Bombay High Court
Shri Ranisati Sarvajanik Aushdhalaya vs Malad Co-Operative Housing Society ... on 4 November, 2025
2025:BHC-OS:20008
Megha 904 _(ch) ial_31101_2025_fc.docx
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO.31101 OF 2025
IN
SUIT (L) NO.31097 OF 2025
Shri Ranisati Sarvajanik Aushdhalaya
and Ors. ...Applicants/ Plaintiffs
V/s.
The Malad Co-operative Housing
Society Ltd and Ors. ...Respondents
______________
Mr. Atul Damle, Senior Advocate with Mr. Anoshak Daver, Mr. Ashok
Dhanuka, Mr. Prashant Pandey, Mr. Hitesh Gupta, Mr. Vipul Makwana
and Mr. Nikhil Sonar for the Plaintiff and for Applicants in
IAL/31101/2025.
Mr. Karl Tamboly with Mr. Ashish A. Gatagat, for Defendant No.1.
Mr. D.D. Madon, Senior Advocate with Mr. Vivek Shiralkar, Mr. Aditya
Shiralkar, Ms. Yashoda Desai, Mr. Vijay Poojari and Mr. Aditya Hegde
i/b. Shiralkar & Co. for Defendant No.2.
______________
CORAM: SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.
RESERVED ON: 17 OCTOBER 2025.
PRONOUNCED ON: 04 NOVEMBER 2025.
JUDGMENT:
1) Plaintiffs have filed the present Interim Application
seeking temporary injunction to restrain Defendant No.1-Society from
executing Draft Development Agreement in favour of Defendant No.2-
Developer during pendency of the Suit.
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2) In 1963, the original land owner M/s. Poddar Mills Ltd.
had entered into financial arrangement with Defendant No.3 for sale of
land admeasuring 13,376.36 sq.mtrs. at CTS No. 425 of Village Malad
(East), Taluka Malad, District-Mumbai Suburban, known as 'Poddar
Park' for construction of 8 buildings comprising of residential flats and
commercial shops. Defendant No.1-Society was incorporated on 26
May 1965 as tenant co-partnership society and according to Plaintiffs,
formation of Society was for the purpose of seeking tax exemption by
Defendant No.3. A registered Deed of Conveyance dated 30 April
1966 was executed between Poddar Mills and Defendant No.1- Society
with consent and confirmation of Defendant No.3. In the conveyance
deed consideration, Rs.4,00,000/- was indicated to have been paid by
Defendant No.3 to Poddar Mills Limited and cost of construction of
all eight buildings was indicated as Rs.54,99,500/-. Defendant No.3
was to avail financial assistance from the Maharashtra Co-operative
Housing Finance Limited for completion of construction. According
to the Plaintiffs, the conveyance did not factor in the cost of
construction and land cost of shops to be constructed on the plot. Deed
of Modification dated 5 May 1970 was executed, under which
Defendant No.3 proposed to convert shop premises into residential
units by construction of additional floors. The flat purchasers were
required to contribute towards construction cost by becoming members
of Defendant No.1-Society. Even shop purchasers contributed to the
construction cost. However, Defendant No.3 treated shop purchasers
differently from flat purchasers and did not admit them as members of
first Defendant-Society. However, amounts towards maintenance
including rent, sinking fund, capital fund, water charges were recovered
from shop allottees. However, the shop allottees were treated as tenants
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rather than being admitted as members of the Society. Plaintiffs dispute
that they are tenants of the society. In 2014-2015 redevelopment
proposals were floated and consent of the shop allottees were obtained
by representing to them that they will be equal stake holders in the
redevelopment. However, the redevelopment proposal did not proceed
further.
3) On 6 May 2023, Plaintiffs and other shop allottees
demanded share certificates and regularisation of their membership
status. On 6 June 2023, provisional committee appointed for
management of day-to-day affairs of the society upon dissolution of
the managing committee, considered appointment of Project
Management Consultant (PMC) for redevelopment of the building.
Society has undertaken redevelopment of its building by excluding
Plaintiffs from decision making. By circulars dated 28 July 2024 and 20
August 2024, the society allowed shop keepers' four representatives to
participate in redevelopment discussion denying equal representation
to other shop allottees.
