Bombay High Court
Laxman Padam Giri vs The State Of Maharashtra And Anr. on 26 August, 2025
2025:BHC-AS:36595-DB
P.H. JAYANI 905 APEAL472.2021.DOC
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 472 OF 2021
Laxman Padam Giri
Age : 68 years,
R/at : Sahyadri Nagar, (A), near Tower
Vashinaka, Chembur, Mumbai - 74.
(At present serving the sentence of
Rigorous imprisonment at Yerwada Jail) ...Appellant
(Orig. Accused)
Versus
1. The State of Maharashtra,
Through R.C.F. Police Station,
District Mumbai
2. X Y Z
Age : 34, R/at : Sahyadri Nagar, (A),
near Tower Vashinaka, Chembur, Mumbai-74 ...Respondents
Mr. Abhijeet P. Rane, Appointed Advocate a/w.
Ms. Swarta Suryawanshi for the Appellant.
Ms. Kranti Hivrale, APP for the Respondent - State.
Ms. Shraddha Sawant (through VC) appointed Advocate
for Respondent No.2.
CORAM : SUMAN SHYAM &
SHYAM C. CHANDAK, JJ.
RESERVED ON : 14th AUGUST, 2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 26th AUGUST, 2025
JUDGMENT :
(PER : SHYAM C. CHANDAK, J.)
. Present Appeal filed under Section 374 (2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code ("Cr.P.C.") assailed the impugned Judgment and
Order dated 27/03/2019, in POCSO Special Case No.232 of 2017,
passed by the Court of the learned Special Judge under P.O.C.S.O.
Act, Gr. Bombay. Thereby, the Appellant ("the Accused") was
convicted for the commission of an offence of Section 376 (2) of
th
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the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ("IPC") and Section 6 of the
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 ("the Act").
Under Section 6 of the Act, the trial Court sentenced the Accused
to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.6,000/- in
default to suffer simple imprisonment for 30 days. However, in
view of Section 42 of the Act, no separate sentence was imposed
on the Accused for the offence of Section 376 (2) of IPC.
2. Heard Mr. Rane, the learned appointed counsel appearing
for the Appellant, Ms. Hivrale, the learned APP appearing for
Respondent No.1-State and Ms. Sawant, the learned appointed
Advocate appearing for Respondent No.2. Perused the record.
3. The prosecution case was that, the Accused is the husband
of the informant (P.W.1), who got married with the Accused in the
year 2005 and she is his fifth wife. At the time of the incident, the
Accused, P.W.1 and their 3 sons and 1 daughter ("the victim") used
to reside at XYZ place, Vashi Naka. The victim was a baby, just 9
months old. The accused was habituated to consuming alcohol,
which often led to frequent altercations between him and his
spouse. After the birth of the victim, the accused frequently
quarrelled with P.W.1 and used to exert pressure upon her to sell
the victim. On the night of 18/01/2017, the victim was sleeping
between P.W.1 and the Accused. At around 02:00 am, P.W.1 heard
the cries of the victim due to which she woke up and saw that the
Accused was inserting his finger into the genital of the victim.
P.W.1 promptly questioned the Accused about the alleged abuse of
the victim. In response, P.W.1 was assaulted by the Accused, who
also threatened to harm her. This caused the other children to
wake up and start crying. Upon daybreak, P.W.1 informed the
matter to her sister-in-law (P.W.3 - brother's wife) residing in the
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vicinity. The latter warned the Accused that the incident would be
reported to police. Therefore, the Accused ran away. But, P.W.1
did not report the incident to police, treating it as a family dispute.
4. Thereafter, the victim did not urinate. This raised a concern.
Hence, P.W.1 took the victim to a medical practitioner in the
vicinity. However, being scared, P.W.1 merely told him that the
victim was unable to pass urine. The said practitioner medically
treated the victim, accordingly. However, the victim's condition
remained unchanged. So, on 23/01/2017, P.W.1 took the victim to
the same medical practitioner. This time, he advised P.W.1 to take
the victim to Sion Hospital, which she did. In Sion Hospital, the
medical officer advised for sonography. But, for want of money,
P.W.1 brought the victim back home, without treatment.
