[Cites 5, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Raghunath Namdeo Pilore vs The President, Lokjagruti Shikshan ... on 16 April, 2026
Author: Amit Borkar
Bench: Amit Borkar
2026:BHC-AS:17755
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Sayali
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.10528 OF 2011
Raghunath s/o Namdeo Pilore,
Age 50 years, Occu: at present nil
R/at 03/4 Gurujyot society,
Duttmandir Road, Nashik R,
Taluqa and District Nashik ... Petitioner
Vs.
SAYALI 1. The President,
DEEPAK
UPASANI Lokjagruti Shikshan Mandal,
Digitally signed
by SAYALI
DEEPAK
Nashik road, Tq. And Dist. Nashik
UPASANI
Date: 2026.04.16
13:24:00 +0530 2. The Incharge Head Master
New English School, Vihitgaon,
Deolali, Tq. And Dist. Nashik.
3. The Education Officer, (Secondary)
Zilha Parishad, Nashik ...Respondents
Mr. Anilkumar K. Patil with Mr. Digvijay A. Patil with
Mr. Laxmikant Patil, for Petitioner.
Ms. Mrunalini V. Panchal, for Respondents.
CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
RESERVED ON : APRIL 02, 2026.
PRONOUNCED ON : APRIL 16, 2026
1
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JUDGMENT:
1. The present petition is directed against the impugned
judgment and order dated 9 October 2009 passed by the Presiding
Officer, School Tribunal, Nashik in Appeal No.NSK/14/2005,
whereby the said appeal came to be decided. The petitioner seeks
quashing and setting aside of the said judgment and order.
2. The facts giving rise to the present petition, in brief, are as
follows. Respondent No. 1 is a registered educational institution
running a school known as New English School, Vihitgaon, Deolali,
Taluka and District Nashik, which is arrayed as Respondent No.2.
The petitioner possesses the qualifications of B.A., and B.Ed.
(Physical) and was initially appointed as an Assistant Teacher in
the year 1982 in the said school. Subsequently, in the year 1987,
the petitioner was promoted to the post of Head Master. It is
further the case of the petitioner that since the year 1993, he was
also functioning as a Director of the respondent institution. It is
not in dispute that Crime No. 110 of 2004 came to be registered
against the petitioner at Bhusawal Police Station for offences
punishable under Sections 306 and 420 read with Section 34 of
the Indian Penal Code, and the said incident was reported in a
newspaper. On the basis of such publication, the petitioner was
placed under suspension on 25 October 2004. The petitioner was
thereafter released on bail on 01 March 2005. According to the
petitioner, upon his release, when he attempted to resume duties,
he was not permitted to do so by the respondent institution.
Thereafter, on 30 May 2005, an Inquiry Committee was
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constituted and a charge-sheet dated 23 July 2005 was issued to
the petitioner. It is the grievance of the petitioner that no
documents were supplied along with the charge-sheet.
Consequently, on 08 August 2005, the petitioner sought supply of
documents to enable him to submit an effective reply. However,
according to the petitioner, no such documents were furnished,
and the inquiry proceedings were completed ex parte.
3. The petitioner has further contended that the constitution of
the Inquiry Committee itself was not in accordance with law. It is
specifically urged that the Convener of the Committee, Shri
Uttamrao Handore, was not the President of the respondent
institution, thereby rendering the Committee improperly
constituted. It is also contended that no opportunity was afforded
to the petitioner to nominate his representative on the Inquiry
Committee. According to the petitioner, the entire inquiry was
conducted in his absence and without granting him any reasonable
opportunity of being heard. The petitioner asserts that relevant
documents were not supplied, nor was he afforded an opportunity
to cross-examine the witnesses. It is further contended that even
the names of the members of the Inquiry Committee were not
communicated to him. The petitioner points out that the first
meeting of the Inquiry Committee was held on 7 July 2005,
whereas the charge-sheet was issued subsequently on 23 July
2005, which, according to him, amounts to a clear violation of
Rule 37 of the MEPS Rules, 1981. It is also urged that the
respondent institution failed to call for the petitioner's explanation
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on the findings recorded by the Inquiry Committee. The petitioner
has further alleged that the charges framed were vague and not in
conformity with Rule 28(5) of the MEPS Rules, 1981. It is his case
that there existed internal disputes within the management and
that the disciplinary action was initiated with a predetermined
intention to dismiss him from service. The petitioner has also
contended that no subsistence allowance was paid during the
period of suspension. On these grounds, it is contended that the
entire inquiry stands vitiated and the order of dismissal based
thereon is illegal, giving rise to the present proceedings.
