Bombay High Court
Honour Lab Ltd vs The New India Assurance Company Limited on 16 September, 2025
2025:BHC-OS:15310
F-J-CARAP-220-2024+.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
IN ITS COMMERCIAL DIVISION
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION APPLICATION NO. 220 OF 2024
Honour Lab Limited ...Applicant
Versus
The New India Assurance Company Limited ...Respondent
WITH
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION APPLICATION NO. 240 OF 2024
Cirex Pharmaceuticals Private Limited ...Applicant
Versus
The New India Assurance Company Limited ...Respondent
Mr. Akash Rebello, for the Applicant.
Mr. Milind More, for Respondent.
CORAM : SOMASEKHAR SUNDARESAN, J.
RESERVED ON: SEPTEMBER 8, 2025
PRONOUNCED ON: SEPTEMBER 16, 2025
JUDGEMENT :
Context and Factual Background:
1. These Applications have been filed under Section 11 of the
Digitally
signed by
ASHWINI
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (''the Act") seeking appointment
ASHWINI JANARDAN
JANARDAN VALLAKATI
VALLAKATI Date:
2025.09.17
10:54:13
+0530
of a Sole Arbitrator for resolving disputes under insurance policies
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issued by the Respondent in both proceedings. Since the core issue
involved, namely, whether this Court has territorial jurisdiction in the
matter, is the same in both Applications, by consent of the parties, they
were heard together.
2. For purposes of this judgement, Commercial Arbitration
Application No. 240 of 2024 is taken as the lead matter and all
references are based on the filings made in those proceedings. The
determination of the issue in the aforesaid Application would apply to
the determination of the other Application as well.
3. The Respondent issued an Industrial All Risks Policy
("Policy") dated April 4, 2019 to the Applicant. The Applicant's
industrial plant covered by the Policy is situated in Telangana. The
Policy covered risks to the Applicant's building, plant, machinery and
inventory, all of which are situated in Telangana. On February 14, 2020,
a water tank erected on the terrace of Block B of the Applicant's
premises at Telangana collapsed, necessitating switching off electricity
to prevent casualties in the reactors. This resulted in loss and damage to
the Applicant's property and inventory. On June 18, 2020, the
Applicant lodged a claim for Rs. 2.70 crores, which was revised to Rs.
2.48 crores. The Respondent has agreed to pay only Rs. 48.96 lakhs.
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4. This is the dispute sought to be referred to arbitration under
the Policy. It is common ground that the Policy does not explicitly set
out the seat or the venue.
Contentions of the Parties:
5. At the threshold, Mr. Milind More, Learned Advocate for the
Respondent contends that this Court would lack territorial jurisdiction
in the matter. According to the Respondent the cause of action is
entirely in Telangana and there is no basis to invoke the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court. The factory premises, the plant, machinery
and inventory are all located in Telangana. The Secunderabad office of
the Respondent processed the Policy and it was issued in Telangana.
The insurance premium was paid in Telangana. The insurance claim
form was submitted in Telangana. The settlement voucher for the claim
allowed was issued in Telangana.
6. As such, Learned Counsel for the Respondent would contend
that no part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court. He would rely on precedents set in the case of
Triveni Adhesives1 and Hyundai Construction2 by this Court and in Ravi
1 Order dated September 2, 2021 in Triveni Adhesives and Tapes vs. New India
Assurance Company - CARAP No. 356 of 2019
2 Order dated January 11, 2024 in Hyundai Construction Equipment India Pvt. Ltd.
Vs. M/s Saumya Mining Limited & Anr - ARP No. 32 of 2022
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Ranjan3 by the Supreme Court to indicate that the issue is squarely
covered.
