Bombay High Court

Sushma Sharma vs Vishal Shamrma on 23 September, 2025

2025:BHC-OS:16120
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                      IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                          ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

                           INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO.15013 OF 2025
                                              IN
                                   SUIT (L) NO.15012 OF 2025
             Sushma Sharma                                                            ....Applicant
                   V/S
             Vishal Sharma & Anr.                                                     ....Defendants

                                             WITH
                             CONTEMPT PETITION (L) NO.29137 OF 2025
                                              IN
                                   SUIT (L) NO.15012 OF 2025

             Sushma Sharma                                                            ....Petitioner
                   V/S
             Vishal Sharma & Ors.                                                     ....Defendants

                                             WITH
                           INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO.29782 OF 2025
                                              IN
                                   SUIT (L) NO.15012 OF 2025

             Vishal Sharma & Anr.                                                     ....Applicants
             IN THE MATTER BETWEEN
             Sushma Sharma                                                            ....Plaintiff
                   V/S
             Vishal Sharma & Anr.                                                     ....Defendants

                                                 _________

             Mr. Rohan Cama with Ms. Uma Acharya and Ms. Shivani Prasad i/b
             M/s. Jayakar and Partners for the Applicant in IAL 15013 of 2025, for the
             Plaintiff and for Petitioner in CONPL 29137 of 2025.

             Mr. Mayur Khandeparkar with Mr. Akash Agarwal i/b M/s. MAAK Legal
             for Defendants and for Respondents in CONPL 29137 of 2025 and for
             Applicants in IAL 29137 of 2025.
                                            __________



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                                    CORAM : SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.
                                    RESERVED ON : 19 SEPTEMBER 2025.
                                    PRONOUNCED ON : 23 SEPTEMBER 2025.


JUDGMENT:

1. In a Suit filed under provisions of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, Plaintiff has taken out Interim Application (L) No.15013 of 2024 seeking temporary mandatory injunction against the Defendants for handing over possession of the suit premises to her during pendency of the suit. Alternatively, Plaintiff has prayed for temporary injunction for grant of unrestricted access to the Plaintiff in the kitchen located in the suit premises. Plaintiff has also sought appointment of Court Receiver for handing over possession of the suit premises to her. Plaintiff has also sought a declaration that she was in exclusive and unfettered possession of the premises bearing Flat Nos.14A and 14B and has been illegally dispossessed on 6 May 2025. Plaintiff has also sought temporary injunction to restrain the Defendants from entering into the suit premises. Plaintiff has also sought direction to the Senior Inspector, Malabar Hill Police Station to provide a round-o-clock protection to her. She has also sought direction for demolition of the partition wall erected on 6 May 2025 locking her access to the kitchen passage.

2. Plaintiff 's case, as pleaded in the plaint, is that her husband Mr. Harish Sharma had created a Trust named "Ekta Trust". That the Trust acquired premises bearing Flat Nos.14A and 14B, which was a one continuous unit used for residence of the family of Plaintiff and her husband. Plaintiff 's husband made substantial investments in hotel

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business located in Juhu operated under the name Hotel Horizon Pvt. Ltd. Plaintiff 's husband passed away on 18 September 1996. Plaintiff has three sons - two defendants and Mr. Gagan Sharma. Plaintiff alleges conspiracy on the part of the Defendants to exclude her and her other son Gagan from the family business. According to Plaintiff, both the Defendants moved out of the premises and started living separately. The Defendant No.2 got married on 14 January 2007 in Delhi and Defendant No.1 was married on 3 March 2010 in Mumbai. Plaintiff alleges continuous harassment under hands of the Defendants despite staying separately in other premises.

