Bombay High Court
Phaltan Nagar Parishad Through Chief ... vs Pratapsinh Malojirao Naik-Nimbalkar ... on 21 March, 2025
Author: Amit Borkar
Bench: Amit Borkar
2025:BHC-AS:13333
201 Wp 3100-99.doc
Ashish
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.3100 OF 1999
WITH
REJECTED CASE NO.723 OF 2015
IN
WRIT PETITION NO.3100 OF 1999
Phaltan Nagar Parishad Through Chief
Officer ... Petitioner
V/s.
Pratapsinh Malojirao Naik- Nimbalkar
And Ors. ... Respondents
Ms.Gunjan Shah i/b Mr. P.B. Shah, for Petitioner.
Mr.Milind Deshmukh, for respondent nos.1 to 5.
CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
DATED : MARCH 21, 2025
JUDGMENT.:
1. Challenge in the present writ petition is directed against the
judgment and order dated [insert date], passed by the learned
Third Additional District Judge, Satara in Civil Miscellaneous
Application No. 305 of 1992. By the said judgment and order, the
learned Judge was pleased to allow the application filed by
respondent nos.1 to 5, and directed the petitioner-Municipal
Council to pay compensation to the said respondents at the rate of
₹350/- (Rupees Three Hundred and Fifty only) per square meter,
for the area admeasuring 3717.5 square meters forming part of
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City Survey No. 3320, situated at Phaltan. In addition to the
compensation so determined, the learned Judge further directed
the petitioner to pay solatium as contemplated under Section
23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, along with interest at the
rate of 12% per annum on the amount of compensation.
2. The foundational facts giving rise to the present petition, as
pleaded by the petitioner, may be summarised as under:
3. It is the case of the petitioner that during the period between
1962 and 1970, the predecessor-in-title of respondent nos.1 to 5
had submitted a layout plan for development, which included
within it an 80 ft. wide ring road. On 27th January 1970, the said
layout plan, as submitted by the father of the present respondents,
came to be duly sanctioned by the Town Planning Officer
concerned. Subsequently, on 5th February 1975, the Development
Plan of the Phaltan Nagar Parishad was finalised, which
incorporated the 80 ft. ring road as proposed in the earlier
sanctioned layout. It is not in dispute that the said ring road
formed part of the layout sanctioned at the behest of the
predecessor of respondent nos.1 to 5. Thereafter, on 14th May
1978, the original owner, i.e., the father of the respondents, passed
away.
4. It is further the case of the petitioner that during the year
1983-84, the said road came to be constructed by the petitioner-
Municipal Council, and for the said purpose, an expenditure of
₹56,998/- was incurred. Subsequently, on 20th June 1988, a
notice came to be issued by the petitioner to respondent nos.1 to
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5, calling upon them to execute and register the conveyance of the
portion of land forming part of the ring road in favour of the
petitioner-Municipal Council. The petitioner offered nominal
compensation of ₹1/- (Rupee One only) for the said purpose and
requested the respondents to execute the conveyance deed on
requisite stamp paper. The said communication was replied to by
respondent no.3.
5. Thereafter, on 10th December 1992, respondent nos.1 to 5
instituted Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 305 of 1992 before
the learned District Judge, Satara, invoking the provisions of
Section 330 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965, seeking
compensation in the sum of ₹7,500/- (Rupees Seven Thousand
Five Hundred only) per square meter in respect of the land
forming part of City Survey No.3320, which was allegedly utilized
by the petitioner for the construction of the said 80 ft. ring road.
6. The petitioner appeared and contested the said application
by filing a detailed reply, inter alia, contending that the entire area
comprising City Survey No. 3320 was neither reserved nor notified
for any public purpose, and that no part of the said land was ever
shown as being under reservation in the sanctioned Development
Plan. It was further contended that the predecessor-in-title of
respondent nos.1 to 5 had voluntarily submitted a layout plan for
development of the said property, and that the said plan, which
included provision for an 80 ft. wide ring road, was duly
sanctioned by the competent authority. The petitioner also relied
upon the communication dated 20th June 1988, addressed to
respondent no.3, wherein the petitioner had called upon the
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respondents to execute and register the necessary document on
stamp paper for formal transfer of the road area in favour of the
petitioner-Municipal Council. However, it was submitted that
despite the said request, the said transfer could not be effected.
The petitioner has further pointed out that respondent no.3 had
replied to the said communication in the year 1988 itself, but the
execution of the conveyance deed was not undertaken.
