[Cites 38, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Prakash S/O Manikrao Dhawale And 13 ... vs State Of Mah. Thr. Pso Ps Ajni Nagpur And ... on 15 December, 2025
2025:BHC-NAG:14272-DB
J-apl316.21 final.odt 1/19
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
CRIMINAL APPLICATION (APL) No.316 OF 2021
1. Prakash S/o. Manikrao Dhawale,
Aged- 64 Years, Occupation - Agriculturist,
2. Madhav S/o. Manikrao Dhawale,
Aged- 58 Years, Occupation - Service,
3. Suresh S/o Manikrao Dhawale,
Aged- 54 Years, Occupation - Service,
4. Vilas S/o. Manikrao Dhawale,
Aged- 50 Years, Occupation - Service,
All applicants 1 to 4 are
R/o. House No. 1966,
Near NIT Garden,
Besides Hanuman Mandir,
Old Babhulkheda, Nagpur.
5. Shantabai Wd/o. Marotrao Dhawale,
Aged-85 Years, Occupation - Housewife,
6. Vasudeo S/o Marotrao Dhawale,
Aged- 65 Years, Occupation - Retired,
Both applicants 5 & 6 are
R/o.169 Banerjee Layout,
Bhagwan Nagar,
Babhulkheda, Nagpur.
7. Sushila W/o. Ramkrishna Bhoyar,
Aged- 60 Years, Occupation - Housewife,
R/o Plot No. 1, Laxminagar, RPTS Road, Nagpur.
J-apl316.21 final.odt 2/19
8. Anusaya W/o. Vithobaji Lambat,
Aged-60 Years, Occupation - Housewife,
R/o At Post - Chikhlapar,
Mahalgaon, Tahsil and District - Nagpur.
9. Lata W/o. Vijay Mankar,
Aged-63 Years, Occupation - Housewife,
R/o Plot No. Behind Revale Hospital,
Quarter No. 8/5, MHADA, Rambagh Colony, Nagpur.
10. Hemlata W/o. Arun Chaure,
Aged- 60 Years, Occupation - Housewife,
R/o Opp. Ward no. 16, Gajanan Colony,
Belgaon, Jambsavli, Tahsil - Saunsar,
District - Chhindwara.
11. Vijay S/o Bala Dhawale,
Aged-62 Years, Occupation - Business,
12. Sunil S/o Bala Dhawale,
Aged- 60 Years, Occupation - Business,
13. Anil S/o Bala Dhawale,
Aged-58 Years, Occupation - Business,
14. Sanjay S/o Bala Dhawale,
Aged-56 Years, Occupation - Business,
Applicants 11 to 14 are
R/o. Dhawale Engineering Works,
Borsi Potiya Road, Durg, Chattisgarh. : APPLICANTS
...VERSUS...
1. State of Maharashtra,
Through its Police Station Officer,
Ajni Police Station, Nagpur.
2. Adv. Manik S/o Jagorao Sahare,
Aged- 71 years,
Occupation- Legal Practitioner,
R/o. 89, Old Dnyaneshwar Nagar,
Manewada Road, Nagpur. : NON-APPLICANTS
J-apl316.21 final.odt 3/19
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Mr. Ritesh Badhe, Advocate for Applicants.
Mr. M.J. Khan, Additional Public Prosecutor for Non-applicant No.1.
Mr. Uday Gosari, Advocate for Non-applicant No.2.
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
CORAM : URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE AND
NANDESH S. DESHPANDE, JJ.
RESERVED ON : 03rd DECEMBER, 2025.
PRONOUNCED ON : 15th DECEMBER, 2025.
JUDGMENT :
(Per : Nandesh S. Deshpande, J.)
1. Heard. Admit. Heard finally by consent of learned
counsel appearing for the parties.
2. This is an application filed under Section 482 of the
Criminal Procedure Code the challenging the First Information
Report bearing Crime No.70/2021 for the offences punishable
under Sections 107, 109, 166, 217, 218, 406, 420, 467, 468 and
471 read with Section 120 of the Indian Penal Code. It further
challenges the judgment and order dated 2.1.2021 passed by the
District Judge-4, Nagpur in Criminal Revision Application
No.369/2018. By way of amendment the applicant has prayed for
quashing the charge-sheet No.256/2025 filed in connection with
said F.I.R. along with proceeding of Regular Criminal Case
No.4958/2025 pending before the Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Nagpur.
