Sunday, 10, May, 2026
 
 
 
Expand O P Jindal Global University
 
  
  
 
 
 

Vaibhav S/O Dipak Sadanshiv vs The State Of Maharashtra Thr Pso Ps ...
2026 Latest Caselaw 308 Bom

Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 308 Bom
Judgement Date : 13 January, 2026

[Cites 8, Cited by 0]

Bombay High Court

Vaibhav S/O Dipak Sadanshiv vs The State Of Maharashtra Thr Pso Ps ... on 13 January, 2026

2026:BHC-NAG:506-DB

                                              1            27.APL.1183-2025.JUDGMENT.odt




                      IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR

                       CRIMINAL APPLICATION (APL) NO. 1183 OF 2025

                      Vaibhav S/o Dipak Sadanshiv,
                      Age 32 Years, Occ. Business,
                      R/o Anand Nagar, Ward No. 4,
                      Post Mudza, Ta & Dist. Gadchiroli.
                                                           APPLICANT

                       Versus

                  1. The State of Maharashtra,
                     Through its Police Station Officer,
                     Police Station Gadchiroli,
                     Ta & Dist. Gadchiroli.
                  2. X.Y.Z.    (Victim)     in   Crime
                     No.266/2025, Thr. Police Station
                     Officer, Police Station Gadchiroli,
                     Dist. Gadchiroli.                   NON-APPLICANTS

                -----------------------------------------------
                Mr. S. Deshpande, Advocate a/w Mr. S.D. Borkute, Advocate for
                the Applicant.
                Mr. N.H. Joshi, APP for the Non-applicant No.1/State.
                Mr. V.V. Sharma, Advocate (Appointed) for the Non-applicant
                No.2.
                -----------------------------------------------

                                  CORAM : URMILA JOSHI PHALKE, J.

                                  DATED     : 13th JANUARY, 2026.

                 ORAL JUDGMENT :-
                               2             27.APL.1183-2025.JUDGMENT.odt




1.          Heard.


2. ADMIT. Heard finally by the consent of learned

Counsel for the respective parties.

3. The Applicant has approached this Court by filing

the present Application under Section 528 of the Bharatiya

Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) 2023 for quashing of the First

Information Report in connection with Crime No.266/2025

dated 02.05.2025 registered with Police Station Gadchiroli,

District Gadchiroli under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya

Sanhita (BNS), 2023 and consequent proceeding arising out of

the same bearing Sessions Case No.77/2025 pending before the

Additional Sessions Judge-1, Gadchiroli.

4. The crime is registered on the basis of the report

lodged by the Non-applicant No.2 on an allegation that she was

serving at Gadchiroli in the year 2018 and she got acquaintance

with the present Applicant in the year 2019 who proposed her

for marriage. It is further alleged that, on the promise of

marriage he used to visit her room and subjected her for the

forceful sexual assault and subsequently he declined to perform 3 27.APL.1183-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

marriage with her. It is the allegation that, on the promise of

marriage he established physical relations with her. On the basis

of the said report Police have registered the crime against the

present Applicant. During investigation, the Investigating

Officer has recorded the relevant statements of the witnesses,

collected the medical certificate and after completion of the

investigation submitted charge-sheet against the present

Applicant.

5. Heard learned Counsel for the Applicant who

submitted that, the entire relationship between the Applicant

and Non-applicant No.2 was consensual and there was no iota

of concealment or misrepresentation. He submitted that, the

Non-applicant No.2 obtained a report itself and submitted that,

there was a promise of marriage and on that count there was

physical relationship between them. Thus, the relationship

which is of a consensual in nature out of mutual affection

developed between them, no offence is made out as far as the

offence under Section 69 of the BNS is concerned. He submitted

that, by no stage of imagination it can be said that the Applicant

has lured the Non-applicant No.2 and out of lust the said 4 27.APL.1183-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

offence is committed. On the contrary, the statement of Victim/

Non-applicant No.2 itself shows that, out of the promise of

marriage she has developed the relationship with the Applicant,

and therefore, no prima facie case is made out. In view of that,

the Application deserves to be allowed.

6. Per contra, learned APP strongly opposed the

contentions of the learned Counsel for the Applicant and

pointed out the various statements of the witnesses and

submitted that, on the promise of marriage i.e. under the

misconception of the fact the Applicant has subjected for

forceful sexual assault, and therefore, prima facie case is made

out, and therefore, the Application deserves to be rejected.

7. Learned appointed Counsel for the Non-applicant

No.2, has endorsed the same contentions and submitted that the

Non-applicant No.2 was exploited by the Applicant not only

physically but he has also extracted money from her and he

invited my attention towards the statement recorded under

Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as some

screen shots showing that the amounts are extracted from the 5 27.APL.1183-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

Non-applicant No.2. He submitted that, considering all these

facts the Application deserves to be rejected.

8. On hearing both the sides and on perusal of the

entire investigation papers it reveals that, the Applicant and the

Non-applicant No.2 got acquaintance with each other in the

year 2018 and thereafter till 2024 the said relationship was

continued. Thus, it is relevant that it was a consensual

relationship between the Applicant and Non-applicant No.2 by

understanding the consequences of the act. This aspect is

considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in various decisions.

