Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 8963 Bom
Judgement Date : 16 December, 2025
2025:BHC-AS:55472
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Arun Sankpal
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 5735 OF 2025
Kartik Harshad Jhaveri, ..Petitioner
Age: 47 Years
Proprietor,
Care Comp Computer Solutions
2/41, Samrat Ashok Coop Hsg Society,
7th R.T Marg, Malbar Hill,
Mumbai 400 006.
Versus
1. Charanjit Arora,
Proprietor of Esource Global
D-312, Crystal Plaza, Andheri Link Road,
Andheri (West), Mumbai 400 049.
2. The State of Maharashtra
Through Office of Government Pleader
Appellate Side, High Court,
...Respondents
PWD Building, High Court, Mumbai
WRIT PETITION NO. 5646 OF 2025
Kartik Harshad Jhaveri, ..Petitioner
Age: 47 Years
Proprietor,
Care Comp Computer Solutions
2/41, Samrat Ashok Coop Hsg Society,
7th R.T Marg, Malbar Hill,
Mumbai 400 006.
Versus
1. Charanjit Arora,
Proprietor of Esource Global
D-312, Crystal Plaza, Andheri Link Road,
1/19
-WP-5646-2025-.DOC
Andheri (West), Mumbai 400 049.
2. The State of Maharashtra
Through Office of Government Pleader
Appellate Side, High Court, ...Respondents
PWD Building, High Court, Mumbai
WRIT PETITION NO. 5644 OF 2025
Kartik Harshad Jhaveri, ..Petitioner
Age: 47 Years
Proprietor,
Care Comp Computer Solutions
2/41, Samrat Ashok Coop Hsg Society,
7th R.T Marg, Malbar Hill,
Mumbai 400 006.
Versus
1. Charanjit Arora,
Proprietor of Esource Global
D-312, Crystal Plaza, Andheri Link Road,
Andheri (West), Mumbai 400 049.
2. The State of Maharashtra
Through Office of Government Pleader
Appellate Side, High Court,
...Respondents
PWD Building, High Court, Mumbai
Mr. Ashok Shetty, with Karishma Jhaveri, i/b Navdeep Vora &
Associates, for the Petitioner in all Petitions.
Mr. Bhagwan Mishra, for Respondent No.1 in all Petitions.
Smt. R.S. Tendulkar, APP, for the Respondent No.2-State in all
Petitions.
CORAM: N. J. JAMADAR, J.
RESERVED ON : 11th NOVEMBER 2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 16th DECEMBER 2025
2/19
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JUDGMENT:
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and, with the consent of
the learned Counsel for the parties, heard finally.
2. These Petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and
Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, assail the
legality, propriety and correctness of the judgment and order dated 12 th
August 2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in
Criminal Revision Application Nos. 102, 103 and 104 of 2024, whereby
the Revision Applications preferred by the Petitioner-Accused in the
complaints for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ("the N.I. Act, 1881), against an order
dated 8th February 2024 passed by the learned Magistrate thereby
dismissing the Applications for dismissal of the complaints on the
ground of bar of limitation, came to be dismissed.
3. The background facts leading to these Petitions can be stated, in
brief, as under:
2.1 The Respondent No.1-complainant lodged three complaints for
the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, 1881 on 10 th
July 2007, initially, in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, at
Ulhasnagar.
2.2 By an order dated 5th July 2010, the learned JMFC, Ulhasnagar
was persuaded to dismiss the complainants for want of jurisdiction.
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2.3 Being aggrieved, the complainant preferred Criminal Writ Petition
Nos. 3097, 3098 of 3099 of 2010 before this Court. By an order dated
18th October 2011, this Court while affirming the view of the learned
Magistrate, Ulhasnagar, that the said Court had no jurisdiction to
entertain, try and decide the complaints, modified the said order to the
effect that the complaints be restored to the file of the learned JMFC,
Ulhasnagar, and thereupon the learned JMFC shall pass a formal order
returning the complaints to the complainant for presentation to the
proper Court with an endorsement made thereon to that effect.
2.3 It appears that since the complainant did not turn up to take back
the complainants for presentation to the proper Court, by a notice dated
2nd December 2011, the learned Magistrate called upon the
complainants to take back those complaints.
