Bombay High Court
Subhkaran And Sons vs Cheerful Trade And Realty Developers ... on 6 March, 2025
Author: Bharati Dangre
Bench: Bharati Dangre
2025:BHC-OS:3678-DB
21452.23-comapl+.docx
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
COMMERCIAL APPEAL (L) NO.21452 OF 2023
IN
INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO.21398 OF 2021
IN
COMMERCIAL SUIT (L) NO.21256 OF 2021
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO.13622 OF 2022
IN
COMMERCIAL SUIT (L) NO.21256 OF 2021
Digitally
signed by Ashok Investors Trust Ltd. ..... Appellant
BASAVRAJ
BASAVRAJ GURAPPA Vs.
GURAPPA PATIL
PATIL Date:
2025.03.06
Cheerful Trade & Realty
16:02:40
+0530 Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. ..... Respondents
COMMERCIAL APPEAL (L) NO.21524 OF 2023
IN
INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO.21398 OF 2021
IN
COMMERCIAL SUIT (L) NO.21256 OF 2021
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO.13622 OF 2022
IN
COMMERCIAL SUIT (L) NO.21256 OF 2021
DBS Bank India Ltd. ..... Appellant
Vs.
Cheerful Trade & Realty
Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. ..... Respondents
WITH
COMMERCIAL APPEAL (L) NO.21538 OF 2023
IN
INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO.21398 OF 2021
IN
COMMERCIAL SUIT (L) NO.21256 OF 2021
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO.13622 OF 2022
IN
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COMMERCIAL SUIT (L) NO.21256 OF 2021
Subhakaran and Sons ..... Appellant
Vs.
Cheerful Trade & Realty
Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. ..... Respondents
Mr.Zal Andhyarujina, Senior Advocate with
Ms.Akanksha Agarwal and Mr.Rohan Vasa i/b Argus
Partners for the appellant in COMAPL 21452/2023.
Mr.Atharva A. Dandekar for the appellant (DBS Bank)
in Commercial Appeal (L) No. 21524/2023.
Mr.Neerav Merchant with Ms.Neha Surte i/b Thakordas
& Madgavkar for the appellant in COMAPL No.
21538/2023.
Mr.Ashish Kamat, Senior Advocate with Ms.Simantinee
Mohite, Mr.S.K. Srivastav, Ms.Malika Mondal and
Mr.Hitanshu Jain i/b S.K. Srivastav & Co. for the
respondents in all appeals.
CORAM: ALOK ARADHE, CJ. &
BHARATI DANGRE, J.
RESERVED ON : MARCH 3, 2025
PRONOUNCED ON : MARCH 6, 2025
JUDGMENT (PER : CHIEF JUSTICE)
1. In these appeals preferred under Section 13(1-A) of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (Act of 2015), the appellants
have questioned the validity of order dated 5th June 2023 by
which application for injunction filed by Cheerful Trade and
Realty Developers Pvt. Ltd. (formerly known as Prawas Leasing
& Finance Pvt. Ltd.) (plaintiff No.1) and Aristo Realty
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Developers Ltd. (plaintiff No.2), has been allowed and the ad-
interim order of injunction dated 26 th October 2021 has been
made absolute. In order to appreciate the appellants' challenge
to the impugned order, relevant facts need mention, which are
stated infra.
2. The facts giving rise to filing of these appeals, in nutshell,
are that Lakshmi Vilas Bank Ltd. (defendant No.1) issued a
letter of sanction in favour of defendant No.2 for an ad-hoc
credit limit of Rs.10 Crores. The petitioner, by a communication
dated 1st August 2008 informed the Bank that the Bank has
sanctioned cash credit facility of Rs.50 Crores to defendant No.2
and plaintiff No.1 is agreeable to pledge 2,25,000 (two lac
twenty five thousand) shares of M/s.Shree Global Tradefin Ltd.
(SGTL). Between 1st August 2008 to 29th March 2012, 9 pledge
forms were executed by the plaintiffs with the Bank. Plaintiff
No.1 and plaintiff No.2 pledged 60,00,000 (sixty lac) shares and
15,00,000 (fifteen lac) shares respectively, in favour of the Bank
for the credit limit sanctioned by the Bank in favour of defendant
Nos.2 and 3. Two supplemental agreements were executed on
27th June 2017 and 7th August 2017 between the plaintiffs and
defendant Nos.2 and 3, respectively. The borrower viz.
defendant No.2 was declared as non-performing asset. On 25 th
November 2020 Lakshmi Vilas Bank got merged with the DBS
Bank. (hereinafter referred to as the Bank). A notice for
initiation of sale of pledged shares was issued on 16 th June 2021
by defendant No.1 to the plaintiffs as well as the defendant
Nos.2 and 3.
