[Cites 14, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Hanumant Rambhau Chavan vs The State Of Maharashtra on 21 January, 2026
2026:BHC-AS:3421 902-APEAL-618-1998-J.doc
Prasad
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 618 OF 1998
Hanumant Rambhau Chavan,
Age -about 30 years,
Occupation- Labourer,
Residing at Alandi, Tal. Khed,
District - Pune. (At present in Jail) ...Appellant
~ versus ~
State of Maharashtra & Ors ...Respondents
A PPEARANCES
For the Appellant Ms. Sufiya Siddiqui a/w Prerna
Mehta, Hitesh Phulwani and Ajay
Talreja.
For The Respondent-State. Mr. C.D. Mali, APP.
CORAM : R. M. JOSHI, J.
RESERVED ON : 9TH JANUARY 2026.
PRONOUNCED ON : 21ST JANUARY 2026
JUDGMENT:
1. This Appeal takes exception to the Judgment and Order
dated 4th July 1998, passed in Session Case No. 326 of 1994,
whereby the Appellant, i.e., original Accused No. 1, came to be
convicted for the offences, punishable under section 306, and 498A
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of Indian Penal Code, for which Appellant is sentenced to suffer
five years imprisonment, and three years, respectively, with fine
and default sentence.
2. It is a case of the prosecution that Prabhakar, informant,
brother of deceased, lodged report with the police with regard to
the suicidal death of his sister, Mangal . It is his contention that his
sister, was married to the Appellant on 29 th December 1991.
Initially, she was staying at Village Wadaj with her husband, i.e.,
Appellant/Accused No. 1 and mother-in-law, original Accused No.
2. She said to have lived cordial married life for a period of seven
to eight months. Thereafter, accused persons started harassing her
on the ground that she is not able to do household work properly,
and that her husband used to harass and beat her by suspecting
her character. Whenever she used to come to the parental home ,
she used to complain about the harassment caused by the accused
persons to her brother and mother. Prior to the two days' of the
incident, she went to her parental home, and then also complained
about the ill treatment at the hands of the Accused. She was not
ready to return to the matrimonial home. However, her husband
came and fetched her back. On 15th May 1994, informant received
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message that Mangal is admitted in Sassoon hospital at Pune. He,
along with the other family members went to the hospital and
found Mangal dead. She died on account of receiving burn injuries.
Informant, therefore, lodged a report with the police claiming she
being harassed and ill treated by the accused, and therefore, she
having committed suicide. Office came to be registered with
Chakan Police Station while Crime No. 49 of 1994. During
investigation, the Spot Panchnama was prepared in the presence of
Panch Witnesses. The dead body was sent for postmortem. After
receipt of the PM notes, the same were included in the
investigation papers. Investigating Officer recorded statements of
witnesses, and on completion of the investigation, chargesheet
came to be filed before the competent court. On committal, charge
was framed against them at Exhibit-4. As the accused persons
abjured the charge, they were tried. The prosecution led evidence
of four witnesses, and placed reliance on documentary evidence in
order to prove the guilt of the accused. Prosecution examined
following witnesses.
i. Prabhakar Shankar Gayake. Exhibit-11.
ii. Kamlabai Shankar Gayake. Exhibit-14.
iii. Ashok Babanrao Umarge. Exhibit-15.
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iv. Vilas Manikarao Jadhav. Exhibit-17.
3. Learned Trial Court, on assessment of the evidence led by
the prosecution, reached to the conclusion that the charge framed
against Accused No. 2, i.e., mother-in-law of the deceased has not
been proved, and hence, recorded acquittal in her favour. The
prosecution has not challenged the said Judgment and Order of
acquittal of Accused No. 2. The Trial Court, however, convicted
Appellant/Accused No. 1, i.e., husband of the deceased for both
charges. Hence, this appeal.
