[Cites 17, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
The Divisional Manager, Forest ... vs Soma Kalu Wagale on 24 December, 2025
Author: G. S. Kulkarni
Bench: G. S. Kulkarni
LPA [email protected]
2025:BHC-AS:57672-DB
Prajakta Vartak
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 233 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 436 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Tulashiram Rama Khutade .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 207 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7436 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Ramaji Kalu Borase .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 209 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 446 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Budha Pandu Mondhe .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 214 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 448 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Deoram S. Sunwate and anr. .... Respondents
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 235 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7656 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Page 1 of 32
24 December 2025
LPA [email protected]
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shivaji Vaman Sabale .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 215 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7453 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Chandar Bhorji Mirka .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 236 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7445 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Kalu Ramji Khade .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 237 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 421 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Deoram Sitaram Jadhav .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 238 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 418 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Pandurang Rajaram Chaudhary .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 239 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7663 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Page 2 of 32
24 December 2025
LPA [email protected]
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Sitaram Vitthal Raut .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 240 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7665 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Tulashiram Rawaji Khadam .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 241 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7666 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Namdeo Tulshiram Raut .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 242 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7658 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Muralidhar Yewaji Jadhav .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 243 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7659 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Bhika Gangaram Dalavi .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 244 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7664 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Page 3 of 32
24 December 2025
LPA [email protected]
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Soma Kalu Wagale .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 245 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 413 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Kashinath Rama Choudhary .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 246 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7441 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Jagan Santu Gaikwad .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 247 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 428 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Kalu Janu Kakad .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 248 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7437 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Deoram Shivaram Sumbar .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 249 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 458 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
Page 4 of 32
24 December 2025
LPA [email protected]
v/s.
Shri. Kisan Arjun Valavi .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 250 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 432 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest265
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Deoram Pandu Khotare .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 251 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 454 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Ramdas Sakharam Bhoya .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 252 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 440 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Kisan Lahanu Gangode .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 253 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7452 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Keshav Rama Waghmare .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 254 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7667 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
Page 5 of 32
24 December 2025
LPA [email protected]
v/s.
Nareyan Pandu Shingade .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 255 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7444 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Raghunath Janu Pawar .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 256 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 434 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Rajendra Vasant Karpe .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 257 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 453 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shailesh Anirudh Sharma .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 258 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO.412 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Subhas Chandar Sonar .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 259 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 416 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
Page 6 of 32
24 December 2025
LPA [email protected]
v/s.
Shri. Soma Chimana Chaudhari .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 234 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 439 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Santu Ragho Lahare .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 275 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 426 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Tulshiram Kakdu Dagale .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 260 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7455 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Changdeo Waman Pawar .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 261 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7451 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Deoram Kalu Dhonnar .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 262 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO 7440 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
Page 7 of 32
24 December 2025
LPA [email protected]
v/s.
Chandar Hari Mahale .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 263 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 414 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Kashinath Khandu Raundal .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 264 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 427 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Nandkumar Jagan Waghmare .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 265 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7430 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Prabhakar Narayan Amodkar .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 266 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7448 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Narayan Fulsing Patil .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 267 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7653 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
Page 8 of 32
24 December 2025
LPA [email protected]
v/s.
Ayub Makbul Khatik .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 282 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 435 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Lahanu Arjun Pawar .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 268 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7428 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Rajendra Pandurang Sonawane .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 269 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7655 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Fakira Baldar Tadvi .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 270 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7671 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Sanjay Kisan Sonawane .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 271 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 420 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Page 9 of 32
24 December 2025
LPA [email protected]
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Dinkar Raghunath Gangode .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 272 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7439 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Manohar Valu Shingade .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 289 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7438 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Waman Balu Gawali .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 290 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 455 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Soma Bhau Pakhane .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 291 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7672 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Dharma Sakharam Pawar .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 295 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7661 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Page 10 of 32
24 December 2025
LPA [email protected]
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Keshav Amruta Chaudhary .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 296 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7657 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Jayram Sitaram Ahire .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 297 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7660 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Subhas Shankar Dhumase .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 298 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7446 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shivram Gangaram Raut .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 299 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 425 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Shivaji Mahadu Borse .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 300 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7435 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Page 11 of 32
24 December 2025
LPA [email protected]
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Pandurang Mahadu Pawar .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 301 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 429 OF 2001
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Kalu Jiva Bagul .... Respondent
WITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 302 OF 2008
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 7662 OF 2000
The Divisional Manager, Forest
Development Corporation, Nashik .... Appellant
v/s.
