Bombay High Court
Padmakar Badriparasad Dube (Deceased) ... vs Smt. Sonibai Wd/O Chunilal Badsiwal ... on 19 January, 2024
2024:BHC-AS:5357
907-CRA-240-2023.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.240 OF 2023
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.4560 OF 2023
IN
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.240 OF 2023
1. Padmakar Badriparasad Dube )
(Deceased) )
2. Smt. Premadevi Padmakar Dubey )
Age:75 and Occupation: not known )
Residing at Shop No.1-2-3, Ground )
Floor, Gopal Niwas, Building No.7-A, )
Plot No.168, Kherwadi, Bandra (East), )
Mumbai 400 051. ) Applicants
... (Org.Defendant)
V/s.
1.Smt. Sonibai wd/o Chunilal Badsiwal )
(Deleted) Aged about 80 years, )
Occupation: Housewife )
2. Radheshyam S/o. Chunilal Badsiwal )
Aged about 45 years, )
Occupation : Mason, Both adults, )
Indian Inhabitant of Mumbai, Residing )
at Plot No.4, Kherwadi, Bandra (East), )
Mumbai 400 051. Respondents
... (Org. Plaintiffs)
____________________________________
Mr. Pradeep Thorat a/w G.C. Singh h/f Ms. Richa V. Singh,
Advocate for the Applicants.
Adv. Beejal Chowlara a/w Mr. Manoj R. Badsiwal, for the
Respondents. ____________________________________
CORAM : RAJESH S. PATIL, J.
RESERVED ON : 20 OCTOBER 2023
PRONOUNCED ON : 19 JANUARY 2024
1
Sharada
::: Uploaded on - 03/02/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 17/02/2024 16:47:42 :::
907-CRA-240-2023.doc
JUDGMENT:
-
1. This Civil Revision Application is filed by original defendant
challenging the judgment and decree dated 13 April, 2022 passed
by the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes at Bombay,
thereby passing a decree of possession of suit premises.
2. The Applicant herein is the original defendants in a suit for
eviction filed by the Respondent / Plaintiff. The plaintiff before
filing the present proceedings had filed a suit for eviction on the
grounds of arrears of rent and other reliefs being R.A.E. & R. Suit
No.417/916 of 1997. It is the plaintiff's case that thereafter the
defendant had given an oral undertaking that he will not breach
any of the terms of the tenancy and they will pay the rent time to
time; therefore according to the plaintiff considering the
undertaking given by the defendant they withdrew the R.A.E. & R.
Suit No.417 /916 of 1997.
3. The plaintiff in the year 2005 filed a second suit for eviction
as regards Shop No.1, Shop No.2 and Shop No.3, admeasuring
10.3 ft x 10 ft, 10 ft x 12 ft and 8 ft x 10 ft respectively together
with a room on the rear side of Shop Nos. 2 and 3 admeasuring 10
ft x 20 ft of Gopal Niwas (for short "suit premises"). The purpose
of use of the suit premises was dual i.e. commercial and residential
and the monthly rent of the suit premises was fixed at Rs.900/- per
month inclusive of permitted increases. The suit initially was filed
by the plaintiff no.1 and plaintiff no.2 however during the
pendency of the suit, the plaintiff no.1 died. Therefore only
Sharada
907-CRA-240-2023.doc
plaintiff no.2. continued with the suit. So also, the original
defendant died during the pendency of suit therefore his name was
deleted and his legal heirs i.e. Premadevi was brought on record.
4. The plaintiff has averred that before filing of the suit he had
issued a notice dated 31 December, 2004, demanding therein the
arrears of rent of Rs.19,900/- payable upto the month of December
2004. The suit for eviction was filed on 29 November, 2005
claiming an amount of Rs.27,900/- being the arrears of rent, as a
ground for eviction, so also the ground of 'execution of permanent
structure' in the suit premises without permission of the landlord,
'nuisance' and on the ground of 'subletting' were averred. It was
mentioned in the plaint that the defendants have sublet Shop No.3
to Gulabchand Vrahaspati. The plaintiff sought eviction of the
defendants on all the four grounds.
5. The defendant appeared in the matter and filed their written
statement, and denied the contentions as mentioned in the plaint.
