Poona Employees Union Through Gen. ... vs Force Motors Limited
2026 Latest Caselaw 3598 Bom

Bombay High Court

Poona Employees Union Through Gen. ... vs Force Motors Limited on 9 April, 2026

Author: Amit Borkar

Bench: Amit Borkar

2026:BHC-AS:16845
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                         AGK
                                    IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                               WRIT PETITION NO.13442 OF 2016

                         Poona Employees' Union,
                         through it's General Secretary,
                         Sudhakar Damle, having office
                         at "Shramesh" Shree Anand Niwas,
                         Vithalwadi Road, Akurdi,
                         Pune 411 035                                            ... Petitioner
                                                         Vs.
     ATUL                Force Motors Limited,
     GANESH
     KULKARNI            having it's factory at
     Digitally signed
     by ATUL GANESH
     KULKARNI            Mumbai-Pune Road, Akurdi,
     Date: 2026.04.09
     11:40:42 +0530
                         Pune 411 035                                            ... Respondent


                         Ms. Jane Cox with Mr. Vinayak Suthar i/by Mr.
                         Ghanshyam Thombare for the petitioner.
                         Mr. Sudhir Talsania, Senior Advocate with Mr. Vishal
                         Talsania, & Mr. Netaji Gawde i/by M/s. Sanjay Udeshi
                         & Co., for the respondent.


                                                       CORAM            : AMIT BORKAR, J.

                                                       RESERVED ON      : MARCH 27, 2026.

                                                       PRONOUNCED ON    : APRIL 9, 2026

                         JUDGMENT:

1. By the present writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the judgment and order dated 16 December 2014 passed by the Industrial Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 229 of 2008.

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2. The brief facts giving rise to the present petition, as set out by the petitioner, are as follows. The petitioner is a registered trade union representing a majority of the employees employed in the respondent-factory. Prior to the year 2002, the employees were members of Bhartiya Kamgar Sena, which was a recognised union. The last settlement executed with the said recognised union expired on 31 December 2003. Thereafter, no settlement has been executed either with the petitioner-union or otherwise, nor has there been any revision in the service conditions or pay scales of the employees. The service conditions of the employees continue to be governed by the Model Standing Orders framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. It is the case of the petitioner that in or about the year 2002, a substantial number of employees of the respondent-company resigned from the membership of Bhartiya Kamgar Sena and joined the petitioner-union. The petitioner thereafter filed an application before the Industrial Court at Pune seeking de-recognition of Bhartiya Kamgar Sena. By an order dated 22 March 2006, the Industrial Court cancelled the recognition granted to Bhartiya Kamgar Sena and accorded recognition to the petitioner-union. The said order was challenged both by the respondent-company and Bhartiya Kamgar Sena by filing separate writ petitions, which came to be allowed by judgment and order dated 2 February 2009. It is further the case of the petitioner that although by an order dated 14 October 2004 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 8140 of 2004, Bhartiya Kamgar Sena was permitted to negotiate with the management, no settlement was arrived at. Instead, the

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respondent-company unilaterally introduced a scheme titled "Helping Hand Group Incentive Scheme" with effect from 1 July 2007. The said scheme was based on a "Group Performance Index", which was determined solely by the respondent-company. Under the scheme, workmen were classified into different groups, namely production group, production support group, and standard managerial support group. The terms and conditions of the scheme were unilaterally determined by the respondent-company. No undertaking was required from individual workmen for availing the benefits under the scheme. Incentive amounts were paid to all workmen except two. The benefits under the scheme were extended for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 September 2006.

