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Afton Chemical India Private Ltd. vs The State Of Maharashtra
2025 Latest Caselaw 6158 Bom

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 6158 Bom
Judgement Date : 26 September, 2025

Bombay High Court

Afton Chemical India Private Ltd. vs The State Of Maharashtra on 26 September, 2025

Author: G. S. Kulkarni
Bench: G. S. Kulkarni
    2025:BHC-AS:41290-DB                                                                                     11.WP.5952.2023.DOC



                                                   IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                                          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                                          WRIT PETITION NO.5952 OF 2023
                                                                      WITH
                                                       INTERIM APPLICATION NO.11791 OF 2025

                                  Afton Chemical India Private Limited,
                                  Lotus Corporate Park-A, Wing Unit 701/702,
                                  Graham, Firth Steel Compound, Western Express
                                  Highway, Mumbai-400 063.                                        Petitioner
                                         Versus
                                  1. The State of Maharashtra
                                  2. The Panvel Municipal Corporation
                                  3. The Assistant Commissioner, Panvel Municipal Corpn.
                                  4. The Commissioner, Panvel Municipal Corpn.                    Respondents
                                                                      _______
                                  Mr.Jas Sanghavi i/by PDS Legal for Petitioner.
                                  Mr.A.I.Patel, Additional Govt.Pleader, with Mr.Y.D.Patil, AGP for Respondent
                                  no.1 State.
                                  Mr.Sandip D.Ghaterao, Advocate for Respondent nos.2 to 4.
                                                                      _______

                                                                      CORAM:      G. S. KULKARNI &
                                                                                  AARTI SATHE, JJ.

                                                    Date of Reservin the Judgment    :      18th September 2025
                                                    Date of Pronouncing the Judgment :      26th September 2025

                                  JUDGMENT (Per : Aarti Sathe, J.) :

-

1. This petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

challenges the assessment orders referred in the petition (hereinafter referred to as

`impugned orders') passed by Respondent no.3 under Rule 33(3) of Maharashtra

Municipal Corporation (Local Body Tax) Rules, 2010 read with Maharashtra

Municipal Corporation, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as `LBT Rules') for the period

1st January 2017 to 31st March 2018, inter alia, directing the Petitioner to pay MANISH MANISH SURESHRAO SURESHRAO THATTE Date: 2025.09.29 THATTE 19:13:58 +0530

Rs.18,23,731/- being purported Local Body Tax (`LBT') payable along with interest

of Rs.2,69,760/- and Rs.18,23,730/- imposed under Rule 48(3)(a) and 48(3)(b) of

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11.WP.5952.2023.DOC

LBT respectively, totaling to Rs.39,17,230/-. It also assails an order dated 30 th July

2018 passed by Respondent no.3 under Rule 33(3) of Rules directing the

Petitioner to pay LBT for a further period of 1 st April 2017 to 31st June 2017 of an

amount of Rs78,18,030/-. By the impugned order a penalty under Rule 48(2)(c)

(iii) and under Rule 48(6) is sought to be levied, however, the same has been

deferred. Similar orders as impugned were passed in the case of Afton Chemical

Hyderabad Private Limited which was merged/amalgamated with the Petitioner

under the orders passed by the National Companies Law Tribunal, Hyderabad

(hereinafter referred to as `NCLT') order dated 15th September 2017 (Exh.`C' to the

petition).

2. In Company Petition bearing No.CP(CAA) No.88/230/HDB/2017,

both the Petitioner and Afton Chemical Hyderbad Pvt.Ltd filed a joint application

for amalgamation under section 230 and 232 and other applicable provisions of

the Companies Act, 2013 before the NCLT, Hyderabad. By an order dated 15 th

September 2017, the NCLT allowed the appeal, inter alia, allowing the

amalgamation of these two entities. The appointed date of the said amalgamation

was fixed as 1st April 2016. Resultant company after the to the said amalgamation

was named as Afton Chemical Hyderabad Private Limited. Further the LBT

Registration of the erstwhile Afton Chemical Hyderabad Private Limited viz.

PMC/LBT-TIN/0/Z4/04/NRD was retained.