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3. The plaintiffs filed a suit seeking a declaration that there
was no valid pledge of shares and sought return of the same.
Along with the suit an interim application (L) No.21398 of 2021
was filed for temporary injunction restraining defendant No.1
from selling, transferring, alienating and/or disposing of the
shares allegedly pledged with defendant No.1 and also to direct
defendant No.1 to deposit the proceeds received from sale of
such pledged shares with the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also
sought a mandatory injunction to direct defendant No.1 to
render accounts in respect of any dividend/bonus shares
received by defendant No.1 in respect of the pledged shares.
The learned Single Judge, by an ad-interim order dated 26 th
October 2021 inter alia; held that each of the pledges has a
prescribed closure date. The learned Single Judge further
noticed that the plaintiffs have sought return of their securities
and after the suit was instituted, shares worth Rs.15,00,000
(fifteen lac) have been sold. The learned Single Judge,
therefore, restrained the defendants from selling, alienating,
transferring or disposing of the shares pledged with defendant
No.1 in a DMAT form.
4. The plaintiffs filed another interim application (L) No.
13622 of 2022 in which a direction was sought to the defendants
to disclose the quantum of pledged shares sold by defendant
No.1 along with price at which the same were sold, from the
date of passing of the ad-interim order and to deposit the
proceeds received from sale of such pledged shares with the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also sought temporary injunction
restraining the defendants from selling/transferring, alienating
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and/or disposing of the balance shares.
5. The learned Single Judge heard the arguments on the
aforesaid interlocutory application on 18 th May 2022 and after a
period of one year i.e. on 5 th June 2023 disposed of both the
interlocutory applications and made the ad-interim order,
granted on 26th October 2021, absolute. In the aforesaid
background, these appeals have been filed.
6. Learned senior counsel for the plaintiffs, at the outset,
submitted that the impugned order, on interlocutory application,
has been passed by the learned Single Judge after a period of
one year, without considering the contentions urged by the
appellants. It is further submitted that delay of one year in
passing orders on interlocutory application has caused prejudice
to the appellants. It is, therefore, contended that on this count
alone, the order passed by the learned Single Judge deserves to
be set aside. In support of aforesaid submissions, reliance has
been placed on decisions of the Supreme Court in Anil Rai Vs.
State of Bihar,1 Ram Bali Vs. State of U.P., 2 Telstar Travels
Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Enforcement Directorate, 3 Oriental
Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Zaixhu Xie & Ors. 4 Balaji Baliram
Mupade & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.5
7. Alternatively, it is contended that the closure date
mentioned in the pledge/hypothecation forms do not indicate
1 2001 (7) SCC 318
2 (2004) 10 SCC 598
3 (2013) 9 SCC 549
4 (2020) 18 SCC 823
5 (2021) 12 SCC 603
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that the pledge ceases to subsist on such dates. It is further
contended that closure dates on the form are indicative of a date
prior to which the pledgee's Depository Participant (hereinafter
referred to as DP) must either accept or reject the pledge
request raised by the pledgor's DP. It is submitted that the
closure date is the last date on which the pledgee's DP can
confirm the creation of the pledge and upon confirmation of
creation of the pledge by the pledgee's DP, the pledgor's DP
cannot cancel the pledge, except by following the procedure for
closure of the pledge upon repayment of the loan. It is pointed
out that the plaintiffs did not take any action to claim their
pledged shares till 2021, therefore, from the conduct of the
plaintiffs themselves, it is evident that the pledged shares had
not lapsed. It is urged that pledged shares were continuous
security.
8. Learned counsel for the appellants in Commercial Appeal
(L) Nos.21524/2023 and 21538/2024 have adopted the
submissions made by learned senior counsel for the appellant in
Commercial Appeal (L) No.21452/2023 and have submitted that
it is open for the pledgor to redeem the pledge by full payment
of the amount for which the pledge had been made at any time if
there is no fixed period for redemption or at any time after the
date fixed and such a right of redemption continues until the
thing pledged is lawfully sold. In support of the aforesaid
submission reliance has been placed on the Supreme Court
judgment in Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of
Bombay6.