3. The facts as stated in the application can be stated as
under :
A Co-operative Society, namely Medical Teachers Co-
operative Housing Society was registered on 15.1.1970 having
registration No.NGP/HSG/719/1970 with the Registrar of Co-
operative Societies on 15.1.1970 and one Mr. Balkrishna Vitthalrao
Bhatkar was the President of the Society. Since the said Society
was not carrying out its affairs in accordance with the provisions of
the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, the Assistant Registrar,
Co-operative Societies, Sub-Division, Nagpur vide its order dated
11.7.1977 ordered the affairs of the said Society to be wound up
and appointed Assistant Co-operative Society Officer as its
liquidator. It is further stated in the application that thereafter the
family of the applicant entered into an agreement to sale dated
19.10.1981 with one Gandhi Nagar Co-operative Housing Society
for sale of their property situated at Mouza Babulkheda (old) P.H.
No.39 including Survey No.82/1. However, due to no-fulfilment of
contractual obligations, the said agreement to sale could not
culminate into a sale deed.
4. In the backdrop of these facts, a Society namely,
Manavseva Co-operative Houseing Society approached the family of
the applicants to purchase the property at Survey No.82/1,
admeasuring 10.3 acres. The person shown as President of earlier
Medical Teachers, Co-operative Housing Society was the same
person who was the President of Manavseva Co-operative Housing
Society as well. The said person induced the family of the
applicants to enter into a contract of sale by way of encumbered
(boza) sale-deed dated 13.10.1982 posing that the said Manavseva
Society is a registered Society. However, the consideration as
shown in the sale deed was not passed. Even though the sale-deed
was executed on 13.10.1982, the said came to be registered only on
11.5.1983 after obtaining the clearance from the Income Tax
Department. It is submitted by the applicants, and also as can be
seen from the said sale-deed in question executed between the
applicants and their family and the said Manavseva Society, that
the registration number is shown as 719 which was registration
number allotted to the Medical Teachers Co-operative Housing
Society and of which affairs were ordered to be wound up.
5. It is further stated in the application that the Gandhi
Nagar Co-operative Society filed a Special Civil Suit bearing
No.174/1983 which was re-numbered as R.C.S. No.133/2012
seeking specific performance on the basis of agreement to sale
dated 19.10.1981. In the said suit Manav Seva Co-operative
Housing Society was also joined as party/defendant No.17. It is
further submitted in the application that as at the relevant time
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 was in force, the
competent authority under the said Act i.e. the Deputy Collector,
Urban Land Ceiling Act, Nagpur after considering the returns filed
by the applicants held that the sale-deed dated 13.10.1982
executed by the applicants and their family in favour of Manav Seva
Co-operative Housing Society is null and void as provided under
Section 5(3) of the said Act. In an appeal filed by the applicants
under Section 33 of the said Act, the Collector vide order dated 20 th
June, 1991 dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of the
competent authority. Both the authorities held that sale in
contravention of the provisions of the Act and, therefore, void.
6. Meanwhile, the Special Civil Suit No.174/1983 filed by
the Gandhi Nagar Co-operative Society went on trial wherein
certain admissions were made by the Deputy Registrar and the
Secretary of the Manav Seva Co-operative Housing Society, who
appeared as witnesses in the suit.
7. In the backdrop of these facts and more particularly in
view of the fact that the Manav Seva Co-operative Housing Society
and its illegal activities were exposed, the non-applicant No.2
herein filed a Misc. Criminal Application No.2519/2018 under
Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code for directions to the
respondent No.1 to lodge a First Information Report and investigate
the cognizable offences. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate
passed an order below Exh.-1 putting the application for
verification as contemplated under Section 200 of the Criminal
Procedure Code. The respondent No.2 herein challenged the said
order by filing Revision bearing Criminal Revision No.369/2018 on
28.11.2018. Meanwhile, R.C.S. No.133/2022 filed by the Gandhi
Nagar Co-operative Society came to be dismissed by the trial Court
against which Regular Civil Appeal bearing No.225/2019 is pending
before the Distinct Court, Nagpur.
8. In the Criminal Revision filed by the respondent No.2
the District Judge-4 passed an order thereby quashing the order of
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and directing the respondent No.2
to investigate the offences as per the provisions of Section 156(3) of
the Criminal Procedure Code. Thus, the First Information Report
bearing No.70/2021 is filed for offences punishable under various
sections mentioned above. It is this First Information Report which
is challenged in the present application along with charge-sheet
which is filed in consequence to the completion of investigation.