3. Thereafter, the amalgamated entity filed an application for change of

name before the Registrar of Companies (RoC-Hyderabad) and subsequently

obtained a certificate of incorporation pursuant to change of name dated 2 nd

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11.WP.5952.2023.DOC

January 2018 wherein the name of the company was changed from Afton Chemical

Hyderabad Private Limited to Afton Chemical India Private Limited i.e. the

Petitioner. For the purpose of LBT, the registration number remained the same i.e.

PMC/LBT-TIN/0/Z4/04/NRD.

4. The Petitioner vide letter dated 15th January 2018 submitted their Audit

Report sheet for financial year 2016-17 which was shared with the Respondent

no.2. The note 42 of the said audit report provided the description of the

amalgamation carried out pursuant to the order dated 15 th September 2017 passed

by the NCLT. In pursuance of the impugned assessment orders, demand notices

dated 20th February 2023 for the period 1 st June 2017 to 31st March 2017 and 1st

April 2017 to 30th June 2017 have also been issued to the Petitioner. Demand

notices were also issued to Afton Chemical Hyderabad Pvt.Ltd for the aforesaid

period (hereinafter referred to as `impugned notices'). The Petitioner is primarily

challenging the aforesaid impugned orders and the notices issued in pursuance

thereof.

5. The Petitioner is, inter alia, stated to be engaged in the manufacture

and sale of products meeting specific customer needs in the field of metal working,

metal treatment and anti-corrosion and trading in highly formulated lubricant and

fuel additives. In the ordinary course of business the Petitioner procures the

additives (hereinafter referred to as the goods) from areas which are outside the

municipal limits of Panvel. The said goods are imported at Nhava Sheva Port,

which are then duty paid, cleared, transported and stored by the Petitioner in it's

warehouse. Based on the customer demands the goods are either relabelled or

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11.WP.5952.2023.DOC

repacked into required quantities and transported to the various customer

locations. While some of the goods are sold locally, the balance of the goods are

stored in the warehouse of the Petitioner and then transported out of the municipal

limits of Panvel.

6. The Petitioner regularly filed its returns with Respondent no.2 and for

the relevant period i.e. period from 1 st January 2017 to 31st March 2017 and for the

period 1st April 2017 to 31st June 2017, which is the period under consideration in

the present petition, the Petitioner filed its return of income on 15 th January 2018

and 25th January 2018 respectively. For the goods sold locally, the Petitioner

discharged its LBT liability for the relevant period. The Petitioner under such

returns filed for the relevant period, paid an additional amount of Rs.1,89,468/- as

LBT which becomes refundable as per the Petitioner's contention.

7. The Petitioner submitted all the details and documents as called upon

by Respondent no.3 for the purpose of assessment under Rule 33(3) of LBT Rules.

On consideration of all materials the Respondent no.3 passed the impugned orders

levying LBT on the Petitioner to pay the amount as quantified in the impugned

orders. The Petitioner has, accordingly, challenged the impugned assessment

orders and the consequent impugned notices.

8. Respondent no.3 passed the impugned order under Rule 33(3) of the

LBT read with Maharashtra Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred

as `MMC Act'). The said impugned orders are ex-parte orders, inasmuch as barring

a couple of dates the Petitioner's representative did not attend the aforesaid

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11.WP.5952.2023.DOC

hearing. The Respondent no.3 therefore proceeded to pass an ex-parte order. The

following findings were recorded :

"Total value of goods received in PMC area is determined at Rs.22,77,82,373/-. Purchases liable for LBT comes at Rs.22,77,82,373/-, which are taxed @ 2.5%, 3.5% as shown in the body of assessment order. Total tax payable comes to Rs.79,36,540/-. Local Body Tax is paid by the dealer which is allowed as Rs.8,55,561/-. Balance net LBT payable comes to Rs.70,80,979/- as the dealer has paid the LBT after the due date interest U/R 48(3)(a)(i) is levied at Rs.34,222/-.. Interest U/R 48(3)(b) is levied on differential dues from end of financial year to the date of assessment order but not exceeding 50 months @ 2% is levied at Rs.70,80,978/-, penalty U/R 48(2)(c)(iii). For the deferential dues of Net Tax at the time of assessment order is deferred for want of hearing. Penalty will be imposed after giving you opportunity of hearing as per provision of law.

Total LBT payable comes to Rs.1,41,96,179/-. Issue demand notice accordingly."

9. All the impugned orders are similarly worded except for change in

figures of the LBT payable (Exh.A1 to Exh.A4 of the petition). As stated above, in

pursuance of the impugned orders, impugned notices were issued to the Petitioner.