It was denied that the common walls were removed from the suit
premises. It was also denied that the defendant has constructed
additional room near the staircase of the suit premises. It was
denied that the defendant was causing any kind of nuisance and
annoyance to the nearby residents. It was also denied that the
defendant has subletted the suit premises. After filing of the
written statement, the defendant also filed additional written
statement and one more additional written statement during the
pendency of the suit.
6. Thereafter issues were framed and the parties led their
Sharada
907-CRA-240-2023.doc
evidence. The plaintiff no.2 entered the witness box and gave
evidence on behalf of the plaintiff. So also, the plaintiff examined
one Mr. Aral Nicholas Rodrigues (advocate/ Court Commissioner),
and Dr. Virendra Vishnu Mohite, Medical Officer of Health, H(E)
Ward, BMC. All the three witnesses were crossed examined by the
defendant's advocate. Thereafter the defendant examined his
Constituted Attorney Gulabchand Vrahaspati Dubey as per Ex.129
and 141. The defendants also examined DW No.2 Lalchand
Trilochand Mishra in support of its pleadings as made in the
written statement.
7. Thereafter submissions were made by respective counsel of
the parties and the matter was closed for arguments. After both
the parties made their submissions, the Trial Court by its judgment
and order dated 13 January, 2020, held that the plaintiff was not
able to prove that he is a landlord and that the defendant is his
tenant in respect of the suit premises. So also the ground of default
and nuisance were rejected by the Trial Court. However, as regards
the grounds of unlawful subletting, of Shop No.3 of the suit
premises, the Trial Court held that the said issue of subletting of
Shop No.3, has been proved. So also it was held that the ground of
additions and alterations have been proved by the plaintiffs.
Therefore even though the issue nos.4, 6 and 7 were held in favour
of the plaintiff, as the Trial Court came to the conclusion that the
relationship of the landlord and the tenant has not been proved by
the plaintiff, the suit was dismissed by the Trial Court.
8. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit, the landlord
filed an appeal before the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small
Sharada
907-CRA-240-2023.doc
Causes at Bombay. The Appellate Bench framed the points for
determination including the point "whether the plaintiff has
proved the relationship of the landlord and tenant". The Appellate
Bench after hearing both the parties by its judgment and decree
dated 13 April, 2022, held that the plaintiffs have proved the
relationship of landlord and tenant existed between Plaintiff and
Defendant in respect of the suit premises. It was further held that
defendant was in arrears of rent and that the defendant had
carried out additions and alterations of permanent nature in the
suit premises. Further it was held that the defendant had
unlawfully subletted suit premises to one Gulabchand Vrahaspati
Dubey. Hence, a decree of possession was passed against the
defendant.
9. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the
Appellate Bench, the defendant filed the present Civil Revision
Application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908.
SUBMISSIONS :
10. Mr. Pradeep Thorat on behalf of the original defendant/
applicant herein, made his submissions:-
(i) Mr. Thorat submitted that the suit premises was owned and
belonged to Ram Gopal Badsiwal, the step brother of the plaintiff
no.2. And the said fact can be seen from the consent terms entered
into between the plaintiff no.2 and Mr. Ram Gopal Badsiwal (the
stepbrother of the plaintiff no.2). Therefore, the Trial Court had
rightly held that the relationship of the landlord and the tenant
Sharada
907-CRA-240-2023.doc
between the parties had not been established. Hence, a suit under
the Rent Act for eviction was not maintainable. However, the
Appellate Court without considering the facts on record had
reversed the decree passed by the Trial Court.
(ii) Mr. Thorat further submitted that the demand notice was
never served upon the defendant. Hence, decree on the ground of
arrears of rent, could have never been passed.
(iii) Mr. Thorat further submitted that there was no question of
defendant depositing rent in the Court as there was no relationship
of landlord and tenant between the parties.
(iv) He further submitted that in the second written statement
dated 17 February 2011 the defendant has categorically disputed
that the plaintiff is not an absolute owner.
(v) Mr. Thorat further submitted that there was no subletting on
behalf of the original tenant as Gulabchand Vrahaspati and
Subhashchand Vrahaspati were the nephews of the original
tenants and they were helping the tenant in his business. Both
Gulabchand and Subhaschand had lost their father. Therefore they
were the responsibility and in care of their uncle, (the tenant).
Therefore, there can't be any subtenancy in favour of the nephews
of the tenant. Therefore, there was no ground of subletting.
(vi) Mr. Thorat further submitted that if there is any change in
the premises for the betterment of the premises, then it will not
amount to change of a permanent nature in the suit premises.
(vii) Mr. Thorat further submitted that the Commissioner Report
Sharada
907-CRA-240-2023.doc
is neither supported by any evidence nor the Commissioner has
been examined by putting him into the witness box to prove his
report.
(viii) Mr. Thorat in support of his submissions, relied upon three
authorities :-
(a) Bijendranath Bhargava Vs. Harsh Wardhan, reported in 1988
(1) SCC 454,
(b) Venkatlal Pitte vs. Bright Bros. (Pvt.) Ltd, reported in 1987
(3) SCC 558 and
(c) Judgment of Bombay High Court in Sukhlal Chunilal
Bhagani vs. Harish Suvarne, reported in 1998 (5) Bom. C. R. 266.
11. In response Mrs. Beejal Chowlara made her submissions on
behalf of the respondents / landlords:-
(i) Mrs. Chowlara submitted that both the Courts concurrently
held that the grounds of subletting had been proved. So also the
grounds of additions and alterations has been proved. The trial
Court did not grant the decree of possession only on the basis that
relationship of landlord and tenant was not proved by the plaintiff.
However, the Appellate Court has rightly held that the relationship
of the landlord and tenant existed as regards to the suit premises
and by concurrently holding that the grounds of additions and
alterations had been proved. So also the grounds of arrears of rent
having been proved, the Appellate Court had rightly decreed the
suit for possession.
(ii) Mrs. Chowlara submitted that the demand notice was rightly
Sharada
907-CRA-240-2023.doc
sent at the last known address of the defendant. The defendant did
not reply to the said notice, and amongst other grounds the suit
filed on the ground of arrears of rent, the defendant did not come
forward and deposit rent in Court.
(iii) Mrs. Chowlara further submitted that as far as additions and
alterations are concerned, both the Courts had concurrently held
that the grounds of additions and alterations had been duly proved
by the plaintiff. She further submitted that the plaintiff had
examined three witnesses and proved that the defendant had
made additions and alterations of permanent nature in the suit
premises.
(iv) Mrs. Chowlara further submitted that the plaintiff had
examined his witness and had submitted that the defendant had
subletted Shop No.3 to a third party. She further submitted that all
the licences of the suit premises were in the name of the third
party and not in the name of the defendant. She further submitted
that this was enough to prove that there was subletting of the suit
premises. She submitted that the case put up by the defendant that
the persons to whom the subletting was done were like his sons.
However, no such document was brought on record to prove that
there was any kind of an adoption. So also the fact that the
licences were transferred in the name of the said three nephews
proved that there was subletting.
(v) Mrs. Chowlara further submitted that the suit was filed by
the plaintiffs. Plaintiff no.1 being the mother of plaintiff no.2 and
as the plaintiff no.1 had died during the pendency of the suit,
Sharada
907-CRA-240-2023.doc
therefore, the suit was continued only by plaintiff no.2. She further
submitted that in a suit between plaintiff no.2 and the step
brother, there was a decree passed but further there was an
agreement between both the parties, when there was exchange of
the premises. The suit premises came in favor of plaintiff no.2 and
the first and the second premises went in the share of the step
brother of the plaintiff. She further submitted that this fact was
well known to the defendant as defendant was paying rent of the
suit premises to the plaintiff no.2. She further submitted that there
was no denial to this fact that the defendant was paying rent to the
plaintiff. She further submitted that in the proceedings for Rent Act
for eviction, what is contemplated is a relationship of the landlord
and the tenant and there is no need that a person should be the
owner of the premises in order to file a suit for eviction as the Rent
Act contemplates that a person need not be the owner to file a suit
for eviction. She further submitted that in fact the defendant in the
written statement had never denied the title of the plaintiff. It was
only by way of document which the defendant titled as additional
written statement, when for the first time the title of the plaintiff
was questioned by the defendant. She further submitted that the
Appellate Court has rightly come to the finding that relationship of
the landlord and the tenant existed between the parties and
therefore a suit for eviction could be passed.
(vi) Mrs. Chowlara cited two judgments in support of her
submission :-
(a) Omprakash vs. Mishrilal reported in 1987 (1) SCC 458 and
(b) Dhulichand vs. Jagmender Dass, reported in
Sharada
907-CRA-240-2023.doc
1990 (1) SCC 169.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION:-
12. I have heard both the counsel. The counsel have taken me
through the documents on record including the impugned
judgments.
13. In the present suit, the grounds for eviction were 'arrears of
rent', 'additions and alterations of permanent nature' nuisance and
'subletting'. The plaintiff nos.1 and 2 had filed a suit for eviction
under the Rent Act and the plaintiff no.1 was the mother of the
plaintiff no.2 who died during the pendency of the suit. Therefore,
the suit was further conducted only by the plaintiff no.2, also as
L.R. of Plaintiff No.1. The defendant in the written statement has
not raised any kind of objection about the relationship between the
parties. However, by way of additional written statement, the
defendant raised the issue about the relationship between the
parties. The defendant contended that the suit premises was in a
building consisting of ground plus two floors and the plaintiff no.2
was the owner of first floor and the second floor as per the consent
decree passed in the suit filed by the plaintiff no.2 against his step
brother. It is pertinent to note here that after passing of the
consent decree in the suit, the parties i.e. the plaintiff no.2 in the
present proceedings and his step brother, they had entered into an
agreement whereby they had mutually amongst themselves had
agreed and had exchanged the premises. The ground floor
premises coming in the share of plaintiff no.2; and plaintiff no.2
who was owner of the premises of the first floor and the second
Sharada
907-CRA-240-2023.doc
floor gave away the said premises to the step brother. It is an
admitted fact that the defendant was paying rent of the suit
premises to the plaintiff No.1. after there was exchange of
premises between the plaintiff no.2 and his step brother. Even in
the written statement no such objection was taken by the
defendant and only by way of subsequent written statement, such
an objection was raised. In para no.4 of Written Statement dated
27 November 2007, the defendant mentioned that, "The
Defendant says that inspite of repeated requests, the Plaintiff no.2
did not give the particulars regarding permitted increases." It also
needs to borne in mind, that plaintiff no.2, is son of plaintiff no.1,
who continued with the suit also as legal heir of plaintiff no.1.
According to me, the Appellate Court has rightly come to the
conclusion that the plaintiff had proved the relationship between
the parties that being of landlord and tenant in respect of the suit
premises. Therefore, according to me, there is no reason to
interfere with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court being
the last fact finding Court.
14. As regards the ground of 'subletting', both the Court had
concurrently held that the plaintiff had proved the ground of
subletting. It is the case of the plaintiff that the defendant had
sublet Shop No.3 in favour of his two nephews. The defendant
came up with the case that there cannot be subletting in favour of
the nephews as a matter of fact the nephews who were just
helping the original tenant in his business. It is the matter of
record that the licence of the suit premises were transferred in the
name of the nephews of the original tenant. If for the sake of
Sharada
907-CRA-240-2023.doc
argument it is presumed that the nephews were just helping the
original defendant in his business, there was no need to transfer
the licence of the suit premises in favour of the nephews. The
written Statement dated 27 November 2007, is signed by nephew
of tenant. The second and third Written Statement are signed by
another nephew of the tenant.
15. The Supreme Court in case of Omprakash (supra) has held
that subletting can even be by handing over possession of the
premises in favour of the nephews. Para No.31 of the said
judgment reads as under:-
(31) Viz-a-vis the aspect of sub-letting, we are inclined to
concur with the finding of the Trial Court that Motichand,, who
was the nephew of the original defendant,, had been inducted in
the suit premises as a sub-tenant. Further as it is a matter of record
that the original defendant had constructed his own house
elsewhere where he has been residing with his wife, the
accommodation of his nephew Motichand in the suit premises did
amount to sub-letting and the same having been done without the
knowledge and approval of the landlords, this too provided a
ground for his eviction therefrom. Additionally, even if the deposit
of arrears of rent in full by the original defendant at the time of
institution of the suit is construed to be valid, in the face of his own
house elsewhere, he is not entitled to the protection from eviction
under the proviso to sub-section 4 of Section 20. To be elaborate,
under sub-section 4 of Section 20, as referred to herein above, if a
tenant, at the first hearing of the suit, unconditionally pays or
tenders to the landlord the entire amount of rent and damages for
use and occupation of the building due from him together with
interest thereon @ 9% per annum and the landlords' costs of the
suit in respect thereof, after deducting therefrom any amount
already deposited by the tenant under sub-section 1 of Section 30,
the court may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that
ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for
eviction on the ground of default. The proviso thereto predicates
that this benefit would not be available to a tenant who or any
member of his family has built or has otherwise acquired in a
vacant state, or has got vacated after acquisition, any residential
building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area.