Shri. Vijay Udaysingh Girase .... Respondent
__________
Mr. Ashwinikumar R. Kapadnis for Appellant
Mr. Kiran Bapat, Senior Advocate aw Mrs. Pavitra Manish aw Mr. Madhur Surana
aw Mr. S.A. Mulla for Respondent in LPA/233/2008, LPA/207/2008,
LPA/209/2008, LPA/214/2008, LPA/235/2008, LPA/215/2008, LPA/236/2008,
LPA/237/2008, LPA/238/2008, LPA/239/2008, LPA/240/2008,
LPA/242/2008, LPA/245/2008, LPA/247/2008, LPA/248/2008,
LPA/249/2008, LPA/250/2008, LPA/251/2008, LPA/252/2008,
LPA/254/2008, LPA/255/2008, LPA/256/2008, LPA/257/2008,
LPA/258/2008, LPA/259/2008, LPA/234/2008, LPA/275/2008,
LPA/261/2008, LPA/262/2008, LPA/265/2008, LPA/266/2008,
LPA/282/2008, LPA/268/2008, LPA/269/2008, LPA/271/2008,
LPA/272/2008, LPA/289/2008, LPA/290/2008, LPA/291/2008,
LPA/296/2008, LPA/299/2008, LPA/300/2008, LPA/301/2008.
Ms. Pavitra Manesh i/b Mr. M.S. Topkar for Respondent in LPA/241/008,
LPA/243/2008, LPA/244/2008, LPA/246/2008, LPA/253/2008,
LPA/260/2008, LPA/263/2008, LPA/264/2008, LPA/267/2008,
LPA/270/2008, LPA/295/2008, LPA/297/2008, LPA/298/2008,
LPA/302/2008.
Mr. A.I. Patel, Addl. G.P. aw Mr. Ketan Joshi, "B" Panel Counsel for the state in
LPA/233/2008.
Page 12 of 32
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Ms. Tanu N. Bhatia, AGP for State in LPA/207/2008.
Ms. M.S. Bane, AGP for the State in LPA/209/2008.
Mr. S.L. Babar, AGP for the State in LPA/214/2008.
Ms. M.P. Thakur, AGP for the State in LPA/235/008.
Mr. R.S. Pawar, AGP for the State in LPA/215/2008.
Dr. Dhruti Kapadia, AGP for the State in LPA/250/2008.
__________
CORAM : G. S. KULKARNI &
AARTI SATHE, JJ.
RESERVED ON : 28 NOVEMBER, 2025
PRONOUNCED ON: 24 DECEMBER, 2025
Judgment (Per G. S. Kulkarni, J.) :-
1. This batch of Letters Patent Appeals assails a common judgment and order
dated 13 June 2001 rendered by the learned Single Judge on a clutch of petitions,
hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. At the outset, we
need to observe that the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned
Single Judge confirms the orders passed by the Industrial Court. Hence, the
concurrent findings of the Courts against the appellant is the subject matter of
consideration in these appeals.
2. The facts are identical, insofar as all these writ petitions decided by the
learned Single Judge are concerned, except that the respondents/employees in the
respective writ petitions were appointed by the appellant as watchmen on
different dates. There is no dispute in regard to the dates of their appointment
and in fact, a seniority list of all the appointees was prepared and placed on record
before the Industrial Court as also the learned Single Judge.
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3. The common appellant in all these appeals namely the Forest Development
Corporation Ltd., is the original petitioner, in the writ petitions filed before the
learned Single Judge. It is not in dispute that the appellant is a Corporation/an
entity formed by the State of Maharashtra and is fully within its control as the law
would recognize including the same to be a 'State' within the meaning and
purview of Article 12 of the Constitution.
4. The genesis of the present proceedings arises from the ninety nine
complains filed under Section 28 of the The Maharashtra Recognition of Trade
Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short, "MRTU
& PULP Act') by the respondents before the Industrial Court at Nashik alleging
that the appellant had indulged in unfair labour practices against the respondents
under Item 6, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act. The
respondents were appointed by the appellant as watchmen. Such appointments,
which are not in dispute, were during the period from the year 1977 to 1992.
The relevant facts in regard to the dates of appointments, the details of joining
date, period of working days etc. as also the inter se seniority of the respective
respondents as placed on record of the Industrial Court are not in dispute.
