2009
Dr. Sharadchandra Gopalrao Wadalkar
Since deceased through his L.Rs.
Purshottam Sharadchandra Wadalkar
Age : Major, Occu. : Medical Practitioner,
R/o Venu Gopal Niwas, Ganpati Mandir
Road, Nandurbar. .. Applicant
Versus
Shri Bhagwan Ragho Vinchurkar
Since deceased through his L.Rs.
1A Sanjay Bhagwan Sonar
Age : 42 Years, Occu. :
R/o Girivihar Bunglow No. 12,
Nandurbar.
1B Hitesh Bhagwan Sonar,
Age : 40 Years, Occu. :
R/o Girivihar Bunglow No. 12,
Nandurbar.
1C Jayashri Suryakant Dahale,
Age : 38 Years, Occu. : Household,
R/o C/o Saurav Alankar,
Hasanpura, Ahmednagar.
1D Anita Cintamani,
Age : 36 Years, Occu.
R/o Jamkhed, Dist. Nagar.
2 cra 58.09
1E Sangita Shamseth Mayur,
Age : 34 Years, Occu. : Household,
R/o C/o Mayur Jwellers, Sangamner,
Dist. Nagar.
1F Jyoti Santosh Maid,
Age : 32 Years, Occu. : Household,
R/o C/o Dr. Maid Hospital,
Dist. Nagar.
1G Sapna Ganeshrao Kajle,
Age : 30 Years, Occu. : Household,
R/o C/o Shivajirao Kajle Jwellers,
Manchar, Dist. Pune.
1H Dipak Bhagwan Sonar,
Age : 28 Years, Occu. :
R/o Snehankarita Shopy, Alandi
Road, Bhosari, Dist. Pune.
1I Sumanbai W/o Bhagvan Sonar,
Age : 65 Years, Occu. : Household,
R/o Girivihar Bunglow No. 12,
Nandurbar. .. Respondents
Shri Subodh P. Shah, Advocate for the Applicant.
Shri G. R. Syed, Advocate for the Respondent Nos. 1-A, 1-C, 1-E,
1-G and 1-I.
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12854 OF 2023
IN
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 58 OF 2009
3 cra 58.09
Shri Bhagwan Ragho Vinchurkar
Since deceased through his L.Rs.
Sanjay Bhagwan Sonar and others .. Applicants
Versus
Dr. Sharadchandra Gopalrao Wadalkar
Since deceased through his L.Rs.
Purushottam Gopalrao Wadalkar
and others .. Respondents
Shri G. R. Syed, Advocate for the Applicants
Shri Subodh P. Shah, Advocate for the Respondents.
CORAM : SHAILESH P. BRAHME, J.
CLOSED FOR JUDGMENT ON : 06.03.2026
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON : 16.03.2026
JUDGMENT :
. Taken up for final disposal with the consent of the parties.
2. A landlord aspiring for possession of the suit premises has
approached this Court through present revision application being
non suited by both the Courts below. Regular Civil Suit No
179/1982 was dismissed on 24.08.1993. Regular Civil Appeal No.
66/1993 was dismissed on 12.06.2008.
3. The applicant is the owner of City Survey No. 3102
situated at Nandurbar. The shop premises admeasuring 154
square feet out of City Survey No. 3102 was let out to the
respondent who was running tailoring business since 1970. The
applicant was the medical practitioner and he wanted the suit
4 cra 58.09
premises for constructing maternity home. A notice was issued
on 27.09.1982 terminating the tenancy. The suit for eviction was
filed under Bombay Rent Act on the ground of bonafide
requirement. Lateron attempt was made to resort to other
grounds like non user, acquiring accommodation and alteration
without permission.
4. The respondent contested the suit raising various pleas. It
is contended that the requirement pressed into service was not
genuine. The applicant is alleged to have been in possession of
other premises at Nandurbar and he is stated to be affluent
having lucrative medical practice. It is further contended that
tenant had no other premises to run the tailoring business which
was the only source of income. He is stated to have suffered
greater hardship in case of passing of decree of eviction.
5. Both parties adduced oral evidence by examining
themselves and other witnesses. They placed on record
documentary evidence in support of their claims. The Trial
Court dismissed the suit. In appeal, three additional issues were
framed and for recording findings matter was relegated to the
Trial Court. The Trial Court returned findings in favour of the
respondent tenant on 28.08.2006. Appellant raised additional
grounds challenging those findings. The cross objection was
preferred by the respondent before the Appellate Court in respect
of the findings recorded for the issue of jurisdiction of the Civil
Court. Ultimately, appellate Court dismissed the appeal as well
as cross objection.