3. According to the Plaintiff, Defendants who were not residing in the premises, came into the same and put up a partition wall in the premises thereby sub-dividing the same into Flat Nos.14A and 14B in the year 2015. Defendants filed Suit (L) No.882 of 2015 seeking partition of the premises and for removal of Plaintiff as trustee of Ekta Trust. By order dated 27 August 2015, this Court directed all parties to vacate both Flat Nos.14A and 14B and the Court Receiver was appointed to take vacant possession of the same. By further order dated 28 October 2015, Plaintiff was put into possession of Flat No.14B and Defendant No.3 was granted liberty to use Flat No.14A purely for their continuous daily residence. The arrangement was made by making Plaintiff and Defendants as agents of the Court Receiver.

4. According to the Plaintiff, Defendants never resided in Flat No.14A and continued residing in other premises. In the meantime, proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act (DV Act) were initiated by the Plaintiff against the Defendants, Notices of which were served on the

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Defendants on address other than the Suit premises. Plaintiff thus contends that Defendants were not in possession of the suit premises bearing Flat No.14A and that she continued to possess both Flat Nos.14A and 14B.

5. In the above background, the Plaintiff claims that in May 2025 she has been forcibly dispossessed in respect of the suit premises being Flat No.14A as Defendants had completely stopped her access to Flat No.14A including kitchen thereon. Plaintiff has accordingly filed present Suit under provisions of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act for restoration of possession claiming that she has been dispossessed without following due process of law. In her Suit Plaintiff has filed Interim Application (L) No.15013 of 2025 for seeking temporary injunctions.

6. By order dated 9 May 2025 this Court recorded statement made on behalf of the Defendants that Plaintiff would be granted access to the kitchen of Flat No.14A. By further ad-interim order dated 25 June 2025 this Court granted ad-interim relief in favour of the Plaintiff in terms of prayer clauses (b) and (e) of the Interim Application thereby restraining the Defendants from entering into or remaining in the suit premises and directing them to vacate the same. The Senior Inspector, Malabar Hill Police Station was directed to provide round-o-clock protection to the Plaintiff.

7. Defendants have filed Interim Application (L) No.29782 of 2025 seeking recall of the ad-interim orders passed in favour of the Plaintiff. On the other hand, Plaintiff had filed Contempt Petition (L) No.29137 of 2025 alleging breach of the ad-interim orders granted by this Court.

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8. Since pleadings in Interim Application (L) No.15013 of 2025 are complete, I have proceeded to hear and decide the main Application for temporary injunction rather than taking up the Application for recall of ad-interim order.

9. Mr. Cama, the learned counsel appearing for the Plaintiff would submit that Defendants have forcibly dispossessed the Plaintiff in May 2025 without following the process of law. That Defendants have never physically possessed Flat No.14A from 2003 to 2015. That though order was passed by this Court on 16 October 2015 permitting Defendants to occupy Flat No.14A as agent of Court Receiver, Defendants never physically started residing in Flat No.14A. That there is not even an iota of document on record to indicate Defendants' possession of Flat No.14A. That on the contrary, there are voluminous documents in favour of the Plaintiff to infer her physical possession of Flat No.14A. That she has always paid the electricity bills of entire premises including the Flat No.14A. That even the maintenance bill is raised by the Society commonly in respect of Flat Nos.14A and 14B, which is always paid by the Plaintiff.

10. Mr. Cama would further submit that the appointment of Court Receiver in Suit (L) No.882 of 2015 automatically came to an end on account of dismissal of the Suit on 12 April 2016. That therefore agency of Defendants in respect of occupied Flat No.14A also automatically came to an end with dismissal of the Suit. In support of the contention that the appointment of Court Receiver comes to an end with dismissal of the Suit, he would rely upon judgment of the Apex Court in

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Nalangora Inasu Pyleth vs. S.T. Varee and others 1. In support of his contention that interim order gets vacated with dismissal of the Suit, he would rely upon judgment of the Apex Court in Sheralikhan Mohamed Manekia vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.2

11. Mr. Cama would further submit that Defendants are residing in Flat No.3502, B Wing, Lodha Kiara, Lodha Park at Lower Parel (Kiara Flat). He would submit that various correspondence in DV proceedings have been served on the Defendants at the said address at Kiara Flat. That even police have tracked Defendants at the said address at Kiara Flat for indicating that they never resided in the suit premises.