5. The respondents' case before the Industrial Court, in alleging unfair labour
practices was to the effect that the respondents were working with the appellant
without any break in service since from the respective dates of joining service with
the appellant, and had completed more than 240 days "year after year", hence, the
appellant was under an obligation to regularize the services of the respondents
having completed more than 240 days, being engaged on daily wages for 'years
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together'. The respondents contended that considering the settled position in
law, they were entitled to the benefits of permanency and the benefits which are
given to the permanent employees of the appellant. It is also contended that the
work in question being awarded to the respondents was permanent and perennial,
however, the respondents were not being absorbed in the permanent
employment, with an intention to deprive them the status and benefits of
permanency
6. The appellant opposed each of the complaints by filing written statements.
The case of the appellant basically was of denial. It was the appellant's case that
the appellant was registered under the Companies Act and it was under the full
control of the Maharashtra Government, hence it was not a department of the
State Government. It was, however, contended that the implementing agency for
the appellant was the State Government, as various schemes of the State
Government were being implemented by the appellant and that the appellant was
being managed from the funds received under such schemes. It was hence
contended that there was no question of any permanency to be granted to the
respondents. It was next contended that if the scheme was to be continued and
the workers being continued for more than 240 days, that did not mean that the
work was continuously available with the appellant. Hence, the claim of
regularization or permanency as made by the respondents, ought not to be
accepted. It was also contended by the appellant that accepting the respondent's
case would amount to their back door entry in the service of the appellant, which
was not permissible.
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7. The Industrial Court considering the rival contentions as also the
documentary and oral evidence on its record, rendered a common judgment
dated 31 July 2000 on the complaints filed by the said workmen whereby it was
held that the respondents had proved that the appellant had committed unfair
labour practice under items 6, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of MRTU & PULP Act.
Accordingly, the complaints filed by the respondents were allowed. The
Industrial Court recorded clear findings of fact that it was undisputed that since
the date of joining, the respondents were continuously working with the appellant
without any break and certainly they had completed more than 240 days in each
year. The appellant's case that it was wholly dependent on the State Government
was not accepted by the Industrial Court. In such context, the Industrial Court
recorded clear findings that the contention of the appellant having no source of
income and lack of sufficient funds to regularize the complainants, when tested
on evidence, was not an acceptable plea. The Industrial Court observed that there
was arbitrariness to the extent that while making the appointment, the
respondents were not being informed that they were engaged under a particular
scheme and further after completion of a particular scheme they would be
terminated. It was observed that the respondents were in long continuous service
of the appellant, was a finding recorded by the Industrial Court. Considering the
clear position in law in the context of the respondent being in service of the
appellant on year to year basis under such scheme of the appellant, the complaints
were allowed by declaring that the appellant had committed unfair labour practice
under items 6, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of MRTU & PULP Act. Accordingly, the
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appellant was directed to stop and desist from engaging such unfair labour
practices with a further direction to the appellant to give status and benefits of
permanency to the respondents from 01 April, 1998 and arrears of consequential
benefits be paid to them from the said date.
8. The orders passed by the Industrial Court were challenged in the writ
petitions in question which fell for consideration before the learned Single Judge.
It is on such writ petitions by a detailed common judgment, as impugned in the
present appeals, the petitions have been dismissed being devoid of merits and
with costs. Thus, there are concurrent findings against the appellant of both the
forums below, namely, of the Industrial Court and thereafter of the learned Single
Judge.
9. Before we delve on the rival contentions as urged on behalf of the parties, we
find from the record that although the impugned judgment and order is dated 13
January 2001, the appeals appear to have been filed in the year 2008. Be that as it
may, the appeals have remained pending and, although they came to be dismissed
for non-prosecution, they were subsequently restored and are now being disposed
of by this common judgment.
10. On behalf of the appellant, limited submissions are advanced by Mr.
Kapadnis, learned counsel in assailing the concurrent findings. The following
submissions are made on behalf of the appellant:
i. The respondents were appointed on a temporary basis. They were
well aware of the risks and uncertainty of an employment under the
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employment guarantee scheme, despite which they were claiming
permanency in proceedings before the Industrial Court. Considering the
nature of the scheme under which they were appointed, they were not
entitled for regularization, as there were no sanctioned posts.
