[Cites 4, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Municipal Corporation Of Greater ... vs Shri. Tukaram Vitthal Patil on 29 January, 2026
Author: Amit Borkar
Bench: Amit Borkar
2026:BHC-AS:4368
wp2528-2012-J.doc
AGK
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.2528 OF 2012
ATUL Municipal Corporation, A Statutory
GANESH
KULKARNI
Digitally signed by
Corporation under the provisions of
ATUL GANESH
KULKARNI
Date: 2026.01.29
15:04:28 +0530
Municipal Corporation Act, 1888,
having its Head Office at Annexe Building,
Mahapalika Marg, Fort, Mumbai 400 001 ... Petitioner
V/s.
Tukaram Vitthal Patil, At Tanwal
Post Lonad, Taluka Bhiwandi,
District Thane ... Respondent
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO.1374 OF 2019
IN
WRIT PETITION NO.2528 OF 2012
Tukaram Vitthal Patil ... Applicant
In the matter between
Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai ... Petitioner
V/s.
Tukaram Vitthal Patil ... Respondent
Mr. Santosh Parad for the petitioner-MCGM.
Ms. Shubhangi A. Subhedar for the respondent.
CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
RESERVED ON : JANUARY 23, 2026
PRONOUNCED ON : JANUARY 29, 2026
1
::: Uploaded on - 29/01/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 29/01/2026 20:49:11 :::
wp2528-2012-J.doc
JUDGMENT:
1. This writ petition is under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India. The petitioner challenges the Judgment and
Order dated 17 March 2010 passed by the Industrial Court, Thane
in Revision Application (ULP) No. 44 of 2008. By that order, the
Industrial Court confirmed the Judgment and Order dated 28
November 2006 passed by the Labour Court, Thane in Complaint
(ULP) No. 43 of 1992.
2. The relevant facts are as follows. The respondent was
appointed as a Security Guard with effect from 1 October 1984 as
per selection of D.M.C. (Z-I) dated 12 April 1984 under the
General Category. At the time of recruitment, the Corporation
prescribed that the candidate must have passed 7th standard. The
respondent submitted documents in support of his qualification.
The Corporation accepted those documents and appointed him.
3. On 31 September 1989, the Corporation received an
anonymous complaint. The complaint alleged that four persons,
namely the petitioner, Narayan Pandurang Patil, Dattatrey
Raghunath Shelar and Gajanan Patil, had produced bogus school
leaving certificates. On that basis, the Corporation conducted an
inquiry with the Head Master of the concerned school. In his
statement, the Head Master stated that the signature on the
certificate did not match his signature and was forged by the
respondent to secure employment. The inquiry also revealed that
the certificates of the respondent and Narayan Patil carried
registration numbers 108 dated 23 November 1989 and 109 dated
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13 November 1988. These endorsements clearly showed that the
certificates were forged.
4. The petitioner then conducted a regular departmental
inquiry against the respondent. The inquiry followed due process.
The respondent received a show cause notice before the final order
of removal. The respondent got full opportunity to defend himself.
The petitioner thereafter removed the respondent from service.
5. The respondent filed a complaint under Item 1(b), (d), (e)
and (f) of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade
Union and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 before
the Labour Court. The petitioner denied all allegations by filing a
written statement.
6. The Labour Court framed issues. The first issue was whether
the inquiry was fair and proper and whether the petitioner
followed principles of natural justice. The Labour Court decided
this as a preliminary issue. By order dated 19 October 2002, the
Labour Court held that the inquiry was not fair and proper.
7. The petitioner filed Revision Application No. 121 of 2002
before the Industrial Court challenging that order. By Judgment
and Order dated 12 November 2002, the Industrial Court rejected
the Revision Application.
8. After that, the petitioner applied to the Labour Court for
issuance of two witness summons. The Labour Court allowed the
application. The respondent challenged that order by filing a
Revision Application before the Industrial Court. The Industrial
Court set aside the Labour Court's order and remanded the matter
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by order dated 20 July 2005.
9. The respondent did not lead evidence to prove any unfair
labour practice by the petitioner. He also did not lead evidence on
the question of employment or non-employment till 1999. Due to
an interim order of the Labour Court, he was reinstated in the
Corporation in December 1999. There was no evidence led by the
respondent regarding unfair labour practice or for back wages
from 1992 to 1999. Despite this, by Judgment and Order dated 28
November 2006, the Labour Court directed the petitioner to
continue the respondent in service and to pay full back wages with
continuity.