10. It is the Petitioner's contention that the impugned notices and the

impugned orders have been passed without proper jurisdiction as the charging

provision of MMC which is sought to be applied to the Petitioner, is not at all

attracted. The Petitioner has made several submissions, more particularly as raised

in their grounds to the petition, challenging the very imposition and levy of the

LBT and also the consequent passing of the impugned orders and notices. It is the

Petitioner's contention that the said levy of LBT is not attracted in view of

provisions of Section 127(2)(aaa) of MMC Act, inasmuch as the said section

contemplates that levy is on the entry of the goods in to the limits of the city for

consumption, use or sale therein. Therefore entry of the goods ought to be

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11.WP.5952.2023.DOC

coupled with consumption, use or sale therein. The Petitioner's contention is that

in the present case there was no consumption, use or sale of goods attracting levy of

LBT. The Petitioner also contends that the aforesaid levy of LBT on the said goods

which are neither consumed, used or sold and merely stored, are beyond the

powers granted under Entry No.52, List II (State List) of Schedule 7 of

Constitution of India. The Petitioner has also raised other contentions in support

of it's contention that levy of LBT and the consequent impugned notices are liable

to be quashed and set aside and refund of an amount of Rs.1,89,468/- along with

interest be paid to the Petitioner. The Petitioner has further in the grounds of

petition raised a challenge in respect of vires of the provisions of Rule 48 of the

MMC Act.

11. At the outset learned counsel for the Respondent no.2-Panvel

Municipal Corporation has raised an objection to the maintainability of this

petition on the ground that an alternate remedy of an appeal is available to the

Petitioner under the provisions of Section 406(6) of the MMC Act. The provisions

of Section 406 of MMC Act read as follows :

"Section 406. Appeals when and to whom to lie.

1) Subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, appeals against any rateable value [or the capital value, as the case may be,] or tax fixed or charged under this Act shall be heard and determined by the Judge.

2) No such appeal [shall be entertained] unless-

(a) it is brought within fifteen days after the accrual of the cause of complaint;

(b) in the case of an appeal against a rateable value [or the capital value, as the case may be,] a complaint has previously been made to the Commissioner as provided under this Act and such complaint has been disposed of ;

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11.WP.5952.2023.DOC

(c) in the case of an appeal against any tax [including interest and penalty imposed] in respect of which provision exists under this Act for a complaint to be made to the Commissioner against the demand, such complaint has previously been made and disposed of ;

(d) in the case of an appeal against any amendment made in the assessment book for property taxes during the official year, a complaint has been made by the person aggrieved within [twenty-one days] after he first received notice of such amendment and his complaint has been disposed of ;

(e) in the case of an appeal against a tax, or in the case of an appeal made against a rateable value [or the capital value, as the case may be] [the amount of the disputed tax claimed from the appellant, or the amount of the tax chargeable on the basis of the dispute rateable value up to the date of filing the appeal, has been deposited by the appellant with the Commissioner].

2A) Where the appeal is not filed in accordance with the provisions of clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (2), it shall be liable to be summarily dismissed.

3) In the case of any appeal entertained by the Judge, but not heard by him, before the date of commencement of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations (Amendment) Act, 1975, the Judge shall not hear and decide such appeal unless the amount of the disputed tax claimed from the appellant, or the amount of the tax chargeable on the basis of the disputed rateable value, as the case may be, up to the date of filing the appeal has been deposited by the appellant with Commissioner, within thirty days from the date of publication of a general notice by the Commissioner in this behalf in the local news-papers. The Commissioner shall simultaneously serve on each such appellant a notice under sections 473 and 474 and other relevant provisions of this Act, for intimating the amount to be deposited by the appellant with him.

4) As far as possible, within fifteen days from the expiry of the period of thirty days prescribed under sub-section (3), the Commissioner shall intimate to the Judge the names and other particulars of the appellants who have deposited with him the required amount within the prescribed period and the names and other particulars of the appellants who have not deposited with him such amount within such period. On receipt of such intimation, the judge shall summarily dismiss the appeal of any appellant who has not deposited the required amount with the Commissioner within the prescribed period.