3. The petitioner has further contended that this Court, by an interim order dated 27 April 2006 passed in Writ Petition Nos. 2907 of 2006 and 2878 of 2006, directed the parties to maintain status quo as on that date. It is alleged that in breach of the said order, the respondent-company discontinued the earlier scheme on 14 October 2006 and introduced another scheme titled "Helping Hand New Group Incentive Scheme", which was operative only for the month of October 2006. Even under this scheme, no undertaking was required from the workmen. Thereafter, the respondent-company represented before the authorities that the scheme was discontinued due to demand from workers. In November 2006, the respondent-company introduced yet another scheme styled as "Notice Scheme". The said scheme retained the same grouping of workmen and incentive structure based on the Group Performance Index, which continued to be determined by

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the respondent-company. However, under this scheme, individual workmen were required to submit undertakings for availing the benefits. It is alleged that the scheme was not voluntary in nature, as workmen were compelled to join groups and achieve production targets irrespective of their consent. The petitioner contends that the scheme was introduced in violation of the status quo order dated 27 April 2006 and was in substance a productivity-linked scheme imposed unilaterally by the management, with all operational aspects being controlled by the Chairman and Managing Director. It is further the case of the petitioner that under the "Notice Scheme", special personal pay and incentives were paid to workmen based on the performance index of the respective group, as determined by the respondent-company. The functioning of the scheme lacked transparency. Only limited information was displayed through notices indicating division-wise Group Performance Index and incentive amounts, without disclosing names of individual beneficiaries. Despite specific directions, the respondent-company did not furnish complete details of workmen who were granted or denied the benefits under the scheme. The petitioner submits that the discriminatory implementation of the scheme led to dissatisfaction among workmen, many of whom were arbitrarily denied benefits. In April 2008, affected workmen raised demands before the management. As there was no response from the respondent-company, the concerned workmen approached the Labour Officer, Pune by submitting intervention letters. A list of such workmen was produced before the Industrial Court at Exhibit U-27 dated 10 July

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2014. The respondent-company, by its reply dated 22 July 2008, stated that those workmen who were denied benefits were members of the petitioner-union.

4. In the aforesaid circumstances, the petitioner-union filed Complaint (ULP) No. 229 of 2008 under Items 3 and 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971. The respondent-company filed its written statement denying the allegations and contended that benefits under the scheme were extended to all workmen who had submitted undertakings within the stipulated time, namely 10 November 2006. The petitioner, however, relied upon documents produced by the respondent-company to demonstrate that certain workmen, including one Shri Gawde, had submitted undertakings beyond the stipulated date and yet were granted benefits retrospectively. In support of their respective cases, three witnesses were examined on behalf of the petitioner-union, while one witness, namely Mr. Unni, was examined on behalf of the respondent-company. It is further stated that the appeal preferred by the petitioner-union seeking recognition came to be dismissed by the Supreme Court by judgment dated 1 December 2015. Thereafter, on 4 April 2016, the respondent-company and Bhartiya Kamgar Sena entered into a settlement and initiated steps to obtain an award in terms of the said settlement in a reference proceeding in which Bhartiya Kamgar Sena was not a party.

5. By the impugned judgment and order dated 16 December 2014, the Industrial Court dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner. Being aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the present writ petition.

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6. Ms. Jane Cox, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the principal grievance of the petitioner pertains to the requirement imposed upon the workmen to execute an undertaking under the Notice-Group Incentive Scheme dated 30 October 2006. She submitted that, unlike the earlier incentive schemes implemented by the respondent-company, the said scheme contained a stipulation that if any workman engaged in any act which, in the opinion of the company, adversely affected discipline, punctuality, quality improvement efforts or safety requirements, such workman would not only be disqualified from receiving the benefits under the scheme but would also be liable for recovery of all financial benefits extended to him from the inception of the scheme. She submitted that no such provision existed in the earlier incentive schemes, including the scheme of July 2005, and that the scheme introduced on 14 October 2006 was subsequently replaced by the impugned scheme dated 30 October 2006.

7. She further submitted that the introduction of the provision enabling retrospective recovery of amounts paid, based on the unilateral and subjective satisfaction of the respondent-company regarding alleged non-compliance with discipline, efficiency, punctuality or safety norms, assumes significance in the backdrop of the pending dispute relating to recognition of the petitioner- union before this Court. She submitted that by order dated 22 March 2006, the Industrial Court, Pune had granted recognition to the petitioner-union in place of Bhartiya Kamgar Sena. The said order was challenged by Bhartiya Kamgar Sena in Writ Petition No.