2.4 The complainant took back the complainants and lodged the
complaints in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Andheri on 9 th
February 2012 along with the Applications for condonation of delay in
filing those complaints. The said Applications for condonation of delay
were resisted by the accused. The complainant led evidence therein. It
seems the evidence was closed on 21st February 2014.
2.5 On 7th February 2019, the complainant sought leave to withdraw
the Applications for condonation of delay asserting that there was no
delay in filing the complaints. Thereupon, the learned Magistrate
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allowed the complainant to withdraw the Applications for condonation
of delay.
2.6 The accused preferred Application for dismissal of the complaints
contending that the complaints were barred by limitation. The
complainant contested the said Applications. By an order dated 8 th
February 2024, the learned Magistrate rejected the Applications opining
inter alia that in view of the provisions contained in Section 14 (2) of
the Limitation Act, 1963, the time during which the complainant had
been prosecuting with due diligence other proceedings was required to
be excluded.
2.7 The learned Magistrate was also of the view that in the
intervening period, the learned Magistrate had taken cognizance and
issued process against the accused for an offence punishable under
Section 138 of the N.I. Act, 1881. Thus, at that stage, the complaints
cannot be dismissed on the ground of bar of limitation.
2.8 Being aggrieved, the accused preferred Criminal Revisions before
the learned Sessions Judge.
2.9 By the impugned judgment and order, the learned Additional
Sessions Judge rejected the Revision Applications opining that the
accused had not challenged the order of issue of process and, therefore,
the said order attained finality, and whether or not the complaints were
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barred by limitation was to be decided at the trial after giving an
opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence.
2.10 Being further aggrieved the accused has preferred these Petitions.
4. I have heard Mr. Ashok Shetty, the learned Counsel for the
Petitioner, Mr. Bhagwan Mishra, the learned Counsel for the Respondent
No.1 and Smt. R. S. Tendulkar, the learned APP for the Respondent-
State, in all the Petitions.
5. Mr. Shetty, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, submitted that,
the learned Additional Sessions Judge as well as the learned Magistrate
approached the issue of bar of limitation raised by the Petitioner from
an erroneous perspective. Once it was demonstrated that the complaints
were lodged before the jurisdictional Court, clearly beyond the period of
limitation, the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of
the offence. Therefore, the view of the Courts below that since
cognizance of the offence had already been taken, the issue of bar of
limitation could be decided at the trial only, was incorrect.
6. Mr. Shetty would urge that what accentuates the situation in the
case at hand is the fact that the complainant had filed Applications for
condonation of delay in filing the complaints and after the evidence was
led, chose to withdrew those Applications.
7. In the absence of an order condoning the delay in filing the
complaints, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to proceed further and
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take cognizance of the offence. A very strong reliance was placed by Mr.
Shetty on an order passed by the Supreme Court in the Case of H.S.
Oberoi Buildtech Pvt Ltd and Ors Vs MSN Woodtech, 1 wherein the
Supreme Court enunciated that though the Court is empowered to
condone the delay under Section 142 of the N.I. Act, 1881, the first
requirement is that the Court has to take note of the fact that there is a
delay and, thereafter, it had to go on the point whether the reasons
which have been furnished by the complainant are sufficient to condone
such delay and only then move on to take cognizance and proceed for
issuance of summons.
8. Mr. Shetty further urged that the fact that there was delay in
lodging the complaints with the jurisdictional Court is self-evident. This
Court had ordered the learned Magistrate to pass a formal order of
return of the complaint for presentation to the proper Court on 18 th
October 2011. The complainant did not appear before the learned
Magistrate, Ulhasnagar and, therefore, the learned Magistrate had
issued notice on 2nd December 2011. Yet, the complaints were lodged in
the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate at Andheri on 9th February 2012.
9. In the backdrop of these facts, the Courts below could not have
brushed aside the bar of limitation in filing the complaints on the
spacious ground that, in the intervening period, the learned Magistrate
1 Manu/SCOR/68073/2025.
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had taken cognizance of the offence and issued process against the
accused.
