[Cites 12, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Mohan Gangaram Narang vs City And Industrial Development ... on 26 February, 2026
Author: N. J. Jamadar
Bench: N. J. Jamadar
2026:BHC-AS:9986
Digitally signed
SANTOSH by SANTOSH
SUBHASH
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SUBHASH KULKARNI
KULKARNI Date: 2026.02.26
22:09:05 +0530
Arun Sankpal
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 17668 OF 2024
Mohan Gangaram Narang,
Age 82 Years, Occupation Not Known,
Residing at A-1/62/2, A1 Type Apartment
Owners Association, Sector 21, Turbhe, Navi
Mumbai - 400 706. Currently residing at
Room No. 03, Old Barrack, T-105, Gandhi
Market, Near B.M.C. School, Chembur
Camp, ...Petitioner
Chembur, Mumbai.
Versus
1) City and Industrial Development
Corporation Ltd (CIDCO)
Through Its Chief Managing Director,
Having its Corporate Office at Nirmal
Building
No.2, Nariman Point, Mumbai - 400 021.
2) City and Industrial Development
Corporation Ltd, (CIDCO),
Through, its Estate Manager,
Having its office at CIDCO Bhavan,
C.B.D. Belapur, Navi Mumbai - 400 614.
3) The Secretary,
A-1 Type Apartment Owners Association,
Phase-I B-Row, Sector-21, Turbhe,
Navi Mumbai- 400 705.
4) Rajaram Ramdeo Jaiswar,
An Adult, Occupation - Retired,
Residing at NL-1B, L.I.G. 12/07, Shatkar
Apartment Owners Association,
Sector -10, Nerul, Navi Mumbai - 400 706.
1/27
::: Uploaded on - 26/02/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 27/02/2026 22:26:57 :::
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5) Vivek Rajesh Agarwal,
An Adult, Occupation - Not Known,
Residing at JN-1/44/A, Flat No. A-3,
Sector - 09, Near Shabri Hotel,
Sector -15, Vashi, Navi Mumbai - 400 703. ...Respondents
Mr. Harshad Rajeshirke, with Nikhil Rajeshirke, Saurabh
Rajeshirke and Tejasvi Salvi, for the Petitioner.
Mr. Soham Bhalerao, i/b DSK Legal, for Respondent No.1-
CIDCO.
Mr. Nilesh S Bagade, for Respondent No.4.
Mr. Rajaram Jaiswar, for Respondent No.7.
CORAM: N. J. JAMADAR, J.
RESERVED ON : 3rd DECEMBER 2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 26th FEBRUARY, 2026
JUDGMENT:
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. With the consent of
the learned Counsel for the parties heard finally.
2. This Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
assails the legality, propriety and correctness of an order dated
12th September 2024 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Thane,
on an Application (Exhibit 19) in RCS No. 240 of 2023, whereby
the said Application preferred by the Petitioner-Plaintiff for a
judgment on admission under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 ("the Code"), came to be rejected.
3. Shorn of unnecessary details the background facts can
be stated as under:
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3.1 For the sake of convenience and clarity the parties are
hereinter referred to in the capacity in which they are arrayed in
the Suit.
3.2 The Plaintiff is the original allottee of a tenement, bearing
No. A-1/62/2, Sector 21, Turbhe, Navi Mumbai ("the suit
premises"), developed by CIDCO (D1). The Plaintiff has been in
lawful possession and occupation of the suit premises.
Occupants of the building formed a society, A-1 Type Apartment
Owners Association (D3).
3.3 The Plaintiff asserts, Defendant Nos. 4 and 5 with intent to
defraud the Plaintiff, prepared false and forged documents.
Defendant No. 3- society on the basis of such false and forged
documents, issued a NOC for registration of the Deed of
Apartment. On the basis of such forged document and NOC,
Defendant Nos. 4 and 5 applied to CIDCO (D1) for registration of
the Deed of Apartment. Somebody impersonated the Plaintiff
and a false and forged Deed of Apartment dated 10 th October
2016, was got executed and registered. On the strength of the
said Deed of Apartment dated 10th October 2016, Defendant Nos.
4 and 5 executed another forged Conveyance Deed dated 30 th
November 2016, by making somebody impersonate Plaintiff
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before the Registrar of Assurances. Under the said Conveyanc
Deed the suit premises was fradulently transferred in favour of
Defendant No.4. The Deed of Apartment and the Conveyance
Deed are thus not binding upon the Plaintiff.