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2878 of 2006 and by the respondent-company in Writ Petition No. 2907 of 2006. By an interim order dated 27 April 2006, this Court directed maintenance of status quo and further directed that no party shall make any claim or enter into negotiations. It was submitted that taking advantage of the said situation, the respondent-company introduced the scheme dated 30 October 2006. It was further pointed out that the earlier schemes were styled as "Helping Hand Schemes", whereas the impugned scheme was not described as such and was instead introduced as a "Notice" and "Group Incentive Scheme". It was therefore contended that the respondent-company cannot now contend that the said scheme was in continuation of the earlier Helping Hand Schemes.

8. Learned counsel submitted that the concerned workmen refrained from executing the undertaking under the impugned scheme due to a bona fide apprehension that, in the context of the pending and contested litigation regarding recognition, the respondent-company would invoke its unilateral powers under clause 4(g) of the scheme to selectively target and victimise members of the petitioner-union. She submitted that the respondent-company has sought to justify the scheme as a benevolent measure intended to confer benefits upon workmen in the absence of a negotiated settlement. She submitted that such justification is misconceived in law, inasmuch as a settlement under Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 continues to bind the parties unless replaced by a subsequent settlement or an award under Section 10 of the said Act. She further submitted

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that the scheme was not benevolent in nature but was introduced with mala fide intent, conferring upon the management wide and unguided powers to control and victimise workmen, particularly members of the petitioner-union.

9. She further submitted that under the scheme, the respondent-management unilaterally constituted groups of workmen for carrying out work on the shop floor. She submitted that even those workmen who did not accept the scheme and did not execute the undertaking were nevertheless compelled to work within such groups. She submitted that such workmen were not merely working in proximity to those who had accepted the scheme, but were in fact working within the same groups and contributing to the collective productivity, on the basis of which incentives were paid to those who had accepted the scheme.

10. She submitted that the Group Incentive Report issued by the respondent-company, namely the declaration of incentive dated 10 February 2008 for the month of January 2008, demonstrates that under the relevant cost centre, the concerned workmen were grouped together. She invited attention to the wage slips of certain workmen for the said period to demonstrate that both participating and non-participating workmen were working in the same group. She further clarified that the production allowance reflected in the wage slips was independent of the incentive scheme and was payable under earlier settlements based on efficiency levels. She also submitted that certain workmen were rotated across departments and groups from time to time.

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11. She submitted that the aforesaid facts clearly demonstrate that the workmen who did not accept the scheme were placed in a position where they were compelled to contribute to the group output, without being extended the corresponding benefits of the scheme. She submitted that such treatment has resulted in grave prejudice and discrimination. She further submitted that the prejudice was aggravated subsequently, when pursuant to the settlement dated 29 October 2019, a portion of the benefits under the scheme, described as "Special Personal Pay", was merged into the basic pay. According to her, this has led to disparity in basic wages among workmen with similar length of service and has adversely affected calculations of provident fund and gratuity.

12. She submitted that although the Industrial Court observed, on the basis of certain admissions in cross-examination, that there was no compulsion upon the workmen either to accept or reject the scheme, the material aspect remains that the workmen who did not accept the scheme were nevertheless required to work in the same groups and contribute to the production which formed the basis for payment of incentives to others. She submitted that refusal to perform such work would have exposed the workmen to disciplinary action, including issuance of charge-sheets under the applicable Standing Orders for insubordination or disobedience of lawful instructions.

13. She submitted that the impugned order does not adequately consider the aforesaid aspect. She pointed out that in paragraph 28 of the impugned order, the Industrial Court merely recorded the contention regarding the group nature of the scheme but

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proceeded to hold that there was no reason for workmen not to execute the undertaking. She further submitted that in paragraph 29, the Industrial Court held that only those workmen who had formally accepted the scheme were entitled to its benefits. She submitted that the Industrial Court has failed to address the core issue, namely that the obligation to contribute to production was imposed upon all workmen, while benefits were selectively denied, thereby constituting an unfair labour practice. She further submitted that the Industrial Court has also failed to consider the significance of the clause permitting retrospective recovery of incentive amounts based on the unilateral assessment of the management.