Consequently, there was no question of absorption. The appellant is
unwarrantedly required to suffer a monetary loss.
ii. The impugned order passed by the Industrial Court and as
confirmed by the learned Single Judge in fact grants backdoor employment
to the respondents, for such reason, the findings on unfair labour practice
as recorded by the Industrial Court and confirmed by the learned Single
Judge need to be interfered.
iii. The impugned order erroneously interprets the decision of the
Supreme Court in Chief Conservator of Forests & Anr. vs. Jagannath
Maruti Kondhare1. The Industrial Court as also the learned Single Judge
has not appreciated that the appellant is not an industry and there was no
relationship of an employer and employee and for such reason, the
complaints filed by the respondents itself were not maintainable.
iv. In any event, granting of regularization cannot be a matter of course
when there were no posts available, hence the respondents/complainants
could not have been granted permanency. Such proposition is supported
relying on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mahatma Phule vs.
1 AIR 1996 SC 2898
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Nashik Zilla Kamgar2; Ahmednagar Zilla vs. Dinkar Rao Kalyanrao
Jagdale3 and Delhi Development Horticulture vs. Delhi Administration4.
11. On the other hand, Mr. Kiran Bapat, learned senior counsel for the
respondents-workmen has prayed for dismissal of the appeal by contending that
the finding of facts as recorded by the Industrial Court are rightly not interfered
by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment and order. He further
submits that none of the contentions as urged on behalf of the appellants deserve
consideration, as on facts, the unfair labour practice had stood proven and
primarily when for years together the respondents were working every year for
240 days in a year. The submission is to the effect that even the seniority list of
the respondents was prepared and the work was perennially made available. It is
hence submitted that all the essential requirements to consider the plea of the
respondents for regularization, having completed 240 days, was rightly
appreciated and granted by the Courts below. It is his further submission that the
findings in regard to the appellant being an independent entity although founded
by the Government of Maharashtra and being a distinct legal entity incorporated
under the Companies Act, 1956, certainly was a factor in considering that the
appellant was an independent establishment, which granted such employment to
the respondents and for years together provided work, i.e., work was taken for a
period of 240 days on year to year basis from the respondents. He submits that
the finding in this regard as recorded by the learned Single Judge recognizing the
2 (2001) 7SCC 346
3 (2001) 7 SCC 356
4 AIR 1992 SC 789
24 December 2025
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appellant to be an independent establishment, which had appointed the
respondents/workmen, has remained unassailed. It is next submitted that such
findings are neither factually incorrect much less perverse, as also the findings as
recorded by the Industrial Court and the High Court in law in no manner
whatsoever is assailed, so as to make out any case for interference in the present
appeal. In supporting such contention Mr. Bapat has placed reliance on the recent
decision of the Supreme Court in Jaggo v. Union of India5.
Analysis and Conclusion
12. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. With their assistance, we
have perused the record. At the outset, we may observe that this is a case where
there are concurrent findings of facts and law as recorded by the Industrial Court
as also by the learned Single Judge. The indisputed fact that there being no
dispute that the appellant is qualified as an employer within the definition of
"industry" as defined under Section 2(j) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. As also
the respondents at all material times fell in the definition of "workman" as defined
under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, as observed by the Industrial
Court as also the learned Single Judge.
13. The second most significant aspect which is not in dispute, is that the
respondents had worked on daily wages for 15 to 20 years continuously for 240
days from the date of their joining as also indicated in the seniority list by the
appellant. All the respondents worked on the post of 'watchman'.
5 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826
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14. The question was whether the work discharged by the respondents was
permanent and perennial in nature, and was examined by the Industrial Court as
also by the learned Single Judge. It was concurrently held that although the
appellant was implementing various schemes introduced by the State
Government of afforestation, this was a work perennially available with the
appellant as granted to each of the respondent/workman's on year to year basis.
There is a clear finding of fact that the appellant was established as an undertaking
of the Government of Maharashtra, it being a registered Government Company
under the Companies Act, 1956. The business of the appellant was the
development of potential productive forest areas through intensive management,
in accordance with the policy decisions of the Government. It was established as a
permanent corporation. In such circumstances, it was not in dispute that the
services of respondents / complainants were required to be engaged continuously
year after year by the appellant/corporation which being a separate and
independent legal entity/juristic person, as observed by the forums below.
15. The learned Single Judge has categorically observed that merely because the
appellant was executing and implementing the schemes for the Government, that
will not alter the jural relationship between the appellant (employer) and the
respondents (workmen) employed by the appellant. Hence, a clear employer-
employee relationship existed between the appellant and the respondent, which
does not absolve the appellant from complying with the requirements of law.