10. Mr. Shetty submitted that the provisions contained in Section 142
of the N.I. Act, 1881, prescribing the time limit for filing the complaints
are substantive provision. In the event of default on the part of the
payee to lodge the complaint within the stipulated period, substantive
right accrues in favour of the drawer and unless the delay is condoned
under sub-Section (2) of Section 142 of the N.I. Act, 1881, the
Magistrate has no jurisdiction to proceed with the complaint.
11. To this end, Mr. Shetty placed a very strong reliance on the
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Subodh S Salaskar Vs
Jayprakash M Shah & Ors,2 wherein, the Supreme Court enunciated
that the provisions contained in Section 142 are substantive provisions
and not procedural one.
12. Per contra, Mr. Bhagwan Mishra, the learned Counsel for the
Respondent No.1 supported the impugned order. It was submitted that
the initial lodging of the complaints in the Court of JMFC at Ulhasnagar
was within the period of limitation. Therefore, the alleged delay in
taking back the complaints from the Ulhasnagar Court and filing the
same before the jurisdictional Court is of no consequence. In that view
of the matter, the complainant had justifiably withdrawn the
2 (2008) 13 SCC 689.
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Applications for condonation of delay as there was no delay, as such, in
filing the complaints.
13. At any rate, Mr. Mishra would urge, since the cognizance of the
offence has already been taken and process issued, the accused can very
well agitate the defence of bar of limitation at the trial. The learned
Magistrate and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, therefore, took a
correct view of the matter in repelling the challenge to the tenability of
the complaints on the count of bar of limitation. Since the said issue can
be determined at the trial, in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction, this
Court may not entertain the Petitions, at this stage, submitted Mr.
Mishra.
14. To start with incontrovertible facts. Firstly, the demand notice was
served on the accused on 31st May 2007. The cause of action under
Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 arose on 16 th June 2007. Under
the provisions of Section 142(1)(b) of the N.I. Act, 1881, the
complainant was to be lodged within one month of the date on which
the cause of action arose. Secondly, the complaint was lodged in the
Court of Magistrate at Ulhanager on 10 th July 2007. Thirdly, by an order
dated 5th July 2010, the learned Magistrate dismissed the complaint for
want of jurisdiction. Fourthly, on 18th October 2011, in the Criminal
Writ Petition Nos. 3097, 3098 of 3099 of 2010, this Court modified the
said order of dismissal of the complaints, restored the complaints to the
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file of the learned Magistrate, Ulhasnagar with a direction to pass a
formal order returning the complaints to the complainant for
presentation to the proper Court. Lastly, the complainant did not take
back the complaints at least till 2nd December 2011 and, therefore,
notice was issued by the learned Magistrate to the complainant to
appear and take back the complaints. Though the exact date on which
the complainant collected the complaints from the Court of Magistrate
at Ulhasnagar is not clearly evident, yet, it is incontrovertible that on 9 th
February 2012, the complainant lodged complainants alongwith the
Applications for condonation of delay in the Court of Metropolitan
Magistrate at Andheri. There is not much controversy over the fact that
evidence was led in the said Applications and, while the said
Applications were at an advanced stage of hearing, on 7 th February
2019, the complainant withdrew the said Applications for condonation
of delay.
15. In the backdrop of the aforesaid uncontroverted facts, legality
and correctness of the impugned orders is required to be tested. The
learned Magistrate was of the view that in view of the provisions
contained in Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the time during
which the complainant had been prosecuting with due diligence the
other proceedings was required to be excluded. To what extent the
provisions contained in Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act come to the
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aid of the complainant, in a case of the present nature, is the moot
question.
16. First and foremost, it is necessary to note that, hardly five days of
period of limitation had remained unexhausted when the initial
complaints were lodged by the complainant in the Court of the
Magistrate at Ulhasnagar. Secondly, the time that elapsed between the
date of the order passed by this Court in Criminal Writ Petition Nos.
3097, 3098 of 3099 of 2010, i.e., 18th October 2011 and the date of
presentation of the complaints before the jurisdictional Magistrate thus
assumed significance.
17. Whether the entire period form the date of the order passed by
this Court on 18th October 2011 to the filing of the complaints before
the learned Magistrate at Andheri gets completely excluded was the
question which the learned Magistrate was required to pose unto
himself.