14. She submitted that insofar as the finding of the Industrial Court regarding absence of specific evidence as to which workmen were denied benefits is concerned, the relevant data was in the exclusive possession of the respondent-company. She submitted that in any event, if such factual determination is considered necessary, the matter may be remanded for that limited purpose. She further submitted that the Industrial Court has already held that the cause of action is a continuing one and the complaint is not barred by limitation. The said finding has not been challenged by the respondent-company and has therefore attained finality. She submitted that the present petition, though filed on 24 June 2016 against the impugned order dated 16 December 2014, cannot be said to suffer from delay, in view of the intervening circumstances, including pendency of recognition proceedings which culminated in the decision of the Supreme Court dated 1

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December 2015, as well as subsequent negotiations and disputes culminating in a settlement dated 5 May 2016. She therefore submitted that there is no delay in filing the present petition and, in any event, any delay deserves to be condoned in the interest of justice.

15. Mr. Talsania, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent-company, submitted that at the relevant time the respondent-company employed approximately 1500 workmen whose service conditions were governed by their contracts of employment, the Model Standing Orders framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and settlements executed with Bharatiya Kamgar Sena, which was the recognised union. He submitted that Bharatiya Kamgar Sena had been granted recognition by the Industrial Court by order dated 18 November 1998 and that the last settlement with the said union expired on 31 December 2003. According to him, in or about December 2002, certain dissatisfied workmen formed the petitioner-union and initiated a movement of non-cooperation with the respondent-company with a view to secure recognition and compel negotiations. The petitioner thereafter initiated proceedings before the Industrial Court seeking derecognition of Bharatiya Kamgar Sena and grant of recognition to itself. The Industrial Court by order dated 22 March 2006 cancelled the recognition of Bharatiya Kamgar Sena and granted recognition to the petitioner-union, which order was challenged by both the respondent-company and Bharatiya Kamgar Sena before this Court. During the pendency of those proceedings, this Court by

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order dated 27 April 2006 directed the parties to maintain status quo and restrained them from entering into negotiations. In this background, and considering that no settlement was in force after 31 December 2003, the respondent-company, according to him, introduced a group incentive scheme on 14 October 2006 as a voluntary measure to provide some benefit to the workmen. He submitted that upon receiving representations, the said scheme was discontinued with effect from 30 October 2006 and a revised scheme, referred to as the Helping Hand Scheme, was introduced. The scheme was applicable only to those workmen who submitted an undertaking accepting its terms, and a large number of workmen opted for the scheme and were granted its benefits. He emphasised that all workmen who furnished undertakings were granted benefits irrespective of union affiliation, and that the petitioner-union opposed the scheme and dissuaded workmen from accepting it, as a result of which certain workmen did not submit undertakings and were consequently not granted benefits.

16. It was further submitted that the scheme in question was a unilateral scheme requiring a workman to furnish an undertaking signifying acceptance of its terms, upon which he would be placed in a group and required to achieve prescribed production targets to earn incentives. It was contended that even workmen who did not opt for the scheme were required to work in groups and contribute to production, and failure to meet required output could expose them to disciplinary action under the applicable Standing Orders. However, it was submitted that mere contribution to production would not entitle such workmen to claim benefits in the absence of

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compliance with the requirement of furnishing an undertaking. It was also submitted that the petitioner-union has failed to identify the specific workmen on whose behalf the complaint was filed and that the relevant data, if any, was within the custody of the respondent-company. According to the respondent, the reason why certain workmen did not opt for the scheme was their apprehension regarding clause 4(g), which empowered the company to withdraw benefits. It was lastly submitted that the Industrial Court has duly considered all relevant aspects and no interference is warranted.

17. It was further submitted that the case now sought to be urged by the petitioner was not pleaded before the Industrial Court. A reading of the complaint, particularly paragraphs 4 to 6, would indicate that it was confined to Items 3 and 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act. The grievance as pleaded was that all workmen had worked as per directions of their superiors and were eligible for incentives, but the respondent-company had granted such benefits only to some workmen, thereby allegedly showing favouritism. It was contended that apart from a general assertion that breach of law would amount to unfair labour practice, there were no specific pleadings to the effect that workmen were compelled to work in groups against their will, or that identifiable workmen who had achieved production targets were denied benefits, or that workmen refrained from submitting undertakings due to apprehension regarding the scheme, or that refusal to comply would expose them to disciplinary action. In this context, it was submitted that the respondent had specifically

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raised the objection that the complaint was vague and devoid of material particulars.