5. On 31/01/2017, P.W.1 saw the Accused at MHADA Colony.
Immediately, P.W.1 went to the Accused, told him the victim's
plight and forcing him, bought the victim to Shatabdi Hospital.
There, the medical officer examined the victim and admitted her.
During treatment, the medical officer repeatedly questioned P.W.1
about the victim's inability to urinate and her difficulty in doing
so. Further, P.W.1 was sent to a Dilasa Center. There, P.W.1 was
given confidence. As a result, she divulged the incident. Thus,
ultimately, the hospital authority informed the incident to police.
6. In turn, WPSI Ashwini Khambe (P.W.5) went there and
recorded the Statement-cum-Report (Exh.12) of P.W.1. Therein
she narrated the incident as aforestated. Said Report was
registered by P.W.5 at R.C.F. Police Station Mumbai, bearing CR
No. 31/2017, under Sections 376 (2) ( f), 323 and 506 of IPC and
Sections 6 and 10 of the Act, against the Accused. During
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investigation, P.W.5 recorded the Spot Panchanama, statements of
the witnesses and obtained the statement of P.W.1 recorded under
Section 164 of Cr.P.C.. On completion of investigation, P.W.5
submitted the charge-sheet for the said offences.
7. The trial Court framed the charge under Section 376 (2) of
IPC and Section 6 of the Act to which the Accused pleaded not
guilty and claimed trial.
8. During the trial, the prosecution examined the aforesaid
witnesses including PW-2 Dr. Siddhi Kore, the Medical Consultant
at Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya Centenary Hospital (Shatabdi
Hospital), Govandi and PW-4 Pramod Ingale, the spot pancha.
9. On closure of the prosecution evidence, the trial Court
questioned the Accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein he
denied the incriminating evidence and circumstances. Defence of
the Accused was of denial and false implication. In his statement
under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the Accused has stated that P.W.1 is his
second wife. He married her as his first wife had expired. He has
property worth Rs.50 Lakhs. P.W.1 and her relatives wanted the
Accused to transfer that property in the name of P.W.1. He had
stated that, the fidelity of P.W.1 was doubtful. Therefore, she used
to fight with him. Ultimately, P.W.1 filed the said FIR to make the
wrongful gain and to leave him, after getting his property.
Although the Accused stated that he wanted to examine himself on
oath, he did not. Nor did he examine any witness in his defence.
10. On evaluating the prosecution evidence, the learned Judge
of the trial Court held the Accused guilty of the charges. Therefore,
convicted and sentenced him as noted above.
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11. We have gone through the evidence on record with the help
of the learned Counsel for the Accused and the learned APP.
12. With reference to the incident, P.W.1 deposed that after the
birth of the victim, the behaviour of the Accused was changed. The
Accused used to tell her that he did not want the victim and used
to insist on her, to sell the victim. On the relevant night, the victim
slept between her and the Accused. Suddenly, the victim cried.
Therefore, she woke up. At that juncture, she saw that the Accused
was inserting his finger into the genital of the victim. P.W.1
deposed that then the Accused threatened her that if she disclosed
the incident to anyone, he would kill her and he also beat her.
Therefore, the other children cried. P.W.1 deposed that after dawn,
she narrated the incident to P.W.3. in turn, P.W.3 scolded the
Accused, but, he fled away.
