Bombay High Court
Sri Sri Ravishankar Vidya Mandir ... vs Government Of India Through Its ... on 8 September, 2023
Bench: Mangesh S. Patil, Shailesh P. Brahme
2023:BHC-AUG:19497-DB
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO. 7861 OF 2020
Sri Sri Ravishankar Vidya Mandir,
Jadhavwadi Road,
Hatladevi Campus, Osmanabad
Through its Head Master
Kiran Dattatraya Ghodke
Age : 31 years, Occu: Service,
R/o C/o Sri Sri Ravishankar
Vidya Mandir, Jadhavwadi Road,
Hatladevi Campus, Osmanabad. .. Petitioner
Versus
1. Government of India,
Through its Under Secrtary
Ministry of Human Resource
Development Department of School
Education and Literacy.
2. The State of Maharashtra
Through its Secretary,
School Education & Sports Department,
Mantralaya, Mumbai.
3. The Commissioner,
Maharashtra State Examination Council,
17, Dr. Ambedkar Road, Near Lal Deul,
Pune. .. Respondents
Shri Santosh S. Jadhavar, Advocate for the Petitioner.
Shri Bhushan B. Kulkarni, Standing Counsel for the Respondent
No. 1.
Shri A. S. Shinde, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 2.
Shri Anup P. Nikam, Advocate for the Respondent No. 3.
CORAM : MANGESH S. PATIL AND
SHAILESH P. BRAHME, JJ.
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CLOSED FOR JUDGMENT/ORDER ON : 21.08.2023
JUDGMENT/ORDER PRONOUNCED ON : 08.09.2023.
JUDGMENT (Per Shailesh P. Brahme, J.) :-
. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. With the consent
of parties heard learned counsel for respective parties for final
disposal.
2. By the present petition, the validity of Note I of clause 3(d)
of the brochure dated 14 March 2021 and clause 1.2 of the
revised guidelines of Central School National Means cum Merit
Scholarship Scheme (hereinafter referred as to the "Scholarship
Scheme" for the sake of brevity and convenience) are challenged.
Simultaneously, the petitioner is seeking declaration that the
students of unaided private schools are eligible to appear for
National Means cum Merit Scholarship examination. The
grievance of the petitioner is that the students of VIII standard
taking education in unaided private schools are not eligible for
appearing in the scholarship examination and they are deprived
of the scholarship scheme.
3. The petitioner is a recognized unaided private school
imparting secondary education. The respondent No. 1 issued
communication dated 20 April 2018 with revised guidelines of
Scholarship Scheme, thereby declaring the object of the scheme.
The guidelines provide the eligibility, procedure for selection and
overall implementation of the scheme. Its clause No. 1.2
provides for scholarship to students in Class IX from a
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Government, Government aided and local body schools. The
scheme proposed disbursement of scholarship to one lakh
students in entire nation. A quota of 11682 is earmarked for the
State of Maharashtra.
4. The respondent No. 3 published brochure for scholarship
scheme on 14 March 2021. It provides eligibility, modality of
conducting examination, declaration of results, etc. Its clause
No. 3(d) provides that the students taking education in unaided
schools, central schools, Jawahar Navodaya schools, students
having availed the benefits of government hostel, mess and
education and Military schools are ineligible for the scholarship.
The ineligibility of students of the private schools stipulated by
clause 3 is under challenge in the present petition.
5. It is averred by the petitioner that the representations are
made to the respondents to hold its students eligible for
scholarship examination. However, there is no response to the
representations. The schools in the vicinity also made written
request to permit the students of private unaided schools to
appear for scholar examination. Their common ground was that
the promising and poor meritorious students need financial
assistance and encouragement.
6. The petitioner has placed on record a communication
issued by the respondent No. 3 on 03.02.2020 addressing the
Head Masters of private unaided schools reiterating the
ineligibility of the students. Under the above factual matrix, the
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petitioner has approached this Court.
7. The respondent No. 3 has filed affidavit in reply contesting
the pleadings and the relief of the petitioner. The respondent
No. 1 has also filed separate affidavit in reply disclosing that the
scholarship scheme was finalized on the recommendation of Over
sight Committee on implementation of new reservation policy in
the higher education with the approval of cabinet committee. It
is contended that objective of the scheme is to award scholarship
to meritorious students of economically weaker sections to arrest
their drop out at Class VIII and to encourage them to continue
the education. It is pleaded in para No. 3 of the reply that if the
private school students are permitted to compete with the
eligible students for scholarship examination, then percentage of
students from Government, Government aided and local body
schools would be reduced remarkably.