4. Learned counsel for the Appellant submits that the Trial
Court committed error in not appreciating the evidence on the
record in proper perspective. It is a submission that on the basis of
similar allegations, charges were framed against both active
persons, and since Accused No. 2 is acquitted, there remains no
reason or justification for conviction of Accused No. 1/Appellant
herein. It is his submission that the prosecution, at the outset, must
prove that the deceased died, a suicidal death, and that it was not
accident. It is his submission that, on the basis of evidence on
record, it cannot be said that deceased committed suicide, and the
possibility of accidental death of the deceased is not ruled out. He
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further argued that there are material inconsistencies in the
statements of witnesses led by the prosecution, more particularly,
evidence of Witness No. 1, i.e., brother of the deceased, and her
mother, PW2. It is his submission that the prosecution has failed to
examine any independent witness, such as neighbours though
available, in order to prove the alleged harassment caused to the
deceased by the Appellant. In this regard, attention of the court is
drawn to the cross-examination of the Investigating Officer who
accepts the fact of not recording statement of neighbors till 16 th
May 1994. It is his further submission that, in any case, evidence of
the brother and mother of the deceased, they being interested
witnesses, is not sufficient to hold that any harassment was caused
to the deceased by the Appellant. In this regard, it is his submission
that these witnesses have not seen harassment so caused to the
deceased by the Appellant. It is submitted that the evidence of
these witnesses is hearsay in nature and, hence, cannot become a
ground for conviction of the Accused. He argued that the Trial
Court has erred in placing reliance on the letter purportedly
written by the deceased (Exhibit-12) when the said letter has not
been sent to the handwriting expert for opinion with admitted
handwriting and signature of the deceased. He thus argued that, in
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absence of proof of the said letter being written by the deceased,
the conviction cannot be based upon the same. It is further argued
that Investigating Officer has accepted in his evidence that at the
time of the filing of the report of the incident, no such letter was
produced by the informant. It is his further submission that there is
no evidence led before the Trial Court in order to show how the
said letter came to be seized and became part of the investigation
papers. Without prejudice to his contention that the postcard,
allegedly seen by the deceased, has not been proved, he submits
that, even in the said postcard, the writings therein do not indicate
any specific allegation against the Appellant/Accused of he beating
or causing harassment to the deceased. Thus it is submission that
in any case, the said evidence is not enough to convict the
Appellant/Accused. According to him, there is admittedly no
allegation against the Appellant of he demanding any dowry from
the deceased or from her parents. It is his submission that, in any
case, there is no proximity between the alleged harassment of the
deceased and the alleged act committed by her of suicide. Learned
counsel took a lot of efforts and pains to convince the Court that
this is a case of acquittal of Appellant. He placed reliance on
following Judgments:
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(a) Abhinav Mohan Delkar vs State of Maharashtra & Ors1
(b) Manikandan vs State by the Inspector of Police,2
(c) Balka Singh & Ors vs The State of Punjab,3
(d) Mahendran VS State of Tamil Nadu with Ravi alias
Gopu & Ors vs State represented by the Deputy
Superintendent of Police4
(e) Dalip Singh & Ors vs State of Punjab,5
(f) Govind Raj vs State (NCT of Delhi),6
(g) Raju alias Balchandran & Ors vs State of Tamil Nadu,7
5. He further drew attention of this Court, to the Judgment of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Abhinav Dailkar vs State
of Maharashtra (Supra). He drew attention of the Court to
paragraph 15 of the said Judgment in order to argue that unless
there is any proximity to the time of occurrence of the incident and
alleged acts of the Accused, the conviction in terms of Section 306
of IPC is not sustainable. On these amongst other submissions, he
seeks interference in the impugned Judgment and Order and
acquittal of the Accused.
1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1725.
2 Criminal Appeal No. 1609 of 2011 with Criminal Appeal No. 407 of 2019,
dated 5th April 2024.
3 (1975) 4 SCCA511.
4 (2019) 5 SCC 67.
5 (1953) 2 SCC 36.
6 2019 SCC OnLine Del 7052 : (2019) 257 DLT 633 (DB) : (210() 174 DRJ 18.
7 (2012) 12 SCC 701.
