Bombay High Court
Trustees Of Swati Education vs N.K. Shah And 2 Ors on 14 March, 2023
Bench: N. J. Jamadar
22-WPL-2392-22.DOC
Sayali Upasani
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.- 2392 OF 2022
Trustees of Swati Education Trusts Smt. ...Petitioner
J.B. Khot High School No. 2
Vs.
N. K. Shah and Ors ...Respondents
Mr.Pankaj M. Patel, for Petitioner.
Mr. B.S. Nayak, for Respondent No. 1.
Mr. S.B. Gore, AGP for Respondent No. 2.
CORAM:- N. J. JAMADAR, J.
RESERVED ON:- 6th MARCH, 2023
PRONOUNCED ON:- 14th MARCH, 2023
JUDGMENT:-
1) Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally.
2) By this Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, the Petitioner takes exception to the judgment and order
dated 29th June, 2020, passed by the learned Presiding Officer,
School Tribunal, Mumbai, in Appeal No. 27 of 2019, whereby and
whereunder the Appeal preferred by the respondent No. 1 came
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to be allowed by setting aside the order of dismissal from service
dated 14th September, 2019 with direction to reinstate the
respondent No. 1 and pay backwages to the extent of 60%.
3) Shorn of superfluities, background facts necessary for the
determination of this Petition can be stated as under:-
(a) Swati Education Trust, the petitioner, is a trust duly
registered under the Maharashtra Public Trust Act, 1950. The
petitioner - Trust runs, inter alia, Smt. J. B. Khot High School, a
recognized school. The respondent No. 1 was appointed as an
Assistant Teacher in the said school.
(b) Alleging that the respondent No. 1 was indulging in
delinquent activities, during the period of 2016 and 2017, two
separate memos were served on the respondent No. 1. By an
order dated 7th February, 2017, respondent No. 1 was placed
under suspension and chargesheet was served on the respondent
No. 1. During the pendency of the inquiry, the suspension was
revoked on 17th April, 2017.
(c) Post conclusion of inquiry, the Inquiry Committee
submitted a report on 1st June, 2019 and found respondent No. 1
guilty of insubordination and misconduct. Based on the findings
recorded by the Inquiry Committee, by an order dated 14 th
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September, 2019, a major penalty of dismissal from service was
imposed upon the respondent No. 1.
(d) Being aggrieved, the respondent No. 1 preferred an Appeal
under Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools
(Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 ("the MEPS Act").
(e) The learned Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, after
appraisal of the material on record and the submissions
canvassed before him, was persuaded to hold that the inquiry
was not fair, legal and proper. The findings recorded by the
Inquiry Committee were perverse and the penalty inflicted upon
the respondent No. 1 was also shockingly disproportionate. Thus
by the impugned judgment and order, the School Tribunal
quashed and set aside the order of dismissal and directed the
reinstatement of the respondent No. 1 in service with 60%
backwages.
4) Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order, the petitioner - Trust has invoked the Writ
jurisdiction of this Court.
5) I have heard Mr. Pankaj M. Patel, the learned Counsel for
the petitioner and Mr. B. S. Nayak, the learned Counsel for
respondent No. 1. With the assistance of the learned Counsel for
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the parties, I have perused the material on record and the
relevant documents.
6) Mr. Patel mounted a two-fold challenge to the impugned
judgment. Firstly, when the School Tribunal came to a finding
that the inquiry was vitiated on account of failure to comply with
the prescription contained in Rule 33 to 37 of the Maharashtra
Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rule, 1981
("the MEPS Rules"), it was incumbent upon the School Tribunal
to either provide an opportunity to the petitioner to hold a fresh
inquiry or itself hold an inquiry by providing an opportunity to
the petitioner to adduce evidence before the School Tribunal.
7) Secondly, the School Tribunal, according Mr. Patel,
committed a grave error in law in awarding 60% backwages in
the absence of pleading and proof on the part of respondent No.1
- employee that, in the intervening period, the respondent No. 1
was not gainfully employed. Mr. Patel would urge that what
accentuates the situation in the instant case is that the School
Tribunal was fully alive to the proposition of law that it was for
the employee to plead that she was not gainfully employed and
no affidavit that the respondent No. 1 had not been gainfully
employed was placed on record. Therefore, the impugned order
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deserves to be interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction,
urged Mr. Patel.