8. It is further stated in reply that in order to prevent the
dropout of the students after elementary education for want of
financial resources by the meritorious students, the scheme of
awarding scholarship is aimed at. There are further schemes
available for the students studying in Class X of the unaided
schools namely National Talent Research Scheme and Central
Sector Scheme of Scholarships for colleges and university
students for those who have completed Class XII. Therefore, it is
contended that the challenge in the writ petition has no merit
and liable to be dismissed.
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9. By interim order the petitioner was called upon to place on
record the list of students from poverty stricken background.
Accordingly, list is placed on record. They are admitted by the
petitioner school through 25% of the quota as per Section 12 of
the Right of the Child to Free and Compulsory Education Act,
2009 (for the sake of brevity hereinafter referred as to the 'Act of
2009')
10. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
clause No. 3(d)(i) of the Brochure and clause 1.2 of the guidelines
do not stand to the test of intelligible differetia. Exclusion of
students of unaided school is arbitrary. The impugned clauses of
the policy are unreasonable and patently illegal. There are
students admitted in the private schools from economically
weaker strata. Such talented students are deprived of the
benefits of scholarship scheme. As per Sec. 12 of the Act of 2009,
the petitioner school has admitted the students, who are
undisputedly from financially weaker section of the society.
11. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that
there is no rational in excluding the talented students from
weaker section of the unaided school from appearing for the
scholarship examination and the scholarship benefits. The fees
which is charged in the petitioner school is moderate and
regulated by the competent authority. It is not always that the
students taking education in the private school are affluent. The
object sought to be achieved by the policy of N.M.C.C. scheme is
frustrated because of the impugned clauses. It is submitted that
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when there is rider of income of parent of a student, restriction
incorporated in clause No. 1.2 on the basis of class of the school is
contrary to the scheme, which is unjust and irrational.
According to him two classes created because of the scheme is
unsustainable in the eyes of law.
12. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the
following judgments.
(i) Dr. Kriti Lakhina and others Vs. State of Karnataka and
others reported in AIR 2018 SC 1657.
(ii) Director General, CRPF and others Vs. Janardan Singh
and others reported in AIR 2018 SC 3101.
13. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would
submit that the scholarship scheme was formulated by the
competent authority. It is based on the recommendations of
Oversight Committee on the implementation of new reservation
policy in higher education which is an expert body. The
impugned clauses are not shown to be violative of any statutory
provisions of law. There are other scholarship schemes available
for the students studying in private unaided schools or the
colleges. It is submitted that there is intelligible differetia to
exclude the students of the private schools which cannot be said
to be discriminatory or unconstitutional.
14. The learned counsel Mr. Bhushan Kulkarni, appearing for
the respondent No. 1 has placed reliance on the following
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judgments of the Supreme Court and this Court.
(a) Judgment dated 21.09.2020 passed by the Division Bench
of this Court in Writ Petition No. 5896 of 2020 in the
matter of Mansi d/o Narayan Gaikwad Vs. Union of India
and others.
(b) Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher
Secondary Education and another Vs. Paritosh
Bhupeshkumar Sheth and others reported in (1984) 4 SCC
27.
(c) Federation Haj PTOs of India Vs. Union of India reported
in 2019 (2) Bom. C.R. 557 .
15. We have heard Mr. Santosh Jadhavar, learned counsel for
the petitioner, Mr. Bhushan Kulkarni learned counsel for the
respondent No. 1, Mr. Shinde, learned Assistant Government
Pleader for the respondent No. 2 and Mr. Nikam, the learned
counsel for the respondent No. 3.