4. Per contra, Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have filed their written
statement resisting the petition and have denied all allegations
made therein. It is their contention that after the petitioner's
appointment as Head Master was approved by Respondent No. 3,
the petitioner started harassing the office bearers of the
respondent institution. It is alleged that the petitioner prevented
the office bearers from entering the school premises and issued
threats of serious consequences, thereby creating an atmosphere in
which it became difficult for the management to take action
against him. The respondents have further contended that the
petitioner was engaged in private business activities, including
running a brickyard and operating trucks, and had utilised school
employees for his personal business. It is further alleged that the
petitioner forged the signatures of office bearers and issued
appointment orders to certain employees, and even obtained
approval from Respondent No. 3 on the basis of such forged
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documents. According to the respondents, the petitioner has
committed serious misconduct and has defrauded several
individuals by falsely promising employment. It is stated that in
view of such conduct, Crime No.110 of 2004 came to be registered
against the petitioner on 30 September 2004. The respondents
assert that the petitioner failed to inform the institution about the
criminal proceedings. It is further contended that the petitioner
remained unauthorisedly absent from duty from 04 September
2004.
5. The respondents have further submitted that a show-cause
notice dated 4 May 2005 was issued to the petitioner by post,
which the petitioner deliberately avoided accepting. It is their case
that the said notice was thereafter sent under certificate of posting
and was duly received by the petitioner, though no reply was
submitted. The respondents have stated that subsequent
correspondence was also sent through registered post as well as
under UPC. It is contended that sufficient opportunity was granted
to the petitioner to nominate his representative on the Inquiry
Committee. According to the respondents, the petitioner attended
the meeting of the Inquiry Committee held on 23 July 2005, at
which time the charge-sheet was served upon him. However,
thereafter, the petitioner failed to participate in the inquiry
proceedings and did not submit any reply to the charge-sheet. The
respondents have denied that any request for documents was
made by the petitioner and have asserted that despite adequate
opportunity, the petitioner chose not to participate in the inquiry.
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Consequently, the Inquiry Committee proceeded ex parte. It is
further contended that copies of oral evidence and documents
were furnished to the petitioner. Upon consideration of the
material on record and the service record of the petitioner, the
management resolved to dismiss the petitioner from service with
effect from 20 September 2005. The respondents assert that the
inquiry was conducted strictly in accordance with the applicable
legal provisions and that adequate opportunity was afforded to the
petitioner at all stages, including supply of inquiry proceedings,
despite which no further explanation was submitted.
6. The respondents have additionally contended that the
petitioner had submitted fabricated documents to various
institutions and had forged signatures of office bearers, thereby
creating false records and causing financial and administrative loss
to the respondent institution as well as other entities. It is further
stated that after the dismissal of the petitioner, further instances of
criminal conduct came to light. According to the respondents, the
petitioner failed to discharge his duties in accordance with law
while serving as Head Master and had grossly misused his position,
thereby committing serious acts of misconduct. In view of the
gravity of the allegations and the material available on record, the
respondent institution deemed it appropriate to dismiss the
petitioner from service. Hence, the present petition arises.
Mr. Anilkumar Patil, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner,
submitted that it is an admitted position that the petitioner had
been serving as Head Master since the year 1987 and had rendered
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long and unblemished service with the school run by the
respondent institution. It was urged that the constitution of the
said Inquiry Committee was contrary to law inasmuch as Shri
Uttamrao Handore was nominated as Convener despite the fact
that he was neither the President nor even a member of the
respondent institution. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that
Rule 36(2)(b)(1) of the MEPS Rules, 1981 mandates that the
President of the management shall be a member of the Inquiry
Committee and, therefore, the very constitution of the Committee
stood vitiated. It was further contended that the petitioner was
denied a fair opportunity of hearing before the Inquiry Committee
and that the charge-sheet came to be served upon him only on 23
July 2005 during the second meeting of the Committee.