3.4 As the fraud was unearthed, the CIDCO (D1) revoked the
NOC and permission to sell. Vide letter dated 14 th February
2017, the CIDCO (D1) noted that an impersonator has forged all
the ID proof documents, and deceived all the Authorities.
CIDCO (D1) thus cancelled the instruments which were
registered with the Registrar. However, the Plaintiff was advised
that the since the documents have been registered, the same
could be cancelled only through the orders of the competent
Civil Court.
3.5 The Plaintiff has thus instituted a suit seeking a
declaration that Deed of Apartment dated 10 th October 2016
and 30th November 2016 in respect of the suit premises are
false, fabricated and bad-in-law and null and voide, and those
Deeds of Apartment are not binding upon the Plaintiff and the
consequential relief of injunction.
3.6 Defendant No. 4, in whose favour the Deed of
Apartment/Conveyance Deed dated 30th November 2016 has
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been executed, has appeared before the Court and contested the
suit by filing Written Statement.
3.7 The Plaintiff took out an Application for a decree on
admission under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code, asserting inter
alia that the suit has proceeded ex parte against rest of the
Defendants. Only Defendant No. 4 has professed to contest the
suit by filing Written Statement. In the said Writ Statement,
Defendant No. 4, has, however, made clear and categorical
admissions, especially in paragraph 22(j) and (m) of the Written
Statement to the effect that the Plaintiff is the real owner of the
suit property and Defendant No. 4 had purchased the suit
property from an impersonator of the Plaintiff. In view of such
clear and explicit admissions, there was no propriety in
proceeding further with the suit and, thus, a decree on
admission be passed.
3.8 Defendant No. 4 resisted the Application.
3.9 After hearing the parties and appraisal of the contentions
in the Written Statement, which allegedly contain admission of
the claim of the Plaintiff, the learned Civil Judge was persuaded
to reject the Application. The learned Civil Judge was of the view
that to pass a decree on admission under Order XII Rule 6 of
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the Code, the admission must be clear, unambiguous and
unconditional. In the case at hand, in the opinion of the Civil
Judge, there was no clear admission of the Plaintiff's claim by
Defendant No. 4 in his Written Statement.
3.10 The contention that Defendant No. 4 was deceived by an
impersonator, was referable to the knowledge which the
Defendant gained after enquiry. The Plaintiff has made
allegations against the Defendant No.4 that Defendant No. 4
has forged the documents, and there was no admission in
relation to the said contention. Thus, a decree on admission
cannot be passed.
4. I have heard Mr. Harshad Rajeshirke, the learned Counsel
for the Petitioner, and Nilesh S. Bagade, the learned Counsel for
Respondent No. 4 and Mr. Soham Bhalerao, the learned
Counsel for CIDCO (R1). With the assistance of the learned
Counsel for the parties, I have also perused the material on
record, especially the pleadings of the parties.
5. Mr. Rajeshirke, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner,
submitted that the learned Civil Judge committed a manifest
error in declining to pass a decree on admission by taking an
erroneous view that there was no clear, unambiguous and
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unconditional admission. Taking the Court through the
contentions in the Written Statement, especially paragraph 22
(j) and 22(m), Mr Rajeshirke would urge that, the contentions in
the Written Statement constitute an unequivocal admission by
Defendant No.4. The learned Civil Judge was not at all justified
in brushing aside the admission in pleadings, which stand on a
higher footing.
6. The refusal to exercise the discretion to pass a decree on
admission in the circumstances of the case caused prejudice to
the Plaintiff, who is above 80 years of age. No fruitful purpose
would be served by proceeding with the suit, in the face of such
clear and explicit admission. The learned Civil Judge did not
keep in view the object of the provision which empowers the
Court to pass a decree on admission, urged Mr. Rajeshirke.
7. Mr Rajeshirke would submit that the attendant
circumstances also substantiate the claim of the Plaintiff.
Defendant No.3-society has withdrawn the NOC by addressing a
communication dated 19th December 2016. The society was
deceived into issuing the NOC by tendering false and forged
documents. Secondly, the instrument of Deed of
Apartment/Conveyance, squarely militates against the bona fide
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of the claim of Defendant No.4. Emphasis was laid on the fact
that under the Conveyance Deed dated 30th November 2016,
Defendant No. 4 had allegedly paid the consideration of Rs.10
Lakhs, somewhere in the year 1998 towards full and final sale
price. This recital in the Conveyance Deed regarding the
payment of consideration prior to 18 years, indicates the falsity
of the claim of Defendant No.4 that he was a bona fide
purchaser for value without notice and thus a victim of fraud
allegedly played by the impersonator of the Plaintiff.