P.W.1 deposed that, on that day, she did not go to the Police
Station but she went to Ayodhya Hospital, at Vashi Naka. There,
she was advised to take the victim to the Sion Hospital. In Sion
Hospital, a Medical Officer suggested for sonography, but she had
no money. However, the victim was not peeing. P.W.1 deposed
that, after 10 days, she spotted the Accused as above. She
forcefully brought the Accused to Shatabdi Hospital and there, she
admitted the victim. P.W.1 deposed that, the Accused had warned
her not to disclose the incident to anyone. The Accused had also
snatched the medical papers from her. But the Doctor present
there took back the papers from the Accused and read it. P.W.1
deposed that then the police came to the hospital and recorded her
Report (Exh.12) as per her narration. It bears her signature. Its
contents are true and correct. P.W.1 deposed that P.W.3 showed
the spot of the incident to police. P.W.1 deposed that, her
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statement (Exh.13, u/Sec.164 Cr.p.C.) was recorded by the learned
Magistrate in the Kurla Court. P.W.1 deposed that the victim was
inpatient for 07 days.
13. P.W.3 is the sister-in-law of P.W.1. In her supporting role,
P.W.3 has deposed that on the relevant date, at about 10:00 am,
P.W.1 had told her that the Accused had committed the aforesaid
act with the victim. Further, P.W.1 had told her that she would
take the victim to Shatabdi Hospital. P.W.3 has deposed that they
shouted on the Accused and therefore, he ran away. P.W.3 has
deposed that police recorded her statement.
14. Admittedly, there is delay in filing the Report (Exh.12). As
indicated by the testimony of P.W.1, often, there used to be
quarrels between P.W.1 and the Accused. The victim of the crime
was the infant, who was unable to realise what had happened to
her and tell it. The defence of the Accused was of false implication.
Therefore, the medical evidence assumes significance and it is
expected to be of sterling quality.
15. In order to meet that expectation of the Court, P.W.2 Dr.
Kore has deposed that she has done M.D., D.G.O. At the relevant
time, she was working as the Medical Consultant, at the Shatabdi
Hospital. The victim was admitted in that hospital on 31/01/2017,
at about 12:12 p.m. P.W.2 has deposed that on 02/02/2017, she
was called at the hospital as the victim had the history of sexual
assault by the Accused, two weeks back. At about 02:50 pm, she
went there. At that time, P.W.1 told her about the aforesaid
incident and therefore, the victim had suffered urethral bleeding.
P.W.2 has deposed that, on examination of the victim, her general
condition was normal and the vitals were stable. The victim was
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discharged on 06/02/2017. She has deposed that abrasion, small
mucosal erosion cannot be detected after 15 days and there may be
possibility of slight penetration in the vagina. Tearing of hymen is
dependent on the extent of penetration. Slight penetration was
possible even without injury as the victim was only 09 months old.
Further, P.W.2 referred the medical treatment papers of the victim
(Exh.16 colly) and proved its contents including her signature.
16. P.W.4, the Spot panch has deposed that P.W.1 had showed
the spot of the incident which was in the house of the Accused and
P.W.1. There, P.W.5 recorded the Spot Panchanama (Exh.19) in
the presence of the panchas. Its contents are correct and true.
17. P.W.5 - WPSI Khambe, Investigating Officer has testified
about the steps she had taken right from recording of the Report
(Exh.12) by going to the hospital, registration of the crime, arrest
of the Accused, drawing of the Spot Panchnama, recording
statement of the witnesses etc. In her cross-examination, an
attempt was made to present that the prosecution case is false.
18. This, in a nutshell, is the evidence against the accused.
However, according to Mr Rane, the learned Appointed Counsel,
said evidence is not sufficient, cogent and reliable to hold the
Accused guilty of Section 376 (2) of IPC and section 6 of the Act.
Relying upon the decision in Dinesh Jaiswal Vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh1, Mr Rane submitted that when the story of the
prosecution does not inspire confidence, conviction for the offence
of rape cannot be sustained.