When a worker continues in employment for years together and completes 240
days of service in each year, certainly legal rights accrued to each of such
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workmen/respondents, entitling them of regularization or permanency, by virtue
of the continuous nature of the work extracted from them. Learned Counsel for
the appellant is not in a position to dispute such findings. In fact when called
upon as to which are the specific findings with which the appellant would have
quarrel, our attention has not been drawn to any findings, which the appellant
would seek interference in the present appeal. As noted hereinabove, the
contentions as urged on behalf of the appellant are quite general in nature.
16. We do not find that the observations of the learned Single Judge referring to
the decision of the Supreme Court in Chief Conservator of Forests & Anr. vs.
Jagannath Maruti Kondhare (supra) were in any manner misplaced. On perusal of
the said decision, it is clear that the Supreme Court was dealing with the Forest
Department of the State Government implementing the scheme at Panchgaon
Parwati as framed by it intending to fulfill the recreational and educational
aspirations of public as also undertaking social forestry work meant for the
preservation of forests and environment could not be regarded as a part of
sovereign function of the State, hence for the workers who were engaged to
perform work under the said scheme, there was no embargo to invoke the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act as also Maharashtra Recognition of
Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, (for short 'MRTU
& PULP Act'). The Supreme Court held that the department of the State
Government is an industry and the employees employed on daily wages were
covered and protected by the State Acts. Learned Single Judge, in our opinion,
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has rightly applied the said decision of the Supreme Court in the facts of the
present case.
17. We are not persuaded to accept the contention as urged on behalf of the
appellant that there is any error of fact or law in the findings as recorded by both
the forums in considering the benefits being awarded to the respondents by
virtue of their continuous service as recognized by Section 25B of the Industrial
Disputes Act. We also do not find merit in the contention as urged on behalf of
the appellant that the Industrial Court as also the learned Single Judge have not
appropriately appreciated the issue that there being no sanctioned posts, hence,
there could not be any regularization as directed by the Industrial Court. In our
opinion, such contention has been rightly negatived by the learned Single Judge
by considering the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Chief Conservator of
Forests & Anr. vs. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare (supra) as also considering the
provisions of Section 30 of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971 which empowers the
Court to grant declaration as granted by the Industrial Court in the present case
considering the mandate of what is contemplated in Item 6 Schedule IV of the
MRTU & PULP Act. Also the Industrial Court having recorded clear findings
that the work performed by the respondents was permanent in nature and a
perennial one, in the facts and circumstances, it was appropriate for the Court to
issue directions of the nature as issued, to declare that the appellant has
committed unfair labour practice and as a consequence thereto, the respondents
were rightly held to be the permanent employees. In these circumstances, the
contention as urged on behalf of the appellant that it was incumbent for the
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Industrial Court as also the learned Single Judge to consider that there was no
sanctioned post, was quite misconceived, as observed by both the forums below.
Also there was no scope for such plea to be tenable, considering the cumulative
scheme of Sections 30 and 32 of the MRTU & PULP Act. Thus, there being
clear findings of fact that the work performed by the respondent was of a
perennial and permanent nature, the appellant's plea of there being no sanctioned
post would certainly be of no consequence, in the Industrial Court granting
declaration of unfair labour practice and awarding regularization.
18. Insofar as the decisions as cited on behalf of the appellant in case of Delhi
Development Horticulture vs. Delhi Administration (supra), Mahatma Phule vs.
Nashik Zilla Kamgar (supra) and Ahmednagar Zilla vs. Dinkar Rao Kalyanrao
Jagdale (supra) are concerned, in the facts of the present case, these judgments are
not applicable.
19. Insofar as the reliance placed on behalf of the petitioner on the decision of
the Delhi Development Horticulture vs. Delhi Administration (supra), the same
is not well founded in the facts of the present case. In such decision, the Supreme
Court was concerned with a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the
Constitution which itself is the distinguishing factor from the facts of the present
case. The case concerned several schemes which were to provide income to those
who are living below the poverty line and particularly during the periods when
they are without any source of livelihood and, therefore, without any income
whatsoever. Thus, the intention of the scheme was not the intention which was
relevant for the schemes with which the Industrial Court was concerned in the
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present case, which is a forestation and other forest activities by creating a proper
corporation like the appellant which is a registered company. In the present case
in regard to the legal requirement of the respondents establishing basic rights of
240 days of continuous employment and not only for one year but for several
years, was the subject matter of consideration. Learned Counsel for the appellant
is certainly not urging a proposition that the Supreme Court in that decision
dispelled the requirement of 240 days of continuous working being not relevant
as attracted in the case in hand. Such is not the proposition which can be derived
from the judgment. It cannot be in the present cases, an adjudication on the
factual matrix was held before the Industrial Court on the basis of oral and
documentary evidence, factual findings of all essentials in law being fulfilled of an
unfair labour practice in view of the continued employment rendered to the
respondents for years together, eminently fulfilling the statutory norms of not
only 240 days of continuous employment for one year but for years together, a
relief was granted to the respondents. It is these findings which are confirmed by
the learned Single Judge. In this view of the matter, the decision in Delhi
Development Horticulture (supra) would not assist the appellant.