9. In view of these facts, I am of the considered

opinion that the relationship was nothing but consensual in

nature between two major persons. The concept of 'consent' has

been elaborated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of

Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. ,

(2019) 9 SCC 608, which reads as under :

"16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a "misconception of fact" that vitiates the woman's "consent". On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false 6 27.APL.1183-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The "consent" of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a "misconception of fact" where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act."

10. In Deepak Gulati vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 7

SCC 675, this Court observed:

"21. ... There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently.

24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time, i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The "failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the fact must have an immediate relevance". Section 90 of IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, "unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.

(Emphasis supplied)"

7 27.APL.1183-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

11. In Uday Vs. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46,

the complainant was a college going student when the accused

promised to marry her. In the complainant's statement, she

admitted that she was aware that there would be significant

opposition from both the complainant's and accused families to

the proposed marriage. She engaged in sexual intercourse with

the accused but nonetheless kept the relationship secret from

her family. The court observed that in these circumstances the

accused promise to marry the complainant was not of

immediate relevance to the complainant's decision to engage in

sexual intercourse with the accused, which was motivated by

other factors: (SCC P.58, Para 25)

"25. There is yet another difficulty which faces the prosecution in this case. In a case of this nature two conditions must be fulfilled for the application of Section 90 IPC. Firstly, it must be shown that the consent was given under a misconception of fact. Secondly, it must be proved that the person who obtained the consent knew, or had reason to believe that the consent was given in consequence of such misconception. We have serious doubts that the promise to marry induced the prosecutrix to consent to having sexual intercourse with the appellant. She knew, as we have observed earlier, that her marriage with the appellant was difficult on account of caste considerations. The proposal was bound to meet with stiff opposition from members of both families. There was therefore a distinct possibility, of which she was clearly conscious, that the marriage may not take place at all despite the promise of the appellant. The question still remains whether even if it were so, the appellant knew, or 8 27.APL.1183-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

had reason to believe, that the prosecutrix had consented to having sexual intercourse with him only as a consequence of her belief, based on his promise, that they will get married in due course. There is hardly any evidence to prove this fact. On the contrary, the circumstances of the case tend to support the conclusion that the appellant had reason to believe that the consent given by the prosecutrix was the result of their deep love for each other. It is not disputed that they were deeply in love. They met often, and it does appear that the prosecutrix permitted him liberties which, if at all, are permitted only to a person with whom one is in deep love. It is also not without significance that the prosecutrix stealthily went out with the appellant to a lonely place at 12 clock in the night. It usually happens in such cases, when two young persons are madly in love, that they promise to each other several times that come what may, they will get married...

(Emphasis supplied)"

12. To summarize the legal position that emerges from

the above cases, the "consent" of a woman with respect to

Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation

towards the proposed act. To establish whether the "consent"

was vitiated by a "misconception of fact" arising out of a

promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The

promise of marriage must have been a false promise given in

bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time

it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate

relevance or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to

engage in the sexual act.

9 27.APL.1183-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

13. I am therefore of the view that, the matter squarely

falls within the parameters laid down in the judgment in the

case of State of Harayana & Ors. Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others ,

1992 AIR 604, which read as under:

"1) ........

2) ........

3) ........

4) ........

5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

6) ........

7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

14. The allegations made in the First Information

Report, upon careful perusal, appear to be inherently

improbable and devoid of material substance. It is difficult to

accept that a woman of mature understanding, would continue

to voluntarily meet and maintain physical intimacy with him

over an extended period if such acts were indeed induced by

deception or coercion.

10 27.APL.1183-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

15. In my considered opinion, this is a fit case to quash

the charge-sheet/final report form. Accordingly, I proceed to

pass the following order.

ORDER

i. Criminal Application is allowed.

ii. The First Information Report in connection with Crime No. 266/2025 dated 02.05.2025 registered with Police Station Gadchiroli, District Gadchiroli under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 and consequent proceeding arising out of the same bearing Sessions Case No.77/2025 pending before the Additional Sessions Judge-1, Gadchiroli, are hereby quashed and set aside to the extent of present Applicant.

iii. Fees of the learned Appointed Counsel be quantified as per rules.

16. Pending application/s, if any, shall stand disposed of

accordingly.

(URMILA JOSHI PHALKE, J.)

S.D.Bhimte Signed by: Mr.S.D.Bhimte Designation: PA To Honourable Judge Date: 14/01/2026 13:55:25

 
Download the LatestLaws.com Mobile App
 
 
Latestlaws Newsletter
 

Publish Your Article

 

Campus Ambassador

 

Media Partner

 

Campus Buzz

 

LatestLaws Guest Court Correspondent

LatestLaws Guest Court Correspondent Apply Now!
 

LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026

 

LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!

 
 

LatestLaws Partner Event : IJJ

 

LatestLaws Partner Event : Smt. Nirmala Devi Bam Memorial International Moot Court Competition

 
 
Latestlaws Newsletter