7. In contrast, Mr. Akash Rebello, Learned Advocate for the
Applicant would contend that this Court indeed has jurisdiction. He
would submit that the Respondent's head office is in Mumbai. Surveys
to assess the claim can be said to have been conducted under
instructions from the head office. The decision to partially repudiate the
claim can be said to have been taken in Mumbai since a circular showing
devolution of decision-making authority would show that the size of the
claim involved necessitated a decision being taken in the head office.
The Policy provides for raising grievances before the local office,
regional office or the head office. Therefore, the Applicant has a right to
choose where to prosecute the matter and it has chosen Mumbai, which
is sufficient, Mr. Rebello would contend, for purposes of Clause XII of
the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court. The Respondent would
contend that although Clause XII of the Letters Patent would not apply,
the underlying principles must be applied. Mr. Rebello would press into
3 Ravi Ranjan Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Aditya Kumar Chatterjee - 2022 SCC OnLine
SC 568
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service the decision of this Court in VHB Life Sciences4 and of the
Supreme Court in Jindal Vijayanagar Steel5.
8. Mr. Rebello would submit that when the parties have not
explicitly stipulated the seat or venue in their written agreement, the
principles governing Section 2(1)(e) of the Act must be applied, and that
must be read with Section 11 of the Act. Mr. Rebello too would rely
upon Ravi Ranjan, to contend that this Court is indeed a Court that
would also have jurisdiction under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act. According
to Mr. Rebello, in terms of Clause XII of the Letters Patent, this Court
would have jurisdiction so long as the Respondent has an office in
Mumbai, even if no part of the cause of action arose in Mumbai.
Thereby, this Court, he would submit, is the Court under Section 2(1)(e)
of the Act.
Analysis and Findings:
9. Having heard the Learned Advocates for the parties and
having examined the record with their assistance, it is abundantly clear
that the entire bundle of facts, the proving of which would lead to grant
or denial of relief, lies in Telangana. The risk covered by the Policy took
4 VHB Life Sciences Limited v. Orchid Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Limited -
2010 SCC OnLine Bom 1623
5 Jindal Vijayanagar Steel (JSW Steel Ltd) vs. Jindal Praxair Oxygen Co. Ltd. -
(2006) 11 SCC 521
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place in Telangana. The facts that must be proved to bring home the
claim are all located in Telangana. The Policy was issued in Telangana
and was serviced in Telangana. The jurisdiction of Telangana would in
fact be a forum convenient to the parties, with all the records, as indeed
the situs of the premises, being in Telangana. However, the Respondent
has sought to raise a pure question of law as to whether this Court could
still proceed to appoint an arbitrator, even suggesting that the venue of
arbitration may be Telangana but the seat can certainly be in Mumbai in
reliance upon Clause XII of the Letters Patent.
Jindal Vijayanagar and its Import:
10. The sheet anchor of Mr. Rebello's submission is the ruling in
Jindal Vijayanagar from which he seeks to import certain observations
in order to apply some observations made in Ravi Ranjan, to thereby
make a case that this Court would have jurisdiction despite the silence
in the arbitration agreement about venue or seat, by reference to the
Respondent's head office being in Mumbai.
11. I am unable to accept Mr. Rebello's submission that a reading
of sub-paragraphs (f), (g), (h) and (i) of Paragraph 65 in Jindal
Vijayanagar, when read with Ravi Ranjan, would lead to the
Respondent's head office being in Mumbai, confering jurisdiction in
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terms of Clause XII in this Court, to thereby make it the "Court" under
Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, and thereby attract the jurisdiction of Section
11 of the Act. This is simply because the extensive discussion in Jindal
Vijayanagar was on the issue of whether the judgement in Food
Corporation of India6 was on the ground of being in conflict with Patel
Roadways7. On facts, the arbitration agreement in Jindal Vijayanagar
explicitly entailed arbitration in Mumbai, which would have given
jurisdiction to this Court for purposes of Section 11 of the Act.