9. We have heard Mr. Ritesh Bade, learned counsel for
the applicant, Mr. M.J. Khan, learned Additional Public Prosecutor
for the non-applicant No.1 and Mr. Uday Gosavi, learned counsel
for the non-applicant No.2.
10. Mr. Bade, learned counsel for the applicant submits
that perusal of the First Information Report would show that
occurrence of the offences is shown from 10.1.1992 to 10.1.1998.
Thus, the First Information Report lodged on 10.2.2021 is highly
belated and, therefore, liable to be quashed. He further submits
that the litigation between the parties is a civil litigation which has
been intentionally given colour of criminality. He, therefore,
submits that the First Information Report and the consequent
charge-sheet is nothing but abuse of process of Court and,
therefore, liable to be quashed.
11. Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for
non-applicant No.1 while vehemently opposing the contentions
advanced by the learned counsel for the applicants submits that
even though there may be some civil straits in the dispute between
the non-applicant No.2 and the applicants, if a meaningful reading
of the First Information Report in question and the consequent
charge-sheet give rise to an offence punishable under the Indian
Penal Code, the charge-sheet need not be quashed.
12. Mr. Uday Gosavi, learned counsel for the non-applicant
No.2 while supporting the contentions advanced by the learned
Additional Public Prosecutor submits that only because there is
some element of civil dispute, cannot be a reason to quash the
entire charge-sheet. He further submits that no prejudice of
whatsoever nature would be caused if the matter is investigated as
directed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class. He further submits
that the delay itself cannot be a ground to reject a legitimately
launched criminal prosecution.
13. By taking us through judgment in civil suit of Gandhi
Nagar Co-operative Housing Society Shri Gosavi submits that in the
said judgment certain sale-deeds executed by applicants have been
declared null and void. He further submits that the order of Urban
land Ceiling Authority is without hearing the non-applicant No.2. It
is his submission that the delay caused in lodging the First
Information Report is due to the fact of obtaining relevant
documents for lodging the First Information Report.
14. We have carefully perused the contentions advanced by
the learned counsels for the respective parties as also the record of
the matter. As can be seen from the First Information Report, the
crux of the matter lies in the sale-deed executed by one Manav Seva
Co-operative Housing Society showing its registration number as
NGP/SHG/719/70. The said sale-deed is executed in favour of
Manav Seva Co-operative Housing Society through its President
Mr. Balkrushna Vitthalrao Bhatkar by family members of the
applicants. As can be seen from the documents regarding liquidator
being appointed, the same is not disputed. It is, therefore, clear
that the said Manav Seva Co-operative Housing Society had no
authority or right to use registration number mentioned above
which belonged to one Medical Teachers Co-operative Housing
Society. It is, therefore, clear that it is the said Manav Seva Co-
operative Housing Society which by playing fraud upon the family
of the applicants have executed the sale-deed in question.
15. It can further be seen from the documents filed on
record that vide order dated 25.10.1988 the competent authority
under the Urban Land Ceiling Act declared the sale-deed dated
14.10.1982 as null and void which order was confirmed by the
Collector on 20th June, 1991. The other civil litigation between the
parties is also matter of record. In that view of the matter, the
non-applicant No.2 had no cause to file a complaint before the
Magistrate leading to lodging of the impugned First Information
Report in question.
16. The allegations in the First Information Report in
nutshell is that even though the family of the applicants sold the
property to said Manav Seva Co-operative Housing Society, the said
family of the applicants subsequently and without having any title
over the said property has sold the same again to various persons.
However, as stated supra the sale-deed in question was declared
null and void by the competent authority and thereafter by the
Collector.
17. On a deeper perusal of the record in the light of the
averments made by the counsels, even though it is submitted that
the order of ULC Authority was not available as per the information
supplied under the Right to Information Act, it would not deter us
from observing that the said order is already placed on record by
the applicants in which it is clearly observed that the sale-deed in
question is declared null and void. As far as the contention of the
learned counsel for the non-applicant No.2 is concerned, regarding
non-issuance of notice, before declaring the sale-deed as null and
void is concerned, the same is not a subject matter before us.