1. (2010) 3 SCC 232.
th
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19. In reply, Ms. Hivrale, the learned APP vociferously
submitted that, the testimony of P.W.1 is supported with her
Report (Exh.12) and by P.W.3. Further, P.W.1's testimony has the
requisite support of the testimony of P.W.2 and the medical
papers (Exh.16 colly), which cumulatively proved that the victim
had sustained significant injury to her genital because of the weird
act of the accused and she could not urinate. She submits that said
act is an offence punishable under Section 376 (2) of IPC and
Section 6 of the Act. As such, the presumption under Section 29 of
the Act is available in this case. Thus, in short, according to the
learned APP, this Appeal has no merit at all.
20. These submissions have been adopted by Ms Sawant, the
learned Appointed Counsel appearing for Respondent No.2.
21. Lastly, Ms Hivrale and Ms Sawant have cited the following
reported decisions to buttress their submission that since the
testimony of PW-1 is trustworthy, unblemished and credible, she
has been a sterling witness.
(1) Rai Sandeep Alias Deepu Vs. State (NCT of Delhi)2,
(2) Phool Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh3.
22. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the said
submissions made by Mr Rane and Ms Hivrale and evaluated the
prosecution evidence in the light of their submissions. On such an
exercise, what we have found is, the testimony of P.W.1 is of
sterling quality. Her testimony is consistent with the testimonies
of P.W.3 and P.W.5. Their testimonies are corroborated with
2. (2012) 8 SCC 21.
3. (2022) 2 SCC 74.
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P.W.1's Report (Exh.12). Nothing significant has emerged in their
cross-examination to discard their testimonies.
23. Additionally, we have noticed that the post incident conduct
of both P.W.1 and P.W.3 was very natural. Because, as soon as
P.W.1 saw the Accused interfering with the genitals of the victim,
she questioned him, but she was responded with a threat as well as
beating from the Accused, because he did not want his illegal act
to travel to the ears of others through P.W.1. Consequently, her
other children had cried, which was quite normal. Next what has
impressed us is, immediately after the dawn, P.W.1 informed the
incident to P.W.3, who, scolded the Accused and warned him of
reporting the incident to the police. But, the Accused fled away.
This conduct leads to an inference that since the Accused had
committed the wrong with the victim, first, he had beaten the
P.W.1 because she questioned him and secondly, he fled away with
the fear of the police action of which P.W.3 had warned him.
24. Another circumstance that warrants attention is the medical
evidence, as it provides a level of certainty that exceeds what is
ordinarily expected in cases of this nature. Because, the evidence
of P.W.2 coupled with the medical papers (Exh.16) clearly show
that the urinary bladder of the victim was partially distended. This
finding has surfaced after 2 weeks had passed over the incident.
Therefore, it can be easily imagined what could be the finding had
the victim been examined in the correct perspective soon after the
incident. Meaning, there was certainly an injury to the victim's
genitals due to the fingering, and therefore, she had cried, which
caused P.W.1 to immediately woke up at an odd time in the night.
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25. Needless to state that, a distended bladder is when the
pouch that holds urine, stretches out to hold more fluid. It
happens when one is not peeing enough or at all (urinary
retention). Blockages, infections, surgery or an enlarged prostate
can lead to a distended bladder. It was not the defence of the
Accused that before 18/01/2017, the victim was ever medically
treated for the complaint of 'unable to urinate'. As such, there was
no reason for the victim to suddenly develop the said medical
condition. In fact, the evidence of P.W.1 clearly states that the
victim developed the problem of not peeing since the morning of
18/01/2017, i.e., immediately after the incident which had
occurred at 02:00 am of 18/01/2017. Secondly, if there was no
distended bladder, there was no need to keep the victim as an
inpatient for a week's time. Thus, the medical evidence has
supported the deposition of P.W.1.
26. The first limb of the submissions of Mr Rane relates to the
delay in filing the Report (Exh.12). Raising the delay issue, Mr
Rane submitted that often there used to be quarrels between the
P.W.1 and the Accused. P.W.1 has admitted that there was dispute
between her and the Accused as the latter was addicted to liquor.
According to P.W.1, there was considerable change in the conduct
of the Accused post the birth of the victim and even he wanted that
P.W.1, i.e., the mother should sell her own child, the victim.
