[Cites 14, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Shivling Namdeorao Patwe vs State Information Commissioner, State ... on 6 March, 2026
2026:BHC-NAG:3895
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR
WRIT PETITION NO. 1281 OF 2021
Shivling Namdeorao Patwe,
Aged 47 yrs, Occ.Service,
R/o Govt. Quarter No.B-8/3,
Ravinagar, Nagpur 440 001 ...PETITIONER
...V E R S U S...
1. State Information Commissioner,
State Information Commission, Bench
at Nagpur. Administrative Building No. 2,
Civil Lines, Nagpur
2. Deputy Director, Education Department,
Nagpur
3. Public Information Officer,
Office of the Education Officer (Secondary),
Zilla Parishad, Nagpur
4. Chandrashekhar Namdeo Bhimte, (dismissed against resp.
Aged 54 yrs, Occ. Not known, No. 4 vide order dated
R/o Sureshnagar, Kanhan, 1.4.2022.)
Tah. Parseoni, Dist. Nagpur. ...RESPONDENTS
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Mr. U.J. Deshpande, Advocate for petitioner.
Mr. A.M. Ghogare, AGP for respondent No. 3.
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CORAM:- M.W. CHANDWANI, J.
DATE :- 06.03.2026
ORAL JUDGMENT:
1. Heard.
2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard the learned counsel
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for the petitioner and the learned AGP for respondent No.3.
3. The petition challenges the order dated 10.01.2020,
passed by respondent No. 1 - the State Information Commissioner,
Nagpur in Appeal No. 1166/2019, recommending to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner under Section 20(2) of
the Right to Information Act, 2005 (for short "RTI Act") for not deciding
the appeal within the time stipulated under Section 19(6) of the RTI
Act.
Brief facts of the case can be culled out as under:
4. Respondent no.4 had filed an application dated 7.2.2019
under Section 6 the RTI Act before respondent No. 3-the Public
Information Officer, Office of the Education Officer (Secondary), Zilla
Parishad, Nagpur who was a Nominated Authority under Section 5 of
the RTI Act. Respondent No. 3 vide letter dated 2.3.2019 expressed his
inability to furnish the information and therefore, respondent No.4
preferred First Appeal before the petitioner. Thereafter, without
waiting for the decision of the First Appeal, respondent No. 4 preferred
a Second Appeal before respondent No.1 even before completion of 45
days from the date of filing appeal before the petitioner. Respondent No
1, without giving cautious consideration to the fact that respondent No. 3
was duty bound to supply the available information and was the only
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officer who was responsible for ensuring that the information as sought
was provided to respondent No. 4, erred in passing the order dated
10.01.2020 issuing directions to the respondent No. 2 Deputy Director
to take disciplinary action against the petitioner for his failure to
provide the information to respondent No. 4 within the time stipulated
under Section 19 of the Act. Feeling aggrieved by this order, the
petitioner is before this court.
5. The main contention raised in this petition is that that
the SIC has no power to recommend disciplinary action against the
First Appellate Authority under Section 20(2) of the RTI Act.
Section 20(2) of the RTI Act provides that the Central Information
Commission(CIC) or the State Information Commission may
recommend disciplinary action against a Central Public
Information Officer (CPIO) or a State Information Officer(SIO) if it
finds that the officer has, without any reasonable cause and
persistently, failed to receive an application for information or has
not furnished information within the time specified under the
relevant section. The said provision does not speak about
imposition of penalty on the First Appellate Authority under the
RTI Act. In the present case, the petitioner was working as
Education Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nagpur who is designated as the
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First Appellate Authority under the RTI Act and therefore, the SIC
had no power to recommend disciplinary action against the
petitioner.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also contended
that the SIC had not put the petitioner to notice regarding
imposing of the penalty. It is submitted that as per the Proviso to
Section 20(1) of the RTI Act, an opportunity of being heard is
required to be given before imposing any penalty. Proviso to
Section 20(1) of the RTI act is equally applicable to Section 20(2)
of the RTI Act and therefore, the SIC is duty bound to issue show-
cause notice before imposing any kind of penalty for non-
supplying of information under Section 20(2) of the RTI Act as
well. However, in the present case the said proviso has not been
complied with.