5 cra 58.09
6. At the outset it needs to be clarified that in the Courts
below parties have rival claims as to whether it was tenancy or
license. Additional issues of separate grounds of eviction were
framed by the appellate Court and the findings were recorded in
favour of the respondent. Learned counsel Mr. Subodh Shaha
has canvased the submissions only on the ground of bona fide
requirement and comparative hardship. Other grounds of
evictions and other submissions have not been pressed into
service.
7. During pendency of the revision application, applicant Dr.
Sharadchandra Wadalkar passed away on 15.07.2017. His son
Dr. Purushottam Sharadchandra Wadalkar is brought on record.
So is the case with respondent tenant. Civil Application No.
12854/2023 is preferred by respondent under Order XLI Rule 27
of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking permission to consider
additional evidence.
8. The applicant had preferred writ petition challenging
judgment passed by the appellate Court in Regular Civil Appeal
No. 66/1993. It was permitted to be converted into civil revision
application. By way of civil application, referred above City
Survey extracts of the subject matter and the adjoining premises
belonging to the applicant landlord and their photographs are
sought to be brought on record. The photographs are being filed
for the first time in the High Court and those are objected by the
applicant. It is not permissible to invoke powers under Order
XLI Rule 27 of C.P.C. because revision application cannot be said
6 cra 58.09
to be continuation of suit or appeal. The documents in question
could have been produced either in the Trial Court or Appellate
Court. I find no merit in the civil application and it is liable to be
rejected.
9. Learned counsel for the applicant Mr. Shah submits that
both Courts below committed manifest illegality in discarding
ground of bona fide requirement and comparative hardship. The
voluminous record is produced before the Court disclosing
genuine need for constructing maternity home. Both courts
below exceeded their jurisdiction in non suiting the applicant.
The need is doubted for perverse reasons. It is submitted that
even alternate premises was also offered to the respondent but it
was refused which reflects audacity of the tenant. It is
vehemently submitted that applicant's son was taking education
at the relevant time and later on he started his medical practice
and the need is subsisting. As against that the respondent has
acquired premises and no hardship would be caused to him.
10. Learned counsel Mr. G. R. Syed repeals the submissions on
the ground that only small portion of 154 square feet was let out
to his client out of 1800 square feet. The applicant is in
possession of alternate premises and has lucrative practice. The
requirement is absolutely concocted. It is submitted that
dishonest and false claim has been set up to evict the respondent.
It is submitted that due to death of landlord, requirement of the
premises is eclipsed. It is further submitted that both courts
below have dealt with all aspects of the matter and have arrived
7 cra 58.09
at plausible and reasonable conclusion. It is submitted that
reappreciation of evidence is not permissible and the findings of
the Courts below cannot be said to be perverse or illegal.
11. It is not disputed that the applicant had purchased four
units by sale-deed dated 14.03.1966 which is at Exh. 66. Those
units form a cluster as they are adjoining. Following are the
material particulars :
Sr. CTS No. Description of building Area
No.
1) 666 B/2, 667, A three storied house. 1127 sq.ft.
667/A and 668/A
2) 3005 A single storied building 450 sq.ft.
adjoining Sr.No. 1 to its north
Also accommodated a wooden
staircase to reach second floor of
the three stories house
3) 3018 Open space adjoining Sr.No. II to 112 sq.ft.
its West
4) 3102 Open plot adjoining Sr.No. 3 to Roughly
its North 154 sq.ft.
12. The applicant was medical practitioner. He needed shop
premises for construction of maternity home. To make out
ground of bona fide requirement besides oral evidence, following
three documents were filed on record:
(i) A map of proposed construction at Exh. 111.
(ii) Application dated 22.02.1974 at Exh. 68
submitted to Collector and,
(iii) Purchase receipt of cement bags at Exh. 69 and
8 cra 58.09
In those days permission was required to purchase cement and
accordingly application was made. The Trial Court castigated
doubts on the application Exh. 68 and the admissions of P.W. 2.
Application Exh. 68 is for corroboration. It shows the
preparedness to go for construction. Even cement was also
procured. There is no inconsistency in the cross-examination of
P.W. 2 and the contents of application Exh. 68. The inference
that construction was to be erected on CTS No. 666/B/2, 667/A,
668/A is patently illegal. The landlord is not expected to prove
the bona fide requirement beyond hilt.