8. In opposition to this Mr. Bagade, the learned Counsel for
the Respondent No.4 stoutly supported the impugned order. It
was contended that in the Written Statement, Defendant No. 4
has nowhere admitted that the Plaintiff is the real owner of the
suit premises and the instrument in question are forged. What
the Defendant No.4 has contended is that Defendant Nos. 1 and
2 had apprised him about the allegations of the Plaintiff.
Therefore, the contentions in paragraph 22(j) and (m) of the
Written Statement, which are referable to someone else's
knowledge and understanding, cannot be considered as
admission, by the Defendant No.4.
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9. On the contrary, Mr Bagade would urge, Defendant No.4
has categorically denied the case set up by the Plaintiff. In
substance, there was no clear admission, and the contentions in
the Written Statement especially paragraph 22(j) and (m) were
based on narration of facts by other persons. It was further
submitted that, whether Defendant No. 4 has been deceived by
the Plaintiff or the alleged impersonator is required to be
adjudicated at the trial. Therefore, the impugned order does not
warrant any interference in exercise of the supervisory
jurisdiction.
10. To appreciate the aforesaid submissions in a correct
perspective, at the threshold, it may be apposite to extract the
contentions in paragraphs 22(j) and 22(m) of the written
statement filed by the defendant No.4, which the plaintiff claims
contain the admissions on the strength of which a decree can be
passed. They read as under:
"22(j) When the Defendant No.4 tried to enquire with the
officials of the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 about the suit premises,
he came to know that the Plaintiff approached the Defendant
Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and requested for the cancellation of Deed of
Apartments/Conveyance Deed, dated 10/10/2016 and
30/11/2016. Further the Defendant No. 4 also came to know
that the person from whom he purchased the suit premises is
not the real owner of the suit premises and the Plaintiff is the
Real Owner of the suit premises. He also came to know that the
Plaintiff is the real Mr. Mohan Gangaram Narang and the one
from whom he purchased The Suit Premises is impersonator of
Mr. Mohan Gangaram Narang.
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22(m) The Defendant No. 4 is an old aged person and paid
the amount of Total Consideration out of his retirement money
and savings. He suffered huge financial losses from the said
transaction and he is getting punished for no fault on his part.
The Defendant No.4 acted in good faith throughout the
transaction and been cheated/deceived by the Defendant No. 5
and the impersonator of Mr. Mohan Gangaram Narang. The
Defendant No. 4 is the victim of the negligence of the Plaintiff
and the Defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3."
11. It would be immediately necessary to note the reasons
which dissuaded the learned Civil Judge from exercising the
discretion to pass a decree on the basis of aforesaid purported
admissions. The learned Civil Judge was of the view that there
was no clear admission. Secondly, on the basis of the fact that
the defendant came to know about the real owner of the suit
property and an impersonator of the plaintiff sold the suit
property, an inference of admission cannot be drawn and suit
decreed. Thirdly, the plaintiff has made various allegations
against defendant No.4 including that, defendant No.4 has
forged the instruments and, thus, it would be appropriate not to
exercise the discretion as those issues need to be adjudicated on
the basis of evidence.
12. Whether the aforesaid approach of the learned Civil Judge
is justified? Or, the discretion not to pass the decree on
admission requires correction?
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13. Before exploring an answer to the aforesaid question, the
contours of the power to pass a judgment on admission deserve
to be kept in view. Order XII Rule 6 of the Code reads as under:
"Order XII Rule 6. Judgment on admissions.--
(1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the
pleading or otherwise; whether orally or in writing, the Court
may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any
party or of its own motion and without waiting for the
determination of any other question-between the parties, make
such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having
regard to such admissions.
(2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1)
a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment
and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was
pronounced."
14. The text of sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 of Order XII, on its plain
reading, makes it abundantly clear that, the legislature has
designedly conferred jurisdiction on the Court to pass a
judgment on admission. The phraseology underscores that the
source of admission is not of material significance. Firstly, the
admissions can be found either in the pleadings or otherwise.
Secondly, the insistence for admission being in writing is done
away with. The admission may be oral or in writing. Thirdly, the
stage of the suit does not matter. The Code expressly empowers
the Court to pass judgment on admission at any stage of the
suit. The said aspect is further reinforced by the words "without
waiting for the determination of any other question between the
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parties". Fourthly, the party, in whose favour the admission is
made, need not apply. The Court, on its own motion, can pass a
judgment on admission if it comes to the conclusion that the
claim or part of the claim of one party is admitted by the other.