12. Mr. Cama would further submit that perusal of the ad-interim order dated 9 May 2025 makes it abundantly clear that Defendants have never resided in Flat No.14A. That on 9 May 2025, they sought permission to reside in Flat No.14A indicating thereby that they did not possess said Flat as on 9 May 2025. That this Court granted liberty to the Defendants to file appropriate proceedings for seeking entry into Flat No.14A. Mr. Cama would further submit that Defendants have violated the ad-interim order dated 9 May 2025 with impunity by not only remaining in possession of Flat No.14A but also blocking Plaintiff 's access to the kitchen located in Flat No.14A. That this Court has granted further ad-interim order dated 25 June 2025 after being fully satisfied that the Defendants have never resided in Flat No.14A and have directed their removal from the said flat. That even ad-interim order dated 25 June 2025 is violated by the Defendants, who continue to remain in the said flat and

1 (1975) 4 SCC 465 2 (2015) 12 SCC 192

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are continuously harassing the Plaintiff. That even otherwise, there are several admissions on the part of the Defendants that they are not residing in Flat No.14A. He would accordingly submit that Plaintiff 's possession of Flat No.14A is proved beyond any doubt whereas the Defendants have thoroughly failed to prove their possession of Flat No.14A prior to May 2025. He would accordingly submit that a perfect case is made out for restoration of possession of the Plaintiff under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. He would accordingly pray for making Interim Application (L) No.15013 of 2025 absolute in terms of prayers made therein. He would also urge this Court to initiate contempt proceedings against Defendants for breach of ad-interim orders. He would also pray for dismissal of Interim Application (L) No.29782 of 2025 filed by the Defendants for recall of the ad-interim orders.

13. Per contra, Mr. Khandeparkar, the learned counsel appearing for the Defendants would submit that Defendants have gained possession of the suit flat (Flat No.14A) by virtue of order dated 2 August 2008 passed in Trust Petition No.1 of 2008. That by order dated 16 June 2008 passed in the said Trust Petition, this Court recorded the position that the Defendants were put in physical possession of Flat No.14A. That Plaintiff has suppressed the orders dated 2 May 2008 and 16 June 2008 and has secured ad-interim relief in her favour by indulging in gross suppression of facts. He would further submit that Defendants thus remained in continuous physical possession of Flat No.14A until order dated 27 August 2015 was passed by this Court in Suit (L) No.882 of 2015 directing Plaintiff and Defendants to vacate both the flats and appointing Court Receiver in respect thereof. That thereafter by order

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dated 28 October 2015, Defendants are again put in possession of Flat No.14A by appointing them as agents of the Court Receiver. That accordingly possession of Flat No.14A by Defendants is resumed by virtue of order dated 28 October 2015 and their possession has never been disturbed in any manner. That Plaintiff has not produced any document on record to indicate the manner in which she could have gained possession of Flat No.14A. He would rely upon the complaint filed in Domestic Violence (DV) proceedings in support of his contention that there are admissions on the part of Plaintiff about Defendants' possession of Flat No.14A.

14. Mr. Khandeparkar would further submit that Suit filed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act must be predicated on actual settled physical possession of the suit property, which burden Plaintiff has failed to discharge. On the other hand, Defendants have ample material to demonstrate prima facie case of their lawful possession of the suit flat. He would submit that the Court Receiver appointed in respect of suit property can continue even after disposal of the suit and in support he would rely upon judgment of this Court in Atul D. Sohni and another vs. B.M. Choksey and others3. Mr. Khandeparkar would accordingly pray for dismissal of the Interim Application (L) No.15013 of 2025. He would submit that if Plaintiff 's prayer for temporary injunction is being rejected, Defendants would not press Interim Application (L) No.29782 of 2025. Similarly, upon non-grant of temporary injunction in Plaintiff 's favour, nothing would survive to be adjudicated in Contempt Petition (L) No.29137 of 2025 and he would pray for dismissal of the same.