12. The issue in Jindal Vijayanagar was whether this Court had
jurisdiction to grant interlocutory protective measures under Section 9
of the Act. Both the parties in that dispute, who were partners in a joint
venture, were headquartered in Mumbai and had executed a settlement
agreement pursuant to discussions at a board meeting of the joint
venture held in Mumbai. On facts, Jindal Vijayanagar stood on a
completely different footing. The contents of sub-paragraphs (a), (b),
(c), (d) and (e) of Paragraph 65 in Jindal Vijayanagar quotes
approvingly, from the order impugned in that case. They make clear
what weighed with the Supreme Court in defending the jurisdiction
assumed by this Court in that case. Effectively, the Supreme Court
6 Food Corporation of India vs. Evdomen Corpn - (1999) 2 SCC 446
7 Patel Roadways Ltd. Vs. Prasad Trading Co. - (1991) 4 SCC 270
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decided that it was not necessary to refer Food Corporation of India to a
larger bench. The extensive discussions about the inter-play (in fact, the
absence of that) between Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
("CPC") and Clause XII of the Letters Patent are in aid of that facet of
the decision.
13. The contention considered by the Supreme Court was that
the aforesaid two provisions were pari materia and that therefore,
judgements interpreting Section 20 of the CPC should inform the
interpretation of Clause XII of the Letters Patent. The Supreme Court
ruled that Letters Patent governed the chartered High Courts and
Section 120 of CPC explicitly excluded the application of Section 20, and
therefore rejected the request for reconsideration of Food Corporation
of India by reference to a larger bench. On facts, considering Mumbai
was a convenient forum and arbitration was already taking place in
Mumbai, and that too pursuant to an explicit agreement between two
parties with their head offices in Mumbai, the Court saw no point in
making a reference to a larger bench.
14. Mr. Rebello's reliance on select portions of Jindal
Vijayanagar to make the case for this Court assuming jurisdiction in
these Applications for no reason other than the fact that the Respondent
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has a head office in Mumbai, and that there is a generic provision in the
Policy document for raising grievances at any of the three offices - local
office, regional office or the head office - would not take the case far.
15. Unlike Jindal Vijayanagar, where the parties had an
agreement to arbitrate in Mumbai, in the matter at hand, there was no
such consensus on venue. In the captioned proceedings, what is
apparent is that every material element in the bundle of facts, the
proving of which would lead to relief being granted or denied, is located
in Telangana. The location of some incidental and inconsequential fact
in a Court's territory would not make such a fact a part of the cause of
action. The contention that the survey report, although sent to the
Respondent in Telangana was copied to the Deputy General Manager
sitting in Mumbai, or that the internal devolution of authority would
indicate that claims of above Rs. 2 crores would be finally decided upon
in Mumbai would not constitute a material fact, the proving of which,
would make it a part of the cause of action.
16. Ravi Ranjan was based on facts where a Court in Bihar had
already been presented with a petition under Section 9 based on
location of the assets in that Court's territorial jurisdiction. In that
context, interpreting Section 42 of the Act, entailing the need to go to
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the same Court with all future applications, the Supreme Court held that
the High Court that has supervisory jurisdiction over the Section 9
Court that had issued interlocutory measures, would be the Section 11
Court. That ratio has no relevance to the facts of the instant case.
17. In fact, Ravi Ranjan has an extract that would be appropriate
to extract:
41. It is well settled that a judgment is a precedent for the issue of law that is raised
and decided. The judgment has to be construed in the backdrop of the facts and
circumstances in which the judgment has been rendered. Words, phrases and
sentences in a judgment, cannot be read out of context. Nor is a judgment to be read
and interpreted in the manner of a statute. It is only the law as interpreted by in an
earlier judgment, which constitutes a binding precedent, and not everything that the
Judges say.