5) In the case of any appeal, which may have been entertained by the Judge before the date of commencement of the Act aforesaid or which may be entertained by him on and after the said date, the Judge shall not hear and decide such appeal, unless the amount of the tax claimed by each of the bills, which may have been issued since the entertainment of the

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11.WP.5952.2023.DOC

appeal, is also deposited, from time to time, with the Commissioner in the first month of the half year to which the respective bill relates. In case of default by the appellant at any time before the appeal is decided, on getting an intimation to that effect from the Commissioner, the Judge shall summarily dismiss the appeal.]

6) An appeal against the demand notice in respect of levy of cess under Chapter XIA or the Local Body Tax under Chapter XIB shall lie,-

(i) to the Deputy Commissioner, when the demand notice is raised by the Cess Officer or any other officer, not being the Deputy Commissioner.

(ii) to the Commissioner, when the demand notice is raised by the Deputy Commissioner.

7) The appeal under sub-section (6) shall be filed within fifteen days from the date of the demand notice.

8) No appeal under sub-section 96) shall be entertained by the Deputy Commissioner or, as the case may be, the Commissioner unless the amount of the disputed tax claimed from the appellant has been deposited by the appellant with the Commissioner.

(emphasis supplied)

12. On a plain reading of sub-clause 6 of Section 406 of the MMC Act, it is

clear that an appeal against the demand notice against levy of cess under Chapter-

XIA or the LBT under Chapter-XIB shall lie to the Deputy Commissioner when

the demand notice is raised by the Cess Officer or any other officer, not being the

Deputy Commissioner and to the Commissioner when the demand notice is raised

by the Deputy Commissioner. It is also provided that the said appeal shall be filed

within a period of fifteen days from the date of demand notice. The appeal shall be

entertained by the Deputy Commissioner or as the case may be by the

Commissioner only once the amount of the disputed tax claimed by the Appellant

has been deposited by the Appellant with the Commissioner. It was therefore

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11.WP.5952.2023.DOC

submitted that once an appeal has been provided under the MMC Act, then

necessarily the Petitioner needs to take recourse to the said statutory remedy and

not invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ Court under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India, challenging the impugned orders and the impugned notices

by filing the present petition.

13. Learned counsel for the Respondent Municipal Corporation in support

of the aforesaid contentions has also drawn the Court's attention to four judgments

rendered by the Division Bench of this Court namely :

(i) Kokuto Camlin Limited Vs. The State of Maharashtra

(W.P.No.4309/2023, decided on 10-8-2023);

(ii) Pidilite Industries Ltd. Vs. The State of Maharashtra (W.P.No.3480/2022, decided on 20-6-2023);

(iii) Kharghar Co-op.Hsg. Society Federation Ltd. Vs. Panvel Municipal Corporation (W.P.No.8586/2021, decided on 6-4-2023);

(iv) Svizera Labs Pvt.Ltd. Vs. The State of Maharashtra (W.P.No.2118/2015, decided on 20-2-2018)

to contend that in the context of the very provision namely Section 406 of MMC

Act, this Court considering the position in law has taken a view that it would not

be an acceptable practice to permit bypassing a statutory remedy of appeal as

provided under section 406of MMC Act and invoke the writ remedy.

14. Insofar as the facts of the present case are concerned, it is clear that a

statutory appeal itself lies from the impugned orders and notices before the

appropriate authority as envisaged under section 406(6) of MMC Act. It is also

clear from the decisions which have been rendered by the Division Bench of this

Court, that this Court has consistently taken a view that when a statutory appeal is

provided under the MMC Act, it is an efficacious alternate remedy as provided

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11.WP.5952.2023.DOC

under the statute i.e. the MMC Act. In such event invocation of the writ

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ought not to be

resorted. In any event, adjudication of the statutory appeal in the present

circumstances involves determination of some factual aspects as well, which

necessarily falls within the domain of the statutory appellate authority.

15. In such context it will be relevant here to extract the relevant paragraphs

of a recent judgment of the Division Bench of this Court dated 10 th August 2023

in the case of Kokuyo Camlin Limited Vs. The State of Maharashtra (supra).