20. In Mahatma Phule v. Nashik Zilla Kamgar (supra), the issue before the
Supreme Court concerned the challenge to qualified daily wages awarded in an
application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In that context,
the Supreme Court observed that when no sanctioned posts were available for
absorbing the workmen, the status of permanency could not be granted in the
absence of such posts. Therefore, the High Court's decision of not granting
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permanency and extending wages and other benefits applicable to permanent
employees, was held to be erroneous. Hence, this decision would not be
applicable to the present case.
21. Insofar as the reliance on behalf of the appellant on the decision in
Ahmednagar Zilla Shetmajoor Union vs. Dinkar Rao Kalyanrao Jagdale 6 is
concerned, the same is certainly not applicable in the present facts. In the said case
although the issue was of the Industrial Tribunal allowing the complaint filed by
the workmen for absorption on completion 240 days of service with the appellant
therein, when the Government had sanctioned only 36 posts. The respondents in
whose favour the regularization was granted were workmen who were appointed
and worked over and above the sanctioned post. It is in such context, the Supreme
Court observed that for absorption as regular employees, existence of the post in
such circumstances was mandatory. Further the work in question was only
seasonal work and it is in such context, the observations in paragraph 3 on which
reliance is placed on behalf of the appellant. The present facts are completely
distinct and hence, such decision would not assist the appellant. These are not the
facts in our case. In such context we may also observe that the decision would be
required to be understood and the binding force derived only on the basis of the
facts before the Court and in the context of such facts, the decision which was
rendered by the Court on issues which had actually fell for consideration of the
Court for the ratio decidendi to become applicable. In such context, we may also
refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. Vs.
6 (2001)7 SCC 356
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Dhanwanti Devi & Ors.7 on to the law of Precedents, the Supreme Court made
the following observations:
"9. Before adverting to and considering whither solatium and
interest would be payable under the Act, at the outset, we will dispose of
the objection raised by Shri Vaidyanathan that Hari Kishan Khosla's case is
not a binding precedent nor does it operate as ratio decidendi to be
followed as a precedent and per se per incuriam. It is not everything said
by a Judge who giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only
thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the
case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and
isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well settled theory of
precedents, every decision contain three basic postulates - [i] findings of
material facts, is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or
perceptible facts; [ii] statements of the principles of law applicable to the
legal problems disclosed by the facts; and [iii] judgment based on the
combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it
actually decides. What is of the essence in decision is its ratio and not
every observation found therein not what logically follows from the
various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read
as applicable to the particular facts proved, since the generality of the
expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of
the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the
case in which such expressions are to be found. It would, therefore, be not
profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to
build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every
observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on
which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding between
the parties to it, but it, is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a
consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject matter of the
decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what
it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is
binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution. A deliberate judicial
decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a question which arises in
the case or is put in issue may constitute a precedent, no matter for what
reason, and the precedent by long recognition may mature into rule of
stare decisis. It is the rule deductible from the application of law to the
facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi.
10.Therefore, in order to understand and appreciate the binding force of a
decision is always necessary to see what were the facts in the case in which
the decision was given and what was the point which had to be decided.
No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a
sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a full exposition of law.
Law cannot afford to be static and therefore, Judges are to employ an
intelligent in the use of precedents. ... ... ..."
7 (1996)6 SCC 44
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22. We may also observe that the learned Single Judge has rightly held that the
case of the respondents would stand squarely covered by the decision of the
Supreme Court in Chief Conservator of Forests & Anr. vs. Jagannath Maruti
Kondhare (supra). The relevant observations as made by the Supreme Court in
the said decision are required to be noted, which read thus:
21. Shri Dholakia would not agree to this submission as, according to him,
the item in question having not stopped merely by stating about the
employment of persons as casuals for years being sufficient to describe the same
as unfair labour practice, which is apparent from what has been in the second
part of the item, it was the burden of the workmen to establish that the object of
continuing them for years was to deprive them of the status and privileges of
permanent employees. Ms. Jaising answers this by contending that it would be
difficult for any workmen to establish what object an employer in such a matter
has, as that would be in the realm of his subjective satisfaction known only to
him. She submits that we may not fasten a workman with such a burden which
he cannot discharge.