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6. On the other hand, learned APP supported the impugned
Judgment and Order by contending that the prosecution has
proved the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is his
submission that the number of examination of witnesses is not
relevant for the proof of any fact. It is his submission that there is
no inimical terms between the parties in order to PW1, brother and
PW2, mother of the deceased, to depose against the
Accused/Appellant. It is his further submission by drawing
attention of the Court to the evidence on record, that the evidence
of the witnesses is consistent and supported by the writing of the
deceased informing that the deceased was harassed by the
husband.
7. Learned APP has drawn attention of the Court to the Spot
Panchanama which, according to him, indicates that the possibility
of accidental burns being sustained by the deceased is ruled out. In
this regard, he referred to the findings recorded by the learned
Trial Court, which, according to him, are consistent with the
material evidence of record, and requiring no interference therein.
Thus, it is argued that the prosecution, since, has succeeded, in
proving the charge against the present Appellant, no interference is
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called in the impugned Judgment and Order.
8. It is not in dispute that deceased Mangal got married with
Appellant/Accused 29th December 1991and that she died on 16th
of May 1994, after having sustained burn injuries on 15th May
1994, at about 11:30 pm. No doubt, the burden would be on the
prosecution, to prove at first instance that the deceased died
suicidal death. It is, however, pertinent to note that, in case of
suicide, in general, and in particular having regard to the facts of
the present case, there cannot be any direct evidence indicating
that the deceased self-immolated. The prosecution will have to
prove the cause of the burn injuries to the deceased on
circumstantial evidence. In order to prove the same, prosecution
places reliance on postmortem report, which indicate that the
deceased had sustained 97% burn injuries. Apart from this,
evidence of Ashok Umarge, Exhibit-15, PW3, is led by the
prosecution, in whose presence these Spot Panchanama was
prepared. This witness, in his testimony on oath, before the Trial
Court states about the situation of the spot, so also, the articles
seized therefrom. In the cross-examination, it has come on record
that the kerosene was found spread in the room. Similarly, can
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filled with kerosene, so also, there was a utensil, in which kerosene
was found and match stick and pieces of burnt saree were seized
from the spot. Thus, Spot Panchanama Exhibit-16 is duly proved by
the prosecution through this witness. Nothing has been brought on
the record by way of cross-examination in order to discard his
testimony. Perusal of the said evidence indicates that the spot at
which the incident has occurred, kerosene was found spilled over
the room. Apart from this, in the Spot Panchanama, there is
nothing to indicate that the stove, which was there in the kitchen
platform, has bursted or flared up. Apart from the kerosene in the
can, there was kerosene found in another vessel. In case of the
accidental burns caused to the deceased, there was no reason for
the kerosene being found spilled all over the flooring in the room.
The circumstantial evidence, which is on the record, clearly
indicates that deceased poured kerosene on her person and,
thereafter, lit herself, resulting into causing of 97% burns to her.
The learned Trial Court has also held accordingly. On the basis of
evidence on record, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the
death of the deceased is suicidal one and not accidental.
9. At this stage, it would be relevant to take note of the
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provision of Section 113A of Indian Evidence Act, which reads
thus:
"113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a
married woman.--When the question is whether the
commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted
by her husband or any relative of her husband and it
is shown that she had committed suicide within a
period of seven years from the date of her marriage
and that her husband or such relative of her husband
had subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume,
having regard to all the other circumstances of the
case, that such suicide had been abetted by her
husband or by such relative of her husband.
Explanation. -- For the purposes of this
section, "cruelty" shall have the same meaning as in
section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860)."
10. As per the said provision, when it is shown that a woman
had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the
date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of the
husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume
having regard to all other circumstances of the case that such
suicide has been abated by her husband or relative of the husband.
Having regard to this provision, now it needs to be seen as to
whether the prosecution has proved any cruelty being caused by
the Appellant to the deceased.
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11. Prosecution has examined two witnesses in order to show
that prior to the death, deceased was subjected to the cruel
treatment at the hands of the accused persons. PW1 is brother of
the deceased, who categorically states about the deceased living
seven to eight months cordial married life with her husband. It is
thereafter, whenever she used to visit the parental home,
complained about the harassment caused by the Appellant and her
mother-in-law for not performing household work properly, and
also by suspecting her fidelity. She used to tell brother and mother
that her husband beats her. This witness clearly states about he
advising husband of deceased not to harass and beat her. He
deposes about the incident, which was narrated by the deceased to
him, when she visited his house prior to two to three days of the
occurrence of the incident.