However, P.W.1 did not file the Report promptly.
Pointing at the admission by P.W.1 that she was pregnant on
the date of her deposition, Mr Rane submitted that there were
trust issues between the couple. P.W.1 has admitted that except
doing signature, she does not know reading and writing. She has
admitted that she does not know what was written in the Report
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(Exh.12). She has admitted that police told her to sign on the said
Report in the hospital, therefore, she had signed it. Mr Rane urged
that P.W.3 is an interested witnesses. At the same time, the
medical evidence is not supportive. As such, there was a possibility
of filing a false Report (Exh.12) by P.W.1 just to get rid of the
quarrels with the Accused. Thus, according to Mr Rane there is a
reasonable doubt about the truthfulness of the prosecution case.
27. However, looking at the facts and circumstances of the case,
in our opinion, the aforesaid submissions will not be sufficient to
take an exception in this case and acquit the Accused. In this
regard, at the first place, we have noticed that P.W.1 has been
married to the Accused for more than 10 years, during which she
got four children from him. However, at no point of time did she
complain about the Accused, not even to her relatives, let alone
the police. Therefore, P.W.1 had no apparent reason to suddenly
file a false Report (Exh.12), alleging the offence of sexual assault
on the victim by her own husband, the Accused.
28. Secondly, P.W.1 and the Accused are husband-wife.
Immediately after the incident, the Accused not only threatened
P.W.1 to harm her but had also beat her. As such said conduct of
the Accused must have created sufficient fear in her mind. In this
background, it was natural that P.W.1 would suppress the incident
treating it as a family matter, although unwillingly. Thirdly, from
the evidence it appears that P.W.1's poverty also proved to be an
obstacle in promptly reporting the incident to the police. Because
she was aware that, looking at the gravity of the offence, soon after
filing of the Report, police will arrest the Accused and he will be
behind bars. This situation was certainly unfavourable to P.W.1
because, being a rag picker, alone she was not able to maintain the
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four children without the support of the Accused. Thus, the delay
in filing the Report (Exh.12) is of no avail to the Accused.
29. The law on the aspect of delay in lodging the FIR in such
cases is no more res integra and by a catena of decisions, it has
been held that if delay has been properly explained, then there
should not be any reason to suspect any embellishment or
afterthought. In sexual offences delay in lodging of the FIR can be
due to variety of reasons, particularly the reluctance of the
prosecutrix or her family members to go to the police and
complain about the incident which concerns the reputation of the
prosecutrix and the honour of her family.
In the case of Amar Singh Vs. Balwinder Singh and others4,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed and held that, "... There
is no hard-and-fast rule that any delay in lodging the FIR would
automatically render the prosecution case doubtful. It necessarily
depends upon facts and circumstances of each case whether there
has been any such delay in lodging the FIR which may cast doubt
about the veracity of the prosecution case and for this a host of
circumstances like the condition of the first informant, the nature
of injuries sustained, the number of victims, the efforts made to
provide medical aid to them, the distance of the hospital and the
police station, etc. have to be taken into consideration. There is no
mathematical formula by which an inference may be drawn either
way merely on account of delay in lodging of the FIR. ..."
30. In the case of Ravinder Kumar and another Vs. State of
Punjab5, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 13 has observed
that, "The attack on prosecution cases on the ground of delay in
4. (2003) 2 SCC 518.
5. (2001) 7 SCC 690.
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lodging FIR has almost bogged down as a stereotyped redundancy
in criminal cases. It is a recurring feature in most of the criminal
cases that there would be some delay in furnishing the first
information to the police. It has to be remembered that law has
not fixed any time for lodging the FIR. Hence a delayed FIR is not
illegal. Of course, a prompt and immediate lodging of the FIR is
the ideal as that would give the prosecution a twin advantage. First
is that it affords commencement of the investigation without any
time lapse. Second is that it expels the opportunity for any
possible concoction of a false version. Barring these two plus
points for a promptly lodged FIR the demerits of the delayed FIR
cannot operate as fatal to any prosecution case. It cannot be
overlooked that even a promptly lodged FIR is not an unreserved
guarantee for the genuineness of the version incorporated
therein."