7. The learned Third Additional District Judge, Satara, by the
impugned judgment and order dated 8th October 1988, was
pleased to allow the application filed by the respondents and
directed the petitioner to pay compensation at the rate of ₹350/-
(Rupees Three Hundred Fifty only) per square meter for the land
admeasuring 3717.5 sq. meters. In addition to the compensation
amount, the learned Judge also awarded solatium at the rate of
30% in terms of Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, and
interest at the rate of 12% per annum on both the compensation
and solatium amounts, to be calculated from the date of filing of
the application till actual realisation. It is this judgment and order
which is impugned in the present writ petition filed under Article
227 of the Constitution of India.
8. Learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner has placed
reliance upon the provisions of Section 330 of the Maharashtra
Municipalities Act, 1965, and has specifically invited the attention
of this Court to sub-section (1) thereof. It was submitted that the
amount offered by the petitioner to respondent nos.1 to 5 in the
communication dated 20th June 1988 did not amount to a
determination of compensation under the said provision, and in
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any case, no compensation was legally payable under the Act,
particularly in the facts and circumstances of the present case
where the layout plan had been sanctioned at the instance of the
respondents' predecessor. The learned Advocate further submitted
that even assuming, without admitting, that the said letter dated
20th June 1988 amounted to an intimation under sub-section (1)
of Section 330, sub-section (2) thereof mandates that a person
aggrieved by the amount so offered is required to approach the
District Court within a period of one month from the date of
receipt of such communication. It was, therefore, submitted that
the application filed by the respondents on 10th December 1992
was clearly barred by limitation, and consequently, not
maintainable in law.
9. Per contra, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of
respondent nos.1 to 5 has supported the impugned judgment and
order and submitted that the land in question has admittedly been
utilized for the construction of a public road by the petitioner-
Municipal Council, which is a public body, and hence, it cannot
retain or use the said land without payment of just compensation
to the rightful owners. It was submitted that the petitioner has
derived benefit from the land belonging to the respondents and,
therefore, is under a legal and moral obligation to compensate
them. It was further argued that the learned District Judge, after
taking into consideration comparable instances of sale of
neighbouring plots, has rightly determined the market value of the
land at ₹350/- per square meter, which according to the
respondents, is reasonable and just. In the circumstances, it was
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contended that the impugned order does not suffer from any
illegality or perversity warranting interference in exercise of writ
jurisdiction.
10. The rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel
appearing for the respective parties now fall for consideration of
this Court. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and
the learned counsel for respondent nos.1 to 5 at length. With their
able assistance, I have perused the pleadings placed on record, the
documents annexed thereto, and the impugned judgment and
order passed by the learned Third Additional District Judge,
Satara. In order to properly appreciate the legal contentions raised
by both sides and to examine the sustainability of the impugned
order, it becomes necessary to refer to the statutory scheme
governing the field.
11. For the purpose of effective adjudication of the controversy
involved in the present petition, and to ascertain the true import
and scope of the powers conferred upon the District Court in such
matters, it would be apposite to reproduce hereunder Section 330
of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965, which reads thus:
"330. Determination of damages,
compensation, etc.
(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this
Act, if an agreement is not arrived at with
respect to any compensation or damages which
are by this Act directed to be paid, the amount
and if necessary the apportionment of the
same, shall be ascertained and determined by
the Council.
(2) Any person who is aggrieved by the amount
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of compensation or damages, determined by
the Council or the apportionment of such
compensation or damages, may, within, one
month from the date of receipt by him of an
intimation about the compensation or damages
or the apportionment thereof determined by
the Council, appeal to the District Court against
the determination made by the Council.
(3) Any person who is aggrieved by the failure
of the Council to determine the amount of
compensation or damages or the
apportionment thereof, may, give to the Council
a notice stating the circumstances of the case
and requesting the Council to determine the
amount of compensation or damages or the
apportionment thereof. If the Council fails so to
determine the amount of compensation or
damages or the apportionment thereof within a
period of one month from the receipt by it of
the notice aforesaid, such person may apply to
the District Court to determine the amount of
compensation or damages or the
apportionment thereof.
(4) In cases in which the compensation is
claimed in respect of land, the District Court in
deciding any appeal or application under sub-
section (2) or (3) shall follow, as far as may be,
the procedure provided by the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, for proceedings in matters referred
for the determination of the Court;
Provided that-
(a) no application to the Collector for a
reference shall be necessary ; and
(b) the Court shall have full power to give and
apportion the costs of all proceedings in any
manner it thinks fit.