8) In contrast to this, the learned Counsel for the Respondent
No. 1 stoutly submitted that the challenge to the impugned order
on both the counts is misconceived. Inviting the attention of the
Court to the alleged perfunctory and slipshod manner in which
the Departmental Inquiry was conducted by the Inquiry
Committee, as adverted to by the learned Presiding Officer,
School Tribunal, it was urged that in the circumstances of the
case, the setting aside of the dismissal order and reinstatement
of the services of the respondent No. 1 was the only viable
option. It is not a case of a bona fide mistake or breach of
principles of natural justice of insignificant nature. The learned
Presiding Officer, School Tribunal has specifically observed that
the inquiry was vitiated from its inception to conclusion. In the
face of such finding, the learned Presiding Officer committed no
error in setting aside the order of dismissal whilst declining to
provide another opportunity to the petitioner to conduct a fresh
inquiry.
9) On the second count of challenge, the learned Counsel for
the respondent No. 1 countered the submissions that there was
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no assertion on the part of the respondent No. 1 that she was
not gainfully employed during the currency of the termination.
Attention of the Court was invited to an affidavit filed on behalf of
the respondent No. 1 seeking an amendment in the Appeal Memo
so as to incorporate the prayer of reinstatement in service. In the
said affidavit, a categorical statement was made that, after
passing of the impugned order, the respondent No. 1 had not
been serving elsewhere and earning therefrom. In the affidavit-
in-reply to the said application, it was denied by the petitioner
that the respondent No. 1 was not serving elsewhere. Therefore,
the petitioner can not be permitted to take advantage of a stray
observation in the impugned judgment that there was no
affidavit of respondent No. 1 not being gainfully employed, which
is not factually correct.
10) In view of the aforesaid submissions, whether a case to
interfere with the impugned judgment and order in exercise of
extraordinary writ jurisdiction is made out is required to be
considered in two parts. First, the grievance of the petitioner that
having found the inquiry to be vitiated the School Tribunal ought
to have either provided an opportunity to the petitioner to hold a
fresh inquiry or itself conducted the inquiry.
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11) In order to appreciate the aforesaid contention in a proper
perspective, it may be apposite to extract the observations of the
learned Presiding Officer, which bear upon the nature of the
inquiry and the infirmities therein.
" ........The inquiry proceeded defectively right from
the stage of issuing of the statement of allegations
till the conclusion of the inquiry by recording its
findings but without decision as to penalty. The
constitution of the inquiry committee was equally
defective. The proceeding of inquiry conducted
appeared to be not fair and proper offending every
provision and procedure under the Rules 33 to 37
of the MEPS Rules for inquiry in to the charges
ensuring the major penalty. Two memos were
issued to the appellant and on her reply the vague
charge sheet was issued to her. Two witnesses were
examined by the Management to prove the charges
against the appellant. One of these witnesses could
not be produced by the Management for his cross
examination. The appellant filed her statement of
defence and she was cross examined on such
statement of defence in a way foreign to the MEPS
Rules. The appellant was cross examined at length
and number of admissions were secured from her
by the Ld. Practicing advocate as Representative of
the Management. The reliance was placed on such
admissions of the appellant to prove her guilt. The
findings were recorded by the CEO of the inquiry
committee and the consensus was recorded by
other two members of the inquiry committee. The
nominee of the appellant appears to have not been
given any opportunity to record his findings on
inquiry. The findings of the inquiry committee
appear to be perverse. The penalty of dismissal
inflicted on the appellant appears to be shockingly
disproportionate. Therefore, the appellant is entitled
to the reliefs sought for. Section 10 of the MEPS
Rules empowers the tribunal with all powers of the
appellate Court under the CPC for the purpose of
admission, hearing and disposal for the appeal
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before this tribunal. Section 107 of the CPC
empowers the appellate court to decide the case
finally. It is the matter of record that the inquiry
could not be concluded within 120 days and it took
a length of time between 2017 to 2019 to have its
march. The charges against the appellant were not
specific but vague. The charges included even what
was not there in the memos issued to the appellant.