In paragraph 14 and 15, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
observed that, "When there is a criticism on the ground that FIR
in a case was delayed the Court has to look at the reason why there
was such a delay. There can be a variety of genuine causes for FIR
lodgment to get delayed. ..." "... the stale demand made in the
criminal courts to treat the FIR vitiated, merely on the ground of
delay in its lodgment cannot be approved as a legal corollary. In
any case, where there is delay in making the FIR, the Court is to
look at the causes for it and if such causes are not attributable to
any effort to concoct a version no consequence shall be attached to
the mere delay in lodging the FIR."
31. As another limb of his submissions, Mr Rane, the learned
Counsel has attacked the medical evidence claiming it as deficient
to support the charge as well as the testimonies of the witness. In
this regard, he has insisted this Court to consider that immediately
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after the incident, P.W.1 had not noted some visible injury to the
genitals of the victim which was attributable to the alleged sexual
assault. He has pointed that the medical papers of the medical
treatment which P.W.1 had availed first, were not produced. In
addition, Mr Rane highlighted that, on 31/01/2017 the victim was
medically treated but only for the complaint of cough, cold and
fever. As admitted by P.W.2, her opinion above, i.e., "small
abrasion, small mucosal erosion cannot be detected after 15 days.
There may be slight penetration in vagina. Tearing of hymen is
dependent on extend of penetration", is not incorporated in the
medical papers (Exh.16 colly).
However, in our view, the aforesaid circumstances are not
sufficient to wash away or ignore the proved fact that the bladder
of the victim was found partially distended even after two weeks of
the incident, which was obviously serious. Secondly, the assertion
of P.W.1 that since the morning of 18/01/2017 the victim was
unable to pass urine, has remained unshaken. If really the victim
had not suffered that medical condition, P.W.1 had no reason to go
from one hospital to another. Similarly, the treating medical
officer would not have kept the victim as an inpatient for a week's
time, just to depose false against the Accused.
32. The Accused has failed to rebut the presumption under
Section 29 of the Act. The Accused has not produced on record the
details of the property, which, according to him, P.W.1 and her
relatives wanted him to part with and get it transferred in the
name of P.W.1. As such, there is no scope to think of his defence.
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33. In view of the above discussion, the trial Court has rightly
held that on the relevant night, the Accused inserted his finger in
the genitals of the victim and it caused her unable to urinate.
34. In the IPC, "Hurt" is defined in Section 319 as causing bodily
pain, disease, or infirmity to any person. It essentially means
inflicting physical discomfort, illness, or a state of weakness upon
another individual. This can include anything from a simple punch
causing pain to a disease or a temporary inability to function
normally. Similarly, "Injury' is defined under Section 44 of IPC as
any harm illegally caused to a person in body, mind, reputation, or
property. This definition is broad and encompasses various forms
of harm, including physical injury, mental distress etc.
35. Section 375 (b) of IPC provides that, "A man is said to
commit "rape" if he--inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of
the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus
of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person;".
Clause (f) and (i) of Section 376 (2) IPC provide that:- "Whoever,
-- (f) being a relative, guardian or teacher of, or a person in a
position of trust or authority towards the woman, commits rape on
such woman; or (i) commits rape, on a woman when she is under
sixteen years of age (before amendment w.e.f. 21/04/2018); shall
be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall
not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment
for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that
person's natural life, and shall also be liable to fine.