4) Plaintiffs claim that redevelopment is undertaken as per
Regulation 33(9) of the Development Control and Promotion
Regulation, 2034 (DCPR 2034), under which the shop allottees are
allowed to 46% enhanced carpet area. On 18 September 2025, some of
the Plaintiffs received copy of the draft of the Development Agreement
(DA), under which shop allottees are treated as tenants of Defendant
No.1-Society and are being allotted only 30% additional area as against
their entitlement of 46% additional built-up area. Plaintiffs have
accordingly filed the present Suit seeking a declaration that they have
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same right in respect of the suit plot and suit buildings as that of
residential flat owners and that they are entitled to parity in terms of
entitlement flowing through redevelopment process. Plaintiffs have
challenged the draft DA circulated on 18 September 2025. They have
also sought a declaration that redevelopment process undertaken by the
Society by excluding Plaintiffs is illegal and not binding on them. In
their Suit, Plaintiffs have filed present application for temporary
injunction seeking following reliefs:-
a) That this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to pass an order of
temporary injunction thereby restraining the Defendant Nos. 1 and
2, jointly or severally, or their employees, servants, agents,
representatives, officers, successors, assigns or any person claiming
by, through or under them, from executing, registering, or acting
upon the draft Development Agreement dated 18th September
2025 or any redevelopment agreement, plan, or step, unless and
until the Plaintiffs' rights and entitlements as set out in the suit are
incorporated therein;
b) That this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to pass an order directing
the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2, jointly or severally, or their
employees, servants, agents, representatives, officers, successors,
assigns or any person claiming by, through or under them, to
maintain status quo qua the Draft Development Agreement
circulated on 18th September, 2025 or any other redevelopment
agreement or plans or steps in furtherance of the same;
c) For ad-interim reliefs in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b) above:
d) For such further and other reliefs as this Hon'ble Court may deem
fit in the circumstances of the present case.
5) The application is opposed by Defendant No.1-Society by
filing its Affidavit-in-reply. Defendant No.2-Developer has also filed its
Affidavit-in-reply opposing the Interim Application. Plaintiffs have
filed Affidavit-in-rejoinder. Since pleadings in the Interim Application
are complete, the same is taken up for hearing and disposal.
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6) Mr. Damle, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for
Plaintiffs would submit that the first Defendant Society is illegally
discriminating against the shop allottees by giving them different
treatment than the one given to residential flat owners. That the shops
are also part of building of the Society and therefore shop allottees
cannot be treated differently than the flat allottees. That the shop
allottees have also contributed towards the cost of construction of the
building of the society and they are illegally treated as tenants without
admitting them as members of the society. That shop allottees have
never accepted the status as tenants as they entitled to membership of
the first Defendant -Society.
7) Mr. Damle would further submit that there is clear
disparity in the offer made to the shop allottees in the reconstructed
building as compared to the flat allottees. In the draft DA, Plaintiffs
and other shop allottees are given discriminatory treatment in the
following manner:-
(i) They are denied title and status as shop owners thereby
illegally dealing with proportionate right in the land and the
building without involving shop allottees in the decision-making
process.
(ii) Shop allottees are not permitted to participate in decision
making process relating to appointment of developer, drafting of
draft DA, etc. While residential flat owners are given 63%
additional area over and above minimum 376 sq.ft. carpet area,
shop allottees are getting only 30% additional area.
(iii) No final layout plan and type of shopping complex is
provided to the shop allottees with the result they are not even
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aware about the exact location at which shops would be
constructed in redeveloped building.
(iv) Developer is proposing to construct an atrium type
shopping mall under the podium area of the entire residential
complex by reserving large departmental stores for it in the front
side and locating the shop allottees at undesired location. No
provision is made for frontage of shops in the Draft DA.
Allocation of shop premises is left entirely at the discretion of
the Developer and the Society without involving shop allottees in
the decision making process.
(v) There is no adherence to requirement of minimum height
for the shops.
(vi) No car parking spaces have been allotted to the shop
allottees contrary to DCPR 2034.
(vii) Project details are made available only to flat purchaser
members and not to shop allottees.
(viii) There is penalty provision of Rs.50,000/- per day as
liquidated damages only for shop allottees.
(ix) While flat owners are permitted to sell premises after
execution of PAAA without permission of Society and
Developers, shop allottees cannot do similar act.
(x) Sale proceeds of additional FSI is made available to flat
allottees and not to shop allottees.
8) Mr. Damle would accordingly submit that since the shop
allottees are being given discriminatory treatment in the redevelopment
process, injunction deserves to be granted restraining Defendant Nos.1
and 2 from executing draft DA.