Lastly, the exercise of the said power is undoubtedly
discretionary. But, in view of the wide ambit and unhinged
nature of the powers conferred on the Court to pass a judgment
on admission, the Court may not be justified in refusing the
relief where a case falls within the four corners of the said
provision. The Court is required to be alive to the object of the
provisions namely to give an expeditious relief to a party when
its claim is admitted by the adversary.
15. A profitable reference, in this context, can be made to the
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Uttam Singh
Duggal & Co. Ltd. Vs. United Bank of India & Ors.1, wherein the
object of the aforesaid rule was expounded and the approach
expected of the Court was delineated, in the following words :
"12 As to the object of the Order 12 Rule 6, we need not say
anything more than what the legislature itself has said when
the said provision came to be amended. In the objects and
reasons set out while amending the said rule, it is stated that
where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a
judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted
claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a
speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which
according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is
entitled. We should not unduly narrow down the meaning of
1 (2000) 7 SCC 120
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this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy
judgment. Where other party has made a plain admission
entitling the former to succeed, it should apply and also
wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of
which, it is impossible for the party making such admission to
succeed."
(emphasis supplied)
16. The aforesaid pronouncement was followed by the
Supreme Court in the case of Karam Kapahi & Others Vs. Lal
Chand Public Charitable Trust 2. The Supreme Court traced the
historical backdrop of the said provision, including the
amendment introduced therein by the Amendment Act, 1976,
pursuant to the recommendations of the Law Commission, and
instructively enunciated the true nature and import of the said
provision. The observations of the Court are as under :
"37, The principles behind Order 12 Rule 6 are to give the
plaintiff a right to speedy judgment. Under this Rule either
party may get rid of so much of the rival claims about `which
there is no controversy' [See the dictum of Lord Jessel, the
Master of Rolls, in Thorp versus Holdsworth in (1876) 3
Chancery Division 637 at 640].
38. In this connection, it may be noted that order 12 Rule 6
was amended by the Amendment Act of 1976. Prior to
amendment the Rule read thus:-
"6. Judgment on admissions. - Any party may, at any
stage of a suit, where admissions of facts have been made,
either on pleadings or otherwise, apply to the Court for
such judgment or order as upon such admission he may
be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any
other question between the parties and the Court may
upon such application make such order or give such
judgment, as the Court may think just."
39. In the 54th Law Commission Report, an amendment was
suggested to enable the Court to give a judgment not only on
the application of a party but on its own motion. It is thus clear
that the amendment was brought about to further the ends of
2 (2010) 4 SCC 753
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justice and give these provisions a wider sweep by empowering
judges to use it `ex debito justitial, a Latin term, meaning a debt
of justice. In our opinion the thrust of the amendment is that in
an appropriate case, a party, on the admission of the other
party, can press for judgment, as a matter of legal right.
However, the Court always retains its discretion in the matter of
pronouncing judgment.
40. If the provision of order 12 Rule 1 is compared with Order
12 Rule 6, it becomes clear that the provision of Order 12 Rule
6 is wider in as much as the provision of order 12 Rule 1 is
limited to admission by `pleading or otherwise in writing' but in
Order 12 Rule 6 the expression `or otherwise' is much wider in
view of the words used therein namely: `admission of
fact.........either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or
in writing'.
41. Keeping the width of this provision in mind this Court
held that under this rule admissions can be inferred from facts
and circumstances of the case [See Charanjit Lal Mehra and
others v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan (Smt.) and another, (2005) 11
SCC 279 at page 285 (para 8)]. Admissions in answer to
interrogatories are also covered under this Rule [See Mullas's
commentary on the Code, 16th Edition, Volume II, page 2177].
42. In the case of Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd., v. United
Bank of India and others, (2000) 7 SCC 120, this Court, while
construing this provision, held that the Court should not
unduly narrow down its application as the object is to enable a
party to obtain speedy judgment.
43. In that case it was contended on behalf of the appellant,
Uttam Singh Duggal, that:
(a) Admissions under Order 12 Rule 6 should only be
those which are made in the pleadings.
(b) The admissions would in any case have to be read
along with the first proviso to Order 8 Rule 5 (1) of the
Code and the Court may call upon the party relying on
such admission to prove its case independently.