13. The landlord was a medical practitioner. He was having
adjoining premises available for construction of maternity home,
which is comprising of open space and disputed property also.
He wanted to construct maternity home utilizing the open spaces
and the demised property. Under these circumstances his desire
to have maternity home cannot be said to be unreasonable or
fancy. After all he was the best judge to decide as to which was
the suitable area. The Trial Court exceeded his jurisdiction in
commenting upon the size of the shop or viability of construction.
14. I have gone through the findings recorded by the Appellate
Court on the point of bonafide requirement. It is already
recorded that Exhibit Nos. 68, 111, 69 and 70 are pressed into
service in support of the ground. Applicant was the owner of
various properties and he was having lucrative practice. His
ability to construct maternity home is not doubted by the Courts
below. The purport of application Exhibit 68 or Exhibit 111 was
9 cra 58.09
not to secure permission to construct at CTS No. 3102. The
authority concerned was not competent to grant any such
permission for procuring the cement. The bonafides of the
landlor cannot be doubted just because there is no mention of
demised premises in those documents. No Court or tenant
dictate a landlord to utilize his properties in a particular way
only. Appellate Court committed manifest error of jurisdiction in
holding that the requirement shown was tented with oblique
motive. The findings are unsustainable.
15. It is necessary to deal with comparative hardship. Both
courts below have carried away by fact that applicant is in
possession of various city survey numbers, purchased by him.
Just because applicant is the owner of the properties which are
adjoining to the suit premises would not obliterate the
requirement. In this regard it is necessary to consider the
conduct of the parties also. The respondent was offered alternate
premises by pursis at Exhibit 98. The alternate premises is
rejected by the respondent on the ground that its entrance was
East facing. He wanted it to be West or North facing. His choice
of the entrance has a little significance when he is at the
receiving end.
16. One fact is surfacing that the premises would have been
available for the respondent. His evidence and the pleadings are
silent on the fact as to whether any attempts were made by him
for searching the alternate premises for himself. This aspect
10 cra 58.09
carries significance in the wake of law laid down by this Court in
the matter of Suhasini Atmaram Parab and others Vs. B. H. Khatu reported
in 2003(1) Bom. C. R. 733. I hold that comparative hardship would
be caused to the applicant in refusing the decree of eviction.
17. Learned counsel Mr. Subodh Shah has relied upon the
judgment of the Coordinate Bench in the case of Goverdhandas
Mulchand Agrawal and others Vs. Bherulal Uderam Bagade and another
reported in 2005(3) Mh.L.J. 196 to buttress as to how should be the
approach of the Court while examining ground of bonafide
requirement. I have gone through para No. 27 of the judgment.
Further reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court
in the matter of Raghunath G. Panhale (Dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Chaganlal
Sundarji and Co. reported in (1999) 8 SCC 1. It is relevant to quote
following extracts.
"7. The above principles have been laid down in various decisions of
this Court and we shall refer to a few of them which are relevant to the
issue before us. It was stated in Bega Begum & Others v. Abdul Ahad
Khan & Others, [1979] 1 SCC 273 that the reasonable requirement
postulates an element of need" as opposed to a mere "desire or wish". It
was also pointed out that if it was indeed a case of a reasonable need, the
same could not be diluted by characterising it as only a mere desire. It was
stated:
"The distinction between desire and need should
doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even a
genuine need as nothing but a desire".
(emphasis supplied)
It was also held that the language of the provision cannot be unduly
stretched or strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the
landlord to get possession. If more limitations are imposed upon the
11 cra 58.09
landlord holding property, it would expose itself to the vice of
unconstitutionality. Yudhishtir v. Ashok Kumar, [1987] 1 SCC 204. The
construction of the relevant statutory provision must strike a just balance
between the right of the landlord and the right of the tenant. In Bega
Begum's case the landlords adduced evidence to show that they wanted to
augment their present income by starting hotel business. This was treated
as a genuine need and it was held that it could not be equated with a mere
desire. This Court observed that "the Act does not completely overlook
the interest of the landlord" In Mattulal v. Radhelal, [1974] 2 SCC 365, a
like principle was laid down stating that the test was not subjective but an
objective one and that the Court was to judge whether the need of the
landlord was reasonable and bona fide. This Court held that the Additional
District Judge in that case was wrong in thinking that the landlord who
wanted to start iron and steel business, had to produce proof of
preparations for starting his new business, such as making arrangements
for capital investment, approaching the Iron and Steel Controller for the
required permits etc. This court held that the above circumstances were
"wholly irrelevant" and observed :
"It is difficult to imagine how the respondent could be
expected to make preparations for starting the new
business unless there was reasonable prospect of his
being able to obtain possession of the Lohia Bazar Shop
in the near future".