6 AIR 1956 SC 575
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9. On the other hand, learned senior counsel for the
respondents has submitted that mere delay in delivery of
order/judgment cannot be a sole ground to set aside the same
and the party complaining of such a delay has to demonstrate
the prejudice caused to it on account of delay in delivery of
order/judgment. It is submitted that the appellants did not
complain of delay in delivery of the order before the learned
Single Judge and therefore, the appellants cannot be permitted
to raise a plea that the order passed by the learned Single Judge
is vitiated on account of delay in pronouncing the same. In
support of the aforesaid submission, reliance has been placed on
a Supreme Court decision in SJVNL Vs. CCC HIM JV and Anr. 7
and K. Kesava Vs. M. K. Veerendra Babu8.
10. It is also urged that the appeals at the instance of the
appellants should be dismissed in-limine as the appellants have
not complied with the directions contained in the ad-interim
order. In support of the aforesaid submission reliance has been
placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Prestige Lights
Ltd. Vs. State Bank of India9.
11. It is contended that the plaintiffs have neither pledged their
shares nor are the borrowers. It is submitted that the grounds
relating to valid enforcement of pledged shares are duly
considered while granting interlocutory reliefs. In this
connection, our attention has been invited to paragraph 14 of
7 (2021) 14 SCC 55
8 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3463
9 (2007) 8 SCC 449
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the order passed by learned Single Judge. It is further
contended that the impugned order has been passed in
accordance with the well settled principle of law and does not
suffer from either perversity or arbitrariness so as to warrant
interference by this Court in these appeals.
12. We have considered the rival submissions made by both
the sides and have perused the record. The solitary issue which
arises for our consideration in these appeals can be summarized
as under:
Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the
delay of more than a year in passing the impugned order
has caused prejudice to the appellants and therefore the
impugned order is liable to be set aside?
13. At this stage, it is apposite to take note of the principles
laid down by the Supreme Court with regard to the delay in
delivery of order/judgment. A two Judge bench of the Supreme
Court in Anil Rai (supra) dealt with the criminal appeal in
which arguments were concluded and the judgment was
reserved by the High court on 23 rd August 1995, which was
pronounced on 14th August 1997. It was held that even though
there is no period of pronouncement of judgment prescribed
either under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or under the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 but the pronouncement of judgment
is a part of justice dispensation system and it has to be without
delay. It was further held that the delay in disposal of cases
facilitates the people to raise eyebrows, sometimes genuinely
which, if not checked, may shake the confidence of the people in
the judicial system. It was further held that it is the policy and
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purpose of law, to have speedy justice for which efforts are
required to be made to come up to the expectation of the society
of ensuring speedy, untainted and unpolluted justice. In
paragraph 10 of the judgment, some guidelines were prescribed
with regard to pronouncement of judgments, which are
extracted below:
10. Under the prevalent circumstances in some of the
High Courts, I feel it appropriate to provide some
guidelines regarding the pronouncement of judgments
which, I am sure, shall be followed by all concerned, being
the mandate of this Court. Such guidelines, as for the
present, are as under:
(i) The Chief Justices of the High Courts may issue
appropriate directions to the Registry that in a
case where the judgment is reserved and is
pronounced later, a column be added in the judgment
where, on the first page, after the cause-title, date
of reserving the judgment and date of pronouncing it
be separately mentioned by the Court Officer
concerned.
(ii) That Chief Justices of the High Courts, on their
administrative side, should direct the Court
Officers/Readers of the various Benches in the High
Courts to furnish every month the list of cases in the
matters where the judgments reserved are not
pronounced within the period of that month.
(iii) On noticing that after conclusion of the
arguments the judgment is not pronounced within a
period of two months, the Chief Justice concerned
shall draw the attention of the Bench concerned to
the pending matter. The Chief Justice may also see
the desirability of circulating the statement of such
cases in which the judgments have not been
pronounced within a period of six weeks from the
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date of conclusion of the arguments amongst the
Judges of the High Court for their information. Such
communication be conveyed as confidential and in a
sealed cover.