Apart from the fact that no evidence is forthcoming to attest that
Sharada
907-CRA-240-2023.doc
the requirements of sub-section 4 of Section 20 had been fully
complied with, the construction of his own house elsewhere, as is
evident from the record, did dis-entitle the original defendant and
now the respondents to avail the benefit of such protection, as
contemplated by the Act.
16. Supreme Court in the judgment of Dhulichand (supra) has
held that tenant allowing his relative to do business in the suit
premises would also amount to subletting. Paragraph Nos 4 and 5
of the said judgment reads as under:-
(4) The facts in this case as found by the Rent Control
Tribunal which was accepted by the High Court are that the
concern M/s Hira Lal Sri Bhagwan is the sole proprietary
concern of Sri Bhagwan, that Sri Bhagwan has been carrying on
that business in the premises in dispute, that Duli Chand-tenant
had no interest in the business, that Sri Bhagwan is in exclusive
possession of the property, that tenant-Duli Chand works at
another shop, M/s Aggarwal Hardware and Mills Stores with his
younger son, that there was no plea of concurrent user of the
premises by the tenant nor there is any plea that Sri Bhagwan is
a licensee, that occasionally the tenant-Duli Chand was seen
sitting in the shop and that the tenant had not retained any
control over the same. These facts clearly support the finding of
Appellate Tribunal and High Court that the tenant had parted
with legal possession of the shop to the said Sri Bhagwan.
(5) The learned counsel for the appellant, however,
contended that Sri Bhagwan was not the adopted son of Hira Lal
and that by permitting the son to carry on business it could not
be stated that he had parted with the legal possession of the
premises. In this connection, he drew our attention to the
decision of this Court in Lakshman Singh Kothari v. Smt. Rup
Kanwar1 wherein this Court had held that in order that an
adoption may be valid under Hindu law there must be a formal
ceremony of giving and taking by the natural parent and the
adopted parent after exercising their volition to give and take
the boy in adoption and that such an evidence of a valid
adoption is not available in this case. The Appellate Tribunal and
the High Court have dealt with the evidence available in this
case in detail and came to the conclusion that Sri Bhagwan was
adopted by Hira Lal. It is not necessary for us to rely on the
evidence available or the findings as proof of a valid adoption
under Hindu law but the evidence and the findings are enough
to show that though Duli Chand and Sri Bhagwan are father and
1 (1962) 1 SCR 477: AIR 1961 SC 1378
Sharada
907-CRA-240-2023.doc
natural son, it is not possible to invoke any presumption that
they constituted a Joint Hindu Family. It may also be mentioned
that in the written statement the tenant had not pleaded
specifically that he and Sri Bhagwan, constituted a Hindu Jooint
Family, that they are in joint possession,, that either the business
is joint family business or Sri Bhagwan was permitted to use the
premises for carrying on any business as licensee remaining in
joint possession. The evidence on adoption is thus to be treated
only relevant for the purpose of considering the question
whether the tenant has not retained any control over the
premises and that he has parted with the possession, and we do
think that the courts below erred in relying on the same for this
purpose.
[Emphasis Supplied]
According to me the landlord has succeeded in proving the
said ground of 'subletting'. In the light of above analysis in my
opinion there is no need to interfere with the concurrent findings
recorded by both the Court.
17. Both the courts have concurrently held that the tenant had
made "additions and alterations in the suit premises". For that
purpose the tenanted, the landlord has examined its witness. The
said witness had given his evidence that the tenant had made
additions and alterations by removing the walls of the three suit
premises and making the three shop premises into one. So also
there was encroachment made by the tenant. Therefore the
original size of the suit premises was increased by the tenant. In
such a case, it was a clear case of additions and alterations of
permanent nature. Therefore in my opinion both the Courts have
rightly come to the conclusion that there were additions and
alterations made in the suit premises.
Sharada
907-CRA-240-2023.doc
17.1 In Brijendra Nath (Supra), the facts were that the eviction
ground was of material alternation in suit premises without
permission. The material alteration pleaded was of balcony of
wooden construction. During the pendency of suit the Landlord
had sold the premises, therefore the new Landlord was aware of
the pending suit, therefore it was contended that the new Landlord
indirectly purchased the litigation. So also in non-examination of
earlier Landlord it was recorded that, "no notice was given for the
reason that the Defendant had said that when they would vacate
the show room they would remove the balcony. On their saying so,
I did not have any objection about the balcony. On the eastern side
there is a window. I do not know its length and breadth. This is
correct that this window was constructed in the year 1964. The
cost of construction of the window amounting to Rs.199.85/- has
been paid by me to the defendant. The balcony gets right and air
through this window". In this circumstance, the Supreme Court
held that the wooden structure does not amount to material
alteration which could give a cause of action of eviction. In the
judgment of Venktlal Pittie (supra), the permanent structure
alleged were construction of lofts, several rooms and construction
of pillars and stanchions into the flooring. The Trial Court and the
Appellate Court had granted eviction decree of the tenant on the
ground of permanent construction. However, High Court reversed
the concurrent findings of the Courts below. Supreme Court set
aside the Judgment and Order of the High Court and restored the
order of the Appellate Bench of Small Causes, there by granting
Sharada
907-CRA-240-2023.doc
order for possession and mesne profits.
17.2 Supreme Court, in the above judgment, has restored the
order of possession. However, there are observation on how the
question whether the structure is a permanent or not should be
judged. Considering the facts involved in the present case the trial
Court and Appellate Court have held in my opinion interference
under Section 115 of CPC is unwarranted.
17.3 The facts in the judgment of Single Judge of Bombay High
Court Shubhlal Chunilal Ghagani (supra), were quite different.
The Trial Court had deserve the suit on grounds of arrears and
permanent alterations, however the Appellate Court had reversed
the findings of Trial Court, thereby dismissing the suit, High Court
while confirming the findings of Appellate Court, held that it was
not even the allegation of the landlord that because of the alleged
alterations, any damage is caused to the findings or its utility is
impaired in any way.
Since, the facts in the above judgment were quite different,
then the present proceedings, the observation made in the above
judgment will not be applicable to the present proceedings.
18. As regards the ground of arrears of rent, the Appellate Court
has held that the notice was rightly sent to the defendant at the
last known address and therefore it should be presumed that the
notice was duly served upon the defendant. Admittedly the
demand notice which sent by the landlord was addressed to the
last known address of the defendant and there was no reply to the
said notice.
Sharada
907-CRA-240-2023.doc
19. In fact, the Trial Court in its judgment has held that the
demand notice was served upon the defendant but considering the
non existence of the relationship of the landlord and tenant, the
landlord is not entitled to claim rent from the defendant. The
Appellate Court has considered the fact that the notice was duly
exhibited and the notice was sent at the last known address of the
defendant. The notice being returned with remark "Not Claimed".
The Appellate Court further considered that admittedly the
defendant has not deposited any rent in the Court. Therefore, the
ground of eviction of arrears in rent is duly proved. Bombay High
Court in the judgment of Krishna Ramchandra Jadav Vs. Smt.
Shankar Ajmal 2 held that notice packet returning with remark
"unclaimed", 'intimation' and 'not claimed', it should be presumed
that the notice is served. In another judgment of Bombay High
Court in Tirathdas Pokhardas Kalda vs. Suribai Assumal
Moolchandani and Ors3 it was held that notice packet returned
back with endorsement like "not claimed" or "unclaimed or nor
found', it is apparent that initial burden is upon person sending
notice to show that he did all that was necessary to get notice
served upon other side. Once he establishes this, the burden shifts
to other side to show that the endorsement are incorrect.
Therefore, I am of the opinion that there is no need for me to
interfere with the findings recorded by the Appellate Court.
20. In view of my findings recorded above, in my view no case is
made out by the tenant to interfere with the judgment and decree
passed by the Appellate Court, hence, in my judgment there is no
2 2005 (4) Mh.L.J. 577
3 2007 (2) Mh.L.J. 307
Sharada
907-CRA-240-2023.doc
force in the submissions made by the tenant and this Civil Revision
Application must fail and is hence dismissed. No cost.
(RAJESH S. PATIL, J.)
At this stage, advocate for the applicant seeks stay to the
execution of this judgment. The request made by the applicant is
opposed by the landlord's counsel. The suit is of the year 2005
and the landlord is not able to enjoy the fruits of the decree. The
request made by the advocate for the applicant for stay is hence
rejected.
(RAJESH S. PATIL, J.)
Sharada