The inquiry was conducted at the cost of objectivity.
The charges did not appear to be so serious to
warrant the dismissal or other major penalty that is
reduction in rank. Therefore, there is no good cause
to remand the inquiry to the management to follow
the second inning of inquiry to go with the
appropriate procedure. There appears a substantial
cause to interfere with the impugned order of
dismissal of the appellant by the Management.
There appears an occasion to set aside the
impugned order of dismissal and direct the
reinstatement of the appellant... "
12) In fairness to Mr. Patel, it must be observed that Mr. Patel
did not make a serious endeavor to assail the aforesaid findings
of the learned Presiding Officer. The infirmities and infractions
which the learned Presiding Officer has highlighted in the
observations, extracted above, speak for themselves. It would be
difficult to urge that the learned Presiding Officer was not
justified in recording a scathing observation that the inquiry was
vitiated at every stage since inception till conclusion. Having
recorded such a finding, the learned Presiding Officer came to
the conclusion that there was no good cause to remand the
inquiry to the management and give a second chance.
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13) Whether the aforesaid approach of the learned Presiding
Officer is justifiable? Mr. Patel urged that it is well neigh settled
that where the inquiry is vitiated on account of the breach of
governing rules or principles of natural justice, a direction to
hold de novo inquiry ought to be given. The learned Presiding
Officer, in the case at hand, did not adhere to the said discipline.
14) It is trite that ordinarily when a Court or Tribunal records a
finding that inquiry was vitiated on account of breach of the
procedure prescribed for holding the inquiry or principles of
natural justice were infringed, an opportunity is given to the
employer to hold a fresh inquiry from the stage at which there
was breach of the rules or principles of natural justice. This,
however, does not seem to be an immutable rule of law to be
applied in every case, even where the Court or Tribunal finds
that the employee has been treated unfairly and the entire
proceeding betrays an intent to get rid of the employee at any
cost.
15) A useful reference in this context can be made to a
judgment of this Court in the case of Bhagwanrao s/o
Vishwanath Vyawhare and Another Vs. Sau. Sunita w/o
Gopinath Palve and Another1. In the said case, in the context of
1 2008 (1) Mh. L.J. 417
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allegations that there was violation of Rules 36, 37 and 38, while
upholding the order of the School Tribunal, this Court observed
that after subjecting the respondent No. 1 (employee) to the
rigmarole of a full fledged inquiry for a period of 10 months, it
would not be just and proper to relegate the matter to
management for holding a fresh inquiry. The manner in which
the petitioners had proceeded against the respondent No. 1 did
not inspire confidence and, therefore, the contention on behalf of
the respondent No. 1 that the petitioners were bent upon to
remove the respondent No. 1 by hook or crook appeared to be
well founded. In paragraph No. 10 of the said judgment, the
Court concluded as under:-
" ....It is pertinent that the School Tribunal also
considered the findings recorded by the Inquiry
Committee and has made observations in the
impugned order as regards the said findings. Since the
Tribunal has not followed either of the courses
contemplated in the judgment reported in 2004 (4) Mh.
L.J. p. 173, it would have to be held that the Tribunal
did not deem it fit to follow the said course in the facts
and circumstances of the instant case. For the reasons
stated earlier in this judgment the order of the Tribunal
cannot be faulted with. In that view of the matter, no
case for interference in the writ jurisdiction of this
Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is
made out...."
16) The aforesaid pronouncement was followed by another
Single Judge of this Court in the case of Rajashri Shahu
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Chhatrapati Shikshan Sanstha, Nagpur and Another Vs.
Mangala w/o Rajesh Mankar and Others 2. Observations in
Paragraph Nos. 21 and 22 are material and thus extracted
below:-
"21. In order to examine the said submission made on
behalf of the petitioners, it would be necessary to analyze
whether in every case where violation of principles of
natural justice and fundamental defects in the enquiry
are found, the Management/ employer is to be permitted
to hold a fresh enquiry. In this regard, the learned
counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 has correctly
relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of
Bhagwanrao s/o Vishwanath Vyawhare and another v.