(iv) Where a judgment is not pronounced within
three months from the date of reserving it, any of the
parties in the case is permitted to file an application
in the High Court with a prayer for early judgment.
Such application, as and when filed, shall be listed
before the Bench concerned within two days
excluding the intervening holidays.
(v) If the judgment, for any reason, is not
pronounced within a period of six months, any of the
parties of the said lis shall be entitled to move an
application before the Chief Justice of the High Court
with a prayer to withdraw the said case and to make
it over to any other Bench for fresh arguments. It is
open to the Chief Justice to grant the said prayer or
to pass any other order as he deems fit in the
circumstances."
14. The principles laid down by Supreme Court in Anil Rai
(supra) was reiterated with approval by the Supreme Court in
Ram Bali (supra). In Telstar Travels Pvt. Ltd. (supra) a
two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court dealt with a case where
an order of adjudication under the Foreign Exchange Regulation
Act, 1973 was passed after three and half years from the date of
arguments. It was held that there is no gainsaying that any
court or authority hearing the matter must within a reasonable
time-frame pronounce the orders especially when any misgiving
arising out of inordinate delay which gave rise to unnecessary
apprehensions in the minds of the litigants especially in the
minds of a party that has lost the matter at the hand of such
long delay. It was however, held that the delay by itself would
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not constitute a ground for setting aside the order that may
otherwise be find legally valid and justified.
15. A two Judge Bench of Supreme Court in Balaji Baliram
Mupade & Anr. (supra) held that judicial discipline requires
promptness in delivery of judgments. The Supreme Court, in
the aforesaid decision was dealing with a case where the
operative portion of the order though was pronounced, but the
reasons were not disclosed. In paragraphs 3, 4, 10 and 11 it was
held as under:
"3. Further, much later but still almost two decades ago,
this Court in Anil Rai v. State of Bihar [Anil Rai v. State
of Bihar, (2001) 7 SCC 318 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1009]
deemed it appropriate to provide some guidelines
regarding the pronouncement of judgments, expecting
them to be followed by all concerned under the mandate of
this Court. It is not necessary to reproduce the directions
except to state that normally the judgment is expected
within two months of the conclusion of the arguments, and
on expiry of three months any of the parties can file an
application in the High Court with prayer for early
judgment. If, for any reason, no judgment is pronounced
for six months, any of the parties is entitled to move an
application before the then Chief Justice of the High Court
with a prayer to re-assign the case before another Bench
for fresh arguments.
4. The aforementioned principle has been forcefully
restated by this Court on several occasions including in
Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat [Zahira
Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158,
paras 77-79 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 999] , Mangat Ram v. State
of Haryana [Mangat Ram v. State of Haryana, (2008) 7
SCC 96] , SCC paras 5-10 and most recently in Ajay Singh
v. State of Chhattisgarh [Ajay Singh v. State of
Chhattisgarh, (2017) 3 SCC 330 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 161].
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10. We must note with regret that the counsel extended
through various judicial pronouncements including the one
referred to aforesaid appear to have been ignored, more
importantly where oral orders are pronounced. In case of
such orders, it is expected that they are either dictated in
the court or at least must follow immediately thereafter, to
facilitate any aggrieved party to seek redressal from the
higher court. The delay in delivery of judgments has been
observed to be a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in Anil Rai case [Anil Rai v. State of Bihar,
(2001) 7 SCC 318 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1009] and as stated
aforesaid, the problem gets aggravated when the operative
portion is made available early and the reasons follow
much later.
11. It cannot be countenanced that between the date of
the operative portion of the order and the reasons
disclosed, there is a hiatus period of nine months! This is
much more than what has been observed to be the
maximum time period for even pronouncement of reserved
judgment as per Anil Rai case [Anil Rai v. State of Bihar,
(2001) 7 SCC 318 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1009] ."
16. The decision in Balaji Baliram Mupade & Anr. (supra)
delivered by a two Judge Bench was followed by three Judge
Bench of the Supreme Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.
(supra).
17. A two Judge Bench of Supreme Court in SJVNL (supra),
inter alia; dealt with an order passed by a Division Bench of the
High Court by which, an order passed by the learned Single
Judge was set aside solely on the ground that the learned Single
Judge ought to have followed the mandate contained in Order XX
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Supreme Court in the
said decision held that the provisions of Order XX of the CPC do
not apply to the High Court and the order passed by the Division
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Bench of the High Court was set aside and the matter was
remitted for decision afresh. In K. Kesava (supra), a two
Judge Bench of the Supreme Court again held that once hearing
is concluded, the judgment should be pronounced without any
delay. The need for promptness in delivery of judgment was
again emphasized by a two Judge Bench of Supreme Court vide
order dated 21st October 2024 in Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar v.
