"307. Attempt to murder. - Whoever does any act with
such intention or knowledge, and under such
circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he
would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and
if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender
shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such
punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.
11. While dealing with an identical situation, where an offence
12. Similarly, in the judgment of Naushey Ali, referred supra in
paragraph Nos. 10 and 11, which is apropos to reproduce the same
"26. Having said so, we would hasten to add that though
it is a serious offence as the accused person(s) attempted
to take the life of another person/victim, at the same
time the court cannot be oblivious to hard realities that
many times whenever there is a quarrel between the
parties leading to physical commotion and sustaining of
injury by either or both the parties, there is a tendency
to give it a slant of an offence under Section 307 IPC as
well.. "
13. In the judgment of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi
Narayan and others reported in [2019] 2 S.C.R. 864, after
elaborately considering the entire law on the subject, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has stated in paragraph No. 9.1 as under:
"9.1 However, the High Court has not at all considered
the fact that the offences alleged were non-
compoundable offences as per Section 320 of the Cr.P.C.
From the impugned judgment and order, it appears that
the High Court has not at all considered the relevant
facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly
the seriousness of the offences and its social impact.
From the impugned judgment and order passed by the
High Court, it appears that the High Court has
mechanically quashed the FIR, in exercise of its powers
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court has not at all
considered the distinction between a personal or private
wrong and a social wrong and the social impact. As
observed by this Court in the case of State of
Maharashtra vs. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, (2014) 15 SCC
29, the Court's principal duty, while exercising the
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal
proceedings, should be to scan the entire facts to find
out the thrust of the allegations and the crux of the
settlement. As observed, it is the experience of the Judge
that comes to his aid and the said experience should be
used with care, caution, circumspection and courageous
prudence. In the case at hand, the High Court has not at
all taken pains to scrutinise the entire conspectus of facts
in proper perspective and has quashed the criminal
proceedings mechanically. Even, the quashing of the FIR
by the High Court in the present case for the offences
under Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC, and that too in
exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is just
contrary to the law laid down by this Court in a catena
of decisions."
14. As observed by this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra
Vs. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, (2014)15 SCC 29, the Court's principal
duty, while exercising the powers under Section 482 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, to quash the criminal proceedings, should be to
scan the entire facts to find out the thrust of the allegations and the
crux of the settlement.
15. Furthermore, by relying on the judgment of Gian Singh and
Narinder Singh, this Court observed that when it comes to a
question of compounding an offence under Sections 307, 294 and
34, of the Indian Penal Code, by no stretch of imagination can it be
held to be an offence as between the private parties simpliciter.
Such offences will have a serious impact on society at large. The
accused are facing trial under Section 307 as the offences are
definitely against society, and the accused will have to necessarily
face trial and come out unsketched by demonstrating their
innocence. The same view has been reiterated in State of Madhya
Pradesh Vs. Deepak, (2014) 10 SCC 285 and State of Madhya
Pradesh Vs. Manish, (2015) 8 SCC 307.
16. Thus, the common thread emerges from perusal of these
judgments that the High Court should be slow enough to quash the
First Information Report and the charge-sheet only on the basis of
the settlement for the offences punishable under Section 307 of the
Indian Penal Code and the Arms Act. Thus, such power is not to be
exercised in those prosecutions which involves heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or in offences like murder, rape,
dacoity, as such offences are not private in nature and have a
serious impact on society.
17. Furthermore, even if in the First Information Report
No.214/2015, offences punishable under Sections 307, 143, 147,
148 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections 4 and 25
of the Arms Act are invoked, however in subsequent charge-sheet
bearing No.01/2016 filed, only offence under Section 334 of the
Indian Penal Code is mentioned. Furthermore, brief facts as
mentioned in the Final Report Form, there is mention of use of arms
in the incident. However, for reasons best known to prosecuting
agency, it has chosen to file a non-cognizable report. This fact is
elaborately recorded by the trial Court in its order dated
27/06/2017.