18. The position in law, in this regard, seems to be well settled. What
gets excluded from the computation of the period of limitation is the
date of presentation of the proceeding before the Court, which had no
jurisdiction, and the date on which such Court passes an order and
makes an endorsement on the Plaint returning it for presentation to the
proper Court. If the Plaintiff allows time to elapse from the date of such
order and endorsement on the Plaint to the actual presentation of such
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returned Plaint to the jurisdictional Court, the said intervening period is
not covered by sub-Section (2) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act,
1963.
19. In the case of Firm Jiwan Ram Ramchandra Vs Jagemath Sahu, 3
the Plaintiff had instituted the Suit in the Court which had no
jurisdiction on the last day of limitation. The said Court ordered the
Plaint to be returned to the Plaintiff on 26 th September 1991 for being
presented to the proper Court on or before 9 th October 1931. A
submission was canvassed that since the Court which had no
jurisdiction had granted time to the Plaintiff to present the Plaint before
the jurisdictional Court on or before 9th October 1931 and the Plaint
was accordingly presented on 9th October 1931, the bar of limitation
would not apply.
20. The Patna High Court upheld the view of the Courts below that in
computing the period of limitation the Plaintiff was entitled to exclude
only the period during which the Plaint was pending in the Court which
had no jurisdiction and the Plaintiff was not entitled to exclude the
period between 26th September 1931 and 9th October 1931. It was held
that where the Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, it has also no
jurisdiction to pass an order to the prejudice of one of the parties.
3 AIR 1937 Patna 495.
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21. In the case of Subbu Naidu Vs Varadarajulu Naidu, 4 a Division
Bench of the Madras High Court held that an order of return of the
Plaint and endorsement on the Plaint that the plaint was returned under
Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("the Code") is
an essential formality and the Plaint cannot be returned before it is
made. The proceedings in former Suit cannot reasonably be said to have
ended before such endorsement is made. But the Plaintiff is not entitled
to any deduction thereafter except perhaps where the Plaintiff can show
that the Court delayed the return of the Plaint in spite of his endeavour
to take it back.
22. In the case of Amar Chand Inani Vs Union of India 5 the facts were
that a Suit for damages was filed in the Court of Karnal on the next
working day as on the last day of expiry of period of limitation, the
Court was closed. By an order dated 28 th October 1959, the Plaint was
returned for presentation to the proper Court. The Plaint was thereafter
presented in the Court at Ambala on 29th October 1959. When the
question of limitation arose, it was contended on behalf of the Plaintiff
that the Plaintiff would be entitled to the benefit of the provisions
contained in Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
23. Repelling the contention, a Three Judge Bench of the Supreme
Court enunciated that :
4 AIR 1948 Madras 26.
5 AIR 1973 SC 313.
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"8..........Section 14 of the Limitation Act only provided for the exclusion of the time during which the Plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding against the defendant, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. Even if the plaintiff was entitled to get an exclusion of the time during which he was prosecuting the suit in the Karnal and Panipat Courts, the suit would not be within time as the filing of the suit in the Karnal Court was beyond the period of limitation. It was, however, argued by counsel for the appellant that the suit instituted in the Trial Court by the presentation of the plaint after it was returned for presentation to the proper Court was a continuation of the suit filed in the Karnal Court and, therefore, the suit filed in Karnal Court must be deemed to have been filed in the trial Court. We think there is no substance in the argument, for, when the plaint was returned for presentation to the proper Court and was presented in that Court, the suit can be deemed to be instituted in the proper Court only when the plaint was presented in that Court. In other words, the suit instituted in the trial Court by the presentation of the plaint returned by the Panipat Court was not a continuation of the suit filed in the Karnal Court (see the decisions in Hirachand Succaram Gandhy and Ors Vs G.I.P. Rly. Co. A.I.R. 1928 Bom 421, Bimla Prasad Mukherji Vs Lal Moni Devi and Ors A.I.R. 1926 Calcutta 355, and Ram Kishun Vs Ashirbad, ILR 29 Patna 699. Therefore, the presentation of the plaint in the Karnal Court on March 2,
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1959, cannot be deemed to be a presentation of it on that day in the trial Court.