(c) The expression `either in pleadings or otherwise'
should be interpreted ejusdem generis. [See para 11,
pages 126-127 of the report]
Almost similar contentions have been raised on behalf of
the Club. In Uttam Singh (supra) those contentions were
rejected and this Court opined no effort should be made
to narrow down the ambit of Order 12 Rule 6.
44. In Uttam Singh (supra) this Court made a distinction
between a suit just between the parties and a suit relating to
Specific Relief Act where a declaration of status is given which
not only binds the parties but also binds generations. The
Court held such a declaration may be given merely on
admission (para 16, page 128 of the report). But in a situation
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like the present one where the controversy is between the
parties on an admission of non-payment of rent, judgment can
be rendered on admission by Court.
45. Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code has been very lucidly
discussed and succinctly interpreted in a Division Bench
judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Shikharchand v.
Bari Bai reported in AIR 1974 Madhya Pradesh 75. Justice G.P.
Singh (as His Lordship then was) in a concurring judgment
explained the aforesaid rule, if we may say so, very
authoritatively at page 79 of the report. His Lordship held : (AIR
para 19)
"... I will only add a few words of my own. Rule 6 of Order
12 of the Code of civil Procedure corresponds to Rule 5 of
Order 32 of the Supreme Court Rules (English), now rule
3 of Order 27, and is almost identically worded (see
Annual Practice 1965 edition Part I. p. 569). The Supreme
Court Rule came up for consideration in Ellis v. Allen
(1914) Ch 904. In that case a suit was filed for ejectment,
mesne profits and damages on the ground of breach of
covenant against sub-letting.
Lessee's solicitors wrote to the plaintiff's solicitors in
which fact of breach of covenant was admitted and a case
was sought to be made out for relief against forfeiture.
This letter was used as an admission under rule 5 and as
there was no substance in the plea of relief against
forfeiture, the suit was decreed for ejectment under that
rule. Sargant, J. rejected the argument that the rule is
confined to admissions made in pleadings or under rules
1 to 4 in the same order (same as ours) and said:
"The rule applies wherever there is a clear admission of
facts in the face of which it is impossible for the party
making it to succeed."
Rule 6 of Order 12, in my opinion, must bear the same
construction as was put upon the corresponding English
rule by Sargent, J. The words "either on the pleadings or
otherwise" in rule 6 enable us not only to see the
admissions made in pleadings or under Rules 1 to 4 of the
same order but also admissions made elsewhere during
the trial."
46. This Court expresses its approval of the aforesaid
interpretation of Order 12 Rule 6 by Justice G.P. Singh (as His
Lordship then was). Mulla in his commentary on the Code has
also relied on ratio in Shikharchand (supra) for explaining these
provisions.
47. ........
48. However, the provision under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code
is enabling, discretionary and permissive and is neither
mandatory nor it is peremptory since the word "may" has been
used. But in the given situation, as in the instant case, the said
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provision can be applied in rendering the judgment."
(emphasis supplied)
17. It would be contextually relevant to note that the primary
requirement of there being a clear and unambiguous admission
by one party is a jurisdictional condition for the Court to
exercise the discretion under the aforesaid rule. This aspect was
highlighted by the Supreme Court in the case of Jeevan Diesels
and Electricals Limited Vs. Jasbir Singh Chadha (HUF) & Anr. 3
wherein, the Supreme Court underscored the necessity of
applying the principles in Karam Kapahi and Ors. V/s. Lal
Chand Public Charitable Trust4 to the facts of the given case.
Paragraph No.10 reads as under :
"10. The learned counsel for the respondents-
plaintiffs relied on a judgment of this Court in
Karam Kapahi & Others vs. M/s. Lal Chand
Public Charitable Trust & Another reported in
2010 (3) SCALE 569 and contended that in view
of the principles laid down in that case, this
Court may affirm the judgment of the High Court
in the instant case. This Court is unable to
accept the aforesaid contention. In Karam Kapahi
(supra) a Bench of this Court analyzed the
principles of Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code and
held that in the facts of that case there was clear
3 (2010) 6 SCC 601
4 (2010) 4 SCC 753
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admission on the part of the lessee about non-
payment of lease rent. The said admission was
made by the lessee in several proceedings apart
from its pleading in the suit. In view of such clear
admission, the Court applied the principles of
Order 12 Rule 6 in the case of Karam Kapahi
(supra). The principles of law laid down in Karam
Kapahi (supra) can be followed in this case only if
there is a clear and unequivocal admission of the
case of the plaintiff by the appellant. Whether or
not there is a clear, unambiguous admission by
one party of the case of the other party is
essentially a question of fact and the decision of
this question depends on the facts of the case.