(5) In any case where the compensation is
claimed in respect of any land or building, the
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Council may after the award has been made by
the Council or the District Court, as the case
may be, take possession of the land or building,
after paying the amount of compensation
determined by the Council or the District Court
to the party to whom such compensation may
be payable. If such party refuses to accept such
compensation, or if there is no person
competent to alienate the land or building, or if
there is any dispute as to the title to the
compensation or as to the apportionment of it,
the Council shall deposit the amount of the
compensation in the District Court."
12. Upon careful and conjoint reading of sub-sections (1) and
(2) of Section 330 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965, it
becomes evident that the legislative intent underlying the
provision is to empower the Municipal Council to determine the
amount of compensation payable, where such compensation is
required to be paid under the provisions of the Act. Sub-section (1)
of Section 330 contemplates a situation where the Council, in the
course of its statutory functions, either causes damage to any
property or takes possession thereof in accordance with the
provisions of the Act, and consequently, quantifies compensation
or damages payable in that behalf. Sub-section (2), in turn,
provides a remedial mechanism for a person aggrieved by such
determination, by conferring upon such person a right to approach
the District Court within one month from the date of receipt of
intimation of such compensation, damages, or apportionment, as
determined by the Council.
13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is pertinent to
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note that no material has been placed on record by respondent
nos.1 to 5 to demonstrate that the compensation claimed by them
was one which the Municipal Council was obliged to pay under
any express or implied provision of the Maharashtra Municipalities
Act, 1965. It is not the case of the respondents that the land in
question was acquired by the petitioner in accordance with law,
nor has any notification under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, or
any corresponding statutory provision been brought to the notice
of this Court. The records indicate that the layout plan submitted
by the predecessor-in-title of respondent nos.1 to 5 was duly
sanctioned, and the same contained a stipulation that the 80 ft.
wide road shall remain as an open road. The said road
subsequently came to be incorporated in the Development Plan of
the Phaltan Municipal Council. However, in the absence of
acquisition proceedings or a statutory mandate for payment of
compensation, no obligation can be fastened upon the petitioner-
Municipal Council to pay compensation merely because the land
has been utilised as a road. The concept of compensating
landowners for roads shown in sanctioned layouts must be
understood in the light of settled legal principles that such
earmarking, if voluntarily done, does not confer an automatic right
to compensation unless acquisition or statutory vesting is
established.
14. That being said, it is not in dispute that the petitioner, by
communication dated 20th June 1988, addressed to respondent
no.3, had offered to compensate the owners of the land in question
by payment of a nominal sum of ₹1/-. Assuming arguendo, and
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without concluding that such an offer amounted to a
determination under Section 330(1), it still attracts the procedural
safeguard under sub-section (2), which mandates that any
aggrieved person, if dissatisfied with the amount so offered, must
approach the District Court within one month from the date of
receipt of such intimation. In the present case, it is evident from
the record that respondent no.3 had replied to the said notice in
the year 1988 itself. Therefore, the cause of action, if any, for
seeking redressal against the compensation offered, arose in the
year 1988 itself.
15. Despite such cause of action having arisen in 1988,
respondent nos.1 to 5 filed Civil Miscellaneous Application No.
305 of 1992 only on 10th December 1992, i.e., more than four
years after the receipt of the communication dated 20th June
1988. There is nothing on record to indicate that any application
for condonation of delay was filed, nor does the impugned
judgment reflect any consideration of the limitation aspect. In view
of the mandatory requirement of filing such an application within
one month under Section 330(2), and in absence of any valid
explanation for the inordinate delay, I am constrained to hold that
the said application was clearly barred by limitation. The learned
District Judge, in my respectful view, erred in entertaining the said
application on merits and granting relief to the respondents
despite the statutory bar.
16. In the light of the foregoing discussion, and considering the
factual and legal position as emerging from the record, this Court
is of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment and
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order dated 8th October 1988 passed by the learned Third
Additional District Judge, Satara in Civil Miscellaneous Application
No. 305 of 1992, is unsustainable in law and deserves to be
quashed and set aside.
17. Accordingly, Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause
(b) of the petition.
18. It is further directed that the amount of ₹3,75,000/- (Rupees
Three Lakhs Seventy-Five Thousand only), deposited by the
petitioner pursuant to the interim order dated 17th September
1999 in this court, shall be refunded to the petitioner along with
accrued interest, if any.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