12. He also relied upon a postcard sent by the deceased (Exhibit-
12), which, according to him, indicates that the deceased was
being harassed by the husband. He categorically states about
thereafter having asked the husband of the deceased not to cause
harassment to her. In the cross-examination of this witness, though
it is suggested that the letter was not received from the deceased,
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there is no specific suggestion to the effect that the handwriting or
the signature on Exhibit-12 does not belong to the deceased. It is
pertinent to note that, even in the cross-examination of the
investigating officer, though it is suggested and it is accepted by
the Investigating Officer, that at the time of lodging of the report,
such letter was not produced by the informant to the police,
however, there is no suggestion to the Investigating Officer with
regard to the planting of the said evidence. Once the defence does
not dispute the handwriting and signature of the deceased on the
letter in question, and the same is found to have received through
Postal Department, as rightly held by the learned Trial Court, that
there is no reason to disbelieve that deceased had sent the said
letter to her brother. In a given case, there could be doubt about
any chit being left behind by deceased to in a given case to say that
the same is planted. The letter in question (Exhibit-12) is received
through Postal Department with stamp thereon. In that case, in
absence of specific case made out of fabrication of letter and its
planting, the Court would not be justified in keeping the same out
of consideration. Now coming to the contents of the said letter,
though it is sought to be argued on behalf of the counsel for the
Appellant, that in the said letter, she does not name anyone
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particularly to have caused harassment to her. However, the
contents of the said letter are self-explanatory. It would be relevant
to reproduce the contains of the said letter, which read thus:
frFkZLi vkÃzP;k lsosl vkiyh eqyxh eaxykpk ueLdkj- i«kkl dkj.k
dh eh vkGanh vkys bdMps okrkoj.k ch?kMysys vkgs- nknk
dkjfrdsyk ;s.ks ,[kk|kosGsl eh ;sÃy frdMs eyk cjs ukgh ek>h
ikB.k lqtyh vkgs o dacjgh nq[krs- nknk eyk fnokGh Bsok eyk
[kk;yk feGkyh ukgh- nknk eyk vkls okVrs fot;k fnnhlkj[kh ek>h
gh rhp vkoFkk gks.kkj- vkuY;kiklqu ekjgku pkyq vkgs- njsdj
rkbZyk ueLdkj lkaxk- Hkkysjko dkdkauk lkaxk dkfrZdhyk ;s.ks- vkbZ
xqMX;kyk vkS"k/ks ?ks.;klkBh dkdqu cjkscj tk.ks- x.ks'k osG vklsu
rj nknkyk ?kj ekfgr ukgh ?ksoqu ;s.ks- dkfrZdhyk tkLr fyfgr
ukgh- fniqyk xksM xksM ikik fniqyk fto yko.ks o y{k Bso.ks-
lxGs fyghrk ;sr ukgh- vkiyh [kq'kkyh dGo.ks- i«kkps mRrj ns.ks-
dGkoh vkiyh cgh.k
lkS- eaxyk pOgk.k
13. The tenor of the letter is clear to indicate that she was
harassed by her husband. This becomes more important in view of
the fact that Accused No. 2, i.e., mother-in-law of the deceased was
not residing with her at the relevant point of time. It is only
husband of the deceased and deceased were staying along with
their child. Thus, this Court finds no substance in the contention of
the counsel for the Appellant, that since the name of the Accused
No. 1, i.e., Appellant herein is not mentioned in the said letter, it is
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to be held that there is no allegation against the Accused. The said
letter clearly shows that the deceased was not only harassed,
verbally, but also was abused physically. She makes a mention
about the same in the said letter. Apart from this, the evidence of
PW1 clearly indicates that even prior to two to three days of the
occurrence of the incident, she had been to the parental home and
refused to go back to the matrimonial home. It is at that time, the
Accused came and fetched her back. These facts clearly indicate
that just before the occurrence of the incident of suicide committed
by the deceased, she was harassed and abused and beaten by the
Accused/Appellant herein. Thus, there is proximity in the act on
the part of Accused of causing harassment to deceased and she
committing suicide.