8. This Court took judicial notice of long delays in Courts and
observed :
"It is common but unfortunate failing of our judicial
system that a litigation takes an inordinately long time
in reaching final conclusion and then also it is uncertain
as to how it will end and with what result" and that,
therefore, "it would be too much to expect from him
(landlord) that he should make preparations for starting
the new business. Indeed, from a commercial and
practical point of view, it would be foolish on his part to
make arrangements for investment of capital, obtaining
of permits and receipt of stocks of iron and steel
materials when he would not know whether he would at
all be able to gel possession of the Lohia Bazar Shop,
12 cra 58.09
and if so, when and after how many years".
9. Next comes the decision of this Court in A.K. Veeraraghava
Iyengar v. N.V. Prasad, AIR (1994) SC 2357. In that case, this Court
observed that the need was bonafide and that the tenant failed to
adduce any evidence against the "experience of landlord, his
financial capacity and his readiness and willingness to start
jewellery shop". In Vinay Kumar and Ors. v. District Judge,
Ghazipur and Ors., [1995] Suppl. 2 SCC 586, it was contended for
the tenant that the son of the landlord whose requirement was
pleaded, was in government service and, therefore, he could not
have any bona fide need to start private practice as a doctor. This
contention was rejected. In Rena Drego (Mrs.) v. Lalchand Soni and
Ors., [1998] 3 SCC 341 it was observed that in the light of the
factual position in that case, "where the (landlady) says that she
needs more accommodation for her family, there is no scope for
doubting the reasonableness of the requirement" It was held that the
circumstances of the case raised a presumption that the requirement
was bonafide and that "tenant has failed to show that the demand for
eviction was made within any oblique motive". It was held that in
the absence of such evidence by the tenant, the presumption of the
bona fide need stood unrebutted. In Sarla Ahuja v. United India
Insurance Co., [1998] 8 SCC 119 it was again observed that the
Court should not proceed on the assumption that the requirement of
the landlord was not bona fide and that the tenant could not dictate
to the landlord as to how he should adjust himself without getting
possession of the tenanted premises. It was stated in Prativa Devi
(Smt.) v. T.V. Krishnan, [1996] 5 SCC 353 and in Meenal Eknath
Kshirsagar v. Traders and Agencies & Another, [1996] 5 SCC 344,
that the landlord was the best judge of his requirement. In Smt.
Sheela Chadha and Ors. v. Dr. Accharaj Ram Sehgal, [1990] Suppl.
SCC 736, it was held that the landlord had the discretion to
determine his need. See also in this connection the judgment of this
Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, [1999] 6
SCC 222. In Raj Kumar Khaitan and Ors. v. Bibi Zubaida Khatun
and Anr., [1997] 11 SCC 411, this Court had even stated that it was
not necessary for the landlord to state in the pleadings, the nature of
the business he proposed to start."
13 cra 58.09
18. Further reliance is placed on the judgment of the
Coordinate Bench in the case of Shankar Bhairoba Vadangekar since
deceased through L.Rs. Dattatraya Shankar Vadangekar and others Vs. Ganpati
Appa Gatare since deceased through L.Rs. Smt. Sushilabai Ganpat Gatare and
others reported in 2001(4) Mh. L. J. 131. It is useful to refer to the
following observations.
"23. Now, I shall proceed to consider the issue of reasonable and bona
fide requirement asserted by the landlord in respect of the suit premises.