State of Gujarat10.
18. Thus, on perusal of aforesaid decisions of Supreme Court,
the following principles can be culled out:
(i) judicial discipline requires promptness in delivery of
judgment. The aforesaid problem gets compounded where
result of the litigation is made known but not the reasons.
(ii) The Courts hearing the matter must pronounce the
orders within a reasonable time frame so as to avoid
unnecessary apprehensions in the minds of the litigant,
specially the party that has lost the matter at the hands of
such a long delay.
(iii) The delay in delivery of the judgment/order deprives
an aggrieved person of an opportunity to approach the
higher forum.
(iv) However, mere delay in delivery of order itself is not
sufficient to set aside an order which may otherwise be
found legally valid and justified.
(v) A party is required to demonstrate that it has suffered
a prejudice on account of delay in delivery of the
judgment/order.
10 2024 INSC 801
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19. The instant appeals arise out of an order passed in a
Commercial Suit. The Act of 2015 is an Act to provide for
constitution of Commercial Courts for adjudicating commercial
disputes of specified value and for matters connected therewith
or incidental thereto. The Act of 2015 has been enacted with an
object for speedy disposal of high value commercial disputes.
Section 16 of the Act of 2015 deals with the amendments to the
provisions of the CPC. Section 16 is extracted below for the
facility of reference:
"16. Amendments to the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 in its application to commercial
disputes. -
(1) The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5
of 1908) shall, in their application to any suit in respect of
a commercial dispute of a Specified Value, stand amended
in the manner as specified in the Schedule.
(2) The Commercial Division and Commercial Court shall
follow the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(5 of 1908), as amended by this Act, in the trial of a suit in
respect of a commercial dispute of a Specified Value.
(3) Where any provision of any rule of the jurisdictional
High Court or any amendment to the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, as amended by this Act, the provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by this Act shall
prevail."
20. It is pertinent to note that in view of Rule 3(5) of Order
XLIX of CPC, Rules 1 and 8 of Order XX of CPC do not apply to
the Chartered High Courts in exercise of its ordinary or
extraordinary original civil jurisdiction.
21. Clause 11 of the Schedule appended to the Act of 2015
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deals with the Amendment of Order XX, which reads as under:
11. Amendment of Order XX - In Order XX of the
Code, for Rule 1, the following Rule shall be substituted,
namely:-
"(1) The Commercial Court, Commercial Appellate Court,
Commercial Division or Commercial Appellate Division, as
the case may be, shall, within ninety days of the conclusion
of arguments, pronounce judgment and Copies thereof
shall be issued to all the parties to the dispute though (sic.
through) electronic mail or otherwise".
22. Thus, it is evident that under the Act of 2015 the
Commercial Court, Commercial Appellate Court, Commercial
Division or Commercial Appellate Division have to deliver
judgment within 90 days of concluding the arguments. In the
instant case, the arguments on the interlocutory application
seeking injunctions were heard by the learned Single Judge on
18th May 2022 and an order has been passed on 5 th June 2023.
Thus, there has been a delay of more than a year in delivery of
the order. However, the delay by itself is not a sufficient ground
to set aside the order.
23. Therefore, now we proceed to examine whether any
prejudice has been caused to the appellants by delay in delivery
of the order of more than a year. The contention of the
respondents/plaintiffs have been recorded in paragraph 7 of the
order. Similarly, the contentions of the defendants have been
recorded in paragraph 8 and 9 of the order. The learned Single
Judge in paragraph 14 has recorded the findings, which read as
under:
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"14. Next it is seen that both the parties have made
their submissions on facts which are at variance with each
other. The notable fact which stands out for consideration
at this juncture is the denial of the Plaintiffs having
executed the two supplemental agreements dated
27.06.2017 and 07.08.2017. In support of the Plaintiffs'
submissions, Mr. Agarwal has submitted that the
signatories on behalf of the Plaintiffs on these two
supplemental agreements is of persons who resigned as
Directors from the Plaintiffs' companies was back in 2011
and 2012. According to Plaintiffs, signatory to first
supplemental agreement had resigned from the
directorship of the Plaintiff No. 1 Company on 30.07.2012
whereas signatory to agreement dated 07.08.2017 Mr.