This question, namely, whether there is a clear
admission or not cannot be decided on the basis
of a judicial precedent. Therefore, even though
the principles in Karam Kapahi (supra) may be
unexceptionable they cannot be applied in the
instant case in view of totally different fact
situation."
18. In the case of Himani Alloys Limited vs. Tata Steel
Limited5, the Supreme Court emphasise the discretionary
nature of the jurisdiction under Order XII Rule 6. The
enunciation of law in paragraph 11 of the said judgment is
instructive and, thus, extracted below:
"11. It is true that a judgment can be given on an "admission"
contained in the minutes of a meeting. But the admission
5 (2011) 15 SCC 273.
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should be categorical. It should be a conscious and deliberate
act of the party making it, showing an intention to be bound by
it. Order 12 Rule 6 being an enabling provision, it is neither
mandatory nor peremptory but discretionary. The court, on
examination of the facts and circumstances, has to exercise its
judicial discretion, keeping in mind that a judgment on
admission is a judgment without trial which permanently
denies any remedy to the defendant, by way of an appeal on
merits. Therefore unless the admission is clear, unambiguous
and unconditional, the discretion of the Court should not be
exercised to deny the valuable right of a defendant to contest
the claim. In short the discretion should be used only when
there is a clear "admission" which can be acted upon. (See also
Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. vs. United Bank of India [2000
(7) SCC 120], Karam Kapahi vs. Lal Chand Public Charitable
Trust [2010 (4) SCC 753] and Jeevan Diesels and Electricals
Ltd. vs. Jasbir Singh Chadha [2010 (6) SCC 601]. There is no
such admission in this case."
19. In the case of S. M. Asif vs. Virender Kumar Bajaj 6, a
three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court again postulated that
the words, "may" and "make such order or give such judgment
as it may think fit" implied in Order XII Rule 6, show that the
power under Order XII Rule 6 is discretionary and cannot be
claimed as a matter of right. Judgment on admission is not a
matter of right and rather is a matter of discretion of the Court.
Where the defendants have raised objections which go to the
root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise the
discretion under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The said rule is an
enabling provision which confers discretion on the Court in
delivering a quick judgment on admission and to the extent of
the claim admitted by one of the parties.
6 (2015) 9 SCC 287.
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20. The aforesaid being the nature of the discretionary
jurisdiction conferred on the Court, the purported admissions
in the written statement are required to be appreciated. In
addition to the contentions in paragraph 22(j) and 22(m)
(extracted above), the contentions in paragraph 22(k) and 22(l)
also deserve to be noted. They reads as under:
"(k) It was very much shocking and surprising for the
Defendant No.04) that he was been cheated/deceased
by the Defendant No.05) and the impersonator of MR.
MOHAN GANGARAM NARANG. The Defendant No.04)
has acted in good faith and suffered the loss of Lakhs of
Rupees. Further he also came to know that the
Defendant No. 01) & 02) sealed The Suit Premises.
(l) There is a negligence on the part of the Plaintiff
and also on the part of the Defendant No. 01) 02) & 03),
It is really not digestible that someone has sold The Suit
Premises of the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff is not aware
about it. Even the Defendant No. 01), 02) & 03) gave
their No Objection Certificates (N. O. C) and later
withdrawing/cancelling it. It was the duty of the
Defendant No. 01), 02) & 03) to check and confirm the
identity of the Owner of The Suit Premises before
issuing their No Objection Certificates (N. 0. C.) for any
such transaction. The same is not possible without the
involvement of the Officials/ Members of the Defendant
No. 01), 02) & 03) in cheating/ deceiving the Defendant
No. 04) and hence the detail investigation to that effect
is necessary. Later the Defendant No.01), 02) & 03)
cancelled their No Objection Certificates (N.O.C) without
considering the grievances of the Defendant No.04)."
21. Do these contentions constitute clear, unequivocal and
unambiguous admissions?
22. From the perusal of the contentions in paragraph 22(j) of
the written statement, it becomes evident that they are in three
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parts. First, the defendant No.4 made inquiries with the
officials of the defendant Nos.1 and 2 and thereupon he came to
know that the plaintiff approached the defendant Nos.1 to 3 and
requested for the cancellation of the instruments. In the second
part, the defendant No.4 contends he also came to know that
the persons from whom the defendant No.4 purchased the suit
flat was not the real owner thereof and the plaintiff was the real
owner. Thirdly, the defendant No.4 came to know that the
plaintiff is the real Mohan Gangaram Narang and the one from
whom he purchased the suit premises was an impersonator.