"4. Having a leaf into the report and the statement of
the witnesses, particularly Juber Ahmad, Rehan Ahmad,
Abdul Sattar, recorded u/s 161, CrPC the prima facie
offenca u/s 143, 147, 148, 307 r/w 149, 1PC and u/s
4/25, Arms Act has been made out. At the threshhold
stage the police could not have concluded regarding the
aspect of provocation, which is an element to be dealt in
the course of evidence and trial. So also, the police could
not have made their opinion in view of the cross report
filed by the accused against the informant and others.
Both the reports and cases are different and the material
of one case could not have been considered in an
another case. The report and statements clearly spell out
that victim has been wounded on his head with a sword
and so also informant saved himself from the ghastly
attack of sword on is neck. It could also be read from the
report that accused were armed with arms and one of
them, namely Abdul Hanif, accused number 12 exhorted
other accused to kill the informant and others. The vital
aspect for an offence u/s 307, IPC is the intention and
not the nature of injury. Perhaps, there may not be any
injury still having an intention to kill would make out a
case u/s 307, IPC. Viewed from this angle, the opinion of
medical officer cannot be given much weight at this
juncture of the case.
5. In evaluation I am of the view that prima facie a case
u/s 143, 147, 148, 307 r/w 149, IPC and u/s 4/25,
Arms Act has been made out qua accused. Hence,
accused needs to be summoned to answer the charge
and face the trial for the offences u/s 143, 147, 148, 307
r/w 149, IPC and u/s 4/25, Arms Act. Accordingly, issue
summons to accused number 1 to 12 to appear and
furnish bail of Rs 15,000/- each for an offence u/s 143,
147, 148, 307 r/w 149, IPC and u/s 4/25, Arms Act.
Summons shall be returnable on 27.07.2017.
Administrative office of this Court is directed to register
this case in the nature of warrant trial."
18. Furthermore, the First Information Report bearing
No.213/2015 and the corresponding charge sheet invoke offences
punishable under Sections 307, 143, 147, 148, 149, 452 of the
Indian Penal Code, read with Sections 4 and 25 of the Arms Act. In
the indoor inquiry certificate, assault with head injury is shown. A
knife is recovered from the applicant No.4. A sword is recovered
from applicant No.3. An iron rod is recovered from applicant No.7.
A kukri has also been recovered from the shop. All these weapons
and clothes have blood stains over them. Furthermore, the injury
report clearly states that injuries are possible with some of these
weapons.
19. In the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, if
we analyze the material placed on record, in Criminal Application
(APL) No. 1207/2025, the injury report of Mohd. Asif Mohd. Arif,
shows a head injury, while in Criminal Application (APL) No.
1203/2025, the injury report also shows a head injury. However, as
far as the First Information Report No. 214/2015 is concerned,
Sections 4 & 25 of the Arms Act, are also invoked. In the report of
non-applicant No.2 in Criminal Application (APL) No. 1203/2025,
concerned there is specific reference of use of sword and injuries
were caused due to it. Even the statements of witnesses specify
about use of sword.
20. In view of the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it
can be seen that the power under 482 is not to be exercised to stifle
a legitimate prosecution only on the basis of a settlement between
the parties. In the present case, as already discussed supra,
dangerous weapons have been found and recovered from the
accused persons in both matters. The statements of witnesses
recorded during the course of the investigation refer to use of those
weapons by the accused persons. The clothes of the accused persons
have been found to be having blood stains. In that view of the
matter, we are of the considered opinion that only because the
matter has been settled between the parties, it would not be proper
to quash the First Information Report and the consequent charge-
sheets. The judgments of Narinder Singh and Naushey Ali (supra),
even state that the offences under Section 307 of the Indian Penal
Code would fall in heinous and serious offences. It is true that only
because offence punishable under Section 307 is invoked in the
matter, that would not deter this Court from exercising jurisdiction.
However, looking to the fact that dangerous weapons have been
seized from the accused persons as discussed above, it would not be
a proper case to exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Criminal Procedure Code. We therefore proceed to pass the
following order:
ORDER
Both applications are rejected.
(NANDESH S. DESHPANDE, J.) (URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE, J.)
Jayashree..