16. It can be seen from the affidavit in reply of the respondent
No. 1 and the letter dated 20 April 2018, which is at Exhibit - A
of the paper book of the petition that the aim and object of the
scholarship scheme is to award scholarships to the meritorious
students of economically weaker section to arrest their dropout
at Class VIII and to encourage them to continue the study at
secondary stage. The Finance Minister in his budget speech of
28.02.2007 has announced a national means cum merit
scholarship to award one lakh scholarships each year. Initially it
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was Rs. 6,000/- per annum to be disbursed towards scholarship
for a student to nurture the talent from the excluded section. The
scheme in question needs funding and an amount of Rs. 750
crores was earmarked from 2008 - 2009 onwards. The scheme of
funding for scholarship was approved by expenditure finance
committee. The scheme was floated on the basis of
recommendations of experts in the field of education department
and finance department.
17. Subsequently, the amount of scholarship was enhanced
from 6,000/- to Rs. 12,000/- per annum, the annual income of the
parents of a student to be eligible for the examination is also
enhanced from Rs. 1,50,000/- to Rs. 3,50,000/-. It is seen from
the record that each state has been allotted a particular quota of
scholarships. For Maharashtra 11682 students are earmarked
for disbursing the scholarship in a year. The scheme in question
has financial repercussions. It is not pointed out by the learned
counsel for the petitioner that the clauses under challenge are
violative of any statutory provisions.
18. The respondent No. 1 is competent to formulate the policy.
The required budgetary provisions are also made. The experts in
the field have deliberated and recommended the policy. The
scholarship scheme casts a financial burden, therefore, it is the
prerogative of the respondent No. 1 to lay down the eligibility
criteria for awarding the scholarship to the students. It is the
wisdom of the respondent No. 1 to determine a class of students
to whom financial assistance is to be extended. We are afraid,
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we can not dictate terms in policy matters to the State
Government.
19. The respondent No. 1 has formulated the policy of
scholarship scheme to be made applicable to particular students
only. The students taking education (a) in unaided school, (b)
central school/Jawahar Navodaya school (c) students having
availed hostel facilities of the government, mess and education
facilities and (e) military schools are excluded from appearing for
the scholarship examination. We do not find any infirmity or
want of competency to formulate above criteria.
20. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that
there is no intelligible differntia and rationale relation to the
object sought to be achieved by the policy in question. The
classification is founded on the financial position of the student
or the parent. Normally, the students taking education in the
Government, Government aided and local body schools are from
moderate to low income group. A tendency of the students of
dropping out is detected by the experts and the reason is non
availability of financial resources. In order to encourage them to
continue the study at a secondary stage, the scheme is aimed at.
The excluded category of the student represent a picture that the
students or their parents of unaided schools, central school,
parents of a unaided school are comparatively of economically
sound income group. They can afford to prosecute the study and
the financial assistance is not required. There are less chances
of dropping out of such students.
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21. For examining the policy on the touchstone of permissible
classification two conditions are laid down by the Constitution
Bench matter in the matter of Budhan Choudhary Vs. State of
Bihar reported in AIR 1955 S.C. 191. We are of the considered
view that both the conditions in the present matter are fulfilled.
Consciously the respondent No. 1 created two classes and it is
the wisdom of the respondent No. 1 not to disburse the
scholarship throughout country irrespective of nature of the
school, because it involves availability of the funds. The
respondents are the best persons to decide and determine how to
spend and where to spend its corpus. The Court of law cannot
insist the respondent No. 1 to formulate policy involving
financial liability in a particular manner.
22. While examining the validity of policy of government we
have limited scope. High Court cannot substitute the policy
decision of the government. Neither can we suggest what is best
suitable to the situation. It has to be left to the wisdom of the
respondent No. 1. In the absence of any violation of the statutory
provision or arbitrariness, the High Court has very little role to
monitor the policies of the Government.
23. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that
all the students in the private schools are not affluent and they
are also from the weaker strata of the society. It is demonstrated
that the fee structure in the petitioner school is moderate and
affordable. A reference is also made to Section 12 of the Act of
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2009. There is no dispute that every year 25% of the seats are to
be admitted from economically weaker section of the society. The
students from 25% of the quota are definitely in need of financial
assistance. No fees is chargeable from them. The private
management is entitled to reimbursement of the fees. Just
because these 25% of the students are from weaker section does
not lead to violation of principles of equality or reasonableness.
It is up to the respondent No. 1 to take care of students from
economically weaker section. The manner and mechanism has to
be left to the respondent No. 1 to be formulated.
24. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the objective of the
scholarship scheme is not only to provide the financial succor to
the weaker section of the society, but to arrest the dropout and to
encourage them to go for secondary education. We are of the
considered view that the State Government has taken care of the
need of financial help to this quota of 25% by disbursing the
tution fees to the managements. Therefore, the arguments of the
learned counsel for the petitioner. in respect of 25% quota cannot
be countenanced.
25. The petitioner has relied upon the judgment in the matter
of Dr. Kriti Lakhina and others Vs. State of Karnataka and
others cited supra. In that case directly petition under Article 32
of the Constitution was filed before the Supreme Court. The
eligibility criteria for post graduation in the medical college was
under consideration. The law laid down by the Supreme Court is
undisputed. But that cannot be made applicable to the facts and
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situation of the matter at hand.
26. Another judgment cited by the petitioner in the matter of
Director General, CRPF and others Vs. Janardan Singh and
others supra also does not apply to the facts of the present case.
The respondent in that case was granted special allowance
considering the place of serving in North-Eastern region by the
Central Administrative Tribunal. Emanating from that the
matter had reached the Supreme Court. In paragraph No 18 the
principles of intelligible differentia are reiterated with reference
to the constitution bench judgment of the Supreme Court. We
have tested the validity of the impugned clauses to the
touchstone of those principles.
27. The learned counsel Mr. Bhushan Kulkarni referred case of
Mansi d/o Narayan Gaikwad Vs. Union of India and others
(supra) in which the challenge was to the eligibility of the
candidate to appear for compartment examination. The
regulations are framed stipulating the eligibility. The reliance
was placed on the judgment of Maharashtra State Board of
Secondary and Higher Secondary Education and another Vs.
Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth and others (supra) and the
petition was dismissed holding that the experts in the field have
framed the policy and accordingly made amendment in the
examination bye-laws of the C.B.S.C. on the basis of which
circular in question was issued. The principles which are laid in
the judgment, are equally applicable for the policies of the
Government. We have no hesitation to hold that the
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classification which is appearing in the present petition is
reasonable and does not suffer vice of arbitrariness interalia not
violative of article 226 of the Constitution of India.
28. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has relied
upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of
Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary
Education and another Vs. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth and
others (supra). A delegated legislation was under challenge in
that matter. The relevant consideration for examining the
validity of the subordinate legislation are stipulated in
paragraph No. 14, 16 and 22. The restriction on the powers of
the High Court while examining the validity of delegated
legislation are laid down in the judgment. The same restriction
with equal force are applicable to the policies of the Government.
We are of the considered view that we cannot substitute our
views for that of the respondent No. 1 as to which policy would
best serve the object and purpose of the scheme and cannot sit in
judgment over the wisdom and effectiveness or otherwise of the
policy adopted by the respondent No. 1 and declare it as ultra
virus merely on the ground that the impugned clauses will not
serve the object and purpose of the act.
29. The guiding principles laid in para No. 16 of the above
judgment are as follows :
16. In our opinion, the aforesaid approach made by
the High Court is wholly incorrect and fallacious. The Court
cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the policy evolved
by the legislature and the subordinate regulation-making
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body. It may be a wise policy which will fully effectuate the
purpose of the enactment or it may be lacking in effectiveness
and hence calling for revision and improvement. But any
drawbacks in the policy incorporated in a rule or regulation will
not render it ultra vires and the Court cannot strike it down on
the ground that, in its opinion, it is not a wise or prudent
policy, but is even a foolish one, and that it will not really
serve to effectuate the purposes of the Act. The legislature and
its delegate are the sole repositories of the power to decide
what policy should be pursued in relation to matters covered
by the Act and there is no scope for interference by the Court
unless the particular provision impugned before it can be said
to suffer from any legal infirmity, in the sense of its being
wholly beyond the scope of the regulation-making power or its
being inconsistent with any of the provisions of the parent
enactment or in violation of any of the limitations imposed by
the Constitution. None of these vitiating factors are shown to
exist in the present case and hence there was no scope at all
for the High Court to invalidate the provision contained in
clause (3) of Regulation 104 as ultra vires on the grounds of
its being in excess of the regulation-making power conferred
on the Board. Equally untenable, in our opinion, is the next
and last ground by the High Court for striking down clause (3)
of Regulation 104 as unreasonable, namely, that it is in the
nature of a bye-law and is ultra vires on the ground of its
being an unreasonable provision. It is clear from the scheme
of the Act and more particularly, Section 18, 19 and 34 that
the legislature has laid down in broad terms its policy to
provide for the establishment of a State Board and Divisional
Boards to regulate matters pertaining to secondary and higher
secondary education and it has authorised the State
Government in the first instance and subsequently the Board
to enunciate the details for carrying into effect the purposes of
the Act by framing regulations. It is a common legislative
practice that the legislature may choose to lay down only the
general policy and leave to its delegate to make detailed
provisions for carrying into effect the said policy and effectuate
the purposes of the Statute by framing rules/regulations which
are in the nature of subordinate legislation. Sec. 3(39) of the
Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904, which defines the 'rule'
states: Rule shall mean a rule made in exercise of the power
under any enactment and shall include any regulation made
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under a rule or under any enactment." It is important to notice
that a distinct power of making bye-laws has been conferred
by the Act on the State Board under Section 38. The
legislature has thus maintained in the Statute in question a
clear distinction between 'bye-laws' and 'regulations'. The bye-
laws to be framed under Section 38 are to relate only to
procedural matters concerning the holding of meetings of
State Board, Divisional Boards and the Committee, the
quorum required, etc More important matters affecting the
rights of parties and laying down the manner in which the
provisions of the Act are to be carried into effect have been
reserved to be provided for by regulations made under Section
36. The legislature, while enacting Sections 36 and 38, must
be assumed to have been fully aware of the niceties of the
legal position governing the distinction between
rules/regulations properly so called and bye-laws. When the
statute contains a clear indication that the distinct regulation-
taking power conferred under Section 36 was not intended as
a power merely to frame bye-laws, it is not open to the Court
to ignore the same and treat the regulations made under
Section 36 as mere bye-laws in order to bring them within the
scope of justiciability by applying the test of reasonableness.
30. The last judgment cited by the respondent No. 1 is in the
matter of Federation Haj PTOs of India Vs. Union of India cited
supra is also squarely applicable to the present case. We are
bound to follow the restriction described on the Court while
considering the validity of the policies of the Government. A
useful reference can be made to the para No. 19, which is
reproduced below.
19) The scope of judicial review is very limited in
such matters. It is only when a particular policy
decision is found to be against a statute or it offends
any of the provisions of the Constitution or it is
manifestly arbitrary, capricious or mala fide, the court
would interfere with such policy decisions. No such
case is made out. On the contrary, views of the
petitioners have not only been considered but
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accommodated to the extent possible and permissible.
We may, at this junction, recall the following
observations from the judgment in Maharashtra State
Board of Secondary & Higher Secondary Education v.
Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth:
"16... The Court cannot sit in judgment over the
wisdom of the policy evolved by the Legislature and
the subordinate regulation-making body. It may be a
wise policy which will fully effectuate the purpose of
the enactment or it may be lacking in effectiveness and
hence calling for revision and improvement. But any
drawbacks in the policy incorporated in a rule or
regulation will not render it ultra vires and the Court
cannot strike it down on the ground that in its opinion,
it is not a wise or prudent policy, but is even a foolish
one, and that it will not really serve to effectuate the
purposes of the Act. The Legislature and its delegate
are the sole repositories of the power to decide what
policy should be pursued in relation to matters covered
by the Act and there is no scope for interference by the
Court unless the particular provision impugned before
it can be said to suffer from any legal infirmity, in the
sense of its being wholly beyond the scope of the
regulation-making power or its being inconsistent with
any of the provisions of the parent enactment or in
violation of any of the limitation imposed by the
Constitution."
31. Considering the scope and the restrictions deducible from
the judgments referred to above, we are of the view that the
impugned clauses cannot be disturbed in exercise of writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
32. Before parting with the judgment we express our sympathy
with the cause espoused by the petitioner. The bona-fides of the
petitioner cannot be doubted. We are not oblivious of the fact
that in private schools there are students of the parents having
low income and they need financial assistance and inspiration to
prosecute further education. However, it is for the Government
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to take a decision.
33. For the reasons assigned above, we are constrained to hold
that the petition is sans merit. The writ petition is dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs. Rule is discharged.
[ SHAILESH P. BRAHME, J.] [ MANGESH S. PATIL, J.]
bsb/Sept. 23