3 1998 (3) Mh.L.J. 258






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15. I have considered the submissions canvassed by the learned counsel appearing for rival parties. I have also gone through the pleadings and documents filed alongwith the pleadings.

16. This is an unfortunate case where the mother is fighting with her two sons over possession of the suit flat. It appears that after purchase of Flat No.14 by the Trust formed by Plaintiff 's husband, the internal wall therein was removed and a specious five bed room residential unit existed with two separate entrance doors for residence of the family comprising of Plaintiff, her husband and three sons. After death of Plaintiff 's husband on 18 September 1996, apparently disputes arose between Plaintiff and her son Gagan on one hand and the two Defendants on the other relating to running and management of family's hotel business. It is Plaintiff 's case that Defendants separated from her and started residing separately and not in any portions of Flat Nos. 14A and 14B. It appears that the Flat No.14 is sub-divided into Flat Nos.14A and 14B. Flat No.14A is a larger flat comprising of three bed rooms, living and dining room and a kitchen. Building's staircase divides Flat Nos.14A and 14B. Flat No.14B is a smaller flat comprising of living room, two bed rooms and kitchen. It appears that when two flats were used as combined residential unit by the family, the kitchen room in Flat No.14B was used converted into a study room. On account of sub-division of the flat into Flat Nos.14A and 14B, it appears that there is only one common kitchen located in Flat No.14A and there is no kitchen in Flat No.14B.

17. It appears that Defendants had filed Trust Petition No.1 of 2008 before this Court against the Plaintiff seeking her ouster from the Trust and the flat. On 2 May 2008, this Court passed order in Trust Petition

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No.1 of 2008 recording statement made on behalf of the Plaintiff that possession of larger three bed room flat (No. 14A) shall be handed over to the Defendants while the mother and other son would retain possession of smaller two bed room flat (No. 14B). It appears that by order dated 16 June 2008, parties confirmed the position that Defendants were put in possession of bigger flat being Flat No.14A. It also appears that in Trust Petition No.1 of 2008 Notice of Motion No.1869 of 2008 was filed by the Plaintiff and in Affidavit of support thereof, she stated that she had commenced construction of kitchen in Flat No.14B and that upon completion of construction of kitchen in Flat No.14B she had handed over possession of entire Flat No.14A to the Defendants.

18. Prima facie therefore, it becomes difficult to believe Plaintiff 's story that Defendants never had any concern with Flat No.14A upto 2015 or that they never possessed the same. Orders dated 2 May 2008 and 16 June 2008 passed in Trust Petition No.1 of 2008 prima facie show that Defendants were put in possession of Flat No.14A. In fact Plaintiff has not disclosed the orders dated 2 May 2008 and 16 June 2008 passed in the Trust Petition and has contended on the contrary that Defendants never possessed Flat No. 14A prior to the year 2015.

19. It also appears that Income Tax Authorities had attached Flat Nos.14A and 14B in the year 2010 and had initiated proceedings for auction thereof. Defendants had filed Petition in this Court against such auction and their Petition was dismissed. They filed Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court in which order dated 29 July 2011 was passed staying the auction process in respect of Flat Nos.14A and 14B and directed the Defendants to maintain status quo in respect of title and

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possession thereof. If Defendants were not residing or had no concern with Flat No.14A, there was no reason for them to challenge income tax proceedings before Supreme Court and secure stay order ensured status quo qua their possession.