22. We have given our due thought to the aforesaid rival contentions and,
according to us, the object of the State Act, inter alia, being prevention of certain
unfair labour practices, the same would be thwarted or get frustrated if such a
burden is placed on a workman which he cannot reasonably discharge. In our
opinion, it would be permissible on facts of a particular case to draw the
inference mentioned in the second part of the item, if badlis, causals or
temporaries are continued as such for years. We further state that the present was
such a case inasmuch as from the materials on record we are satisfied that the 25
workmen who went to Industrial Court of Pune (and 15 to Industrial Court,
Ahmednagar) had been kept as casuals for long years with the primary object of
depriving them the status of permanent employees inasmuch as giving of this
status would have required the employer to pay the workmen at a rate higher
than the one fixed under the Minimum Wages Act. We can think of no other
possible object as, it may be remembered that the Pachgaon Parwati Scheme was
intended to cater to the recreational and educational aspirations also of the
populace, which are not ephemeral objects, but par excellence permanent. We
would say the same about environment-pollution-care work of Ahmednagar,
whose need is on increase because of increase in pollution. Permanency is thus
writ large on the face of both the types of work. If, even in such projects, persons
are kept in jobs on casual basis for years the object manifests itself; no scrutiny is
required. We, therefore, answer the second question also against the appellants."
23. Mr. Bapat would be correct in placing reliance on the decision of the
Supreme Court in Jaggo v. Union of India (supra). Such decision also dispels the
contention as urged on behalf of the appellant of any backdoor entry of the
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respondents/workmen. The Supreme Court considering the decision of the
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Secretary, State Of Karnataka vs
Umadevi And Ors.8 made the following significant observations, which are aptly
applicable in the present situation:-
"21. The High Court placed undue emphasis on the initial label of the
appellants' engagements and the outsourcing decision taken after their
dismissal. Courts must look beyond the surface labels and consider the realities
of employment : continuous, long-term service, indispensable duties, and
absence of any mala fide or illegalities in their appointments. In that light,
refusing regularization simply because their original terms did not explicitly
state so, or because an outsourcing policy was belatedly introduced, would be
contrary to principles of fairness and equity.
22. The pervasive misuse of temporary employment contracts, as
exemplified in this case, reflects a broader systemic issue that adversely affects
workers' rights and job security. In the private sector, the rise of the gig
economy has led to an increase in precarious employment arrangements, often
characterized by lack of benefits, job security, and fair treatment. Such practices
have been criticized for exploiting workers and undermining labour standards.
Government institutions, entrusted with upholding the principles of fairness
and justice, bear an even greater responsibility to avoid such exploitative
employment practices. When public sector entities engage in misuse of
temporary contracts, it not only mirrors the detrimental trends observed in the
gig economy but also sets a concerning precedent that can erode public trust in
governmental operations.
23. The International Labour Organization (ILO), of which India is a
founding member, has consistently advocated for employment stability and the
fair treatment of workers. The ILO's Multinational Enterprises Declaration 6
encourages companies to provide stable employment and to observe obligations
concerning employment stability and social security. It emphasizes that
enterprises should assume a leading role in promoting employment security,
particularly in contexts where job discontinuation could exacerbate long-term
unemployment.
24. The landmark judgment of the United State in the case of Vizcaino v.
Microsoft Corporation7serves as a pertinent example from the private sector,
illustrating the consequences of misclassifying employees to circumvent
providing benefits. In this case, Microsoft classified certain workers as
independent contractors, thereby denying them employee benefits. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that these workers were, in
fact, common-law employees and were entitled to the same benefits as regular
employees. The Court noted that large Corporations have increasingly adopted
the practice of hiring temporary employees or independent contractors as a
means of avoiding payment of employee benefits, thereby increasing their
profits. This judgment underscores the principle that the nature of the work
performed, rather than the label assigned to the worker, should determine
8 AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1806
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employment status and the corresponding rights and benefits. It highlights the
judiciary's role in rectifying such misclassifications and ensuring that workers
receive fair treatment.