"15. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having noted the legislative scheme of the MMC Act in relation to the levy and collection of LBT, we may observe that the municipal taxation in regard to the levy and recovery of the LBT is part of a well defined statutory scheme, which is a Code by itself. The question would be whether the petition has made out any exceptional case so as to be made an exception from deviating the statutory scheme and discipline as may be legitimately required in entertaining the present petition. Considering the case as averred by the petitioner in the petitioner, as also argued before us, we are of the clear opinion that at this stage of the proceedings we are not inclined to examine the vires of sub-section 152D of the MMC Act, as challenged by the petitioner as prayed for in prayer clause (a). This for the reason that we are of the clear opinion that what was questioned by the petitioner are primarily the assessment orders, which is clear from the reading of prayer clause (b) of the petition. Illustratively prayer clause (b) of the petition reads thus :

"(b) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction for calling for the records of the present case and after going through the legality and validity thereof be pleased to quash and set aside the Assessment order dated 13/3/2023 for the period 2016-17 as per Exhibit-A raising total demand of Rs.2,71,36,506/-.

16. It would quite justified for us in taking such view considering the clear averments as made in the memo of petition in paragraph 5(f) when the petitioner takes a position contrary to the well settled principles of law, i.e. when the petitioner contends that the provision

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of not allowing filing of a statutory appeal without deposit of the disputed tax is arbitrary, harsh and irrational (when the validity of the said provision of pre-deposit has already been upheld. Also when the petitioner clearly avers in the petition that it is difficult for the petitioner to pay the entire amount of disputed ta to maintain the appeal, and for such reason this petition is filed. The averments as made are already noted by us in paragraph 9 above.

17. In our opinion, such contentions as urged by the petitioner are also contrary to the observations of the Division Bench of this Court in case Kharghar Co-op.Housing Societies (supra) when in the context of payment of municipal taxes the Division Bench referring to the provisions of section 406 and considering the several decisions of the Supreme Court in Shivram Poddar Vs. Income Tax Officer, Central Circle-II, Calcutta and anr., Income Tax Officer Lucknow Vs. M/s.S.B.Singar Singh & Sons and anr; Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal Vs. Dunlop India Ltd & Ors; M/s.Godrej Sara LEE Ltd. Vs. The Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority and ors has held that the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution assailing the assessment and demand order ought not to be entertained and the proper remedy would be to challenge the assessment order by taking recourse to the statutory remedy of an appeal. Such decision is squarely applicable in the facts of the present case, as contention of the petitioner is similar to one considered by the Division Bench in Kharghar Co- op.Housing Societies' case (supra). The relevant observations of the Division Bench are required to be noted which read thus :-

"36. Be that as it may, we would also consider as to whether the grounds on which the present petition has been filed, in any manner are precluded to be raised, in such statutory appeal. As noted above, primarily the grounds as raised by the petitioners in the present petition are, firstly, non-adherance to the provisions of law in assessment and levy of property taxes which is quite vague, secondly, no authority to levy retrospective tax and thirdly, principles of natural justice not being followed.

37. We are not impressed with any of the grounds as urged by the petitioner so as to pursuade us to entertan this petition and/or to come to a conclusion, that the petitioners be permitted to by-pass the statutory remedy made available by law to persons who are aggrieved and who intend to assail the property tax bills. All these grounds are certainly grounds which can be raised by the

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petitioners in a statutory appeal under Section 406 of MMC Act. In our opinion, the grounds as raised by the petitioner in fact can be more effectively raised, only by taking recourse to the statutory remedy of an appeal, as each of the assessees would be required to prove on evidence, that the PMC in issuing individual bills in respect to each of these assesses, has not acted in accordance with the provisions of law and/or that in respect of such assesses there was a breach of principles of natural justice. We may also observe that all these are issues which are purely subjective and which are required to be individually adjudicated before the appellate authority. On a deeper scrutiny, it would certainly not be possible for this Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in such blanket manner, examine these issues, albeit camouflaged by the petitioners to be common issues.