20. Defendants filed Suit (L) No.882 of 2015 before this Court inter alia seeking partition and their separate share. When Notice of Motion (L) No.2359 of 2015 had come up for hearing before this Court on 27 August 2015, this Court noticed a disturbing fact where a young child of second Defendant was found to have been mistreated in the flat. This Court therefore expressed that both the parties must vacate the portions of flats in their possession. Accordingly, both the parties agreed to vacate possession of flats and agreed for appointment of Court Receiver for the purpose of letting out the flats to a third party. This is how both the Plaintiff as well as Defendants lost possession of Flat Nos. 14A and 14B by virtue of order dated 27 August 2015. Later, Plaintiff complained to this Court that the flat being her matrimonial house, she cannot be kept out therefrom and she desired her re-entry into Flat No.14B. On Plaintiff 's request, she was appointed as agent of the Court Receiver in respect of Flat No.14B whereas Defendants were jointly appointed as agents of Court Receiver in respect of Flat No.14A. However, Defendants were directed to provide access to the Plaintiff to the kitchen existing in Flat No.14A though she was occupying Flat No.14B. It was however made clear that if Defendants were not found using Flat No.14A on daily basis for residence, their agency would stand terminated. Paragraphs 4 to 10 of the order dated 20 October 2015 reads thus :-

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"4. I am not, at this stage, addressing the rival contentions as to the title of any of the parties to either these two flats. What I proposed today is a temporary ad-hoc arrangement that seeks to preserve the status quo ante and at the same time make some provision for a clear separation so there is no further acrimony.

(a) The 1st Defendant will be appointed as an agent of the Court Receiver in respect of Flat No. 14B.

(b) The two Plaintiffs shall both be jointly appointed as agents of the Court Receiver in respect of Flat No. 14A.

(d) It is clarified that neither of these agencies will require the payment of royalty at this stage. However, the outgoings in respect of each of these two flats will be borne by the parties in occupation.

5. Mr. Jaiswal, on instructions from the Plaintiffs who are both personally present in Court states:

(a) that the Plaintiffs will make necessary arrangements to make available to the 1st Defendant the existing kitchen. In other words, the 1st Defendant will have access to the kitchen from flat No.14B and the Plaintiffs will not access that kitchen from Flat No.14A.

(b) Mr. Jaiswal also states that the Plaintiffs will make arrangements to create a kitchen in Flat No.14A at their own expenses. Mr. Jaiswal says this can be done in a month. Although this seems to me to be a triumph of optimism over experience, the Plaintiffs are at liberty to do so. In any case, the question of creating a second kitchen is not new. It is something that the 1 st Defendant herself has said needed to be done in her Affidavit dated 27th May 2008 filed in Notice of Motion No.1859 of 2008. There can be, therefore, conceivable objection to the creation of a second kitchen.

6. There remains the question of arrears of dues to the society, which I am told are substantial, in the region of approximately Rs. 23 lakhs. These arrears are to be paid in the ratio of 2/3rd by the Plaintiffs and 1/3rd by the 1st Defendant

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since the Plaintiffs claim to be entitled to a 2/3rd share, right, title and interest in the property. This is without prejudice to all rights and contentions of in the regard.

7. There are four garages to these two flats. Two of these will be used by the 1st Defendant and two will be used by the Plaintiffs.

8. There are common terraces above these flats with separate entrances from both flats 14A and 14B. The Court Receiver is directed to hand over the keys of the terraces to the respective parties. Each side will access the terrace from the flats occupied by them as agents of the Court Receiver. The two sides agree to use the terrace without altercations.

9. Neither the 1st Defendant nor the Plaintiffs will be entitled to let out the premises. It is to be borne in mind that they are occupying these flats as agents of the Court Receiver.

10. I am also clarifying that this arrangement is arrived at by consent since the Plaintiffs sought liberty to use the Flat No.14A only when the 1st Defendant asked for leave to use the combined flat or some part of it, saying she could not, at her age, live elsewhere. Till that time, the Plaintiffs were content to have the whole combined flat let out to a third party. The 1st Defendant's request is to be expected, because she has been staying here for a long time, while the Plaintiffs, though in occupation for a period earlier, have on their own showing come into the flat only recently in February 2015. From what Mr. Jaiswal says, it is not at all clear to me that the Plaintiffs actually need Flat No.14A. They seem to be asking for it only because the 1st Defendant has put in a request. That makes no difference. I am making it clear that if it is found that the Plaintiffs are not using Flat 14A on a daily basis or as a whole, their agency will be terminated. At this, Mr. Jaiswal once again reaffirms the Plaintiffs' consent to the foregoing arrangement."