Sau. Sunita w/o Gopinath Palve and another (supra). In
the said case also a similar question had arisen, because
the Management was insisting on its right to hold a de
novo enquiry while the employee contended that the
Management was hell bent upon removing her by hook
or crook and that the Court ought not to come to the
assistance of such a Management. In the said judgment,
this Court took into consideration the law pertaining to
the requirement of holding a de novo enquiry and found
that in every case the Management could not be
permitted to hold a de novo enquiry and that on an
appreciation of the facts and circumstances of an
individual case, if it was found that the Management had
acted in a malicious manner, there was no need to
permit a de novo enquiry, particularly when the employee
was sought to be removed by hook or by crook.
22. The facts of the present case, as noted above,
clearly indicate that the petitioner No.1-Management
acted in a most malicious and biased manner from the
very beginning against the respondent No.1 and that it
was hellbent upon removing the respondent No.1 from
the post of headmistress by hook or by crook. Once such
a conclusion is reached, it would not be justified to
permit the petitioner No.1-Management to hold a de novo
enquiry, thereby not only prolonging the harassment of
2 2019 SCC Online Bom 1196
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the respondent No.1, but giving a premium to such
malicious and biased actions of the petitioner No.1-
Management. Therefore, it cannot lie in the mouth of the
petitioner No.1-Management that permission for holding
de novo enquiry was required to be given in the present
case...."
(emphasis supplied)
17) It the facts of the case at hand are appraised on the
touchstone of the aforesaid principles, especially in the context of
the findings of the learned Presiding Officer, School Tribunal,
that there was infringement of the MEPS Rules and principles of
natural justice at every stage of the inquiry, an inference
becomes inescapable that the inquiry stood vitiated in all facets,
right from the service of the chargesheet to composition of
Inquiry Committee, to the cross examination of the respondent
No. 1 merely on the strength of defence statement without the
respondent No. 1 having entered into the witness box and placing
reliance on the admissions allegedly elicited in such cross-
examination, to the denial of the opportunity to the nominee of
the appellant to record his findings.
18) In the aforesaid view of the matter, I am persuaded to hold
that the School Tribunal was justified in foreclosing the option to
conduct a fresh inquiry in conformity with the Rules. Element of
objectivity was completely lost in the disciplinary proceedings
and an animus to get rid of the respondent No. 1 was borne out
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by the manner in which the said proceedings was conducted,
especially in the context of the gravamen of indictment which is
essentially the perceived insubordination.
19) On the issue of grant of 60% backwages, Mr. Patel would
urge that the School Tribunal after having noted the party on
whom onus lay and absence of evidence to show that the
respondent No. 1 was not gainfully employed, could not have
awarded backwages. A very strong reliance was placed by Mr.
Patel on the pronouncement of Supreme Court in the case of
Deepali Gundu Surwase Vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak
Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) And Others3.
20) In the case of Deepali (supra) a two Judge Bench of the
Supreme Court had, after reviewing the earlier precedents
including the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of
Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. Vs. Employees 4, and Surendra
Kumar Verma Vs. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour
Court5, the three Judge Bench judgments, had laid down the
following principles:-
"....22. The very idea of restoring an employee to the
position which he held before dismissal or removal or
termination of service implies that the employee will be put
3 (2013) 10 SCC 324
4 (1979) 2 SCC 80
5 (1980) 4 SCC 443
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in the same position in which he would have been but for
the illegal action taken by the employer. The injury suffered
by a person, who is dismissed or removed or is otherwise
terminated from service cannot easily be measured in terms
of money. With the passing of an order which has the effect
of severing the employer employee relationship, the latter's
source of income gets dried up. Not only the concerned
employee, but his entire family suffers grave adversities.