Both the Courts below, in my view, have applied wrong tests to nonsuit
the landlord. At the outset, I shall advert to the legal position with regard
to this ground. The Apex Court in the latest decision in the case of
Raghunath Panhale v. Chaganlal Sundarji (supra) has referred
to catena of decisions with regard to the said issue in paragraphs 6 to 9 of
the judgment and restated the legal position. It would be useful to refer to
the decision in Dattairaya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali
Kotkunde,. The Trial Court has relied on the decision of this Court in
Sukhadeo Krishnarao Ghatode v. Laxmibai Dattatraya Mohoril, On
analysing the aforesaid decisions, it is well settled thatwhere the landlord
seeks toevlct a tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement he has to
satisfy three tests (i) that he requires the suit premises reasonably and
bona fide, (ii) that such requirement is for his own occupation and (iii)
comparative hardship. It is well settled that the word "require" does not
mean mere wish or fancy of the landlord. The landlord must show some
need or necessity. However, it does not mean absolute need or absolute
requirement. It is also well settled that the landlord is the best judge of his
residential requirements, and he has complete freedom in that behalf. It is
no concern of the Courts to dictate to the landlord as to how, in what
manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard or
their own. There is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial
enjoyment of his property. Ordinarily speaking, the landlord, if he says he
wished to use premises of which he is the owner, he is entitled to do
so.What the Rent Act endeavours to provide for, is the case of a
landlord who evicts the existing tenants in order that he may let them to
another tenant at a rent, or exact a higher rent from the tenant on a threat
of eviction. The law as enunciated by the Apex Court see Kena Drego v.
Lalchand Soni, is that :
14 cra 58.09
"When the landlord says that he needs more accommodation for his
family, there is no scope for doubting the reasonableness of the
requirement. Further, the circumstances would raise a presumption that
the requirement is bona fide. It is for the tenant to show that the demand
for eviction was made with any oblique motive and in the absence of any
such evidence the presumption of bona fides stands unrebutted."
This principle has been reiterated by the Apex Court in the
decision referred to above in the case of Raghunath Panhale v. Chaganlal
Sundarji & Co.(supra). The Apex Court has reiterated the principle that
the Legislature employed two terms "reasonably" and "bona fide"
together, the requirement must be real and genuine from any reasonable
standard. All the same, the genuineness of the requirement is not to be on
par with the dire need of a landlord because the latter's need is much
greater. The Apex Court has further observed that there is no warrant for
presuming that the landlord's need is not bona fide. The statute enjoins
that the Court should be satisfied of the requirement of the landlord. So,
the Court would look into the broad aspects and if the Court feels any
doubt about the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord, it is for the
landlord to clear such doubts. The Apex Court has observed that it is open
to the Court to presume that the landlord's requirement is bona fide and
put the contesting tenant to the burden to show how the requirement is not
bona fide.
24. The principles deduced from the aforesaid decisions would clearly
justify the requirement of placing onus on the tenant to establish that the
requirement of the landlord is not bona fide, whereas the burden on the
landlord in this behalf is very light. This position is reinforced by the
mandate of Section 17 of the Bombay Rent Act which provides that where
a decree for eviction has been passed by the Court on the ground of
reasonable and bona fide requirement, and the premises are not occupied
or the work of erection is not commenced within a period of one month
from the date the landlord recovers possession or the premises are re-let
within one year of the said date to any person other than the original
tenant, the Court may, on the application of the original tenant made
within thirteen months of such date, order the landlord to place him in
occupation of the premises, on the original terms and conditions, and on
such order being made, the landlord and any person who may be in
15 cra 58.09
occupation of the premises shall give vacant possession to the original
tenant.
25. Understood thus, there is no scope for the Courts to doubt the
genuineness and reasonableness of the requirement of the landlord and it
can be presumed that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide, for the
scheme of the Rent Act would permit such an approach in that sense, it is
sufficient for the landlord to assert that the suit premises are reasonably
and bona fide required by him and the onus is on the tenant to show that
the suit premises are neither reasonably nor bona fide required by the
landlord.
19. The principles laid down in the judgments cited by the
applicant support the claim of bonafide requirement. Applicant
is entitled to decree on the said ground. Further reliance is
placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of
Kanshaiya Lal Arya Vs. Md. Ehshan and others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 432. It deals with the situation when landlord is having
possession of other premises, but he wants the suit premises for
particular purpose. Following are the relevant paragraphs.
"10. The law with regard to eviction of a tenant from the suit
premises on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord is well
settled. The need has to be a real one rather than a mere desire to
get the premises vacated. The landlord is the best judge to decide
which of his property should be vacated for satisfying his
particular need. The tenant has no role in dictating as to which
premises the landlord should get vacated for his need alleged in
the suit for eviction.