18. It was submitted that the Industrial Court has rightly upheld the objection of vagueness. In paragraph 22 of the impugned order, it has been recorded that the complaint does not disclose the identity of the workmen allegedly denied benefits, the nature of work performed by them, or the extent of incentive payable. In paragraph 26, the Industrial Court has considered the evidence of the petitioner's General Secretary, who admitted in cross- examination that no list of affected workmen was annexed to the complaint and that he was unable to identify the workmen entitled to the claimed benefits. It was further submitted that none of the witnesses examined by the petitioner were competent to depose on behalf of other workmen, and that only one witness had not received benefits and had admitted that he had not submitted the undertaking or made any demand. The Industrial Court therefore rightly concluded that vague pleadings and limited evidence cannot establish entitlement to incentive. It was submitted that although strict rules of the Code of Civil Procedure may not apply, material facts must be pleaded, and no evidence can be led in respect of facts not pleaded. The findings of the Industrial Court were therefore based on proper appreciation of pleadings and evidence and warrant no interference.

19. It was submitted that although the complaint was filed under Item 3 of Schedule IV, the Industrial Court has examined the issue under Item 5 relating to alleged favouritism. The only allegation in the complaint was that incentives were granted to some workmen

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and denied to others. It was contended that the allegation that the scheme was not made available to all workmen is incorrect, as the petitioner's own evidence shows that the scheme was displayed on the notice board and was applicable to all employees. It was therefore submitted that all workmen were aware of the scheme and its requirement of furnishing an undertaking. It was further submitted that execution of an undertaking was a condition precedent for claiming benefits and, in the absence thereof, no entitlement could arise. It was pointed out that it is an admitted position that none of the workmen on whose behalf the complaint was filed had submitted the undertaking. The Industrial Court has therefore rightly held that no case of favouritism or unfair labour practice was made out.

20. It was further submitted that the issue of delay in filing both the complaint and the writ petition was expressly kept open at the stage of admission. The scheme was introduced in October 2006, whereas the complaint was filed only in December 2008, and is therefore barred by limitation. Further, the impugned order is dated 16 December 2014, whereas the present writ petition was filed on 25 June 2016, indicating substantial delay. It was submitted that the explanation sought to be offered by the petitioner regarding pendency of other proceedings is vague and unsupported by pleadings. In view of the aforesaid submissions, it was urged that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.

REASONS AND ANALYSIS:

21. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some

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length and I have also gone through the record which was placed before the Industrial Court and the impugned judgment dated 16 December 2014. The petitioner contends that the respondent company made the workmen work in the same group, took benefit of their work, and yet refused the incentive money to those who did not sign the undertaking. The respondent company contends that the scheme was voluntary, that the undertaking was a condition for receiving benefit, that all workmen were informed of it, and that only those who did not accept the terms were kept outside the scheme.

22. The petitioner has tried to put forward the case in a manner that the scheme dated 30 October 2006 was not a normal incentive scheme but something which carried pressure inside it though not openly stated. The argument is that the management fixed groups of workers on its own. These groups were then made to work and their total output was measured. Based on that group output, incentive amounts were paid. However, according to the petitioner those workers who did not sign the undertaking were still made to work in the same groups and contribute equally to the production but when it came to payment they were excluded. The grievance is that the benefit was linked to group work, but the exclusion was individual and this created unfairness. The petitioner has also pointed out clause 4(g) of the scheme. According to them this clause gave full power to the company to later say that a worker did not maintain discipline or efficiency and on that basis even recover the incentive already paid. The submission is that this power was not controlled by any objective

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standard and was left to the company's own view. Because of this, the workers were put in a position where they had to accept the scheme without knowing whether the benefit would remain or be taken back. In that sense the petitioner contends the scheme was not really for helping workers but was used as a tool to keep them under control and also to weaken the members of the petitioner union at a time when the recognition dispute was going on.