They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children
are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of
education and advancement in life. At times, the family has
to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintance to avoid
starvation. These sufferings continue till the competent
adjudicatory forum decides on the legality of the action
taken by the employer. The reinstatement of such an
employee, which is preceded by a finding of the competent
judicial/quasi judicial body or Court that the action taken
by the employer is ultra vires the relevant statutory
provisions or the principles of natural justice, entitles the
employee to claim full backwages. If the employer wants to
deny back wages to the employee or contest his entitlement
to get consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to
specifically plead and prove that during the intervening
period the employee was gainfully employed and was getting
the same emoluments. Denial of back wages to an employee,
who has suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would
amount to indirectly punishing the concerned employee and
rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to
pay back wages including the emoluments.
...............
38. The propositions which can be culled out from the
aforementioned judgments are:
38.1 In cases of wrongful termination of service,
reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is
the normal rule.
38.2 The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that while
deciding the issue of back wages, the adjudicating authority
or the Court may take into consideration the length of
service of the employee/workman, the nature of
misconduct, if any, found proved against the
employee/workman, the financial condition of the employer
and similar other factors.
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38.3 Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose services
are terminated and who is desirous of getting back wages is
required to either plead or at least make a statement before
the adjudicating authority or the Court of first instance that
he/she was not gainfully employed or was employed on
lesser wages. If the employer wants to avoid payment of full
back wages, then it has to plead and also lead cogent
evidence to prove that the employee/workman was gainfully
employed and was getting wages equal to the wages he/she
was drawing prior to the termination of service. This is so
because it is settled law that the burden of proof of the
existence of a particular fact lies on the person who makes a
positive averments about its existence. It is always easier to
prove a positive fact than to prove a negative fact. Therefore,
once the employee shows that he was not employed, the
onus lies on the employer to specifically plead and prove
that the employee was gainfully employed and was getting
the same or substantially similar emoluments.
38.4 The cases in which the Labour Court/Industrial
Tribunal exercises power under Section 11-A of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and finds that even though
the enquiry held against the employee/workman is
consistent with the rules of natural justice and / or certified
standing orders, if any, but holds that the punishment was
disproportionate to the misconduct found proved, then it
will have the discretion not to award full back wages.
However, if the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal finds that
the employee or workman is not at all guilty of any
misconduct or that the employer had foisted a false charge,
then there will be ample justification for award of full back
wages.
38.5 The cases in which the competent Court or Tribunal
finds that the employer has acted in gross violation of the
statutory provisions and/or the principles of natural justice
or is guilty of victimizing the employee or workman, then the
concerned Court or Tribunal will be fully justified in
directing payment of full back wages. In such cases, the
superior Courts should not exercise power under Article 226
or 136 of the Constitution and interfere with the award
passed by the Labour Court, etc., merely because there is a
possibility of forming a different opinion on the entitlement
of the employee/workman to get full back wages or the
employer's obligation to pay the same. The Courts must
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always be kept in view that in the cases of wrongful / illegal
termination of service, the wrongdoer is the employer and
sufferer is the employee/workman and there is no
justification to give premium to the employer of his
wrongdoings by relieving him of the burden to pay to the
employee/workman his dues in the form of full back wages.
38.6 In a number of cases, the superior Courts have
interfered with the award of the primary adjudicatory
authority on the premise that finalization of litigation has
taken long time ignoring that in majority of cases the
parties are not responsible for such delays. Lack of
infrastructure and manpower is the principal cause for
delay in the disposal of cases. For this the litigants cannot
be blamed or penalised. It would amount to grave injustice
to an employee or workman if he is denied back wages
simply because there is long lapse of time between the
termination of his service and finality given to the order of
reinstatement. The Courts should bear in mind that in most
of these cases, the employer is in an advantageous position
vis-à-vis the employee or workman. He can avail the services
of best legal brain for prolonging the agony of the sufferer,
i.e., the employee or workman, who can ill afford the luxury
of spending money on a lawyer with certain amount of fame.
Therefore, in such cases it would be prudent to adopt the
course suggested in Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. Vs.
Employees of Hindustan Tin Works Private Limited (supra).