Subhash Singh had resigned from Plaintiff No. 2 Company
on 10.01.2011. Affidavits of these two employees have
been filed by the Plaintiffs with regards to the above facts.
Plaintiffs have submitted that statutory form No. 32
certifying the names of the Directors of the Plaintiffs'
Companies (resigned and continuing) were also filed at the
then time with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs to notify
the change in directorship. This is an important
circumstance for consideration because the two
supplemental agreements executed on 27.06.2017 and
07.08.2017 are strongly relied upon by Defendant No. 1 for
seeking continuity of the transactions between the parties.
Undoubtedly, at this prima facie stage without evidence
having been led by the respective parties, a final verdict
cannot be given by the Court. The balance shares will have
to be protected as denying interim relief would frustrate
the Plaintiff's case entirely. This Court will have to consider
the documentary evidence placed before the Court as it
appears prima facie. Defendant No. 1 has however argued
that assuming for the sake of argument that the pledges
were duly made in the year 2008 with their closure dates
upto 2013, nothing prevented or precluded the Plaintiffs
from seeking back the pledged shares pursuant to the
closure dates. The conduct of the Plaintiffs in not seeking
back the pledged shares after the alleged closure dates
also needs to be considered by the Court. These are rival
contentions which will obviously have to be decided on the
edifice of evidence to be led by both the parties. It is seen
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that there is no denial of the fact that the principal original
documents of pledge i.e. the hypothecation forms being
Exh. H1 to H9, each one of which indicates and describes a
closure date. These are the dates which range from
31.03.2011 to 31.03.2013. As noted by this Court, in the
order dated 26.10.2021, it is quite curious that even after
the passage of time since 2013, Plaintiffs did not seek
return of its securities if the closure dates are to be
adhered to. Equally if the submissions of the Plaintiffs
regarding closure dates is to be accepted, then certainly
the pledges cannot subsist beyond the closure dates.
Defendants in their affidavit-in-reply have given one and
only one explanation i.e. the execution of the two
supplemental agreements alluded to herein above in the
year 2017 for relying upon continuity of the pledged
shares. It is seen that Plaintiffs have not only denied
executing the said two supplemental agreements but have
stated that they are forged and fabricated documents
bearing signatures of signatories who no longer were
working with the Plaintiffs more than six years before the
execution of the said agreements. In this view of the
matter, I am inclined to continue the ad-interim order
granted vide order dated 26.10.2021 and confirm the same
as interim order in the present Interim Applications. I am
inclined to accept the submissions made by Mr. Agarwal
partly and give the following directions."
24. Thus, on perusal of the order passed by the learned Single
Judge, it is evident that learned Single Judge has not adverted to
the essential ingredients for deciding a prayer for temporary
injunction viz. prima facie case, balance of convenience and
irreparable injury. The learned Single Judge has also not
considered the submissions made on behalf of the plaintiffs
which have been recorded in paragraph 8 and 9 of the order.
The learned Single Judge by a cryptic order, without adverting to
the rival submissions of the parties, has confirmed the ad-
interim order. The inevitable conclusion that, in the facts and
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circumstances of the case, delay of more than a year in
pronouncing the order on an interlocutory application has caused
prejudice to the appellants.
25. For the aforementioned reasons, the solitary issue is
answered in the affirmative. The impugned order dated 5 th June
2023 cannot be sustained in the eye of law. It is, accordingly,
quashed and set aside. It is pertinent to note that prior to grant
of the ad-interim order in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs, on
26th October 2021, out of the total pledged shares, 16,00,000
(sixteen lac) shares were already sold. The appellants were
restrained from alienating the aforesaid shares. Therefore, in
the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we direct that
till the matter is considered afresh by the learned Single Judge,
the remaining shares shall not be alienated, transferred/disposed
of.
26. The learned Single Judge is requested to decide the
application for temporary injunction within a period of six weeks
from today. It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any
opinion on the merits of the matter and all contentions are kept
open to be urged by the parties.
27. Accordingly, the appeals are disposed of.
28. Interim application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
(BHARATI DANGRE, J.) (CHIEF JUSTICE)
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