10. The petitioner filed a Revision Application before the
Industrial Court challenging the order dated 28 November 2006.
By Judgment and Order dated 17 March 2010, the Industrial Court
rejected the Revision Application. The Industrial Court directed the
petitioner to treat the respondent's service as uninterrupted and to
pay back wages for the entire period. Hence, the petitioner has
filed the present writ petition.
11. Learned Advocate for the petitioner Corporation submits that
the Labour Court has not given any reason for granting full back
wages to the respondent. According to him, the respondent did not
produce any evidence regarding his employment or unemployment
for the period 1992 to 1999. He submits that the Labour Court also
failed to note that there was no requirement for the petitioner to
lead evidence to prove misconduct because the issue before the
Labour Court was only whether the petitioner committed any
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unfair labour practice. He submits that the Labour Court
proceeded on the basis of principles under the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 where management is required to lead evidence for
proving misconduct. In the present case, there was no such
requirement. He submits that the allegation of unfair labour
practice was against the petitioner and the respondent had to
prove it. He submits that the Labour Court has completely
misdirected itself. He submits that the Labour Court did not
appreciate that the entire burden to prove unfair labour practice
was on the respondent. The respondent did not discharge that
burden. Therefore the question whether the petitioner led
evidence or not was irrelevant for deciding unfair labour practice.
He submits that the Labour Court ought to have dismissed the
complaint since the respondent failed to prove any unfair labour
practice. He submits that the Labour Court could not have granted
full back wages for the period of alleged unemployment when
there was no evidence on record. He therefore submits that the
writ petition deserves to be allowed.
12. Learned Advocate for the respondent submits that though
Item 1(f) was not mentioned in the title of the complaint, the
respondent has pleaded Item 1(f) in paragraph 2 of the complaint.
She submits that at page 6 of the complaint, the respondent has
stated that he studied up to 7th standard and did not have
knowledge of inquiry procedure. She submits that the respondent
asked for adjournment which was refused. She submits that the
complaint contains a plea that the inquiry was in violation of
fairness and that there were procedural defects. She submits that
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the respondent has pleaded denial of opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses and that the inquiry was conducted in haste. She
submits that in view of these pleadings and mention of Item 1(f), it
cannot be said that there was no pleading regarding inquiry. She
therefore submits that the Labour Court rightly framed and
decided the issue relating to inquiry.
13. She submits that the Labour Court held that the inquiry was
not fair and proper and the Industrial Court confirmed that
finding. She submits that this Court cannot reopen that issue. She
submits that the Industrial Court also refused the request of the
petitioner for issuance of summons for proving the charges. She
submits that the said order is binding on the parties and also binds
this Court. She submits that in view of these orders, there was no
evidence before the Labour Court to support the charges. She
submits that in absence of proof of charges, the respondent was
entitled to reinstatement with all benefits. She submits that the
burden to prove the charges was on the petitioner, and that burden
remained undischarged. She submits that the order of
reinstatement with full benefits suffers from no perversity or
patent error and no interference is warranted. She submits that
the respondent was dismissed in January 1992 and reinstated in
December 1999 under interim orders and continued in service
thereafter. She submits that the petitioner is therefore required to
treat the entire service as uninterrupted and pay back wages for
the period of forced unemployment. She therefore prays for
rejection of the writ petition.
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Analysis:
14. Interference with concurrent findings of fact by the Labour
Court and Industrial Court requires strong justification. The
jurisdiction is supervisory. This Court does not reappraise evidence
afresh. Interference is permissible where the conclusions are
perverse, illegal, or based on no evidence. This principle guides the
present review.
15. The Labour Court found procedural lapses. The respondent
pleaded denial of effective opportunity to cross-examine. He
pleaded refusal of adjournment and lack of legal literacy because
he had only studied to 7th standard. Those pleas were part of the
complaint and were considered by the Labour Court.
16. The material shows contested procedural steps. The
Corporation sought issuance of witness summons. The Labour
Court allowed issuance. The Industrial Court later set aside that
direction and remanded the matter. The result left the record in a
state where the Labour Court had reached findings without full
testimonial proof on charges. The Labour Court concluded that the
inquiry procedures adopted did not afford the respondent a fair
hearing in substance. The Industrial Court confirmed that
conclusion.