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9) The application is opposed by Mr. Tamboly, the learned
counsel appearing for Defendant No.1-Society submitting that the Suit
itself is not maintainable as the Suit essentially seeks membership
rights, which relief needs to be claimed under Section 22 of the
Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. Therefore, this Court
does not have provision to decide the issue of grant of membership of
the society. That Plaintiffs and other shop allottees are always treated
as tenants of the society and have been paying rent for over 50 years.
That the Society has agreed to admit shop allottees as members after
completion of redevelopment process even though they are not entitled
in law for conversion of tenancy into ownership.
10) Mr. Tamboly would further submit that prayer for grant of
membership is otherwise hit by the principle of delay and laches. That
the issue of membership is raised for the first time by the Plaintiffs only
at the time when Draft DA is to be executed with Defendant No.2-
Developer. That otherwise issue of membership was not raised and that
the said issue was never raised for last 59 years. Plaintiffs have
approached this Court by unclean hands by suppressing material facts
and by making the false statements. That several of the Plaintiffs are
original flat owners and members of the society and had full
knowledge about the entire process of redevelopment. That the
Plaintiffs had previously given irrevocable consent letters for
redevelopment, which are suppressed. That the Society has regularly
communicated with the tenant shop allottees through various notices
and circulars, which are also suppressed. That a joint meeting with the
tenants was held by the Developer on 7 September 2020 in which 20
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out of 29 plaintiffs were present and consented without raising any
objection. Relying on judgment of this Court in Nagina Ramsagar
Choube and Ors. V/s. Ajay Mohan and Ors. 1 Mr. Tamboly would
submit that the suit itself is required to be dismissed on account of
suppression of material facts.
11) Mr. Tamboly would further submit that the Plaintiffs form
a minuscule minority, who are obstructing redevelopment process. Out
of the total 68 tenants, only 25 tenants (Plaintiffs) have filed the present
Suit. 16 other tenants have already granted consent for redevelopment
process. He would rely upon judgment of this Court in Pranav
Constructions Limited V/s. Priyadarshini Co-operative Housing
Society Limited and others2 in support of the contention that similar
plea about the grant of different treatment to shop keepers has been
negatived by this Court. He would submit that demand of shop
keepers/ tenants for 46% additional area is totally baseless. That
DCPR 2034 does not create any right in favour of the shop keepers to
claim additional area in the redevelopment building. Despite this
position, the Developer has offered 30% additional carpet area, corpus
of Rs.2,000/- per sq.ft., transit rent, shifting charges and brokerage.
That the Society has implemented the redevelopment in a transparent
and democratic manner and that no interference therein is warranted.
12) Mr. Madon, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for
Defendant No.2-Developer would additionally submit that the society
has 310 members with residential units and 68 tenants with
commercial units, out of which 25 tenants have filed the present Suit
Interim Application No.2143 of 2025 decided on 24 June 2025
Arbitration Appeal (L) No.20093 of 2025 decided on 14 July 2025.
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for putting a spoke in the redevelopment process thereby affecting the
rights of the other willing members. That the prayer for interim
injunction is hit by the principles of delay and laches as the
redevelopment process had commenced in September 2023 by
appointment of PMC. In a Suit filed after delay of two long years, no
interim injunction can be granted. That there is clear evidence of
Plaintiffs being tenants of the Society and therefore relief of
membership cannot be sought in the present Suit. That the Plaintiffs
were aware of all the decisions taken in the redevelopment process by
participating in various meetings.
13) Mr. Madon would further submit that demand of
Plaintiffs for additional area of 46% is untenable in law. That
Regulation 33(9) of DCPR 2034 does not grant any incentive area for
commercial units. That there is no compulsion on the Developer to
avail fungible FSI. That even otherwise fungible FSI for commercial
units cannot be availed without payment of premium under Regulation
33(13) unlike a fungible FSI for residential units. That therefore shop
keepers/tenants cannot be treated at par with residential unit occupiers.
That Plaintiffs are already offered various benefits of redevelopment
such as 30% additional carpet area, corpus, transit rent, etc. He would
accordingly pray for dismissal of the Interim Application.
14) I have considered the submissions canvassed by the
learned counsel appearing for the rival parties and also perused the
records of the case.