Furthermore, except for a bare averments that the applicants with
an intention to grab the land of the Society, they entered into a
conspiracy to initiate the proceeding under the ULC Act, nothing
has been placed on record.
18. Learned counsel for the respondent No.2 has raised a
ground that since the predecessor-in-title of the applicants have
accepted the sale consideration from the Society and executed a
sale-deed, the applicants are now prohibited from challenging the
status, is also unfounded and does not impress us since the
applicants are not challenging the status of the non-applicant No.2
as sale-deeds have been declared void by operation of law. The
same reasoning would apply to answer the contentions advanced by
the learned counsel for the respondent No.2 regarding absence of
challenge to the sale-deed executed in favour of non-applicant
No.2. A further contention of the non-applicant No.2 that the
applicants have never explained in their pleading as to how and
why they have fraudulently re-sold the property in favour of various
entities is not a question which would be germane while deciding
the present application as the inquiry in the present matter is
confined to a prima facie case being made out against the
applicants.
19. As we have already observed that there is no material
particulars regarding applicants acting in collusion with the ULC
Authority. Furthermore, there are no details or material particulars
as required in law to explain the delay caused in lodging the F.I.R.
True, it is that delay by itself cannot be a ground to quash the
F.I.R., however, inordinate and unexplained delay can be an aspect
which would be considered while appreciating rival contentions.
20. Thus, the allegations in the First Information Report
and the sale-deed do not make out any offence since the sale-deed
is already declared null and void. No incriminating material has
been placed on record that the applicants acted in collusion with
the authority except for the bare averments in the First Information
Report. Furthermore, there is no material placed on record that
some documents were forged leading to committing of offence
punishable under Sections 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code.
It seems that the Society i.e. Manav Seva Co-operative Housing
Society Limited has various disputes inter-se amongst its Executive
Committee/Members which has led to filing of the First Information
Report.
21. Furthermore, there is no explanation regarding the
huge delay since even according to the First Information Report the
alleged offences have occurred from 1992 to 1998. Thus, the First
Information Report lodged on 10.2.2021 is highly belated doubting
the veracity of the same. It seems that the non-applicant No.2 is
raking up old matters which have attained finality. A beneficial
reference in this regard can be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Hasmukhlal D. Vora and another Vs.
Stae of Tamil Nadu.
"22. There has been a gap of more than four years
between the initial investigation and the filing of the
complaint, and even after lapse of substantial amount
of time, no evidence has been provided to sustain the
claims in the complaint. As held by this Court in Bijoy
Singh and another Vs. State of Bihar, inordinate delay,
if not reasonably explained, can be fatal to the case of
the prosecution. The relevant extract from the
judgment is extracted below :
"...........Delay wherever found is
required to be explained by the prosecution.
If the delay is reasonably explained, no
adverse inference can be drawn, but failure
to explain the delay would require the Court
to minutely examine the prosecution version
for ensuring itself as to whether any
innocent person has been implicated in the
crime or not. Insisting upon the accused to
seek an explanation of the delay is not the
requirement of law. It is always for the
prosecution to explain such a delay and if
reasonable, plausible and sufficient
explanation is tendered, no adverse
inference can be drawn against it."
23. In the present case, the Respondent has provided
no explanation for the extraordinary delay of more
than four years between the initial site inspection, the
show cause notice, and the complaint. In fact, the
absence of such an explanation only prompts the Court
to infer some sinister motive behind initiating the
criminal proceedings.
24. While inordinate delay in itself may not be ground
for quashing of a criminal complaint, in such cases,
unexplained inordinate delay of such length must be
taken into consideration as a very crucial factor as
grounds for quashing a criminal complaint."