17. The Corporation relies on documentary averments and on
the Head Master's statement that the signature on the certificate
was forged. That material is serious. A prima facie case of forgery
appears from the documents and the Head Master's statement. The
presence of prima facie evidence of misconduct is relevant. It does
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not, however, cure procedural defects in the inquiry. Proof of
misconduct must follow a fair and lawful procedure. The rule of
law demands that the finding of misconduct rest on evidence
admitted after compliance with principles of natural justice.
18. The parties dispute the legal burden. Where an employee
prosecutes a complaint for unfair labour practice, the complainant
must show denial of fair procedure or other designated unfair acts.
Where the management takes disciplinary action for misconduct,
the management must establish the misconduct by evidence in the
inquiry. The two strands operate in parallel depending on the relief
invoked.
19. In the present case, the respondent alleged unfair labour
practice by pointing to procedural wrongs and denial of
opportunity. The Labour Court treated the fairness of the inquiry as
the preliminary question and answered it against the Corporation.
The Corporation cannot be allowed to rely on the same impugned
inquiry as a safe harbor where the inquiry has been held wanting.
The burden to show that despite procedural defects the essential
truth of the misconduct has been proved rests with the
Corporation. That burden was not discharged on the record before
the Labour Court and the Industrial Court.
20. The Head Master's statement is strong on its face. It suggests
forgery. But the procedural history shows that the parties did not
have the benefit of full testimonial proof at the Labour Court
because of contested orders on witness summons and related
remands. The Industrial Court refused issuance of witness
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summons in its later order and the same court remanded the
matter. This fractured the opportunity to place oral proof on
record. In that state, conclusions on guilt were unsafe.
21. The Labour Court and the Industrial Court proceeded on
available material and on the preliminary finding that the inquiry
lacked fairness. That approach is permissible where procedural
infirmity is real and substantial and where the respondent's right
to a fair hearing was compromised. In such a case courts may
direct reinstatement. The Labour Court held that in the absence of
proof of charges and in view of procedural violations,
reinstatement with continuity and back wages was warranted. The
Industrial Court affirmed.
22. Legal principles require careful handling before awarding
back wages for the entire period of forced unemployment. Back
wages are compensatory for loss suffered due to wrongful
dismissal where the employee remained unemployed or where he
had no remedy. The award ordinarily seeks to place the employee
in the position he would have occupied but for the illegality.
23. The Corporation argues that there was no proof of
unemployment from 1992 to 1999 and that the Labour Court did
not record reasons for granting full back wages. The Labour Court
noted that the respondent had no clear proof of alternate
employment on record and the interim order resulted in
reinstatement only in December 1999. In the absence of proof that
the respondent was gainfully employed elsewhere during the
intervening period, the Labour Court reasonably inferred loss of
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earnings and awarded back wages. That finding is fact specific. It
is not vitiated by perversity on the record. The Industrial Court
rightly treated the totality of facts and refused to disturb the
award.
24. The petition hinges on two contentions. First, that the
Labour Court erred in awarding back wages where the respondent
offered no direct proof of unemployment. Second, that the Labour
Court misapplied the burden of proof by treating procedural
defects as determinative. Both contentions raise mixed questions of
fact and law. This Court must not substitute its view for concurrent
findings unless perverse.
25. The factual matrix shows procedural infirmity in the inquiry.
The Labour Court and the Industrial Court considered the Head
Master's statement and other documentary material. The courts
found that the Corporation, despite serious documentary
suggestion of forgery, failed to establish the guilt in a fair inquiry.
The Corporation had the last chance to produce witness evidence
and to secure the record. It failed to do so effectively. The
Industrial Court's orders on summons and remand are part of the
record and justified the Labour Court's approach.
26. No material on record demonstrates that the conclusions of
the Labour Court and Industrial Court are perverse or constitute
patent illegality. The findings rest on evidence and on legitimate
legal reasoning. This Court must respect concurrent findings of the
specialised forums.
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27. For the reasons set out above the writ petition lacks merit.
The findings of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court do not
suffer from perversity or patent illegality. The petition is dismissed.
28. The Corporation shall comply impugned judgments and
orders within six weeks of this order.
29. No order as to costs.
30. In view of disposal of the writ petition, civil application does
not survive and disposed of as such.
31. At this stage, learned Advocate for the petitioner requests for
stay of the judgment. However, for the reasons stated in this
judgment, request for stay is rejected
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