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15) Plaintiffs are occupiers of commercial units /shops whose
main grouse is about discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis residential flat
owner members at the hands of Defendant No.1-Society and
Defendant No.2 -Developer. Suit is filed essentially to claim parity with
the residential flat owners in the redevelopment process. Plaintiffs are
also aggrieved by implementation of the development process without
involving them in the decision-making process.
16) There is no dispute to the position that Plaintiffs and other
shop allottees have not been admitted as members of the first
Defendant-Society. They are being treated as tenants of the society in
respect of the shop premises in their respective occupation. As
disclosed in the Plaint, Defendant No.1 -Society is formed on 26 May
1965 and has been in existence for the last 60 long years. Though
Plaintiffs have not raised a specific prayer in the Suit for grant of
membership of the first Defendant -Society, their prayer for grant of
parity with members of the society cannot be granted without first
elevating them to the status of members of Defendant No.1-Society.
Therefore, it is necessary for Plaintiffs to first secure membership of the
Society, both for the purpose of participation in the decision-making
process for redevelopment of the building as well as for claiming parity
with other members of the Society. I am thus of the prima facie view
that grant of the membership to shop allottees of first Defendant -
Society is a sine qua non for consideration of the relief sought in the
Suit. Plaintiffs cannot skirt the issue of membership and claim parity
with society members. As of now, the Society is treating the Plaintiffs
and other shop keepers as its tenants. There are tenancy receipts on
record evidencing payment of rent by them to the Society. If Plaintiffs
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really believe that they are not the tenants but owners of their
respective shops and are entitled to membership of first Defendant
Society, they ought to have adopted appropriate steps for securing
membership of the Society by filing application under Section 22 of the
Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (MCS Act).
17) Faced with the difficulty that the Plaintiffs cannot seek
membership of the Society in the present Suit, they have conveniently
not sought a prayer for grant of membership. Instead, consequential
relief flowing through the relief of membership in the form of parity
with other members of the Society is being sought in the present Suit.
In my prima facie view, the Plaintiffs cannot seek consequential relief
in the present Suit without first securing membership of the first
Defendant -Society by adopting necessary measures under Section 22
of the MCS Act. This is the first reason why this Court would not be
inclined to grant temporary injunction in favour of the Plaintiffs in the
present Suit.
18) It is another matter that Plaintiffs would no longer remain
mere tenants of the society after they are put back in possession of the
alternate premises in the new building. It appears that Draft DA
contemplates grant of membership in the Society to the Plaintiffs and
other shop allottees as is clear from Clauses 14.1 and 14.2 of the Draft
DA, which reads thus:-
14. MEMBERSHIP TO TENANTS
14.1 Ownership right of Tenants in respect of Tenants' New Premises:
The Tenants' New Premises shall be allotted to the Tenants in the
proposed New Building(s) with a right to use and occupy, which rights
shall be akin and commonly referred to as ownership rights as are
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provided to a member of the Society. The tenancy rights of the Tenants
shall continue to subsist till the Tenants are put in possession of the
Tenants' New Premises and it is only thereafter their tenancy right shall
merge in to ownership right as contemplated above, which shall be also
specified in the PAAA to be executed by the Developer and the Society
in favour of the Tenants.
14.2 Membership of Tenants in Society: The Society shall admit
Tenants as members only after completion of the Project and delivery
of possession of Members' New Premises to the Existing Members and
against nominal membership fees not exceeding Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees
One Thousand only) and subject to the Tenants clearing all the past
dues / arrears, if any, of the Society.
19) The Society has thus agreed to admit the shop allottees
/tenants as members after completion of the project and upon delivery
of possession of the premises. Clause 14.1 also envisages grant of
ownership rights in respect of shop premises to the Plaintiffs upon
construction of the new building. Thus tenancy rights would get
converted into ownership rights. Though Plaintiffs are, at the moment,
treated as tenants by the first Defendant- Society, and though they have
not adopted any proceedings seeking declaration of ownership rights or
for securing membership of the Society, the Society and Defendant
No.2-Developer have agreed to convert tenancy rights of Plaintiffs into
ownership rights and also to admit them as members of the Society
after completion of construction of the building. Thus, though in law
Plaintiffs are entitled to be put back in the possession of newly
constructed premises in the capacity as tenants, Defendant Nos.1 and 2
have still offered to grant ownership rights in favour of the Plaintiffs
upon redevelopment of the building. Additionally, Plaintiffs are already
being paid various other benefits such as corpus, hardship
compensation @ Rs. 2000/- Sq.ft., transit rent of 129 per sq.ft. with
7.25% escalation every year, shifting charges, brokerage, etc. Thus,
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despite being momentarily treated as tenants and non-members, the
Plaintiffs are still being granted substantial benefits in the
redevelopment process.