25. It is a disconcerting reality that temporary employees, particularly in
government institutions, often face multifaceted forms of exploitation. While
the foundational purpose of temporary contracts may have been to address
short-term or seasonal needs, they have increasingly become a mechanism to
evade long-term obligations owed to employees. These practices manifest in
several ways:
• Misuse of "Temporary" Labels: Employees engaged for work that
is essential, recurring, and integral to the functioning of an
institution are often labeled as "temporary" or "contractual," even
when their roles mirror those of regular employees. Such
misclassification deprives workers of the dignity, security, and
benefits that regular employees are entitled to, despite performing
identical tasks.
• Arbitrary Termination: Temporary employees are frequently
dismissed without cause or notice, as seen in the present case. This
practice undermines the principles of natural justice and subjects
workers to a state of constant insecurity, regardless of the quality or
duration of their service.
• Lack of Career Progression: Temporary employees often find
themselves excluded from opportunities for skill development,
promotions, or incremental pay raises. They remain stagnant in
their roles, creating a systemic disparity between them and their
regular counterparts, despite their contributions being equally
significant.
• Using Outsourcing as a Shield: Institutions increasingly resort to
outsourcing roles performed by temporary employees, effectively
replacing one set of exploited workers with another. This practice
not only perpetuates exploitation but also demonstrates a deliberate
effort to bypass the obligation to offer regular employment.
• Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits: Temporary employees are
often denied fundamental benefits such as pension, provident fund,
health insurance, and paid leave, even when their tenure spans
decades. This lack of social security subjects them and their families
to undue hardship, especially in cases of illness, retirement, or
unforeseen circumstances.
26. While the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) sought to curtail the practice
of backdoor entries and ensure appointments adhered to constitutional
principles, it is regrettable that its principles are often misinterpreted or
misapplied to deny legitimate claims of long-serving employees. This judgment
aimed to distinguish between "illegal" and "irregular" appointments. It
categorically held that employees in irregular appointments, who were engaged
in duly sanctioned posts and had served continuously for more than ten years,
should be considered for regularization as a one-time measure. However, the
laudable intent of the judgment is being subverted when institutions rely on its
dicta to indiscriminately reject the claims of employees, even in cases where their
appointments are not illegal, but merely lack adherence to procedural formalities.
Government departments often cite the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) to argue
that no vested right to regularization exists for temporary employees, overlooking
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the judgment's explicit acknowledgment of cases where regularization is
appropriate. This selective application distorts the judgment's spirit and purpose,
effectively weaponizing it against employees who have rendered indispensable
services over decades.
27. In light of these considerations, in our opinion, it is imperative for
government departments to lead by example in providing fair and stable
employment. Engaging workers on a temporary basis for extended periods,
especially when their roles are integral to the organization's functioning, not only
contravenes international labour standards but also exposes the organization to
legal challenges and undermines employee morale. By ensuring fair employment
practices, government institutions can reduce the burden of unnecessary
litigation, promote job security, and uphold the principles of justice and fairness
that they are meant to embody. This approach aligns with international standards
and sets a positive precedent for the private sector to follow, thereby contributing
to the overall betterment of labour practices in the country."
24. We may also observe that, by Government Resolution dated 16 October
2012, the State Government regularized the services of similarly placed workers
who had been appointed between 1 November 1989 and 31 October 1994, on
the ground that they had completed 240 days of service for five consecutive years,
in accordance with the Government Resolution dated 31 January 1996. The
respondents, however, though similarly situated, were not extended the same
benefit. No policy decision was taken in their favour, possibly because they had
already succeeded before the Industrial Court as well as before the learned Single
Judge of this Court, and the present proceedings were pending.
25. As rightly contended by Mr. Bapat, this was an additional factor that ought
to have weighed with the State Government in adopting a similar approach in
respect of the respondent(s). Unfortunately, the State chose to contest the present
appeals despite having taken a contrary position for similarly placed employees
during an earlier period. In our opinion, it would have been appropriate for the
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Government to extend a similar policy decision in favour of the respondents in
the present proceedings. However, that has not been done.
26. In the light of the above discussion, we find that there is no merit in these
appeals. They are accordingly rejected.
27. The respondents/workmen shall be given all the benefits of the orders
passed by the Industrial Tribunal and as confirmed by the learned Single Judge, as
expeditiously as possible, within eight weeks from the date a copy of this order is
made available.
28. At this stage learned Counsel for the appellants has prayed that the interim
order be kept in operation. However, considering the facts of the case and that the
respondents-employees have suffered for so many years, we reject the request.
(AARTI SATHE, J.) (G. S. KULKARNI, J.)
Signed by: Prajakta Vartak
Designation: PA To Honourable Judge
24 December 2025
Date: 24/12/2025 20:57:33