23. In paragraph 22(k) the defendant No.4 reiterates that "he
has been cheated/deceived by the defendant No.5 and the
impersonator of Mr. Mohan Gangaram Narang". The defendant
No.4 acted in good faith and suffered loss of lakhs of rupees.
24. In paragraph 22(l) the defendant No.4 has attributed
negligence to the officials of defendant Nos.1, 2 and 3 and
contends that the transaction was not possible without the
involvement of the officials/members of the defendant Nos.1, 2
and 3 in cheating/deceiving the defendant No.4 and, therefore,
a detailed investigation was necessary.
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25. If these contentions in paragraph 22(j), (k), (l) and (m) are
read in juxtaposition with each other, it becomes explicitly clear
that the thrust of the defence of defendant No.4 is that he was
deceived by defendant No.5 and the impersonator of Mr. Mohan
Gangaram Narang. It is imperative to note the contention that
the defendant No.4 has been deceived by defendant No.5 and
the impersonator of Mohan Gangaram Narang is not a solitary
statement. The said contention finds mention in paragraphs
22(k), 22(l) and 22(m).
26. Defendant No.4 has indeed claimed that he came to know
that the person from whom he purchased the suit flat is not the
real owner and the plaintiff is the real owner of the suit
premises and that the plaintiff is the real Mr. Mohan Gangaram
Narang and one from whom he purchased the suit flat was the
impersonator of the plaintiff. The submission on behalf of the
defendant No.4 - respondent No.4 that the aforesaid statements
are based on the knowledge of the defendant No.4 which he
gathered from the inquiries with the officials of defendant Nos.1
and 2, is required to be appreciated in the light of the fact that
there is no specific denial in the written statement that the
plaintiff had not known the defendant Nos.4 and 5; there was
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no transaction between the plaintiff and defendant No.4 and the
defendant No.4 has not paid any consideration to the plaintiff.
27. Thus, the endeavour of Mr. Bagade to salvage the position
by canvassing a submission that the aforesaid statement in
regard to the plaintiff being the real owner of the suit flat and
the person who professed to sell the suit flat to the defendant
No.4 was an impersonator was based on the knowledge of the
defendant No.4 and not a statement of fact, cannot be acceded
to. In addition to aforesaid categorical statements, the defendant
No.4 repetitively contends that he had been deceived by
defendant No.5 and the impersonator of the plaintiff.
Undoubtedly, the defendant No.4 claims to have acted in good
faith and suffered the financial loss in the alleged fraudulent
transaction. However, that would, at best, furnish a cause of
action for the defendant No.4 to proceed against the defendant
No.5 and the alleged impersonator of the plaintiff.
28. In the case of Rajiv Ghosh Vs. Satya Narayan Jaiswal7, the
Supreme Court enunciated that the words, "or otherwise" are
wide enough to include all cases of admissions made in the
pleading or de hors the pleadings. The observations in
paragraphs 35 to 37 of the said judgment read as under:
7 2025 SCC OnLine SC 751
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"35. The words "or otherwise" are wide enough to include all
cases of admissions made in the pleadings or de hors the
pleadings. Under Rule 6, as originally enacted, it was held that
the words "or otherwise" without the words "in writing" used in
Rule 1 showed that a judgment could be given upon oral or
verbal admission also. [See: Beeny, re, (1894) 1 Ch D 499] The
Amendment Act of 1976, however, made the position clear
stating that such admissions may be "in the pleading or
otherwise" and "whether orally or in writing". Thus, after the
amendment in Rule 6, the admissions are not confined to Rule
1 or Rule 4 of Order 6, but are of general application. Such
admissions may be express or implied (constructive); may be in
writing or oral; or may be before the institution of the suit,
after the suit is brought or during the pendency of
proceedings.
36. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court very correctly
laid down the following interpretation of the provision of O. 12,
R. 6, CPC, in the decision of ITDC Limited v. Chander Pal Sood
and Son, (2000) 84 DLT 337 (DB) : (2000 AIHC 1990):
"Order 12, R. 6 of Code gives a very wide discretion to the
Court. Under this rule the Court may at any stage of the
suit either on the application of any party or of its own
motion and without determination of any other question
between the parties can make such order giving such
judgment as it may think fit on the basis of admission of a
fact made in the pleadings or otherwise whether orally or
in writing".