14. The prosecution, therefore, has proved by leading cogent
evidence that deceased Mangal committed suicide within a period
of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband
had subjected her to cruelty. This Court, therefore, would be
justified in presuming by invoking Section 113A of the Evidence
Act that such suicide has been abetted by her husband. Section 107
of the Penal Code indicates that a person is said to have abetted
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the doing of a thing, who instigate any person to do that thing or
intentionally aids or by any act or omission, the doing of that
thing. The prosecution was able to prove that the deceased was
subjected to physical and mental cruelty by her husband, which
has driven her to commit suicide. In view of the presumption
under Section 113A of the Evidence Act, the burden would be on
the defence to rebut the said presumption. Neither by way of cross-
examination, nor in the explanation while recording statement
under section 313 of CRPC, or by leading any evidence, the
defence has been able to discharge the same. Needless to say that
such onus would not be by way of a strict proof, however, the
defence will have to rebut the said presumption by leading
evidence on probability. Meaning thereby, the defence will have to
show as to what would be the probable reason for the deceased to
commit suicide. There is absolutely nothing on record to indicate
that the deceased has committed suicide on account of any other
reason, but for the cruelty which was meted out to her by the
Accused/Appellant. It is necessary to note that deceased had a girl
child and in spite of the said fact, she decided to end her life. This
also goes to show that she was subjected to such cruelty that left
her with no alternative, but the commit suicide. This Court,
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therefore, finds no justification in disturbing the findings recorded
by the learned Trial Court with regard to the deceased committing
suicide, owing to the cruelty meted out to her by the
Appellant/Accuse.
15. It would be relevant to take note of provision of Section 306
and 498A of IPC, which read thus:
"306. Abetment of suicide.--
If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the
commission of such suicide, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to
fine.
498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty.--
Whoever, being the husband or the relative of
the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to
cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to three years and shall also
be liable to fine.
Explanation.-- For the purpose of this section,
"cruelty" means--
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a
nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit
suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life,
limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the
woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such
harassment is with a view to coercing her or any
person related to her to meet any unlawful demand
for any property or valuable security or is on
account of failure by her or any person related to
her to meet such demand."
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16. A bare perusal of these provisions, clearly indicate that the
deceased was subjected to cruelty by the Appellant/Accused, which
has led her to commit suicide. Learned counsel for the Appellant
has drawn attention of this Court to the Judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in case of Abinav Mohan Dilkar (Supra). The
Hon'ble Apex Court, in the same Judgment, has held as under:
"15. Pawan Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh
was a case of elopement which resulted in a criminal
prosecution against the boy, later acquitted on the
girl's testimony in his favour. The boy continued to
harass the girl, holding her responsible for the
criminal proceeding initiated and even threatened to
kidnap her; which proximate threat led to the girl
setting herself ablaze. A dying declaration in the
form of a letter, pinned the responsibility of her
death on the accused. While upholding the (1994) 1
SCC 73 (2017) 7 SCC 780 Criminal Appeal Nos.
2177-85 of 2024 conviction entered into by the High
Court reversing the acquittal by the Trial Court, this
Court held so on the scope of the words 'abetment'
and 'instigate':
"43. Keeping in view the aforesaid legal
position, we are required to address whether
there has been abetment in committing
suicide. Be it clearly stated that mere
allegation of harassment without any positive
action in proximity to the time of occurrence
on the part of the accused that led a person to
commit suicide, a conviction in terms of
Section 306 IPC is not sustainable. A casual
remark that is likely to cause harassment in
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ordinary course of things will not come within
the purview of instigation. A mere reprimand
or a word in a fit of anger will not earn the
status of abetment. There has to be positive
action that creates a situation for the victim to
put an end to life.
44. In the instant case, the accused
had by his acts and by his continuous course of
conduct created such a situation as a
consequence of which the deceased was left
with no other option except to commit suicide.