7. Learned Counsel further invited attention to the documents
placed on record and submitted that the proceedings of the inquiry
itself disclose that on 08 August 2005 the petitioner had made a
formal application before the Inquiry Committee seeking supply of
documents necessary for defending himself. Though the
proceedings record such request, no documents were supplied to
him at that stage. Reliance was placed upon the communication
dated 30 August 2005 to demonstrate that the management itself
had indicated that the documents would be furnished in the
subsequent meeting of the Inquiry Committee. It was submitted
that although documents were ultimately furnished, the same were
supplied only after six meetings of the Inquiry Committee had
already taken place. According to the petitioner, in absence of the
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relevant documents, he was deprived of the opportunity to submit
his explanation to the charge-sheet. It was further contended that
witnesses of the management were examined prior to supply of
documents to the petitioner, which constitutes a clear violation of
the principles of natural justice and reflects bias on the part of the
Inquiry Committee. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that
the seventh and final meeting of the Inquiry Committee was held
on 19 September 2005, yet no copy of the summary of proceedings
or inquiry report was furnished to the petitioner, nor was any
opportunity granted to him to offer a further explanation. It was,
therefore, urged that there was complete non-compliance with
Rule 37 of the MEPS Rules, 1981. It was additionally submitted
that the respondent institution dismissed the petitioner from
service on 20 September 2005 without passing any formal
resolution, which itself demonstrates the prejudged and biased
attitude of the management.
8. Per contra, Ms. Mrunalini Panchal it was submitted on behalf
of the respondent management that although the petitioner had
been working as Head Master since 1987, disciplinary proceedings
came to be initiated only upon serious allegations of misconduct,
wilful negligence, dereliction of duty, and failure to discharge
obligations contemplated under Rule 28 of the MEPS Rules, as also
allegations of cheating members of the public and employees of
the institution. It was submitted that the management initially
sought the petitioner's explanation by issuing a show-cause notice
dated 4 May 2005 through registered post as well as under
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certificate of posting. However, despite service thereof, the
petitioner failed to submit any explanation. Consequently, the
management resolved to initiate disciplinary proceedings. It was
contended that the petitioner had been lawfully placed under
suspension and was thereafter requested to nominate his
representative on the Inquiry Committee, but he failed to
communicate the name of his nominee despite sufficient
opportunity. In such circumstances, the management constituted
the Inquiry Committee comprising two members, namely Shri
Uttamrao Rajaram Handore, stated to be the President of the
respondent institution and representative of the management
acting as Convener, and Shri P.B. Hingmire, a State Award-winning
teacher.
9. It was further submitted that the first meeting of the Inquiry
Committee was convened on 9 July 2005, which the petitioner
failed to attend. It was pointed out that despite having received
the show-cause notice and charge-sheet, the petitioner did not
submit any explanation thereto. The second meeting of the Inquiry
Committee was held on 23 July 2005, which the petitioner
attended, and during the said meeting the charge-sheet containing
36 charges came to be served upon him. Learned Counsel
appearing for the respondents placed reliance upon the decisions
in Mohd. Irshad Ahmad v. Talha Education and Welfare Society,
Karajgaon and Others, reported in 2012 (3) Mh.L.J. 291, and
Khune Devanand Nagnath (Died) through LRs Prabhawati
Devanand Khune and Others v. Terna Public Charitable Trust and
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Others, Writ Petition No. 6621 of 2012, in support of the
contention that where sufficient opportunity is granted, but the
delinquent employee fails to participate, the inquiry cannot
thereafter be faulted on the ground of denial of opportunity.