7. The controversy revolves around Section 20 of the RTI
Act which reads as under:
"20. Penalties
(1) Where the Central Information Commission or
the State Information Commission, as the case may
be, at the time of deciding any complaint or appeal
is of the opinion that the Central Public Information
Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as
the case may be, has, without any reasonable cause,
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refused to receive an application for information or
has not furnished information within the time
specified under sub-section (1) of section 7 or
malafidely denied the request for information or
knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or misleading
information or destroyed information which was the
subject of the request or obstructed in any manner
in furnishing the information, it shall impose a
penalty of two hundred and fifty rupees each day till
application is received or information is furnished,
so however, the total amount of such penalty shall
not exceed twenty-five thousand rupees:
Provided that the Central Public Information Officer
or the State Public Information Officer, as the case
may be, shall be given a reasonable opportunity of
being heard before any penalty is imposed on him:
Provided further that the burden of proving that he
acted reasonably and diligently shall be on the
Central Public Information Officer or the State
Public Information Officer, as the case may be.
(2) Where the Central Information Commission or
the State Information Commission, as the case may
be, at the time of deciding any complaint or appeal
is of the opinion that the Central Public Information
Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as
the case may be, has, without any reasonable cause
and persistently, failed to receive an application for
information or has not furnished information within
the time specified under sub-section (1) of section 7
or malafidely denied the request for information or
knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or misleading
information or destroyed information which was the
subject of the request or obstructed in any manner
in furnishing the information, it shall recommend
for disciplinary action against the Central Public
Information Officer or the State Public Information
Officer, as the case may be, under the service rules
applicable to him."
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8. A plain reading of Section 20(2) reveals that the State
Information Commission can recommend disciplinary action
against the Central Public Information Officer or State Information
Officer if the said Officer has without any reasonable cause and
persistently, failed to receive an application for information or has
not furnished information within the time specified under sub-
section (1) of section 7 or malafidely denied the request for
information or knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or
misleading information or destroyed information which was the
subject of the request or obstructed in any manner in furnishing
the information. Thus, SIC can recommend disciplinary action
against Public Information Officer and not against the Appellate
Authority.
9. In this regard, it will be appropriate to refer to the
decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of R.K Jain vs Union
of India, reported in 2018 SCC OnLine Del 10957, wherein, a
similar type of issue was dealt with. Relevant portion of the
judgment has been reproduced as under:
"From the above, it is clear that Section 19(1) makes a
provision for filing of an appeal if a person is aggrieved
by a decision or inaction of the CPIO. The Appellate
Authority in sub-section (1) of Section 19 is classified
as an officer senior in rank to the CPIO meaning
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thereby that under the scheme of RTI Act, the CPIO is a
different authority or officer different from an
Appellate Authority to whom an appeal lies under
subSection (1) of Section 19. If the legislative intent, as
can be made out on a combined reading of various
provisions are taken note of, it would be seen that the
legislature only proposes for taking action against
CPIO, and not against any other authority like the
Appellate Authority or officer to whom the appeal lies.
That being so, the legislative intent was that the penal
provisions are to be implemented or enforced only
against the CPIO and not against any other authority
like the senior ranking officer or the Appellate
Authority who decides the appeal under Section 19(1).
If this was not the legislative intention, the words
appearing in Sections 19(1) and (2) would have been
differently worded and the construction of the statutory
provision would have been entirely different. If the
argument canvassed by the petitioner was to be
accepted then by that interpretation, we would be
expanding the meaning of a CPIO and we would be
adding something more into the definition of CPIO
than the one as was conceived by the legislature. This is
not permissible under law and when the CPIO is only
indicated to be officer against whom penal action can
be taken under Section 20, we cannot read into the
said statutory provision anything more by supplying
words or meaning which would enlarge the scope of
the penal provisions under Section 20. That apart, the
CPIO being custodian of the information or the
documents sought for, is primarily responsible under
the scheme of the RTI Act to supply the information
and in case of default or dereliction on his part, the
penal action is to be invoked against him only. The
Appellate Authority is not the custodian of the
information or the document. It is only a statutory
authority to take a decision on an appeal with regard
the tenability or otherwise of the action of the CPIO
and, therefore, there is a conscious omission in making
the Appellate Authority liable for a penal action under
Section 20 of the RTI Act and if that be the scheme of
the Act and the legislative intention, we see no error in
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the order passed by the learned writ Court warranting
reconsideration."
10. Admittedly, in the present case, the petitioner was
neither working as a CPIO or SIO. He was appointed as the First
Appellate Authority under the RTI Act. Therefore, the SIC was not
correct in recommending disciplinary action against the petitioner
for not deciding the appeal within the stipulated time.
11. Even an opportunity of being heard has not been given
to the petitioner. A reference can be made to the decision of the
Apex Court in the case of Manohar S/o Manikrao Aunchule Vs.