[Emphasis Supplied]
Cause of Action - determining factor:
18. Reference may be made to multiple judgements on the
interpretation of the term "cause of action" and its nexus with territorial
jurisdiction of a Court. This issue continues to be presented to Courts,
not just in civil proceedings, but even in writ proceedings under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, where too the cause of action ought to
have arisen in the territory of the writ court. The principles underlying
the territorial jurisdiction of the writ courts too are the same as those
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adopted in ordinary civil proceedings. Judgements rendered in each
track have adopted principles enunciated in the other. To quote from
Kunjan Nair8, which summarises the concept pithily:-
16. The expression "cause of action" has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In
the restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction
of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the
necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction
of the right, but the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously the
expression means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if
traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. Every fact which
is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence which is
necessary to prove each fact, comprises in "cause of action".
17. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.) it has been stated as follows:
"'Cause of action' has been defined as meaning simply a factual situation the
existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against
another person. The phrase has been held from earliest time to include every
fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every
fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse. 'Cause of action' has
also been taken to mean that particular act on the part of the defendant which
gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject-matter of grievance
founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action."
[Emphasis Supplied]
19. The Applicants' complaint is about the Respondent not
accepting his entire claim. That act or rather inaction that gives cause
for the Applicants' grievance did not take place anywhere in the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The law declared in the case of
8 Kunjan Nair Sivaraman Nair Vs. Narayanan Nair and Ors. - (2004) 3 SCC 277 -
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Adani Exports9, where near-similar contentions about tenuous links to
Ahmedabad were invoked, is noteworthy. The Supreme Court repelled
such contentions by finding that the credit of Customs Duty claimed,
which was the cause of action, was in respect of exports made from
Chennai and those claims of duty credit had been processed in Chennai.
The Court held that unless the bundle of facts, proving of which would
lead to a judgement one way or the other, fell within the territory of a
certain Court, that Court would not have jurisdiction at all. The
following extracts are noteworthy:-
13. In spite of the above admitted facts, the respondents herein plead that
as per the plea raised by them in para 16 of the special civil application, the
following facts give rise to the cause of action conferring territorial jurisdiction
on the Court at Ahmedabad. They are:
(i) the respondents carry on their business of export and import from
Ahmedabad;
(ii) their orders of export and import are placed from and are executed at
Ahmedabad;
(iii) documents and payments for export and import are sent/made at
Ahmedabad;
(iv) the credit of duty claimed in respect of exports were handled from
Ahmedabad since export orders were received at Ahmedabad and payments
also received at Ahmedabad;
(v) non-granting and denial of utilisation of the credit in the passbook will
affect the business of the respondents at Ahmedabad;
(vi) the respondents have executed a bank guarantee through their bankers at
9 Union of India & Ors. Vs. Adani Exports & Anr. - (2002) 1 SCC 567
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Ahmedabad as well as a bond at Ahmedabad.
14. Though it is also contended in para 16 of the application that the
appellants have their office at Ahmedabad, that contention has not been pressed
since it is clear from the records that none of these appellants have their office
at Ahmedabad. Dehors this fact, if we take into consideration the other facts
enumerated hereinabove in support of the cause of action pleaded by the
respondents, it is seen that none of these facts is in any way connected with the
relief sought for by the respondents in their civil applications so as to constitute
the cause of action at Ahmedabad.
17. It is seen from the above that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High
Court to entertain a writ petition or a special civil application as in this case,
the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the
cause of action that those facts do constitute a cause so as to empower the court
to decide a dispute which has, at least in part, arisen within its jurisdiction. It is
clear from the above judgment that each and every fact pleaded by the
respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that
those facts give rise to a cause of action within the court's territorial
jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or
relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing
with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of
action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned. If we apply
this principle then we see that none of the facts pleaded in para 16 of the
petition, in our opinion, falls into the category of bundle of facts which would
constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could confer
territorial jurisdiction on the courts at Ahmedabad.