10. Learned Advocate appearing for the respondents, submitted
that as many as 36 charges were levelled against the petitioner
and, considering the gravity of the misconduct alleged, a detailed
statement of allegations accompanied the charge-sheet. It was
submitted that the statement of allegations was dispatched to the
petitioner through multiple modes including RPAD and certificate
of posting, and despite receipt thereof the petitioner failed to
submit any reply. According to learned Counsel, such conduct on
the part of the petitioner amounts to implied admission of the
allegations. It was further submitted that by communication dated
30 May 2005, the petitioner was specifically directed to nominate
his representative on the Inquiry Committee; however, despite
ample opportunity, he failed to do so, compelling the management
to proceed with constitution of the Committee comprising two
members. Learned Counsel submitted that the petitioner
consciously abstained from the inquiry proceedings and effectively
abandoned the same. It was urged that sufficient and reasonable
opportunity had been afforded to the petitioner at every stage to
submit his explanation to the charge-sheet and statement of
allegations, but he deliberately chose not to avail of the same.
11. Learned Counsel for the respondents further submitted, with
reference to the documents on record, that during the meeting
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dated 23 July 2005 the charge-sheet was duly furnished to the
petitioner, and he was granted opportunity to respond thereto. It
was contended that the proceedings of the Inquiry Committee
clearly establish that adequate and reasonable opportunity had
been granted to the petitioner to defend himself, but the petitioner
failed to avail of the same. It was pointed out that the petitioner
attended only one meeting of the Inquiry Committee and
thereafter remained absent, and therefore he cannot legitimately
contend that no hearing was afforded to him. Learned Counsel
further drew attention to documentary material placed before the
Inquiry Committee, including a complaint lodged by one Ms.
Monali C. Suryavanshi on 2 September 2004, to demonstrate the
petitioner's alleged involvement in serious offences. It was
submitted that Charge No. 1 stood proved against the petitioner,
namely that he had intentionally deceived several unemployed
youths, dishonestly induced them to part with money upon false
assurances of employment, and that one such youth committed
suicide on account of such deception. It was further submitted that
offences of forgery in connection with obtaining loans were also
registered against the petitioner. In addition thereto, while
functioning as Head Master, the petitioner allegedly deducted
provident fund contributions from teaching and non-teaching staff
but failed to deposit the same with the provident fund authorities.
It was, therefore, submitted that ample material existed on record
demonstrating serious misconduct on the part of the petitioner and
that it was neither proper nor desirable to continue such person in
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service. According to the respondents, the Inquiry Committee
strictly adhered to the procedure prescribed under the MEPS
Rules, 1981 and no violation of principles of natural justice has
occurred. On these grounds, dismissal of the petition was prayed
for.
REASONS AND ANALYSIS:
12. Upon giving anxious consideration to the rival submissions
advanced by the respective parties and upon careful perusal of the
material available on record, the principal issue, therefore, which
requires determination is whether the action initiated by the
management was a bona fide exercise of disciplinary power in
accordance with law, or whether the same was merely adopted as
a colourable exercise with predetermined intention to remove the
petitioner from service.
13. The record indicates that a show-cause notice had been
issued to the petitioner well before culmination of the inquiry
proceedings. The petitioner did not submit any reply thereto. It
further appears that the petitioner was called upon to nominate his
representative on the Inquiry Committee, but he failed to do so. In
such circumstances, the management proceeded further with the
disciplinary process. Material is also available to indicate that the
petitioner attended at least one meeting of the Inquiry Committee
and was served with the charge-sheet during the meeting held on
23 July 2005. This circumstance prima facie demonstrates that the
petitioner had knowledge of the proceedings initiated against him.