21. This is how Defendants regained entry into Flat No.14A by virtue of order dated 20 October 2015.

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22. From the above position, it appears that Defendants were put in possession of Flat No.14A by virtue of orders dated 2 May 2008 and 16 June 2008. They temporarily lost possession of Flat No.14A by virtue of order dated 27 August 2015 and regained the possession by order dated 20 October 2015 as agent of Court Receiver.

23. It is Plaintiff 's contention that though Defendants were to be appointed as agents of Court Receiver by virtue of order dated 20 October 2015, they never came forward to take possession of Flat No.14A. It is further contended that paragraph 10 of the order contained a specific condition of termination of agency in the event of Defendants not found to be residing daily in whole portion of Flat No.14A. It is contended that even after passing of order dated 20 October 2015, Defendants always resided separately in Kiara Flat and never resided in Flat No.14A. Without prejudice, it is also contended that Suit (L) No.882 of 2015 came to be dismissed on 12 April 2016 and therefore the appointment of Court Receiver as well as agency arrangement automatically came to an end.

24. However there is nothing on record to indicate that Defendants did not accept possession of Flat No. 14A as agent of Court Receiver or that the Court Receiver put Plaintiff in possession of Flat No. 14A. Though order dated 20 October 2015 envisaged termination of agency if Defendants were not to reside daily in Flat No. 14A, there is nothing on record to indicate that the agency was ever terminated. Coming to the aspect of Court Receiver's appointment and agency being terminated with dismissal of the suit, both the sides are at loggerheads. According to Plaintiff, Court Receiver and agency arrangement would terminate with

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dismissal of suit whereas Defendants contend that the Court Receiver would not automatically stand discharged with dismissal of the suit. In my view, it is not necessary to delve deeper into this aspect at this stage. This is the reason why I consider it unnecessary to discuss ratio of judgments of the Apex Court in Nalangora Inasu Pyleth (supra) and of this Court in Atul D. Sohni (supra). Similarly, it is not necessary to go into the issue of vacation of interim order upon dismissal of the suit discussed in Sheralikhan Mohamed Manekia (supra).

25. Even if it is assumed that the arrangement of appointment of Court Receiver and agency executed in favour of the Defendants came to an end with dismissal of the suit on 12 April 2016, it is difficult to conclude that the Defendants lost physical possession of Flat No.14A upon dismissal of the Suit. In fact, by going by that logic, even Plaintiff would lose possession of Flat No.14B upon dismissal of Suit (L) No.882 of 2015 on 12 April 2016. Plaintiff 's contention of termination of agency upon appointment of Court Receiver coming to an end may lead to presumption that Defendants' possession of Flat No.14A was rendered unlawful upon dismissal of the Suit. However, it is too farfetched to contend that Defendants physically lost possession of Flat No.14A upon dismissal of the Suit (L) No.882 of 2015 on 12 April 2016.

26. Also what is important for Suit filed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is settled possession of Plaintiff. There is absolutely no document on record from which it can be inferred that Defendants vacated Flat No.14A after dismissal of Suit (L) No.882 of 2015 or that Plaintiff was put in physical possession thereof. In fact, the plaint is silent

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as to how Plaintiff came in possession of Flat No.14A after passing of order dated 20 October 2015. By that order, Plaintiff was put in possession only of Flat No.14B and Defendants were put in possession of Flat No.14A. It is therefore necessary for the Plaintiff to show some document by which she was put in physical possession of Flat No.14A.

27. I am therefore unable to prima facie hold that Plaintiff was in settled physical possession of Flat No.14A in May 2025 when she was allegedly dispossessed. The object of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is to discourage people from taking law into their own hands for dispossessing a person who is in physical possession of immovable property. Possession of immovable property is sine qua non for maintaining a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. There is nothing on record to indicate Plaintiff 's possession of Flat No.14A. Parties were put in possession of Flat Nos.14A and 14B by a judicial order and therefore it become incumbent upon Plaintiff to demonstrate as to how Defendants got dispossessed in respect of Flat No.14A or how she came in physical possession thereof.