State of Maharashtra and another, [2012(13) SCC 14] in which,
the Supreme Court has held that the powers of the State
Information Commission with reference to Section 20 of the RTI
Act are quasi judicial and have larger repercussions on the
aggrieved party. It has therefore been held that before
recommending disciplinary action, a notice and opportunity of
hearing has to be afforded. The relevant portion has been
reproduced as under:
"16. The State Information Commission has been
vested with wide powers including imposition of
penalty or taking of disciplinary action against the
employees. Exercise of such power is bound to
adversely affect or bring civil consequences to the
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delinquent. Thus, the provisions relating to penalty or
to penal consequences have to be construed strictly. It
will not be open to the Court to give them such liberal
construction that it would be beyond the specific
language of the statute or would be in violation to the
principles of natural justice.
17. The State Information Commission is performing
adjudicatory functions where two parties raise their
respective issues to which the State Information
Commission is expected to apply its mind and pass an
order directing disclosure of the information asked for
or declining the same. Either way, it affects the rights
of the parties who have raised rival contentions before
the Commission. If there were no rival contentions, the
matter would rest at the level of the designated Public
Information Officer or immediately thereafter. It comes
to the State Information Commission only at the
appellate stage when rights and contentions require
adjudication. The adjudicatory process essentially has
to be in consonance with the principles of natural
justice, including the doctrine of audi alteram partem.
Hearing the parties, application of mind and recording
of reasoned decision are the basic elements of natural
justice. It is not expected of the Commission to breach
any of these principles, particularly when its orders are
open to judicial review. Much less to Tribunals or such
Commissions, the Courts have even made compliance
to the principle of rule of natural justice obligatory in
the class of administrative matters as well. In the case
of A.K. Kraipak & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [(1969)
2 SCC 262], the Court held as under :
"17. ... It is not necessary to examine those decisions as
there is a great deal of fresh thinking on the subject.
The horizon of natural justice is constantly
expanding... The aim of the rules of natural justice is to
secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent
miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in
areas not covered by any law validly made. In other
words they do not supplant the law of the land but
supplement it.... The concept of natural justice has
undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In
the past it was thought that it included just two rules
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namely: (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case
(Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no
decision shall be given against a party without
affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram
partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was
envisaged and that is that quasijudicial enquiries must
be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily
or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more
subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of
natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of
the courts that unless the authority concerned was
required by the law under which it functioned to act
judicially there was no room for the application of the
rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is
now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural
justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to
see why those rules should be made inapplicable to
administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to
draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries
from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were
considered administrative at one time are now being
considered as quasi- judicial in character. Arriving at a
just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries
as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision
in an administrative enquiry may have more far
reaching effect than a decision in a quasi- judicial
enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy
George v. University of Kerala the rules of natural
justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of
natural justice should apply to a given case must
depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances
of that case, the framework of the law under which the
enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or
body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever
a complaint is made before a court that some principle
of natural justice had been contravened the court has
to decide whether the observance of that rule was
necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.
23. Thus, the principle is clear and settled that right of
hearing, even if not provided under a specific statute,
the principles of natural justice shall so demand, unless
by specific law, it is excluded. It is more so when
exercise of authority is likely to vest the person with
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consequences of civil nature. Another aspect of this
case which needs to be examined by the Court is that
the appeal itself has not been decided though it has so
been recorded in the impugned order. The entire
impugned order does not direct furnishing of the
information asked for by respondent No.1. It does not
say whether such information was required to be
furnished or not or whether in the facts of the case, it
was required of respondent No.2 to respond to the
letter dated 11th April, 2007 written by the
Department to him. All these matters were requiring
decision of the Commission before it could recommend
the disciplinary action against the appellant,
particularly, in the facts of the present case."
12. In the present case, the SIC was not empowered to
recommend disciplinary action against the petitioner. Even
recommendation of disciplinary action against the petitioner is
made without giving a show cause notice and an opportunity of
being heard.
13. Therefore, the impugned order passed by respondent
no.1 does not stand to the reason and is required to be set aside.
Hence, the following order:-
i) The Writ Petition is allowed.
ii) The impugned order dated 10.01.2020 passed by
respondent no.1 - State Information Commissioner,
Nagpur in Appeal No. 1166/2019 recommending
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disciplinary action against the petitioner is quashed and
set aside.
14. Rule is made absolute in the abovesaid
terms. No costs.
(M.W. CHANDWANI, J.)
Belkhede PS