22. As stated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court for attracting
the offence punishable under Section 406 what is a condition
precedent is that there should be 'entrustment'. In the landmark
decision in the case of State of Gujarat Vs. Jaswantlal Nathalal,
reported in (1968) 2 SCR 408, it is stated as under :
"The term "entrusted" found in Section 405 IPC
governs not only the words "with the property"
immediately following it but also the words "or with
any dominion over the property" occurring thereafter-
see Velji Raghvaji Patel Vs. State of Maharashtra,
[(1965) 2 S.C.R. 429]. Before there can be any
entrustment there must be a trust meaning thereby an
obligation annexed to the ownership of property and a
confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner or
declared and accepted by him for the benefit of
another or of another and the owner. But that does
not mean that such an entrustment need conform to
all the technicalities of the law of trust - see
Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney Vs. State of Bombay
[1956 SCR 483, 498500]. The expression
'entrustment' carries with it the implication that the
person handing over any property or on whose behalf
that properly is handed over to another, continues to
be its owner. Further the person handing over the
property must have confidence in the person taking
the property so as to create a fiduciary relationship
between them. A mere transaction of sale cannot
amount to an entrustment. It is true that the
government had sold the cement in question to BSS
solely for the purpose of being used in connection with
the construction work referred to earlier. But that
circumstance does not make the transaction in
question anything other than a sale. After delivery of
the cement, the Government had neither any right nor
dominion over it. If the purchaser or his representative
had failed to comply with the requirements of any law
relating to cement control, he should have been
prosecuted for the same. But we are unable to hold
that there was any breach of trust."
23. Furthermore, in the case of Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani
Vs. State of Uttar Praesh and another, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 1947, in para 20 the Supreme Court has stated as under :
The following steps should ordinarily determine
the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an
accused by invoking the power vested in the High
Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:-
(i)Step one, whether the material relied upon by
the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e.,
the materials is of sterling and impeccable quality?
(ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon
by the accused, would rule out the assertions
contained in the charges levelled against the accused,
i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the
factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the
material is such, as would persuade a reasonable
person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the
accusations as false.
(iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon
by the accused, has not been refuted by
the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is
such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the
prosecution/complainant?
(iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial
would result in an abuse of process of the court, and
would not serve the ends of justice?
If the answer to all the steps is in the
affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court
should persuade it to quash such criminal -
proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power,
besides doing justice to the accused, would save
precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted
in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising
therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same
would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.
[(See : Thapar vs. Madan lal Kapoor (Criminal Appeal
No.174 of 2013)]
24. If the allegations in the First Information Report and
the consequent charge-sheet filed on record is tested on the
touchstone of the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
re-produced supra, we are of the considered opinion that the First
Information Report and the material collected by the prosecution
falls hopelessly short of the requirement laid down in the said
judgments. It is, therefor, clear that continuance of criminal
proceedings against the applicants would be an abuse of process of
law and would cause serious injustice to them. The situation
would, therefore, fall squarely within the parameters of the State of
Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, reported in AIR
1992 SC 604,
1. Where the allegations made in the First
Information Report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima-facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.
3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there
is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge."
25. As far as the order dated 2.1.2021 passed by the
Special Judge, Special Court in Criminal Revision No.369/2018 is
concerned, the same is totally unreasoned are. The Sessions Court
ought to have examined the facts of the case and could not have
mechanically passed the order leading to lodging of F.I.R.
26. We, therefore, pass the following order :
ORDER
(i) The application is allowed.
(ii) The First Information Report dated 10.2.2021,
registered by the respondent No.1, in Crime No.70/2021, for the
offences punishable under Sections 107, 109, 166, 217, 218, 406,
420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and the Charge-
sheet bearing No.256/2025 along with the proceeding in Regular
Criminal Case No.4958/2025 is quashed and set aside to the extent
of the applicants, namely, (1) Prakash S/o. Manikrao Dhawale, (2)
Madhav S/o. Manikrao Dhawale, (3) Suresh S/o Manikrao Dhawale,
(4) Vilas S/o. Manikrao Dhawale (5) Shantabai Wd/o. Marotrao
Dhawale, (6) Vasudeo S/o Marotrao Dhawale, (7) Sushila W/o.
Ramkrishna Bhoyar, (8) Anusaya W/o. Vithobaji Lambat, (9) Lata
W/o. Vijay Mankar, (10) Hemlata W/o. Arun Chaure, (11) Vijay S/o
Bala Dhawale, (12) Sunil S/o Bala Dhawale, (13) Anil S/o Bala
Dhawale and (14) Sanjay S/o Bala Dhawale,
(iii) Likewise, the Judgment and order dated
2.1.2021, passed by the District Judge-4, Nagpur in Criminal
Revision Application No.369/2008 leading to registration of the
First Information Report No.70/2021 is also quashed and set aside.
(iv) The application is disposed of in above terms.
(v) No order as to costs.
(Nandesh S. Deshpande, J.) (Urmila Joshi-Phalke, J.)
wadode
Signed by: Mr. Devendra Wadode
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 16/12/2025 12:49:21