20) The real grouse of the Plaintiffs is their demand for grant
of 46% additional carpet area in the new building as compared to 30%
additional area offered by Defendant No.2-Developer. It is Plaintiffs'
grievance that residential flat holders are being given 63% additional
area whereas shop allottees are being granted discriminatory treatment
by allotting 30% additional carpet area. Plaintiffs have relied upon their
architect certificate in support of their contention that they are entitled
to be granted 46% additional carpet area in the newly constructed
building. I proceed to prima facie decide the grievance of Plaintiffs for
46% additional area.
21) Plaintiffs rely upon Regulation 31(3) of DCPR 2034
providing for 35% fungible compensatory area for residential
/industrial /commercial development over and above admissible
FSI /built up area. Though Regulation 31(3) provides for payment of
premium @ 50% for residential and 60% for industrial and commercial
development of the Annual Statement of Rates (ASR), the Proviso to
Regulation 31(3) provides that in case of redevelopment under
Regulations 33(7)(A), 33(8), 33(9), 33(9)(B), 33(20) and 33(10), the
fungible compensatory area shall be granted without charging
premium. Since the redevelopment is undertaken under Regulation
33(9), Plaintiffs therefore believe that the fungible area grantable under
Regulation 31(3) is free of cost and must enure to their benefit.
However, perusal of Regulation 33(9)(5) of DCPR 2034 would indicate
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that the provision therein applies only to residential and residential-
cum-commercial occupants. Thus, for pure commercial premises
Regulation 33(9)(5) does not apply since Regulation 33(9)(5) provides
for minimum carpet area of 35 sq.mtrs. and additional area depending
on size of cluster development, there is exemption from payment of
premium for residential and residential-cum-commercial premises
under Proviso to Regulation 31(3)of DCPR 2034. For pure commercial
units, there is no amenity for any minimum carpet area nor grant of
any additional area. Therefore, Plaintiffs' reliance on Regulation 31(3)
of DCPR 2034 for seeking 35% additional fungible carpet area is
clearly misplaced. Thus for commercial units, though fungible FSI upto
35% is available, the same is required to be purchased on payment of
premium @ 60% of ASR value. It is therefore not compulsory for the
Developer to avail fungible FSI under Regulation 31(3). Plaintiffs
therefore cannot insist that the Developer must purchase the fungible
FSI and make the same available to them free of cost. It may be that
Defendant No.2- Developer would procure fungible FSI even for
commercial premises by paying premium to MCGM. However, since
cost is incurred on procurement of fungible FSI for commercial units,
it would not be possible for the developer to handover the entire
fungible area to the Plaintiffs and other shop allottees. This appears to
be the reason why Developer has offered only 30% of additional carpet
area to the shop allottees. In my prima facie view therefore, Developer
is not under any legal obligation to allot 46% additional carpet area as
demanded by the Plaintiffs. It is a matter of commercial bargain
between the Society and Defendant No.2-Developer, under which an
offer of 30% additional carpet area made by the Developer has been
accepted by the Society. Same is also accepted by the majority of the
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shop tenants as only 25 shop tenants have filed the present Suit out of
68 tenants. In my view therefore apart from impermissibility for
Plaintiffs to seek restraint order on redevelopment process in absence of
membership of the Society, their demand for 46% additional carpet
area also appears to be misconceived.
22) In the present case, minuscule number of occupiers are
seeking to stall the redevelopment process of society's building. Society
has 310 members with residential units and 68 tenants with
commercial units. Four commercial units are with the Society. Even if
all the commercial unit occupiers are admitted as members of the first
Defendant -Society, they would still form minority for taking decisions
with regard to redevelopment of the Society's building. As observed
above, it is not that all the commercial unit occupiers are opposing the
redevelopment process. Only 25 out of the 68 tenants have filed the
present Suit. While other tenants have maintained silence, 16 tenants
have executed necessary documents indicating their participation in the
redevelopment process. In my view therefore, Plaintiffs cannot be
granted any injunctive relief, which would result in affecting rights of
about 350 other occupants of the premises in Society's building.