As provided in Section 3 ( b) of the Act, "A person is said to
commit "penetrative sexual assault" if--he inserts, to any extent,
any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the
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vagina, the urethra or anus of the child or makes the child to do so
with him or any other person;". Clauses (i), (m) and (n) of Section
5 of the Act provide that:- "(i) whoever commits penetrative sexual
assault causing grievous hurt or causing bodily harm and injury or
injury to the sexual organs of the child;" or (m) whoever commits
penetrative sexual assault on a child below twelve years; or (n)
whoever being a relative of the child through blood or adoption or
marriage or guardianship or in foster care or having a domestic
relationship with a parent of the child or who is living in the same
or shared household with the child, commits penetrative sexual
assault on such child;", is said to commit aggravated penetrative
assault. This act is punishable under Section 6 of the Act.
36. In the case in hand the urinary bladder of the victim was
partially distended due to insertion of finger in her genitals by the
Accused. Ultimately, the victim's body suffered the temporary
inability to function normally to let her urinate on time. Thus, said
penetrative act caused both bodily harm and injury and also an
injury to the sexual organ of the victim. The Accused is biological
father/natural guardian of the victim and she was in his joint
custody. As such the said act of the Accused was punishable under
Section 376 (2) (f) (i) of IPC and Section 6 of the Act. As a result,
the conviction of the Accused for the said offences is justifiable.
37. Now dealing with the quantum of the sentence. Before the
amendment, the said offence of Section 6 was punishable with
rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten
years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also
be liable to fine. After the amendment, i.e., w.e.f. 16/08/2019, said
offence is punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to
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imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the
remainder of natural life of that person, and shall also be liable to
fine, or with death.
In the cross-examination, P.W.1. has stated that the Accused
may be released because she is not able to cope up with the
financial difficulties due to the poverty. Further, she has
voluntarily requested the trial Court to release the Accused
because there is no one to maintain her children and even she had
no money to pay the room rent. P.W.1 and the Accused were rag
picking to earn their livelihood. We have found substance in this
evidence, because after the arrest of the Accused, P.W.1 alone
must be looking after the children. In the facts, we deem it
appropriate to sentence the Accused to suffer minimum
imprisonment as provided for the offence of Section 6, prior to its
amendment.
38. The conspectus of the above discussion is that, there is no
infirmity in the impugned Judgment and Order of the conviction
recorded against the Accused under Section 376 (2) of IPC and
Section 6 of the Act as the same having based on appreciating the
evidence on record in its correct perspective leading to the logical
conclusions. However, looking at the injury suffered by the victim,
the evidence of P.W.1 related to the need of early release of the
Accused and her post incident financial condition, the impugned
sentence handed over to the Accused is excessive and, in the facts,
it should be the minimum as it was then prescribed and we have
noted above. In the result, the Appeal partly succeeds.
39. Hence, we proceed to pass the following Order :-
1) Criminal Appeal No.472 of 2021 is partly allowed.
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2) The impugned Judgment and Order of conviction
27/03/2019, in POCSO Special Case No.232 of 2017,
passed by the Court of the learned Special Judge under
P.O.C.S.O. Act, Gr. Bombay, against the Appellant for
the offences punishable under Section 376 (2) of IPC
and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual
Offences Act, 2012 is upheld.
3) The impugned sentence imposed on the Accused under
Section 6 of the POCSO Act to suffer imprisonment for
life and to pay fine of Rs.6,000/- in default to suffer
simple imprisonment for 30 days, is quashed and set
aside.
4) Instead, the Appellant Laxman Padam Giri is sentenced
under Section 6 of the POCSO Act to suffer rigorous
imprisonment for a period of 10 years and to pay fine of
Rs.500/- in default of payment of fine to undergo simple
imprisonment for 15 days.
5) As directed by the trial Court, in view of Rule 9 (2) of the
POCSO Rules 2020, the State Government to award
compensation to the victim as survivor of the
penetrative sexual assault, if not provided.
6) Legal Aid fees be paid to the Appointed Advocate.
7) The Appeal is disposed of.
PREETI (SHYAM C. CHANDAK, J.) (SUMAN SHYAM, J.)
HEERO
JAYANI
26th August 2025