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14. The further grievance raised on behalf of the petitioner
regarding delayed supply of documents also requires close and
cautious scrutiny by this Court, particularly because allegations
touching breach of natural justice cannot be brushed aside lightly
in disciplinary matters. It is a settled position that no delinquent
employee can be expected to submit defence to serious charges
unless he is made aware of the allegations and is furnished with
such material as forms the foundation of those allegations. It is
well settled that every delay or irregularity in supply of documents
cannot by itself result in nullification of the entire inquiry
proceedings. The Court is not expected to invalidate disciplinary
proceedings merely because some procedural imperfection is
pointed out. The real test is whether such delay has in fact
occasioned prejudice of substantial nature to the delinquent
employee. That aspect assumes importance. In the present matter,
it is the case of the petitioner that he sought documents by making
application dated 8 August 2005 and despite such request the
same were not immediately furnished to him. On the other hand,
the respondents have contended that the documents and
proceedings were subsequently supplied and that even thereafter
the petitioner failed to participate in the inquiry. Thus, even if this
Court proceeds on the assumption that there was some delay in
furnishing the documents, the question still survives as to whether
such delayed supply caused prejudice as would render the entire
inquiry unfair and unsustainable. The Court has to examine
whether despite opportunities being made available, the petitioner
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abstained from participation, avoided furnishing his explanation,
and chose not to cooperate with the disciplinary proceedings. The
record relied upon by the respondents indicates that after the
initial stage, the petitioner remained absent and did not submit
any explanation to the charges levelled against him. In such
circumstances, the plea of prejudice cannot be accepted merely
upon assertion. The petitioner must demonstrate as to in what
manner the alleged delayed supply of documents altered his
defence or materially affected the result of the proceedings. Such
prejudice is not demonstrated from the record placed before this
Court.
15. At this juncture, the principles enunciated by the Supreme
Court in ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 assume provide
guidance in adjudicating the controversy at hand. The Supreme
Court has held that allegations of denial of inquiry report or denial
of reasonable opportunity are not to be examined in a mechanical
manner. The Court must not proceed on the assumption that every
procedural irregularity ipso facto vitiates the disciplinary
proceedings. Rather, the approach must be to ascertain whether
prejudice has been caused to the employee concerned. The
Supreme Court has cautioned that unless the procedural lapse
complained of has impacted the defence of the delinquent or has
altered the outcome of the proceedings, the punishment cannot be
interfered. This principle squarely applies to the facts of the
present matter. Even assuming that certain procedural deficiencies
may have occurred during the course of inquiry, the question
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remains whether such deficiencies changed the position of the
petitioner or deprived him of defence. On the material presently
before this Court, it appears that the petitioner failed to avail
himself of several opportunities extended to him. He did not
submit reply to the show-cause notice. He failed to nominate his
representative on the Inquiry Committee despite being called upon
to do so. He attended only one meeting of the Inquiry Committee
and thereafter did not participate in the subsequent proceedings.
Therefore, it cannot be accepted that the inquiry was concluded
behind the back of the petitioner or that he was deprived of
opportunity to defend himself.
16. Likewise, the submission that the inquiry report itself was
not furnished to the petitioner also does not improve his case. The
legal position in that regard is no longer res integra. It now stands
settled that mere non-supply of the inquiry report, in absence of
proof of actual prejudice, does not invalidate the order of
punishment nor does it by itself compel the Court to interfere. The
Court must undertake a examination whether supply of such
report, had it been made earlier or in a different manner, would
have brought about any difference in the defence of the employee.
In the facts of the present case, it cannot be overlooked that the
petitioner was aware of the charges levelled against him. He had
knowledge of the allegations and had sufficient occasion to
respond thereto. Despite such awareness and despite opportunities
being afforded, he neither remained present throughout the
proceedings nor submitted any explanation on merits. Therefore,
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in these circumstances, it becomes difficult for this Court to
conclude that non-supply of the inquiry report has resulted in
miscarriage of justice. Hence, the contention founded upon alleged
non-supply of the inquiry report cannot be accepted as sufficient to
vitiate the impugned action.
17. Reliance has been placed by the petitioner upon the
judgment of this Court in Mohd. Irshad Ahmad to contend that
non-compliance with Rule 37(4), (5), and (6) of the Maharashtra
Employees of Private Schools Rules, 1981 would vitiate the order
of dismissal. The applicability thereof must depend upon the
factual matrix of each individual case. The said decision proceeded
on dates showing that the management therein had acted before
the waiting period expired. Thus, the ratio of the said judgment
rests upon a finding that the employee therein was denied the very
period guaranteed under the Rules for furnishing his further
defence. Further, it requires mention that even in the judgment of
Mohd. Irshad Ahmad, the Court was dealing with a situation
where the employee had participated in the inquiry and the
grievance arose at the final stage when his statutory right to
furnish further explanation after receipt of summary of
proceedings was directly curtailed. In the present case, the
material on record reflects that the petitioner did not respond to
the show cause notice at the threshold stage. He failed to nominate
his representative despite opportunity. He attended only one
meeting of the Inquiry Committee and thereafter remained absent
from subsequent proceedings. Thus, the factual context
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demonstrates not a case where an participating employee was
denied final hearing despite participation, but a case where the
delinquent himself abstained from participation in the proceedings
from inception. Therefore, the prejudice occasioned in Mohd.