28. In my view therefore, no prima facie case is made out by the Plaintiff for grant of any temporary injunction in her favour qua Flat No.14A. Her prayer for being put back in possession of Flat No.14A by way of temporary injunction amounts to grant of final prayer. The other two tests of balance of convenience and irreparable loss are also clearly against the Plaintiff. Plaintiff is staying alone in Flat No.14B which is a two bedroom flat. Therefore, no irreparable loss would be caused to the Plaintiff if she is not put in possession of larger three BHK Flat (No.14A)

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during pendency of the suit. The balance of convenience also lies against Plaintiff who would not suffer any inconvenience if Defendants are permitted to retain possession of Flat No.14A.

29. So far as kitchen located in Flat No.14A is concerned, it appears that right since order dated 20 October 2015, Plaintiff has been granted access to the said kitchen, possibly on account of absence of any kitchen in Flat No.14B. As observed above, the space meant for kitchen in Flat No.14B has been converted into study and as of now, there is no kitchen in Flat No.14B. For this reason, this Court granted access to Plaintiff to kitchen in Flat No.14A by order dated 20 October 2015. In order to prevent any further disputes between the parties, Mr. Khandeparkar showed willingness to set up kitchen in Flat No.14B for use by Plaintiff at the expenses of the Defendants. Plaintiff has however refused to accept the offer and has insisted that possession of entire Flat No.14A must be handed over to her by grant of interim injunction. In that view of the matter, Defendants will have to continue granting access to the Plaintiff to the kitchen located in Flat No.14A. The map placed on record indicates that there is separate entrance for Plaintiff to the kitchen located in Flat No.14A from staircase area. Both Plaintiff and Defendants can access to kitchen located in Flat No.14A through separate entrances. The arrangement of sharing of kitchen in Flat No.14A has continued for last 10 long years and the same arrangement needs be continued during pendency of the suit. This is the only relief that can be granted in Plaintiff 's Interim Application (L) No.15013 of 2025.

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30. Since this Court is not inclined to grant temporary injunction in favour of Plaintiff to put her back in possession of entire Flat No.14A (except in kitchen) no purpose would be served in deciding Defendants' prayer for vacation of ad-interim order sought in Interim Application (L) No.29782 of 2025. Similarly, since the relief of temporary injunction qua Flat No.14A (except in kitchen) is being denied, I am not inclined to initiate any contempt proceedings against the Defendants on account of allegation of violation of ad-interim orders.

31. Consequently, I proceed to pass the following order:

i) Plaintiff 's prayer for temporary injunction in Interim Application (L) No. 15013 of 2025 qua Flat No.14A is rejected except the kitchen located therein.

ii) Defendants shall grant to Plaintiff unrestricted access to the kitchen located in Flat No.14A during pendency of the Suit.

32. Interim Application (L) No.15013 of 2025 is accordingly disposed of by granting limited relief to the Plaintiff for access to kitchen located in Flat No.14A during pendency of the Suit while rejecting rest of the prayers.

33. Interim Application (L) No.29782 of 2025 as well as Contempt Petition No.29137 of 2025 are disposed of.




                                                       (SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.)







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34. After the order is pronounced, the learned counsel appearing for the Plaintiff pressed for continuation of ad-interim order granted on 25 June 2025 for a period of 8 weeks. Request is opposed by learned counsel appearing for the Defendant. Considering the nature of findings recorded in the order for holding that Plaintiff was not in possession of Flat No. 14A, I am not inclined to continue the ad-interim order dated 25 June 2025. Request is accordingly rejected.

(SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.)

Digitally signed by SUDARSHAN SUDARSHAN RAJALINGAM RAJALINGAM KATKAM KATKAM Date: