Bombay High Court
Madhukar Ragho Hadage And Ors vs Deputy Collector (Acquisition) And Ors on 11 January, 2024
Author: B. P. Colabawalla
Bench: B. P. Colabawalla, M.M. Sathaye
2024:BHC-AS:1457-DB
wp.11513.2015.docx
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.11513 OF 2015
Vitthal Rama Pawar (Katkari) & Ors. .. Petitioners
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad-Alibag and Others .. Respondents
WITH
UTKARSH INTERIM APPLICATION (ST.) NO. 31804 OF 2022
KAKASAHEB
BHALERAO WITH
Digitally signed by INTERIM APPLICATION (ST.) NO. 31801 OF 2022
UTKARSH KAKASAHEB
BHALERAO
Date: 2024.01.12 WITH
15:57:32 +0530
INTERIM APPLICATION (ST.) NO. 94718 OF 2020
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 11513 OF 2015
Maruti Govind Pawar (Katkari) Decd. Thr.
Lhr Kashi Maruti Pawar ...Applicant
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition) Raigad,
Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 3734 OF 2016
Shri. Vidhyadhar Janardan Joshi ...Petitioner
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Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition) Raigad,
Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2632 OF 2018
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 3734 OF 2016
Shri. Vidyadhar Janardan Joshi (Since Decd.)
Through Lrs. ...Applicant
Versus
The Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.8862 OF 2015
Sunil Maruti Ghonge & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 8856 OF 2015
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Avinash Haribhau Patil & Ors ...Petitioners
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (ST.) NO. 26503 OF 2022
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 8856 OF 2015
Ramdas Ganpati Katkari ...Applicant
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 9889 OF 2015
Laxman Narayan Divekar & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (ST.) NO. 26495 OF 2022
IN
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WRIT PETITION NO.9889 OF 2015
Shimgya Nathu Katkari ...Applicant
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (ST.) NO. 942 OF 2021
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 9889 OF 2015
Laxman Narayan Divekar Anr. Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (ST.) NO. 981 OF 2021
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 9889 OF 2015
Chintaman Manohr Gaikawad ...Applicant
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
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WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 9888 OF 2015
Baliram Lahu Bhaud & Ors ...Petitioners
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors ...Respondents
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 4157 OF 2021
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 9888 OF 2015
Parvati Zitu Bane ...Applicant
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (ST.) NO. 26496 OF 2022
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 9888 OF 2015
Baliram Lahu Bhaud And Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
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WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (ST.) NO. 26489 OF 2022
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 9888 OF 2015
Haribhau Vitthal Khandekar ...Applicant
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (ST.) NO. 26485 OF 2022
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 9888 OF 2015
Gangubai Bhagwan Patil ...Applicant
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (ST.) NO. 26476 OF 2022
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 9888 OF 2015
Pandurang Khandu Patil ...Applicant
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Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 9887 of 2015
Bharat Dagadu Kadam & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 2016 OF 2023
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 2015 OF 2023
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 9887 OF 2015
Taramati Krishna Patil Deceased Through LHRS ...Applicants
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 9883 OF 2015
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Madhukar Ragho Hadage & Ors ...Petitioners
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (ST.) NO. 18359 OF 2023
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 9883 OF 2015
Rakesh Maruti Chorge And Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 966 OF 2016
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 9883 OF 2015
Parshuram Tulsiram Kadam ...Applicant
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
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WRIT PETITION NO. 9885 OF 2015
Vasant Gotiram Gudekar & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (ST.) NO. 26486 OF 2022
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 9885 OF 2015
Santosh Janu Shigvan ...Applicant
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 9884 OF 2015
Mohan Govind Patil & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
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WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 9886 OF 2015
Vasant Gotiram Gudekar & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 11515 OF 2015
Sunil Ambaji Sakpal ...Petitioner
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.11138 OF 2015
Yogesh Balkrishna Dhamale & Ors ...Petitioners
Versus
Deputy Collector (Acquisition)
Raigad, Alibaug & Ors ...Respondents
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Mr.Shriram Kulkarni, Advocate for the Petitioners/
Applicants in all WPs & IAs. (except WP/3734/2016 &
CAW/2632/2018).
Mr.Sachin Chavan, Advocate for the Petitioner in
WP/3734/2016 and for the Applicant in CAW/2632/2018.
Ms. M. S. Bane, AGP for State-Respondent No.1 to 4.
CORAM : B. P. COLABAWALLA &
M.M. SATHAYE, JJ.
RESERVED ON :29th August, 2023
PRONOUNCED ON:11th January, 2024
JUDGMENT [PER B. P. COLABAWALLA, J.]:-
1. Rule in all the above Writ Petitions. The Respondents waive
service. With the consent of parties, Rule made returnable forthwith and
heard finally.
2. All the above Writ Petitions have been filed raising the
same question of law, namely, (i) in acquisition proceedings, whether an
Award can be passed without applying the multiplier factor as specified
in the 1st schedule of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for
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short ' the 2013 Act'); (ii) whether the notification issued under the 2nd
entry of the 1st schedule of the 2013 Act [specifying the multiplier factor],
read with Section 26(2) thereof, is mandatory before making an Award;
and (iii) where acquisition proceedings have been initiated under the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the 1894 Act') and no Award
under Section 11 thereof is passed, then after the coming into force of
the 2013 Act, within how much time the Award has to be passed. These
are the three basic core questions to be decided in the above Writ
Petitions. It is agreed between the parties that the facts in all the cases
are more or less the same, and a decision in one Writ Petition will cover
all the others. Since the facts in Writ Petition No.11513 of 2015 have
been referred to by the counsel for the respective parties, we shall refer
to the facts and the prayers in the said Writ Petition.
3. Writ Petition No.11513 of 2015 is filed inter alia seeking to
quash and set aside the entire acquisition proceedings in relation to the
lands more particularly described in Exhibit 'A' & 'A1' of the Petition as
well as the Award passed in relation thereto (Exhibit 'B' to the Petition).
By an amendment carried out to the above Petition, (a) a declaration is
sought that no Award under Section 26(1) of the 2013 Act can be made
unless the market value of the land is multiplied by a factor as specified
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in the 1st Schedule of the 2013 Act; and (b) for a further declaration that
the period of limitation of 12 months prescribed under Section 25 of the
2013 Act has expired and hence the entire acquisition proceedings have
lapsed.
4. Before we embark upon the journey of deciding the
questions of law raised in the Petition, it would be necessary to advert to
some brief facts. On 31st December 2011, the State Government
published a notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act notifying
several lands in village Nidhavali, for acquisition of the Balganga River
Dam Project. After objections were raised under Section 5A of the 1894
Act, on 19th December 2012, 25th January 2013, 26th January 2013, and
25th March 2013 Section 6 declarations were published in the Official
Gazette as well as in the local newspaper. However, before the Award
could be passed, in the interregnum, on 1 st January 2014, the 2013 Act
came into force. In other words, on the date when the 2013 Act came
into force no Award was made/passed. It is the case of the Petitioner
that it is for this reason that the present case falls under Section 24(1)(a)
of the 2013 Act and the provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the
determination of the compensation, would apply.
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5. Be that as it may, on 19th March 2014, the State
Government, in exercise of powers under Section 26(2) of the 2013 Act
read with the 1st Schedule, issued a notification stipulating that when the
land to be acquired is situated in rural areas, the market value of the
land shall be calculated by the Collector [as per Section 26(1)] by
applying the multiplier factor of 1.00. This notification was challenged
in Writ Petition No.4274 of 2014 before the Aurangabad Bench of this
Court. This Writ Petition was filed on 15 th May 2014. On 26th May 2014
the Vacation Court at the Aurangabad Bench passed an ad-interim order
staying the operation of the said notification which continued from time
to time. Thereafter, a fresh notification dated 13 th August 2014 was
issued by the State Government stipulating that the multiplier factor for
lands in rural areas would be 1.10. Accordingly, on 23 rd September 2014
the Division Bench at Aurangabad permitted the Petitioners in Writ
Petition No.4274 of 2014 to amend the Petition to challenge the fresh
notification dated 13th August 2014 whereby the multiplier factor of 1.10
was prescribed by the State Government as required under the 1 st
Schedule of the 2013 Act. The said Division Bench at Aurangabad
refused to grant any stay of the notification dated 13 th August 2014
restraining the State from passing any Award. It however clarified that
the same would be subject to the outcome of the Writ Petition. Finally,
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Writ Petition No.4274 of 2014 was heard and reserved for Judgment on
9th December 2014. The judgment was finally pronounced on 9 th March
2015 when the Division Bench struck down the notifications dated 19 th
March 2014 and 13th August 2014 respectively. At the request of the
State, a portion of the said Judgment was stayed for a period of 2
months. Despite this the State did not challenge the order and judgment
of the Division Bench of the Aurangabad Bench dated 9 th March 2015
[striking down the notifications dated 19 th March 2014 and 13th August
2014] and proceeded to pass the impugned Award on 6 th May 2015 (i.e.
during the period of the stay). It is being aggrieved by this Award and
the fact that the same has been passed by applying the multiplier factor
of 1.10 as per the notification dated 13 th August 2014, and which has
been set aside/struck down by the Division Bench at Aurangabad, the
above Petition has been filed.
6. In this factual backdrop, Mr. Kulkarni, the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the Petitioners, submitted that Parliament has
repealed the 1894 Act and brought into effect the 2013 Act w.e.f. 1 st
January 2014. He submitted that Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act
contemplates that where no Award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act has
been passed, then all the provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the
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determination of compensation shall apply. He submitted that Section
26 of the 2013 Act contemplates determination of market value. The
criteria to be adopted by the Collector for determining the market value
is set out in Section 26(1), and Section 26(2) contemplates that the
market value calculated as per Section 26(1) shall be multiplied by a
factor to be specified in the 1 st Schedule. He thereafter submitted that 1 st
Schedule contemplates the components to be computed for the
minimum compensation package to be given to the person interested.
Entry 1 of the 1st Schedule contemplates that market value of the land
shall be decided under Section 26(1). Entry 2 contemplates the factor by
which the market value is to be multiplied in case of rural areas. Column
3 of Entry 2 stipulates that the Appropriate Government is required to
issue a notification providing a multiplier factor of 1.00 to 2.00 based on
the distance of the project from the urban area. He thereafter pointed
out that Section 27 of the 2013 Act stipulates that after determining the
market value, the Collector is further required to calculate the total
amount of compensation to be paid to the landowner (whose land has
been acquired) by including all assets attached to the land. Section
30(1), according to Mr. Kulkarni, thereafter, stipulates that the Collector
shall determine the "Solatium" amount equivalent to one hundred
percent of the compensation amount. Mr. Kulkarni therefore submitted
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that in cases where acquisition proceedings have been initiated under
the 1894 Act but where no Award is passed, then, all provisions of the
2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation would apply. He
submitted that this would be by determining the compensation [payable
to the landowner] by resorting to the provisions of Sections 26 to 30 of
the 2013 Act. Mr. Kulkarni submitted that once this is the case, before
any Award could be passed and compensation was determined, the
provisions of Section 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act ought to have been
scrupulously followed.
7. Mr. Kulkarni submitted that in the facts of the present case,
it is not in dispute that whilst determining the compensation (by the
impugned Award) the concerned authority [Respondent No.1] has in
fact applied the provisions of Section 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act. He
however submitted that whilst determining the compensation,
Respondent No.1 has calculated the same by relying upon the
notification dated 13th August 2014 issued under the Entry 2 of the 1 st
Schedule of the 2013 Act [applying the multiplier factor of 1.10], and
which was set aside by this Court (in Writ Petition No.4274 of 2014), on
9th March 2015. He submitted that once this is the case, then the Award
cannot stand. This is for the simple reason that before determining the
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final compensation payable, it is mandatory to apply the multiplier
factor, and which has to be notified by the Appropriate Government.
Mr. Kulkarni submitted that in the facts of the present case the Award
was passed by applying the multiplier factor stipulated in the
notification dated 13th August 2014. However, this notification was
struck down by this Court on 9th March 2015. Once this notification was
struck down, Respondent No.1 could not pass an Award on 6 th May 2015
applying the multiplier factor of 1.10 as stipulated in the notification
dated 13th August 2014. This is for the simple reason that when the
Award was passed, the said notification was already struck down/set
aside by this Court. Merely because that order was stayed for a period of
2 months by the very same Bench to enable the State to challenge this
order before a superior forum, would make no difference. He submitted
that the said order was ultimately not challenged and accepted by the
State. Once this is the case, then, clearly the Award has to go on the
expiry of the stay because the compensation determined therein is
admittedly based on a notification which is struck down by this Court.
In other words, the argument of Mr. Kulkarni was that if the foundation
goes, the super structure has to crumble and cannot stand. He therefore
submitted that on this ground alone all the impugned Awards ought to
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be set aside and the State authorities be directed to determine the
compensation afresh in accordance with law.
8. On the other hand, Ms. Bane, the learned AGP, submitted
that while it is true that the said notification dated 13 th August 2014 was
challenged in the Writ Petition No.4274 of 2014, the same was not
stayed by the Aurangabad Bench and the State was allowed to proceed
to pass the Award by applying the said notification. She fairly stated that
the Court clarified that any Awards passed by applying the multiplier
factor stipulated in the said notification would be subject to the outcome
of Writ Petition No.4274 of 2014. Ultimately, Writ Petition No.4274 of
2014 was allowed and the notifications dated 19 th March 2014 and 13th
August 2014 were struck down. However, the Division Bench that
decided Writ Petition No.4274 of 2014 itself granted a stay of its order
and judgment for a period of 2 months and which expired on 9 th May
2015. It is in the interregnum, and while the stay was operating, that the
impugned Award is passed. In these circumstances, Ms. Bane contended
that the impugned award passed was after applying the multiplier factor
[of 1.10] as per the notification dated 13 th August 2014, and which was in
existence at the time of the passing of the Award. Once this is the case
the Award is passed by applying the correct multiplier factor and the
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same is valid and proper. She, therefore, submitted that there is no
merit in the challenge to the impugned Award, or the acquisition
proceedings on this count, and the same has to be rejected.
9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some
length on this question. We have also perused the papers and
proceedings in the above Writ Petition. As mentioned earlier, the facts
really are undisputed in the present case. Admittedly, though the
acquisition proceedings were initiated in the year 2011 under the 1894
Act, no Award was passed till the coming into force of the 2013 Act.
Once this is the case, then Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act would come
into play and all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to determination of
compensation would apply. For the sake of convenience Section 24 of
the 2013 Act is reproduced hereunder:-
"24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall
be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.- (1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any
case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,--
(a) where no award under section 11 of the
said Land Acquisition Act has been
made, then, all provisions of this Act
relating to the determination of
compensation shall apply; or
(b) where an award under said section 11
has been made, then such proceedings
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shall continue under the provisions of
the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the
said Act has not been repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section
(1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894),
where an award under the said section 11 has been
made five years or more prior to the
commencement of this Act but the physical
possession of the land has not been taken or the
compensation has not been paid the said
proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and
the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall
initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition
afresh in accordance with the provisions of this
Act:
Provided that where an award has been made and
compensation in respect of a majority of land
holdings has not been deposited in the account of
the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in
the notification for acquisition under section 4 of
the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to
compensation in accordance with the provisions of
this Act."
(emphasis supplied)
10. Sections 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act, relate to determination of
compensation under the 2013 Act. What is important for our purposes
is Section 26(2) and the 1st Schedule of the 2013 Act. Section 26 is
reproduced hereunder:-
"26. Determination of market value of land by Collector.-(1)
The Collector shall adopt the following criteria in
assessing and determining the market value of the land,
namely:--
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(a) the market value, if any, specified in the Indian
Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899) for the registration of
sale deeds or agreements to sell, as the case may
be, in the area, where the land is situated; or
(b) the average sale price for similar type of land
situated in the nearest village or nearest vicinity
area; or
(c) consented amount of compensation as agreed
upon under sub-section (2) of section 2 in case of
acquisition of lands for private companies or for
public private partnership projects, whichever is
higher:
Provided that the date for determination of market value
shall be the date on which the notification has been
issued under section 11.
Explanation 1.--The average sale price referred to in
clause (b) shall be determined taking into account the
sale deeds or the agreements to sell registered for
similar type of area in the near village or near vicinity
area during immediately preceding three years of the
year in which such acquisition of land is proposed to be
made.
Explanation 2.--For determining the average sale price
referred to in Explanation 1, one-half of the total number
of sale deeds or the agreements to sell in which the
highest sale price has been mentioned shall be taken
into account.
Explanation 3.--While determining the market value
under this section and the average sale price referred to
in Explanation 1 or Explanation 2, any price paid as
compensation for land acquired under the provisions of
this Act on an earlier occasion in the district shall not be
taken into consideration.
Explanation 4.--While determining the market value
under this section and the average sale price referred to
in Explanation 1 or Explanation 2, any price paid, which
in the opinion of the Collector is not indicative of actual
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prevailing market value may be discounted for the
purposes of calculating market value.
(2) The market value calculated as per sub-section (1) shall
be multiplied by a factor to be specified in the First
Schedule.
(3) Where the market value under sub-section (1) or sub-
section (2) cannot be determined for the reason that--
(a) the land is situated in such area where the
transactions in land are restricted by or under any other
law for the time being in force in that area; or
(b) the registered sale deeds or agreements to sell as
mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1) for similar land
are not available for the immediately preceding three
years; or
(c) the market value has not been specified under the
Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899) by the appropriate
authority,
the State Government concerned shall specify the floor
price or minimum price per unit area of the said land
based on the price calculated in the manner specified in
sub-section (1) in respect of similar types of land
situated in the immediate adjoining areas:
Provided that in a case where the Requiring Body offers
its shares to the owners of the lands (whose lands have
been acquired) as a part compensation, for acquisition of
land, such shares in no case shall exceed twenty-five per
cent, of the value so calculated under sub-section (1) or
sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) as the case may be:
Provided further that the Requiring Body shall in no case
compel any owner of the land (whose land has been
acquired) to take its shares, the value of which is
deductible in the value of the land calculated under sub-
section (1):
Provided also that the Collector shall, before initiation of
any land acquisition proceedings in any area, take all
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necessary steps to revise and update the market value of
the land on the basis of the prevalent market rate in that
area: Provided also that the appropriate Government
shall ensure that the market value determined for
acquisition of any land or property of an educational
institution established and administered by a religious or
linguistic minority shall be such as would not restrict or
abrogate the right to establish and administer
educational institutions of their choice."
11. Section 26(1) sets out the criteria that the Collector has to
adopt for assessing and determining the market value of the land.
Section 26(2) stipulates that the market value calculated as per Section
26(1) shall be multiplied by a factor to be specified in the 1 st Schedule.
Considering this provision, it would also be necessary to reproduce the
1st Schedule of the 2013 Act which reads as under:
THE FIRST SCHEDULE
[See section 30(2)]
COMPENSATION FOR LAND OWNERS
The following components shall constitute the minimum compensation package to be given to those whose land is
acquired and to tenants referred to in clause (c) of section 3 in a proportion to be decided by the appropriate
Government.
________________________________________________________________________________
Serial Component of compensation Manner of determination of value Date of
No. package in respect of land determination
acquired under the Act of value
________________________________________________________________________________
(1) (2) (3) (4)
________________________________________________________________________________
1. Market value of land To be determined as provided under section 26
2. Factor by which the market value 1.00 (One) to 2.00 (Two) based on the distance
is to be multiplied in the case of of project from urban area, as may be notified
rural areas. by the appropriate Government.
3. Factor by which the market value 1(One).
is to be multiplied in the case of
urban areas.
4. Value of assets attached to land To be determined as provided under section 29.
or building.
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5. Solatium Equivalent to one hundred per cent. of the
market value of land mentioned against serial
number 1 multiplied by the factor specified against
serial number 2 for rural areas or serial
number 3 for urban areas plus value of assets
attached to land or building against serial
number 4 under column (2).
6. Final award in rural areas Market value of land mentioned against serial
number 1 multiplied by the factor specified
against serial number 2 plus value of assets
attached to land or building mentioned against
serial number 4 under column (2) plus
solatium mentioned against serial number 5
under column (2).
7. Final award in urban areas Market value of land mentioned against serial
number 1 multiplied by the factor specified
against serial number 3 plus value of assets
attached to land or building mentioned against
serial number 4 under column (2) plus
solatium mentioned against serial number 5
under column (2).
8. Other component, if any, to be
Included.
__________________________________________________________________________
NOTE.-The date on which values mentioned under column (2) are determined should be indicated
under column (4) against each serial number.
(emphasis supplied)
12. As can be seen from this schedule, the same is divided into
four columns. Column 2 deals with the component of compensation
package in respect of land acquired under the Act and column 3 deals
with the manner of determination of value. Entry 1 of the 1 st Schedule
talks about the market value of the land and stipulates that the same is
to be determined as provided under Section 26. Entry 2 of the 1 st
Schedule, and which is relevant for our purpose, stipulates the factor by
which the market value is to be multiplied in the case of rural areas. The
manner of determination of value is that the multiplier factor has to be
between 1.00 to 2.00, based on the distance of the project from the
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urban area, as notified by the Appropriate Government. In other words,
whilst determining the compensation in case of the rural areas, the
appropriate government has to notify the multiplier factor as
contemplated under Entry 2 of the 1 st Schedule of the 2013 Act. On a
plain reading of Section 26 with Section 30 and the 1 st Schedule, it is
clear that before any Award is passed in relation to any land in rural
areas, the aforesaid multiplier factor has to be applied. Passing an
Award without applying the multiplier factor would be contrary to the
provisions of Sections 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act.
13. Coming to the facts of the present case, as mentioned
earlier, compensation has been calculated by applying the provisions of
Section 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act. However, whilst determining the
compensation, the authority [Respondent No.1] passing the impugned
Award, has applied the multiplier factor as notified by the government
vide its notification dated 13th August, 2014. The multiplier factor
applied is 1.10. As mentioned earlier, this notification dated 13 th August
2014 was set aside by this Court vide its order and judgment dated 9 th
March 2015. Once this is a case, no Award could have been passed by
applying the multiplier factor in this notification. The only justification
given by the learned AGP is that even though the Award was passed on
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6th May 2015, and which is after the date when the High Court [in WP
No.4274 of 2014] had set aside/struck down the said notification, the
Award was passed when the Judgment of this Court in WP No.4274 of
2014 was stayed for a period of 2 months. In other words, the
justification given was that all the Awards in all the above Writ Petitions
were passed during the period when the stay was in operation. This
would mean, according to the learned AGP, that the notification was
very much in existence when the Awards were passed. Once this is the
case, then, there was nothing wrong on the part of the State to calculate
the compensation on the basis of the multiplier factor notified in the
notification dated 13th August 2014, was the submission. We find this
argument to be without any substance for the simple reason that on the
date when the Awards were passed, the said notification was already set
aside. It was only to give a liberty to the State to challenge its order that
the Division Bench stayed its own order dated 9 th March 2015 for a
period of 2 months. This does not in any way revive the said
notifications. Otherwise also, even if we were to assume that the
notifications were in force because the Division Bench [in WP No.4274
of 2014] had stayed its own order dated 9 th March 2015 for a period of 2
months, the said Division Bench, by its order dated 23 rd September 2014
[whilst refusing to grant a stay of the notifications dated 13 th August,
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2014], clarified that any Award passed during the pendency of the WP
No.4274 of 2014, would be subject to the outcome of the said Petition.
Once this is the case, and the Writ Petition No.4274 of 2014 was allowed
and the notification dated 13th August 2014 was set aside, and which has
now attained finality, the State cannot justify its actions by contending
that the Awards were passed during the period when the stay was in
operation. Once the said notification dated 13 th August 2014 was struck
down/set aside, any Award passed on the basis of the said notification
cannot stand. In other words, if the foundation of the Award itself goes,
the Award cannot be permitted to be held as valid. We say this also
because the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Executive
Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara,
Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation
VS Mahesh and others, [(2022) 2 SCC 772] has clearly held that
until a notification stipulating the multiplier factor is issued by the
"appropriate government" for rural areas, compensation in terms of
sub-section (2) of Section 26 cannot be determined. Paragraph 26 of
this decision reads thus:-
"26. The determination of compensation is never simple. It is a
complex factual and legal exercise. As per sub-section (2) to
Section 26 of the 2013 Act, the market value calculated under
sub-section (1) is to be multiplied by the factor to be specified in
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the First Schedule. Section 30(2) requires the Collector to issue
individual awards detailing the particulars of compensation
payable and details of payment as specified in the First
Schedule. As per the First Schedule, the factor/multiplier in
case of rural areas can be between one and two, based on the
distance from the urban area, and this factor/multiplier is to be
notified by the "appropriate Government". This aspect is of
importance when we examine the second issue and would be
adverted to later. Thus, it clearly delineates that until
notification of the multiplier is issued by the "appropriate
Government" for rural areas, compensation in terms of sub-
section (2) to Section 26 cannot be determined. When a
multiplier of more than 1 applies, the compensation payable
under Section 26 of the 2013 Act would be higher than the
market value of the land."
(emphasis supplied)
14. In light of this authoritative pronouncement, we are of the
view that since the impugned Award is based on a notification issued by
the State Government dated 13th August 2014 and which is struck down
by this Court, the Award cannot be sustained. On this ground alone the
impugned awards in all the above Writ Petitions are liable to be set
aside. At the risk of repetition, we may reiterate that we have come to
this finding because in all the Writ Petitions, all the Awards are based on
the notification dated 13th August, 2014, and all Awards have been
passed after 9th March 2015, and on or before 9th May 2015 (the period
during which the Division Bench had granted stay of its own order dated
9th March 2015).
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15. There is yet another ground on which the awards and the
proceedings have been challenged by the Petitioners, namely, that the
impugned Awards are not passed within 1 year of 1 st January 2014 i.e.
the date when the 2013 Act came into force, and hence, the entire
acquisition proceedings have lapsed. In other words, it was the
submission of the Petitioners that once acquisition proceedings were
initiated under the 1894 Act and no Award was made on the date when
the 2013 Act came into force, then the Award had to be passed within 12
months from 1st January 2014 subject to any stay being granted by any
Court. In other words, if there was any stay, the same has to be excluded
for the purposes of calculating the period of 12 months within which the
Award ought to be passed.
16. In this regard, Mr. Kulkarni, the learned counsel for the
Petitioner, has once again heavily relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd
Project Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha
Irrigation Development Corporation (supra). Mr. Kulkarni
submitted that in the facts of the present case, even as per the State
there was a stay granted and which was for a period of 42 days. He
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submitted that this is also clearly reflected in the impugned Awards and
not even disputed by the learned AGP. If the Award was to be passed
within 1 year from 1st January 2014, excluding this period of 42 days,
then all the Awards ought to have been passed on or before 11 th February
2015. However, in the facts of the present case it is an admitted position
that all the Awards in all the above Writ Petitions have been passed after
11th February 2015. In fact, they were all passed after the notification
dated 13th August 2014 was set aside by the Division Bench of this Court
on 9th March 2015 and only whilst a stay was operating of the said order
for a period of 2 months, namely, till 9th May 2015. He submitted that
once this is the case then entire acquisition proceedings itself are bad
because the Awards were not passed within the statutory period of 12
months from 1st January 2014 (even after excluding the period of 42
days the stay was operating).
17. In answer to this argument, Ms. Bane, the learned AGP,
submitted that in all the above Writ Petitions the Awards are passed by
taking into consideration the provisions of Section 24 of the 2013 Act.
She submitted that under Section 24(1)(a) where land acquisition
proceedings are initiated under the 1894 Act but have not culminated in
an Award on the date when the 2013 Act came into force [i.e. 1 st January
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2014], then, all the provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the
determination of compensation shall apply. She submitted that when
one reads Section 24(1)(a), it is clear that proceedings initiated under
the 1894 Act have to be continued and it is only for determination of
compensation that the provisions of the 2013 Act would come into play.
In other words, it was the submission of Ms. Bane that once no Award is
passed under the 1894 Act by 31st December 2013, then, only the
provisions of Section 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act relating to determination
of compensation would apply and not the other provisions, namely,
Section 25, which stipulates that the Award is to be passed within a
period of 1 year from the notification issued under Section 19 of the
2013 Act. To put it differently, it was the submission of Ms. Bane that
the time for passing the Award was a period of 2 years as specified in
Section 11A of the 1894 Act and if this be the case, then all the Awards
were passed within time and hence there is no question of either the
Awards, or the acquisition proceedings relating thereto, having lapsed
and or being declared as invalid. In support of this submission Ms. Bane
relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Haryana State Industrial & Infrastructure Development
Corporation Ltd. VS Deepak Agarwal & Ors. [2022 SCC
Online SC 932].
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18. We have heard Mr. Kulkarni as well as Ms. Bane on this
issue. To understand the question raised, it would be appropriate to
once again briefly narrate the facts. In the present case, the notification
under Section 4 of the 1894 Act was issued on 31 st December 2011.
Thereafter, the Section 6 declarations were issued on 19 th December
2012, 25th January 2013, 26th January 2013 and 25th March 2013
respectively. Thereafter, before passing of any Award, the 2013 Act came
into force on 1st January 2014. In the instant case, all the Awards have
been passed after 9th March 2015, and on or before 9th May 2015. What is
to be determined is whether the period to pass the Award is 12 months
from 1st January, 2014 as contended by Mr. Kulkarni, or a period of 2
years from the Section 6 declarations (by applying the provisions of
Section 11-A of the 1894 Act) as contended by the learned AGP. We find
that this argument need not detain us any further because the same is
squarely covered by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi,
Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development
Corporation (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court was examining the
exact same question. After referring to the relevant provisions of both
the Acts, in paragraphs 29, 30 and 31, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
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concluded that in cases covered under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act,
the limitation period for passing of an Award would commence from 1 st
January 2014, i.e. the date when the 2013 Act came into force. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that Awards passed under clause
(a) to Section 24(1) would be valid if made within 12 months from 1 st
January 2014. The Supreme Court clarified that this dictum is subject to
the caveat that a declaration which has lapsed in terms of Section 11-A of
the 1894 Act on or before 31st December 2013, would not get revived.
The relevant portion of this decision reads thus:-
"29. Given the object and purpose behind Sections 24 and 26 to 30 of
the 2013 Act, we notice that practical absurdities and anomalies
may arise if the two-year period for making of an award in terms
of Section 11-A of the 1894 Act commencing from the date of
issue of the declaration is applied to the awards to be made
under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. This would mitigate
against the underlying legislative intent behind prescription of
time for making of an award in respect of saved acquisition
proceedings initiated under the repealed 1894 Act, which is
twofold : (i) to give sufficient time to the authorities to determine
compensation payable under the 2013 Act; and (ii) to ensure
early and expedited payment to the landowners by reducing the
period from two years under Section 11-A of the 1894 Act to
twelve months under Section 25 of the 2013 Act. In case of
declarations issued in January 2012, on application of Section
11-A of the 1894 Act, the time to determine compensation under
the 2013 Act would vary from a day to a month, and while in
cases where the declarations were issued within twelve months
of the repeal of the 1894 Act, the landowners would be at a
disadvantage as an award beyond the twelve-month period
specified in Section 25 of the 2013 Act would be valid. In the
first set of cases, given the onerous factual and legal exercise
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involved in determination of compensation and the need to issue
notification under Section 26(2) of the 2013 Act, publication of
the awards would be impractical. Hasty and incorrect awards
would be deleterious for the landowners. If the awards are not
pronounced, the acquisition proceedings would lapse defeating
the legislative intent behind Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act to
save such proceedings. We would, therefore, exercise our choice
to arrive at a just, fair and harmonious construction consistent
with the legislative intent.
30. A rational approach so as to further the object and purpose of
Sections 24 and 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act is required. We are
conscious that Section 25 refers to publication of a notification
under Section 19 as the starting point of limitation. In the
context of clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act there would
be no notification under Section 19, but declaration under
Section 6 of the 1894 Act. When the declarations under Section 6
are valid as on 1-1-2014, it is necessary to give effect to the
legislative intention and reckon the starting point. In the context
of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, declarations under Section 6
of the 1894 Act are no different and serve the same purpose as
the declarations under Section 19 of the 2013 Act.
31. Consequently, we hold that in cases covered by clause (a) to
Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act, the limitation period for
passing/making of an award under Section 25 of the 2013 Act
would commence from 1-1-2014, that is, the date when the 2013
Act came into force. Awards passed under clause (a) to Section
24(1) would be valid if made within twelve months from 1-1-
2014. This dictum is subject to the caveat stated in paras 20 to
23 (supra) that a declaration which has lapsed in terms of
Section 11-A of the 1894 Act before or on 31-12-2013 would not
get revived."
19. Faced with this decision, Ms. Bane, the learned AGP,
submitted that this decision of the Supreme Court is impliedly overruled
by 3 judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Haryana
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State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corporation
Limited (supra). She submitted that in this decision the Supreme
Court has held that in cases covered under Section 24(1)(a), it is only the
provisions of Section 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act that would apply and not
any other provision, namely, Section 25. We are unable to agree with the
submissions made by the learned AGP for more than one reason. Firstly,
we find that the issue raised before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Haryana State Industrial & Infrastructure
Development Corporation Limited (supra) was the
interpretation of the word "initiated" appearing in Section 24(1) of the
2013 Act with reference to land acquisition proceedings under the 1894
Act. It was the contention of some of the parties that for the purposes of
Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, issuance and publication of notification
under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act alone amounted to initiation of
acquisition proceedings thereunder. The contrary stand was that it is the
declaration under Section 6(1) of the 1894 Act [that the land is required
for a public purpose], which would mark the point of initiation of
acquisition proceedings thereunder. It was this issue that was being
decided by the Supreme Court. In fact, this is clear from paragraph 33 of
this decision which states that taking note of the legislative intention it
has no hesitation in holding that the point of initiation of land
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acquisition proceedings under the 1894 Act, for the purposes of Section
24(1) of the 2013 Act, is the issuance and publication of the Section 4(1)
notification in the official gazette of the Appropriate Government.
Thereafter, the Supreme Court also went on to consider whether the
Section 4 notification issued under the 1894 Act prior to 1 st January 2014
could continue or survive after 1 st January 2014, and as to whether the
Section 6 declaration [under 1894 Act] could be issued after 1 st January
2014. It is whilst discussing this issue that the Hon'ble Supreme Court
inter alia held that the combined effect of Section 24(1) and clause (a)
thereof is that if land acquisition proceedings under the 1894 Act were
initiated prior to 1st January, 2014 (the date of coming into force the
2013 Act), and it did not culminate into an Award under Section 11 [of
the 1894 Act], then all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the
determination of compensation should apply to such acquisition
proceedings. The Hon'ble Supreme Court thus held that in such
circumstances, the land acquisition proceedings should continue but all
the provisions relating to the determination of compensation under the
2013 Act alone will be applicable to such proceedings, meaning thereby,
the 2013 Act would come into play only at that stage. When one reads
the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Haryana State
Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corporation
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Limited (supra) the same cannot be read de-hors the question that
was being determined by the Supreme Court.
20. It is now too well settled a proposition that the ratio of any
decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case.
It has been said a long time ago that a case is only an authority for what
it actually decides and not what logically follows from it. If one must
refer to any authority on this subject, the Supreme Court, in the case of
Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV) v/s State of Maharashtra
[(2008) 1 SCC 494] has very succinctly and eloquently reiterated the
said proposition. The relevant portion of this decision reads thus:-
"14. On the subject of precedents Lord Halsbury, L.C., said in
Quinn v. Leathem [1901 AC 495 : (1900-1903) All ER Rep
1 (HL)] : (All ER p. 7 G-I)
"Before discussing Allen v. Flood [1898 AC 1 : (1895-
1899) All ER Rep 52 (HL)] and what was decided
therein, there are two observations of a general
character which I wish to make; and one is to repeat
what I have very often said before--that every
judgment must be read as applicable to the particular
facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the
generality of the expressions which may be found there
are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but
are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the
case in which such expressions are to be found. The
other is that a case is only an authority for what it
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actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for
a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it.
Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is
necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must
acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all."
(emphasis supplied)
We entirely agree with the above observations.
15. In Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat [(1987) 1 SCC
213] (vide SCC p. 221, para 18) this Court observed:
"18. The ratio of any decision must be understood in
the background of the facts of that case. It has been
said long time ago that a case is only an authority for
what it actually decides, and not what logically
follows from it."
16. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd.
[(2003) 2 SCC 111] (vide SCC p. 130, para 59) this Court
observed:
"59. ... It is also well settled that a little difference in
facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference
in the precedential value of a decision."
(emphasis supplied)
17. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani
[(2004) 8 SCC 579 : AIR 2004 SC 4778] a decision cannot
be relied on without disclosing the factual situation. In the
same judgment this Court also observed : (SCC pp. 584-85,
paras 9-12)
"9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions
without discussing as to how the factual situation fits
in with the fact situation of the decision on which
reliance is placed. Observations of courts are neither
to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a
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statute and that too taken out of their context. These
observations must be read in the context in which
they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts
are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words,
phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become
necessary for judges to embark into lengthy
discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and
not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not
interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes;
their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In
London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton [1951 AC
737 : (1951) 2 All ER 1 (HL)] (AC at p. 761), Lord
MacDermott observed : (All ER p. 14 C-D)
'The matter cannot, of course, be settled
merely by treating the ipsissima verba of
Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act
of Parliament and applying the rules of
interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not
to detract from the great weight to be given to
the language actually used by that most
distinguished Judge, ...'
10. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. [1970 AC 1004
: (1970) 2 WLR 1140 : (1970) 2 All ER 294 (HL)] Lord
Reid said,
'Lord Atkin's speech ... is not to be treated as if it
were a statutory definition. It will require
qualification in new circumstances.' (All ER p. 297g)
Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No. 2)
[(1971) 1 WLR 1062 : (1971) 2 All ER 1267] , observed :
(All ER p. 1274d)
'One must not, of course, construe even a reserved
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judgment of even Russell, L.J. as if it were an Act of
Parliament;'
And, in British Railways Board v. Herrington [1972 AC
877 : (1972) 2 WLR 537 : (1972) 1 All ER 749 (HL)] Lord
Morris said : (All ER p. 761c)
'There is always peril in treating the words of a speech
or a judgment as though they were words in a
legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that
judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts
of a particular case.'
11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or
different fact may make a world of difference between
conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly
placing reliance on a decision is not proper.
12. The following words of Hidayatullah, J. in the
matter of applying precedents have become locus
classicus : (Abdul Kayoom v. CIT [AIR 1962 SC 680] ,
AIR p. 688, para 19)
'19. ... Each case depends on its own facts and a close
similarity between one case and another is not enough
because even a single significant detail may alter the
entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid
the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by
matching the colour of one case against the colour of
another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line
a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is
not at all decisive.'
***
'Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks
the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood
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and trim off the side branches else you will find
yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to
keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which
could impede it.' "
(emphasis supplied)
18. We have referred to the aforesaid decisions and the
principles laid down therein, because often decisions are
cited for a proposition without reading the entire decision
and the reasoning contained therein. In our opinion, the
decision of this Court in Sarguja Transport case [(1987) 1
SCC 5 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 19 : AIR 1987 SC 88] cannot be
treated as a Euclid's formula."
21. Applying the aforesaid principles, we are unable to accept
the submission of Ms. Bane that the decision rendered by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Haryana State Industrial & Infrastructure
Development Corporation Limited (supra) has impliedly
overruled its decision in Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project
Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation
Development Corporation (supra). This is more so when one take
into consideration that the said judgment in Executive Engineer,
Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra
Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation (supra) has
been specifically referred to in Haryana State Industrial &
Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (in
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paragraph 9 thereof), and the same has not been overruled, either
expressly or by necessary implication. Another factor that persuades us
to take this view is that one of the Judges in both the matters was the
same (A. M. Khanvilkar, J. as he then was). If the Supreme Court, in
Haryana State Industrial & Infrastructure Development
Corporation Limited wanted to overrule its judgment in Executive
Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara,
Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation
(supra), it would have expressly done so. We therefore find that the
argument of Ms. Bane is wholly misplaced and so is the reliance on the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Haryana State
Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corporation
Limited (supra).
22. As mentioned earlier, this point is squarely covered by the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Executive Engineer,
Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra
Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation (supra) which
clearly stipulates that in cases falling under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013
Act, the limitation period for passing an Award would commence from
1st January, 2014 and the same would have to be passed within a period
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of 12 months thereafter, subject to any stay being granted by any Court.
In other words, the period during which the stay was operating would
have to be excluded for the purposes of calculating the period of 12
months. This has admittedly not been done in the present case.
Therefore, on this count also, the entire acquisition proceedings are bad
and the Awards passed pursuant thereto, are also unsustainable.
23. In these circumstances, we hold that the acquisition
proceedings in respect of the lands of all the Petitioners in all the above
Writ Petitions have lapsed and the Awards passed pursuant thereto are
quashed and set aside.
24. The State will now have to initiate fresh acquisition
proceedings and acquire the lands of all the Petitioners by following the
procedure under the 2013 Act.
25. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms and all the
Writ Petitions are disposed of in terms thereof. However, there shall be
no order as to costs. In view of the disposal of all the Writ Petitions,
nothing survives in any Interim Applications filed therein and the same
are disposed of accordingly.
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26. This order will be digitally signed by the Private Secretary/
Personal Assistant of this Court. All concerned will act on production by
fax or email of a digitally signed copy of this order.
[ M.M. SATHAYE, J.] [ B. P. COLABAWALLA, J.]
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