11. In the case at hand, the appellant-landlord may be having
some other properties under tenancy of various persons but once
he has decided to get the suit premises vacated for the bona fide
need of establishing an ultrasound machine for his two
unemployed sons, he cannot be forced to initiate such a
16 cra 58.09
proceeding against the other tenants. It is for the appellant-
landlord to take a decision in this regard and once he has decided
to get the suit premises vacated, no error or illegality could be
pointed out in his decision. Secondly, it has come on record by
clear finding of the court of first instance that the suit premises is
the most suitable accommodation for establishing an ultrasound
machine. The reason being that it is situated adjacent to a medical
clinic and a pathological centre and is the most appropriate place
for establishing any medical machine. Moreover, the appellant-
landlord has also proved his capacity to invest in
purchasing/establishing an ultrasound machine and that his two
sons are unemployed and as such the suit premises is required to
establish them in business and to augment the family's income.
Therefore, the bona fide need of the appellant-landlord stands
duly established.
12. Insofar as the issue that his two unemployed sons do not
have any expertise/training to run the ultrasound machine, the
argument is without any substance. It is common knowledge that
these days medical devices such as ultrasound machines are
installed and established and are ordinarily run by the technicians
or the medical experts who are engaged for the said purpose. The
person establishing such devices or ultrasound machines himself
need not have any expertise in running the same. Therefore, the
Appellate Court and the High Court were not justified in
disbelieving the bona fide need of the appellantlandlord solely on
the ground that his two sons do not possess any expertise for
running an ultrasound machine."
20. My attention is adverted to following observations of the
judgment of Shankar Bhairoba (supra) are relevant.
"31. The Courts below have also taken the view that, in law, it is
essential for the landlord to mention about the alleged requirement of the
suit premises and in absence thereof no decree could be passed on this
ground. Even this principle is no more res integra. The Apex Court, in Raj
Kumar Khaitan v. Bibi Zubaida Khatun, has taken the view that it is not
necessary for the landlord to indicate the precise nature of the business
which he intends to start in the premises and even if the nature of the
17 cra 58.09
business had been indicated by the landlord, nobody can bind the landlord
to start the same after the suit premises are vacated.
21. The above principle discloses that the landlord is entitled
to receive the possession if bonafide requirement is proved,
notwithstanding the fact that the purpose for which the
possession is solicited undergoes change or modification. The
heir of the deceased landlord would be entitled to have
possession and put the premises to use for any other commercial
purpose. Both Courts below have committed error of jurisdiction
in refusing decree on the ground of bonafide requirement and
comparative hardship.
22. Mr. G. R. Syed, learned advocate appearing for the
respondent has adverted my attention to various judgments to
buttress that subsequent event of death of the original landlord
needs to be considered in-justa position with the need of
construction of maternity home. I have gone through the
judgment of the Coordinate Bench in the case of Natwarlal
Dahyabhai Shah (Since deceased through L.Rs.) and another Vs. Smt. Jadaobai
W/o Mishrimal Lalwani (Since deceased through L.Rs.) and others reported in
2015(1) Mh. L. J. 365. Learned Single Judge interalia relied upon
the observations of the Apex Court in the matter of Sheshambal
(Dead) Through L.Rs. Vs. Chelur Corporation Chelur Building and others
reported in (2010) 3 SCC 470. In that case plaintiff and her
husband both died and there was no material on record to show
that the bonafide need subsisted. In that context it was decided
in favour of the tenant and concurrent finding of fact was
18 cra 58.09
quashed by High Court in allowing the writ petition. The facts
are distinguishable from the case in hand. This judgment will
not help the respondent.
23. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in the case
of Sulochana Divakar Parkar Vs. Shamrao Dinanath Bhatte and others reported
in 2025 AIR CC 806. In that case the requirement was for the
landlord and his son. But both died and, therefore, it was held
that the eviction decree was unsustainable. The facts of the
present case are different. Further reliance is also placed on the
judgment of this Court in the case of Yashodabai Gopalrao Khedkar
(Since deceased) through L.Rs. Rajendra Govindrao Hatwalne Vs. Godavaribai
Balkrishna @ Chatusheth Sinnarkar and others reported in 2019(5) All MR
750. The landlady died and need is said to be eclipsed. After her
death the need of requirement of daughter in law for conducting
business in the suit premises was pressed into service. The facts
are distinguishable and the ratio cannot be made applicable to
the present case.
24. The subsequent events can be taken into account and for
that purpose the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in
the matter of Sheshambal (Dead) Through L.Rs. Vs. Chelur Corporation
Chelur Building and others (supra) are relevant, which are as followed.
"13. Neither before the Rent Controller nor before the Appellate
Authority was it argued that the requirement in question was not
only the requirement of the petitioner owners of the premises but
also the requirement of any other member of their family whether
dependent upon them or otherwise. Not only that, even in the
19 cra 58.09
petition filed before this Court the requirement pleaded was that for
the deceased widowed owner of the demises premises and not of any
member of her family.