37. The use of the expression 'otherwise' in the aforesaid
context came to be interpreted by the High Court. Considering
the expression the Court interpreted the said word by stating
that it permits the Court to pass judgment on the basis of the
statement made by the parties not only on the pleadings but
also de hors the pleadings i.e. either in any document or even
in the statement recorded in the Court. If one of the parties'
statement is recorded under O. 10, Rr. 1 and 2 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, the same is also a statement which elucidates
matters in controversy. Any admission in such statement is
relevant not only for the purpose of finding out the real dispute
between the parties but also to ascertain as to whether or not
any dispute or controversy exists between the parties.
Admission if any is made by a party in the statement recorded,
would be conclusive against him and the Court can proceed to
pass judgment on the basis of the admission made therein."
29. The Supreme Court has thus emphasised that the
admissions need not be express. The admissions can be implied
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or constructive. In the instant case, repetitive assertions of
Defendant No.4 that Defendant No.5 and the impersonator of
the Plaintiff have deceived Defendant No.4 are impregnated with
an implied admission that there was no transaction as such
with the Plaintiff. The contentions in para 22(j) to 22(m) of the
Written Statement (extracted above), coupled with absence of
specific denial of the averments in the plaint that the Plaintiff
had not known Defendant No.4, there was no transaction
whatsoever between the Plaintiff and Defendant No.4 and the
latter had not paid any consideration to the Plaintiff,
cumulatively constitute an admission that there was no
transaction between the Plaintiff and Defendant No.4 and the
instruments in question have not been executed by the Plaintiff
in favour of Defendant No.4.
30. The recitals in the Deed of Conveyance dated 30 November
2016 that Defendant No.4 had paid the consideration of Rs.10
Lakhs to the vendor somewhere in the year 1998, further
underscores the fact that there was no transaction of
whatsoever nature between the Plaintiff and Defendant No.4.
The attendant circumstances also cannot be lost sight of. Upon
unearthing of the alleged fraud, the Society (D3) has cancelled
the NOC vide communication dated 19 December 2016 and
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CIDCO (D1) has cancelled the Deed of Apartment dated 10
October 2016. FIR was also directed to be lodged against the
suspects and pursuant thereto, FIR No.114 of 2017 has been
registered.
31. In the light of the aforesaid developments, if the
admissions in the Written Statement are considered, then it
becomes explicitly clear that the trial of the suit to the extent of
cancellation of the instruments in question is wholly
unwarranted. On the basis of the admissions, a judgment to
the effect that the instruments are void as there was no
transaction between the Plaintiff and Defendant No.4 can be
legitimately passed.
32. It is true, there are allegations of forgery qua Defendant
No.4 as well in the plaint. However, those allegations need not
detain the Court from passing a judgment on admission as
Defendant No.4 clearly admits that there was no transaction
between Defendant No.4 and Plaintiff and Defendant No.4 has
been deceived by Defendant No.5 and the impersonator of the
Plaintiff. It would be suffice to clarify that this judgment on
admission would not bear upon the guilt of the accused in the
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event the prosecution is initiated in pursuance of FIR No.114 of
2017.
33. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is persuaded to
partly allow the Petition and pass a decree on admission to the
extent of cancellation of the instruments under Section 31 of the
Specific Reliefs Act, 1963.
34. Hence, the following order :
:ORDER:
(i) The petition, thus, stands partly allowed.
(ii) The impugned order stands quashed and set aside.
(iii) The application for judgment on admission stands partly
allowed.
(iv) There shall be a decree on admission to the effect that the
Deed of Apartment dated 10 th October, 2016 and the Deed
of Apartment/Conveyance dated 30th November, 2016 are
void and do not bind the plaintiff and those instruments
are ordered to be delivered up and cancelled.
(v) The trial Court shall forward a copy of this decree to the
Registrar of Assurance in whose office the above
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instruments have been registered and the concerned
Registrar shall make a note on the copies of the
instruments contained in his books the fact of
cancellation of the aforesaid instruments.
(vi) It is, however, clarified that this judgment and decree on
admission shall have no bearing on the guilt of the
accused in the event prosecution is initiated in relation to
subject transactions and the concerned Court shall
decide the said criminal case on its own merits and in
accordance with law, without being influenced by any of
the observations in this judgment.
(vii) No costs.
(viii) Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent.
[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]