23. There is some substance in the concern raised by the petitioner at a general level. Any scheme which is presented as a benefit must be fair in its working. If a company says it is giving extra payment for better work then the conditions must be clear open and applied equally. It cannot keep important parts hidden and then expect workers to accept it without question. Workers are dependent on their wages and incentives. If a scheme creates fear that benefit may be taken away later on uncertain grounds then naturally workers may hesitate. Also, if workers are made to contribute to production but are denied the corresponding benefit without clear reason that may give rise to a sense of injustice. However, in a court of law concern alone is not enough. The party making such allegation must bring clear facts. The Industrial Court had to see not only whether such a situation could exist but whether in fact it did exist in this case. For that the complaint had to clearly state who were the affected workers, what exactly they did, how they were treated differently and how such treatment amounted to unfair labour practice under law. On this requirement the petitioner's case does not stand on strong footing.

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24. The complaint which was filed before the Industrial Court has been described as vague and on careful reading that finding appears correct. The complaint contains broad statements that all workers worked as per instructions and yet only some received incentive. But beyond this general statement there is no detail. It does not mention names of the workers for whom relief is sought. It does not provide a proper list. It does not explain which worker worked in which group during what period and what level of production was achieved. It also does not show how much incentive each worker should have received. In matters like this especially where relief is claimed for many workers such details are necessary. Otherwise, the Court is left to assume facts which it cannot do. The respondent must also be told clearly what case it has to answer. If the case is not clearly pleaded the respondent cannot defend properly. The proceeding then becomes unclear. In the present case that essential requirement is not satisfied.

25. The Industrial Court has also looked at the evidence given by the petitioner and has found it insufficient. The General Secretary of the petitioner union who filed the complaint was expected to have knowledge about the affected workers. However, in cross examination he could not name the workers for whom the complaint was filed. He admitted that no list was attached to the complaint. He was not able to say which worker was entitled to what amount. This shows that even at the stage of evidence the basic facts were not clarified. The petitioner tried to rely on one or two individual cases to show that injustice was done. But that cannot establish a general claim for all workers. Each worker's case

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must be supported by some material. One example cannot stand for all unless the situation is identical. Further the workman who said he did not get benefit admitted that he had not signed the undertaking. He also admitted that he had not made any demand to the company for such benefit. If the scheme itself required an undertaking as a condition and a worker did not fulfil that condition then his claim becomes weak. The Court cannot ignore the terms of the scheme and grant benefit as if the condition did not exist.

26. I also find that the arguments now advanced by the petitioner go somewhat beyond what was originally pleaded before the Industrial Court. In the complaint the main ground was that of discrimination and favouritism. The complaint said that some workers were paid and some were not. However, the more detailed argument now made that workers were forced to work in groups against their will, that they faced threat of disciplinary action if they refused, and that clause 4(g) created a system of pressure is not set out with clarity in the complaint. A party cannot change or expand its case at a later stage. The Court has to decide the matter based on what was pleaded and proved before the lower court. It is true that labour courts are not bound by strict technical rules. Still the basic facts must be there. Without them the other side is taken by surprise and the Court cannot properly understand the dispute. For this reason the Industrial Court was justified in holding that the complaint lacked necessary particulars and could not sustain the serious allegations made therein.

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27. The respondent company has tried to show from the record that the scheme was not something secret. According to them the scheme was put on the notice board and was made known to all workers. This part is important because if a scheme is openly declared, then every worker gets an opportunity to know its terms and decide whether to accept it or not. The respondent has also pointed out that the requirement of giving an undertaking was clearly written in the scheme itself. It was not hidden in any manner. It was one of the basic conditions from the beginning. The material placed on record shows that those workers who signed the undertaking were given the incentive amounts. There is no clear case shown where a worker signed the undertaking, fulfilled the conditions and still was denied benefit. This becomes very important. Because if such cases were shown, then it could indicate discrimination. But in absence of such proof the position remains that the scheme was applied as per its terms. If the scheme itself requires acceptance in writing then only those who accept it can claim benefit. A person who chooses not to accept the terms cannot later say that he should still get the same advantage. That would go against the very structure of the scheme.