18. As we have noticed earlier, the fact that the respondents are carrying
on the business of export and import or that they are receiving the export and
import orders at Ahmedabad or that their documents and payments for exports
and imports are sent/made at Ahmedabad, has no connection whatsoever with
the dispute that is involved in the applications. Similarly, the fact that the credit
of duty claimed in respect of exports that were made from Chennai were
handled by the respondents from Ahmedabad have also no connection
whatsoever with the actions of the appellants impugned in the application. The
non-granting and denial of credit in the passbook having an ultimate effect, if
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any, on the business of the respondents at Ahmedabad would not also, in our
opinion, give rise to any such cause of action to a court at Ahmedabad to
adjudicate on the actions complained against the appellants.
19. Mr Ashok Desai, however, pleaded that the respondents have executed
a bank guarantee and a bond at Ahmedabad which in law the respondents are
entitled to get cancelled through the intervention of the courts at Ahmedabad.
This fact having been specifically pleaded in the application and a relief being
sought for that purpose, would definitely give rise to a part of cause of action at
Ahmedabad, but on behalf of the appellants, it is pointed out to us that the
subject-matter involved in the applications pertains to the denial of the benefit
of the import-export scheme which ended w.e.f. 31-3-1997 while the bank
guarantee and the bond in question were not part of the Passbook Scheme
which is the subject-matter of the special civil applications with which we are
concerned now. Execution of the bank guarantee was not with reference to the
demand of the respondents to give it due credit in the passbook but the same
was executed much later than 31-3-1997 in regard to certain disputes pending
with the Customs Authorities in regard to the valuations made by the said
Authorities as to the value of the export and import of prawn and its inputs. It
was also pointed out that these Customs Authorities, as a matter of fact, are not
even parties to these special civil applications. Thus, it is contended that the
factum of the respondents having executed a bank guarantee and a bond at
Ahmedabad will have no direct nexus or bearing on the disputes involved in
these applications. It is pointed out to us by learned counsel for the appellants
that in regard to the correctness of the valuation, separate proceedings have
been initiated and against the findings in those proceedings, separate appeals
are pending in this Court, therefore, the bank guarantee and the bond executed
by the respondents, as a matter of fact, have nothing to do with the cause of
action that may arise to challenge the denial of the benefit of the Passbook
Scheme. Inclusion of this totally extraneous claim in the present writ petition
cannot be construed as being a factor giving rise to a cause of action. In the
case of ONGC [(1994) 4 SCC 711] this Court negatived the contentions
advanced on behalf of the respondents therein that either the acquisition of
knowledge made through media at a particular place or owning and having an
office or property or residing at a particular place, receiving of a fax message
at a particular place, receiving telephone calls and maintaining statements of
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accounts of business, printing of letterheads indicating branch offices of the
firm, booking of orders from a particular place are not the factors which would
give rise to either wholly or in part cause of action conferring territorial
jurisdiction to courts. In the said case, this Court also held that the mere service
of notice is also not a fact giving rise to a cause of action unless such notice is
an integral part of the cause of action.