15. The position may indeed have been differentiated if in the
original petition the petitioner owners had pleaded their own
requirement and the requirement of any member of their family
dependent upon them. In such a case the demise of the original
petitioners or any one of them may have made little difference for
the person for whose benefit and bonafide requirement the eviction
was sought could pursue the case to prove and satisfy such
requirement.
17. While it is true that the right to relief must be judged by a
reference to the date suit or the legal proceedings were instituted, it
is equally true that if subsequent to the filing of the suit, certain
developments take place that have a bearing on the right to relief
claimed by a party, such subsequent events cannot be shut out from
consideration. What the court in such a situation is expected to do is
to examine the impact of the said subsequent development on the
right to relief claimed by a party and, if necessary, mould the relief
suitably so that the same is tailored to the institution that obtains on
the date the relief is actually granted."
25. A useful reference can be made to the observations of the
Supreme Court in the matter of Gaya Prasad Vs. Pradeep Shrivastava
reported in (2001) 2 SCC 604, which is as follows :
"13. In our opinion, the subsequent events to overshadow the
genuineness of the need must be of such nature and of such a
dimension that the need propounded by the petitioning party should
have been completely eclipsed by such subsequent events. A three-
Judge Bench of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu vs. Motor
and General Traders [1975 (1) SCC 770] which pointed to the need
for re-moulding the reliefs on the strength of subsequent events
affecting the cause of action in the field of rent control litigation,
forewarned that cognizance of such subsequent events should be
taken very cautiously. This is what learned Judges of the Bench said
20 cra 58.09
then:
"We affirm the proposition that for making the right or
remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also
legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the
court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance
of events and developments subsequent to the institution of
the proceedings provided the rules of fairness to both sides
are scrupulously obeyed."
14. The next three-Judge Bench of this Court, which approved
and followed the above decision, in Hasmat Rai vs. Raghunath
Prasad [1981 (3) SCC 103] has taken care to emphasise that the
subsequent events should have wholly satisfied the requirement of
the party who petitioned for eviction on the ground of personal
requirement. The relevant passage is extracted below:
"Therefore, it is now incontrovertible that where possession
is sought for personal requirement it would be correcdespite
the impairment already caused.t to say that the requirement
pleaded by the landlord must not only exist on the date of the
action but must subsist till the final decree or an order for
eviction is made. If in the meantime events have cropped up
which would show that the landlords requirement is wholly
satisfied then in that case his action must fail and in such a
situation it is incorrect to say that as decree or order for
eviction is passed against the tenant he cannot invitdespite
the impairment already caused.e the court to take into
consideration subsequent events." (Emphasis supplied)
15. The judicial tardiness, for which unfortunately our system
has acquired notoriety, causes the lis to creep through the line for
long long years from the start to the ultimate termini, is a malady
afflicting the system. During this long interval many many events
are bound to take place which might happen in relation to the parties
as well as the subject matter of the lis. If the cause of action is to be
submerged in such subsequent events on account of the malady of
the system it shatters the confidence of the litigant, despite the
impairment already caused."
21 cra 58.09
26. It is pertinent to note that the judgment of Supreme Court
in the case of D. Sasi Kumar Vs. Soundarrajan reported in (2019) 9 SCC
282 was not cited before the learned Single Judge in the case of
Yashodabai Gopalrao Khedkar (Since deceased) through L.Rs. Rajendra
Govindrao Hatwalne Vs. Godavaribai Balkrishna @ Chatusheth Sinnarkar and
othersSulochana Divakar Parkar Vs. Shamrao Dinanath Bhatte and others
(supra). Learned advocate Mr. Shah is relying upon the
judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of D. Sasi Kumar Vs.
Soundarrajan (supra). It is relevant to notice following extract.
"12. Further the High Court has also erroneously arrived at the
conclusion that the bonafide occupation as sought should be not
only on the date of the petition but it should continue to be there on
the date of final adjudication of rights. Firstly, there is no material
on record to indicate that the need as pleaded at the time of filing
the petition does not subsist at this point. Even otherwise such
conclusion cannot be reached, when it cannot be lost sight that the
very judicial process consumes a long period and because of the
delay in the process if the benefit is declined it would only
encourage the tenants to protract the litigation so as to defeat the
right. In the instant case it is noticed that the petition filed by the
landlord is of the year 2004 which was disposed of by the Rent
Controller only in the year 2011. The appeal was thereafter
disposed of by the Appellate Authority in the year 2013. The High
Court had itself taken time to dispose of the Revision Petition, only
on 06.03.2017. The entire delay cannot be attributed to the landlord
and deny the relief. If as on the date of filing the petition the
requirement subsists and it is proved, the same would be sufficient
irrespective of Authority in the year 2013. The High Court had
itself taken time to dispose of the Revision Petition, only on
06.03.2017. The entire delay cannot be attributed to the landlord
and deny the relief. If as on the date of filing the petition the
requirement subsists and it is proved, the same would be sufficient
irrespective of the time lapse in the judicial process coming to an
end. This Court in the case of Gaya Prasad vs. Pradeep Srivastava,
(2001) 2 SCC 604 has held that the landlord should not
22 cra 58.09
be penalised for the slowness of the legal system and the crucial
date for deciding the bonafide requirement of landlord is the
date of application for eviction, which we hereby reiterate. The
time lapse in the judicial process coming to an end. This Court in
the case of Gaya Prasad vs. Pradeep Srivastava, (2001) 2 SCC 604
has held that the landlord should not be penalised for the slowness
of the legal system and the crucial date for deciding the bonafide
requirement of landlord is the date of application for eviction,
which we hereby reiterate."
27. Learned advocate Mr. G. R. Syed vehemently canvassed
that due to death of the applicant requirement has eclipsed. In
cross examination of the applicant it was disclosed that his son
was taking education in the medical college. While dealing with
additional issue, it has come on record that applicant's daughter
in law is also in medical profession. It cannot be said in such a
situation that after demise of the original land lord the premises
would not be utilized for construction of hospital. This court
cannot be oblivious of the fact that the suit for possession was
filed in the year 1982. Landlord died in the year 2017. The
present matter is getting decided in the year 2026. The
inordinate delay in deciding the matter cannot be attributable to
the landlord only. Had the matter been decided promptly,
landlord would have been benefited by the decree of eviction. It
cannot be overlooked that the respondent is successful in
retaining the possession for 43 long years.
28. Mr. Subodh Shah, learned advocate for the applicant has
placed on record judgment of the Coordinate Bench in the case of
Hemantkumar Prabhudasji Vora Vs. Khimji Bhanji and Company, through its
23 cra 58.09
Partner and others reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 2365 in which the
issue as to whether bonafide requirement extinguishes or not on
the death of the landlord was dealt with by referring to the
decisions of the Supreme Court in the matters of Gaya Prasad Vs.
Pradeep Shrivastava, Sheshambal (Dead) through L.Rs. Vs. Chelur Corporation
Chelur Building and others as well as D. Sasi Kumar Vs. Soundarrajan
(supra). Ultimately, High Court reversed the decree passed by
the lower Appellate Court and directed to evict the tenant. I also
propose to adopt the same view. The upshot of above discussion
is that applicant is entitled to get decree of eviction. I, therefore,
pass following order.
ORDER
A. Civil Revision Application is allowed.
B. The judgment and order dated 24.08.1993 and 28.08.2006
passed in R.C.S. No. 179 of 1982 by Joint Civil Judge
Junior Division, Nandurbar as well as judgment and
decree dated 12.06.2008 passed by the Appellate Court in
R. C. A. No. 66 of 1993 is quashed and set aside.
C. R.C.S. No. 179 of 1982 is hereby decreed.
D. The respondent shall hand over the possession of the
vacant premises to the applicant.
24 cra 58.09
E. The Civil Application No. 12854 of 2023 is rejected.
F. Decree be drawn up accordingly.
[ SHAILESH P. BRAHME, J. ]
29. After pronouncement of the judgment, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent - tenant seeks stay to operation
and execution of the judgment passed today, as his client is
desirous of approaching the Apex Court. The request is opposed
by the learned counsel appearing for the applicant.
30. The respondent is in possession of the suit premises and
decree of eviction has been passed first time by this Court. The
possession needs to be protected for extending an opportunity to
approach the Apex Court.
31. The operation and implementation of the judgment and
order passed today shall stand stayed for the period of six (06)
weeks from today on condition that the respondent -tenant shall
furnish undertaking before this Court within a period of two (02)
weeks from today stating that he shall not create any third party
interest in the subject matter, shall continue to pay rent and
stating other usual conditions.
[ SHAILESH P. BRAHME, J. ]
bsb/March 26