38. If we accept the contentions as made on behalf of the petitioners, we fear that we are creating a new pattern and jurisprudence in relation to such matters being entertained in exercise of writ jurisdiction, thereby rendering the provision for a statutory appeal wholly otiose. This would lead to severe and drastic consequences, in as much as assessments as may be levied by the several Municipal Corporations, governed by the provisions of the MMC Act, would become vulnerable to challenge by approaching the High Court in its extraordinary writ jurisdiction. This would be applicable across the board in respect of all the Municipal Corporations in the State of Maharashtra. We would hence certainly not accept such wanton contention as sought to be urged by the petitioners, that an enbloc writ petition assailing the property tax bills be entertained. The legislative wisdom behind Section 406 providing for a statutory appeal cannot be defeated, merely because petitioner no.1 is a Federation, with several member societies, and merely because it is claimed that they have a common cause. It would be wrong reading of law that merely by forming a federation, a different color could be given to an individual cause so as to contend that the writ petition be entertained. In our opinion, for such reasons the petitioners are under an erroneous impression that merely because they have many members who purportedly share a common cause, namely, to assail the

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bills issued to them, the petitioners would have a foothold to maintain the present petition and that looking at the numbers albeit miniscule number of assessees, the High Court would be under some obligation, to entertain such a petition. Certainly, the law would not accept such a drastic proposition.

49. The procedure for levy and collection of municipal taxes falls under Chapter XI of the MMC Act titled as "Municipal Taxation". Section 127 which falls under the said Chapter, is the charging Section, providing that the Municipal Corporation, inter alia, is authorised to impose taxes and one of them being property taxes. Section 128 provides for the prescribed manner in which the Municipal taxes may be recovered by the Rules. Section 128-A provides that the property taxes leviable on buildings and lands in the City under the Act shall include water tax, water benefit tax, sewerage tax, sewerage benefit tax, general tax, education cess, street tax and betterment charges. Section 129 provides for property taxes leviable on rateable value, or on capital value, as the case may be and at what rate. The entire chapter dealing with Municipal Taxation comprises of provisions of Section 127 to Section 152-1A. This apart, Chapter VIII falling under Schedule 'D' of the MMC Act provides for Taxation Rules, which contains Rules 1 to 63 dealing with the assessment of taxes. It can certainly be said that the provisions of "Chapter IX (Municipal taxation)" from Section 127 to 152-1A of the MMC Act read with the "Taxation Rules" (Rule 1 to 63) incorporated thereunder is a Code by itself. Thus, on one hand the MMC Act provides substantive provisions in regard to the municipal taxation. Read with these provisions is the provision of Section 406 which forms an inextricable concomitant, of the taxing provisions, when it provides for a statutory remedy of an appeal. Thus, such provision which is integral to the mechanism of the taxing provisions, necessarily is required to be given its highest weightage, when the Court considers whether a challenge to levy or demand of tax being raised in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could be entertained. The petitioners' contention to disregard this provision is not the correct approach."

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16. In view of the aforesaid findings of the Division Bench of this Court, in

the facts of the present case, we do not intend to delve in to the merits of the rival

contentions and in particular the contentions as raised by the Petitioner with

respect to the fact that levy of LBT is inapplicable under the provisions of Section

127(2)(aaa) of MMC Act and charging Section 152(A) is inapplicable. These are

the contentions which can very well be taken by the Petitioner, before the appellate

authority, as Section 406(6) of the MMC Act would provide. On a perusal of the

decisions as relied on behalf of the Respondent Municipal Corporation, the

Petitioner necessarily needs to take recourse to the appellate remedy.

17. We accordingly dispose of this petition by following order :

ORDER

(i) The Petitioner shall take recourse to the statutory remedy of an appeal

as provided under Section 406(6) of the MMC Act in assailing the impugned

orders and notices in question;

(ii) If the statutory appeal be filed by the Petitioner within a period of three

weeks from today, the same shall be decided by the appellate authority without

raising any objection as to limitation, as the Petitioner was bona fide prosecuting

present proceedings;

(iii) The appellate authority shall dispose of the appeals expeditiously and

preferably within a period of six weeks from the date of filing of appeal before the

appellate authority;

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(iv) The Petitioner shall deposit the amount of LBT as levied/demanded by

Respondent no.3 as per the mandate of sub-Section 8 of Section 406 of MMC, as a

pre-condition for the appeal to be entertained and adjudicated;

(v) All contentions of the parties on merits are expressly kept open to be

urged before the appellate authority;

(vi) We expressly keep open the challenge as raised by the Petitioner to the

vires of the provisions of Rule 48 of the LBT Rules to be raised, if the need so

arises;

(vii) The petition stands disposed of in above terms. No costs;

(viii) In view of the disposal of the writ petition, Interim Application does

not survive and stands disposed of.

                (AARTI SATHE, J.)                     (G. S. KULKARNI, J.)





Manish Thatte



 

 
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