20. Mr Desai, however, placed reliance on a recent judgment of this Court
in Navinchandra v. State of Maharashtra [(2000) 7 SCC 640 : 2001 SCC (Cri)
215] wherein this Court had held that a part of the cause of action had arisen
within the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court. It is to be noted that in the
said petition, among other reliefs, the writ petitioner had prayed for a writ of
mandamus to the State of Meghalaya to transfer the investigation to Mumbai
Police as also allegations of mala fides were made as to the filing of the
complaint at Shillong. It was also averred in that case that the petitioner was
primarily aggrieved by the criminal complaint filed at Meghalaya because the
bulk of the investigation was carried on at Bombay. The said writ petition was
dismissed by the Bombay High Court solely on the ground that since the
complaint in question was filed in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya and the
petitioner had sought for quashing of the said complaint, such a writ petition
was not maintainable before the High Court of Bombay. According to this
Court, that finding was given without taking into consideration the other
alternative prayers in the writ petition to which we have made reference
hereinabove, which prayers according to this Court, gave rise to a cause of
action to move the High Court at Bombay for relief. Therefore, in our opinion,
this judgment does not help the writ petitioner to justify its action in filing a writ
petition before the Gujarat High Court. That apart, we must notice that the said
judgment is delivered in a matter involving criminal dispute and consequences
of such dispute have a direct bearing on the personal freedom of a citizen
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, the consideration
that arises in deciding the question of territorial jurisdiction in cases involving
criminal offences may not always apply to cases involving civil disputes like the
special civil applications with which we are concerned. Mr Desai then urged
that since the High Court has elaborately dealt with the merits of the case and
given a finding in favour of the respondents in the interest of justice, we should
not interfere with the said finding and uphold the same. We are not inclined to
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accept this argument of the learned counsel because the appellants herein had
taken objection to the entertainment of the special civil applications by the
Gujarat High Court on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction in the first
instance itself and the same was rejected, according to us, wholly on
unsustainable grounds. As a matter of fact, the appellant on the entertainment
of the civil application and grant of interim order, had challenged the said
order on the ground of want of jurisdiction by way of a civil appeal in this
Court which appeal is pending consideration by this Court, therefore, the
objection having been taken at the first instance itself and the court having not
proceeded to decide this question of territorial jurisdiction as contemplated
under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC, we think we cannot deny relief to the appellant
solely on the ground that the High Court has chosen to proceed to decide the
case on merit. This being a judgment of a court having no territorial
jurisdiction, the judgment has to be set aside. However, the special civil
applications cannot be dismissed on this ground because it has been the
contention of the appellants themselves in the objections filed by them before
the High Court, that these applications ought to be transferred to the High
Court at Chennai, in the interest of justice, we agree with this plea.
[Emphasis Supplied]
20. In ONGC10, the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court had
been invoked on the premise that the awareness about the contract
being proposed came about on reading an advertisement in a newspaper
published in Kolkata. This was repelled by the Court. In fact, Adani
Exports refers to ONGC in the portions extracted above. Likewise is the
case of Kusum Ingots11 the fundamental principle set out is that some
portion of the facts, the proving of which would be necessary to decide
10 Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu - (1994) 4 SCC 711
11 Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Anr. - (2004) 6 SCC 254 -
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the dispute between the parties (nexus with the prayers made) has been
iterated. Despite the legislation being challenged having an effect in the
territory of the Court approached, it was held that the bundle of facts on
which the grievance is based ought to be situated in the territory for
legislation to be challenged in the writ court having jurisdiction over
that territory. To avoid prolixity, extracts of these judgements are not
cited, but the paragraph numbers referred to in these judgements are
set out in the footnotes along with the citations.
21. None of the facets of fact pressed into service by Mr. Rebello
represent facts that have a nexus to the cause of action i.e. the bundle of
facts, the proving or disproving of which would lead to the grant or
denial of relief in the matter. Specifically, the location of the
Respondent's head office; that the circular depicting devolution of
authority would lead to claims of over Rs. 2 crores being finally
approved in the head office; or the general provision indicating that
grievances could also be sent to the head office, are not of a nature that
would constitute a component of the cause of action.
22. The judgement in Triveni Adhesives by a Learned Single
Judge of this Court, and relied upon by the Respondent, is squarely on
point. The only difference is that in that case Uttar Pradesh was the state
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in which the bundle of facts were located, as opposed to Telangana. I am
in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Learned Single Judge
in Triveni Adhesives.
Conclusion:
23. In these circumstances, both the captioned Applications are
disposed of without constituting an arbitral tribunal, leaving it to the
parties to either agree upon an arbitrator or approaching the Telangana
High Court for appointment of the arbitrator.
24. All actions required to be taken pursuant to this order shall
be taken upon receipt of a downloaded copy as available on this Court's
website.
[ SOMASEKHAR SUNDARESAN, J.]
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Ashwini Vallakati