Irshad Ahmad by termination of inquiry timeline is not shown
with similar force in the present facts.
18. Moreover, even otherwise, the reliance on Mohd. Irshad
Ahmad cannot be read in isolation without harmonising the same
with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in ECIL v. B.
Karunakar that procedural fairness is tested on the touchstone of
whether prejudice has been caused in the facts of the case. While
Mohd. Irshad Ahmad recognises the character of the right under
Rule 37(5), the present case does not reveal the same degree of
deprivation of statutory opportunity as was present in that matter.
19. In that view of the matter, though this Court acknowledges
the legal proposition laid down in Mohd. Irshad Ahmad that Rule
37 confers procedural safeguards which cannot ordinarily be
ignored by the management, the said authority does not advance
the petitioner's case in the peculiar facts of the present matter.
Consequently, the reliance placed upon the said judgment is
distinguishable on facts and does not persuade this Court to
invalidate the disciplinary proceedings impugned herein.
20. This Court is also not persuaded to accept the submission
that the management acted with bias that the disciplinary
proceedings stood vitiated. Allegation of bias is a serious allegation
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in law. It cannot be accepted on mere suspicion, assumption, or
general assertions unsupported by material. Bias must be
established by factual foundation. In the present case, the
petitioner has sought to infer bias from the timing of events and
from the constitution of the Inquiry Committee. However, the
respondents have placed on record a factual narrative showing
that repeated opportunities were extended to the petitioner to
participate in the proceedings and to nominate his own
representative, but he chose not to avail of the same. The
documents further indicate that the petitioner was not excluded
from the process nor kept uninformed of the proceedings. He was
served with notices, informed of meetings, and furnished with the
charge-sheet. Therefore, the record does not support a conclusion
that the inquiry was conducted behind the petitioner's back. In
such factual circumstances, the allegation of bias appears to
remain at the level of suspicion rather than proof.
21. In overall analysis of the matter, this Court finds that the
petitioner was aware of the disciplinary proceedings initiated
against him and was afforded sufficient opportunity to meet the
charges levelled against him. The petitioner has failed to
demonstrate that such irregularity caused prejudice of such nature
as would justify invalidating the disciplinary action. The principles
laid down by the Supreme Court in B. Karunakar make it clear
that the consideration in such matters is whether actual prejudice
has been caused and not whether some procedural lapse has
occurred. Applying the said principle to the present facts, this
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Court finds that the petitioner has not established that the
outcome of the disciplinary proceedings would have been
different had the documents or inquiry report been supplied. On
the contrary, the seriousness of the misconduct alleged, the
fairness of the procedure adopted by the management and the
petitioner's own repeated conduct of non-cooperation and
abstention from proceedings collectively indicate that the
disciplinary action cannot be said to suffer from such illegality as
would warrant interference. In the considered opinion of this
Court, therefore, the challenge raised by the petitioner to the
disciplinary proceedings and consequential dismissal order does
not merit acceptance. The petition, being devoid of substance,
deserves to be dismissed.
22. In view of the foregoing discussion and for the reasons
recorded hereinabove, the following order is passed:
(i) The Writ Petition stands dismissed;
(ii) The judgment and order dated 09 October 2009 passed
by the learned Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Nashik in
Appeal No. NSK/14/2005 is hereby upheld and confirmed;
(iii) The order of dismissal dated 20 September 2005 issued
by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 against the petitioner is held to
be legal and valid and does not warrant interference in
exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India;
(iv) Rule stands discharged;
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(vii) In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall
be no order as to costs.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