24. In the case of Hanamanthappa and Anr. V/s.
Chandrashekharappa and Ors.6, the Supreme Court rejected the
contention that once the plaint is returned by the Court having no
jurisdiction and is presented before the Court of competent jurisdiction,
it must be treated to be continuation of the earlier suit. The Supreme
Court held :
"3.....In substance, it is a suit filed afresh subject to the limitation, pecuniary jurisdiction and payment of the court fee.... At best it can be treated to be a fresh plaint and the matter can be proceeded with according to law."
25. In the light of the aforesaid exposition of law, if the facts of the
case at hand are appraised, a factor which is of critical salience is the
inaction on the part of the complainant to take back the complaints
after the order dated 18th October 2011 was passed by this Court in
Criminal Writ Petition Nos. 3097, 3098 of 3099 of 2010. As noted
above, since the complainant did not appear before the Court of
Magistrate at Ulhasnagar on 2nd December 2011, the learned Magistrate
issued a notice to the complainant to appear before the Court to take
back the complaints. Moreover, considerable time elapsed even after the
said notice dated 2nd December 2011, as the complaints were eventually
6 (1997) 9 SCC 688
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lodged before the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate at Andheri on 9 th
February 2012. The balance period of limitation, which had remained
unexhausted was of only five days.
26. Therefore, the fact that the learned Magistrate took cognizance of
the offence does not infuse life into the complaints which were prima
facie barred by limitation. On that count, in the considered view of this
Court, the challenge raised by the accused could not have been thrown
overboard by the learned Magistrate and the learned Additional
Sessions Judge.
27. Having taken the aforesaid view, the issue that bothers this court
is the relief to be granted in these petitions. Should the complaints be
dismissed straightway ? Such a course would bring to a naught the
orders passed by this Court directing the return of the complaints for
presentation to the proper court and the entire process in the
applications for condonation of delay in filing the complaints.
28. It is true, those applications were withdrawn on behalf of the
complainant. Thus, it could be urged that the complaints as of now are
not accompanied by the applications for condonation of delay. However,
the court cannot loose sight of the circumstances in which the said
applications appeard to have been withdrawn.
29. It appears that on 7 February 2019, learned Advocate for the
complainant made an endorsement on the application for condonation
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of delay that the former Advocate for the complainants had filed the
application for condonation of delay as a precutionary measure and as
there was no delay, the Advocate for the complainant requested the
Court to permit the complainant to withdraw the said application.
Thereupon, the learned Magistrate made the following endorsement
thereon :
"Adv. For complainant withdraw this application. Hence, filed."
30. Evidently, the learned Magistrate did not apply his mind to the
prayer for withdrawal of the applications made on behalf of the
complainants, and made an endorsement as a matter of course. The
fact that in the said application, evidence was adduced and it had
reached an advanced stage, and, more importantly, there was a time lag
between the order passed by this Court directing return of the
complaints and the actual presentation of the complaints before the
jurisdictional Magistrate, did not engage the attention of the learned
Magistrate.
31. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the dictates of the command
of justice persuades this Court to adopt a just measure. Having regard to
the circumstances of the case and the time and efforts spent by the
parties in prosecuting the proceedings, it would be appropriate to quash
and set aside the order of withdrawal of the applications for
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condonation of delay also and restore the said applications to the file of
the learned Magistrate, for a decision on merits. Resultantly, the Writ
Petitions deserve to be partly allowed.
32. Hence, the following order:
: ORDER:
(i) The Petitions stand partly allowed. (ii) The impugned order dated 12th August 2025 as well as the
order passed by the learned Magistrate on 8 th February 2025 stand
quashed and set aside.
(iii) The orders passed by the learned Magistrate taking
cognizance of the offence and issue of process also stand quashed
and set aside.
(iv) The orders of withdrawal of the applications for
condonation of delay also stand quashed and set aside.
(v) The Applications for condonation of delay stand restored to
file of the learned Magistrate.
(vi) The learned Magistrate shall decide those Applications from
the stage at which those Applications were withdrawn, after
providing an opportunity of hearing to the parties and in
accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible and, preferably,
within a period of three months from the date of communication
of this order.
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(vii) Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent.
No costs.
[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge Date: 16/12/2025 21:49:20
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