23) Apart from demand for additional area, the objections
raised by Plaintiffs to various clauses in the draft DA cannot be
considered in the light of the position that their status is only of
tenants. The Society is their landlord, to whom they have been paying
rent. Therefore, the decision with regard to redevelopment process of
shops would necessarily be taken by the Society. The only right, which
tenants enjoy under the provisions of Maharashtra Rent Control Act,
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1999 is to continue tenancy in respect of same carpet area in the newly
constructed building. In the present case, this is the only statutory right
of the Plaintiffs. However, over and above the said statutory right, they
are being offered not just 30% additional area, but also the ownership
in respect of the new premises in redeveloped building. Redevelopment
process is thus largely beneficial even to shop allottees and there is no
reason for granting any interim injunction in favour of the Plaintiffs.
24) Plaintiffs' apprehension of losing road frontage also
cannot be a ground for stalling the redevelopment process. Plaintiffs
and other shopkeepers are being granted 30% additional carpet area in
the redeveloped building. It is otherwise impossible for a developer to
allot the new shop premises with the road frontage to all the
shopkeepers considering the increase in the sizes of the shops.
25) Plaintiffs have also not approached the Court with
necessary alacrity for seeking temporary injunction. Redevelopment
process has commenced on 9 September 2023 when PMC was
appointed. Tender was floated in October -2023. Offer by Defendant
No.2 was circulated on 1 April 2024. Resolution appointing Defendant
No.2 as Developer was adopted in the meeting held on 13 October
2024, Letter of Intent was issued to Defendant No.2 on 29 October
2024, Suit is however filed on 27 September 2025 only when occasion
arose for finalising and executing the draft DA. Considering the delay
in approaching the Court, Plaintiffs cannot be granted equitable relief
of temporary injunction.
26) Plaintiffs' claim of they being kept in dark about various
steps taken in the redevelopment process and towards finalization of
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draft DA cannot be accepted. It appears that the Plaintiffs have
participated in the decision-making process either directly or indirectly.
As a matter of fact, Plaintiff Nos.4, 9,13,14, 17, 19, 21 and 24 are
members of the Society in their capacity as residential flat owners.
Therefore, they are actual decision makers in appointing Defendant
No.2 as Developer and accepting the offer for 30% additional carpet
area for shops. Additionally, there is an admission in the Plaint that
four representatives of shop occupiers were involved in the decision-
making process. Additionally, it appears that several notices were given
by the Society to shop allottees /tenants informing them about various
developments happening in the proposal. On 7 September 2025 a joint
meeting was held between shop keepers /tenants and the Developer in
which the proposal was discussed. The Society has apparently
maintained a website giving details of redevelopment process. Plaintiff
Nos.9,17 and 19 have given irrevocable consent to the Society for
redevelopment. It therefore cannot be contended that Plaintiffs were
oblivious about the steps taken towards the redevelopment process.
Plaintiffs have chosen to suppress most of the above factual position
which is brought on record by the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2. It is
incomprehensible that Plaintiff Nos.4, 9,13,14, 17, 19, 21 and 24, who
have taken decision for implementing redevelopment process as
residential flat owners are turning around and questioning the same in
their capacity as shop occupiers. With a view to escape the consensus
arising out of this conflict, Plaintiffs have chosen to suppress the
factum of some of them being members of the society in their capacity
as residential flat owners. Having not disclosed all the relevant facts,
Plaintiffs would not be entitled to equitable relief of temporary
injunction.
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27) Considering the overall conspectus of the case, I am of the
view that Plaintiffs have failed to make out prima facie case for grant of
any temporary injunction. Rights of the Plaintiffs are sufficiently
protected as they are being offered commercial units with 30%
additional carpet area on ownership basis in the reconstructed building.
The redevelopment process cannot be stalled only on account of
alleged absence of opportunity to the Plaintiffs to participate in the
decision-making process regarding the redevelopment on account of
absence of membership of the Society. Grant of any stay to the
redevelopment process would affect the rights of over 300 other unit
occupiers in the building. No irreparable loss would be caused to the
Plaintiffs by refusal of injunction, whereas other members, shop
occupiers and particularly Defendant No.2 would be affected by
stalling the redevelopment process at this stage. Balance of convenience
is thus clearly tilted against the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs have
accordingly failed to make out a case for grant of temporary injunction
in their favour.
28) Plaintiffs' Interim Application for temporary injunction is
accordingly rejected.
[SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]
Designation: PA To Honourable Judge 4 November 2025
Date: 04/11/2025 18:20:26