The active acts of the accused have led the
deceased to put an end to her life. That apart,
we do not find any material on record which
compels the Court to conclude that the victim
committing suicide was hypersensitive to
ordinary petulance, discord and difference in
domestic life quite common to the society to
which the victim belonged. On the other hand,
the accused has played active role in tarnishing
the self-esteem and self-respect of the victim
which drove the victim girl to commit suicide.
The cruelty meted out to her has, in fact,
induced her to extinguish her life spark."
Criminal Appeal Nos. 2177-85 of 2024. Here
again the live link, to the just prior threat was
emphasised while also noticing the fact that a
young girl living in a village setting, also
belonging to the poor strata of society, was
threatened and teased constantly, resulting in
her resort to the extreme step. The accused
would have known that his acts would lead to
the drastic consequence.
16. Amalendu Pal vs. State of West Bengal 8 also
held:
8 (2010) 1 SCC 707.
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"Merely on the allegation of harassment
without there being any positive action
proximate to the time of occurrence on the
part of the accused which led or compelled the
person to commit suicide, conviction in terms
of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable."
17. S.S.Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan9
emphasised the requirement of a positive act on the
part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing
suicide. Looking at Section 306, it was held so:
"... in order to convict a person under
Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens
rea to commit the offence. It also requires an
active act or direct act which led the deceased
to commit suicide seeing no option and that
act must have been intended to push the
deceased into such a position that he
committed suicide."
17. There cannot be any dispute made with regard to the
proposition of law, settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court holding,
that mere allegations of harassment, without any positive action, in
proximity to the type of occurrence on the part of the accused that
led to a person to commit suicide, a conviction under Section 306
IPC is not sustainable. The facts of this case in hand, however,
totally, differ. As observed hereinabove, on the basis of evidence on
record, that the deceased was subjected to the cruelty, since
substantial period of time, so also, she was subjected to the cruelty
9 (2010) 12 SCC 190.
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just before the act of commission of suicide by her. The said cruelty
was not only verbal, but also physical. This Court finds no
substance in the contention of counsel for the Appellant that in the
PM notes, no injuries are seen on the person of the deceased. It is
pertinent to note that, prior to about 2 to 3 days of the occurrence
of the incident, the deceased had been to her brother, and
complained about the harassment caused by the
Accused/Appellant. In such circumstances, it would not be possible
that any injuries on her person could be seen during the
postmortem of the deceased. In respectful view of this Court, the
Judgment cited of the Hon'ble Supreme Court would not apply to
the present case for the material difference in the facts involved in
both cases.
18. As a result of the above discussion, it must be held that the
prosecution has conclusively and beyond reasonable doubt proved
that the deceased was subjected to the cruel treatment by the
Appellant-husband, and on account of the same, she committed
suicide. Thus, the Appellant has abetted the act of commission of
suicide by the deceased, which makes him liable for the offences
punishable under section 306 and 498A of IPC.
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19. In view of the said findings, there is no justification in
causing interference as in the Judgment and Order of the learned
Trial Court recording conviction of Accused.
20. Heard learned APP so also learned counsel for the Appellant
on sentence.
21. Considering the nature of offence and since wife of
Appellant lost her life due to harassment / ill-treatment caused by
him, this is not a fit case to extend benefits of probation of
offenders act to the Appellant.
22. Having regard to the fact that the incident has occurred as
back as in the year 1994, so also having regard to the present age
of the Appellant, it would be in the interest of justice that he is
sentenced to suffer one year rigorous imprisonment instead of
seven years with fine as directed by the Trial Court. Hence,
following order.
ORDER
(i) The Appeal stands partly allowed.
(ii) Judgment and order of conviction of the stands
confirmed.
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(iii) The substantive sentence imposed against the
Appellant, however is modified.
(iv) The appellant to suffer one year of rigorous
imprisonment.
(v) Rest of the order passed by the Trial Court to
remain unchanged.
23. A copy of this order be sent to the Trial Court. Trial Court to
take steps to ensure that Appellant undergoes above sentence.
(R. M. JOSHI, J.)
{
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