28. The petitioner has then argued that even those workers who did not sign the undertaking were made to work in the same groups and contribute to production and, therefore, they should also be given the incentive. There is a difference between working together and being entitled under a scheme. In an industrial setup workers are often required to work in teams or groups. That is part of normal functioning. The management has a right to organise

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work in such manner for efficiency. But that by itself does not create a right to claim every benefit linked to that work. The scheme here was not shown to be a binding settlement or an award which applies to all workers. It was a separate scheme with its own rules. One of those rules was that a worker must sign an undertaking. If a worker did not agree to that condition then he remained outside the scheme. The Court cannot remove that condition and say that everyone should be treated as if they accepted it. That would mean rewriting the scheme, which is not permissible. The petitioner's argument is that the benefit should be given without accepting the condition. Such a position cannot be accepted in law.

29. As regards clause 4(g) much emphasis was placed by the petitioner on the power of the company to withdraw benefits. It is argued that this clause gave too much power to the employer and created fear among workers. It is possible that such a clause may cause worry. A worker may feel that even after working, the benefit can be taken away later. However, the Court has to see the matter in a legal context. The question is whether in this case that clause was actually used in a manner which is unfair or discriminatory. For that some concrete example is necessary. There must be material to show that a particular worker was targeted or that benefits were withdrawn arbitrarily or that the clause was used only against certain workers. In the present case no such specific instance has been brought on record. The argument remains at the level of apprehension. Therefore, this contention also does not advance the case of the petitioner.

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30. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has then made an alternative request. It is submitted that even if this Court finds that there are no proper pleadings or full details of the workers on record still the matter should be sent back to the Industrial Court. According to the petitioner an opportunity may be given to place proper details, such as names of workers, nature of work done by them, and the benefits claimed. This submission though appearing fair at first glance cannot be accepted in the facts of the present case. The complaint was filed in the year 2008. The matter was pending before the Industrial Court for several years. During that time the petitioner had full opportunity to place all necessary material on record. The petitioner examined witnesses. Documents were produced. The proceedings were not rushed. In such situation if still the basic facts were not brought on record then it cannot be said that the petitioner did not get opportunity. It appears more as a case where the petitioner failed to properly present its case, rather than being prevented from doing so. It is also important to note that a remand is not to be ordered as a matter of routine. If such requests are accepted easily, then every party whose case fails can come and say that one more chance be given to improve the case. That will make finality of proceedings uncertain. The other side will also be prejudiced, because it has already contested the matter based on the pleadings as they stood. Litigation cannot be allowed to continue in this manner without end.

31. Further the defect in the present case goes to the root. The identity of workers, the details of their work, and the exact

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entitlement claimed are the very foundation of the complaint. These are not minor omissions which can be casually corrected later. Allowing such improvement at this stage would mean permitting the petitioner to build a new case. In these circumstances, I am not inclined to accept the request for remand. The petitioner had sufficient opportunity before the Industrial Court. Having failed to make out a proper case,it cannot now seek a fresh opportunity to fill up the lacuna. The submission is therefore rejected.

32. In the end the position becomes clear when everything is seen together. The petitioner has made serious and strong allegations against the respondent company. However, the complaint filed before the Industrial Court did not contain proper and clear facts to support those allegations. The basic details were missing. Even during evidence the witnesses were not able to supply those missing facts or make the case clear. The Industrial Court considered the entire record carefully. It came to the conclusion that the complaint was vague. It also noted that the scheme required an undertaking and that those workmen who had given such undertaking were granted the benefits. It further found that there was no proper proof of discrimination or favouritism. These findings are based on the material available on record. They appear to be reasonable and possible conclusions. It cannot be said that the Industrial Court has taken a view which is illegal or completely wrong. Therefore, this Court does not find any ground to interfere while exercising writ jurisdiction.

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33. For these reasons, the writ petition stands dismissed.

34. Rule stands discharged. There shall be no order as to costs.

(AMIT BORKAR, J.)