38.7 The observation made in J.K. Synthetics Ltd V. K.P.
Agrawal(supra) that on reinstatement the
employee/workman cannot claim continuity of service as of
right is contrary to the ratio of the judgments of three Judge
Benches referred to hereinabove and cannot be treated as
good law. This part of the judgment is also against the very
concept of reinstatement of an employee/workman...."
(emphasis supplied)
21) The aforesaid principles have been followed as laying down
the correct criteria for determination of the issue of grant of
backwages where termination has been held to be illegal. It
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would be superfluous to note the judgments which have followed
the line in the case of Deepali (supra). It would be suffice to make
a profitable reference to a recent pronouncement of the Supreme
Court in the case of Pradeep s/o Rajkumar Jain Vs. Manganese
Ore (India) Limited and Others6, wherein the Supreme Court
considered two lines of the decisions. The first, which follows the
Three Judge Bench judgment in the case of Hindustan Tin Works
(supra) and, the second, represented by the view adopted by the
Supreme Court in the case of Talwara Coop. Credit and Service
Society Ltd Vs. Sushil Kumar7, wherein reference was made to
the provisions contained in Section 106 of the Evidence Act to
cast burden on the workman to show that she was neither
gainfully employed nor generated income. After analyzing the
aforesaid two lines of decisions, the Supreme Court in the case of
Pradeep (supra) expounded the legal position as under:-
"....12. It is, undoubtedly, true when the question
arises as to whether the backwages is to be given and as to
what is to be the extent of backwages, these are matters
which will depend on the facts of the case as noted in
Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra). In a case where it is found
that the employee was not at all at fault and yet, he was
visited with illegal termination or termination which is
actually activised by malice, it may be unfair to deny him
the fruits of the employment which he would have enjoyed
but for the illegal / malafide termination. The effort of the
6 (2022) 3 SCC 683
7 (2008) 9 SCC 486
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Court must be to then to restore the status quo in the
manner which is appropriate in the facts of each case. The
nature of the charges, the exact reason for the termination
as evaluated and, of course, the question as to whether the
employee was gainfully employed would be matters which
will enter into the consideration by the Court....."
(emphasis supplied)
22) The aforesaid pronouncement indicates that the nature of
the action which visited the employee with the consequence of
termination must enter the arena of determination as to
entitlement of backwages. If the Court comes to a conclusion
that the action of termination, which was found to be illegal, was
actuated by malice or ill-will, as distinguished from a bona fide
persuit of disciplining an employee, it would be unfair to deny the
employee fruits of employment which he would have enjoyed but
for the illegal/malafide termination. In such a case, the nature
of the charges, the reason for the termination as well as the
aspect as to whether the employee was gainfully employed would
be the factors influencing the decision.
23) Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the case at
hand, first and foremost, it is pertinent to note that the premise
of the petitioner that there was no assertion by employee that
post termination order she was not serving elsewhere and did not
generate any income is not factually correct. Not only the
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application to amend the Appeal Memo clearly records the said
fact but the petitioner, in its reply, had also controverted the
same.
24) Secondly, in the light of the propositions enunciated in the
case of Deepali (supra), the onus on the employee, which is in a
sense negative one, would stand discharged once a positive
assertion is made by the employee that she was not gainfully
employed or was employed on a lesser wages. Then if the
employer wants to avoid the backwages, it is incumbent on the
employer to plead and also lead cogent evidence to the contrary.
In the case at hand, the petitioner does not profess to have led
such evidence to the contrary.
25) Thirdly, the nature of the employment also assumes
significance. An Assistant Teacher after having rendered more
than 15 years of service, would not be in a position to get an
alternate employment easily. Mr. Patel, attempted to salvage the
position by canvassing a submission that the respondent No. 1
could have rendered tutions. This submission does not fully
comprehend the practicability and realities of life.
26) In any event, the learned Presiding Officer, School Tribunal
has taken into account the then prevailing circumstances,
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including the situation brought about by COVID-19 Pandemic,
and scaled down the backwages to 60%. I do not find any reason
to interfere with the exercise of judicious discretion by the School
Tribunal.
27) Resultantly, the Petition fails on both the counts.
28) Hence, the following order.
-:ORDER:-
(i) The Petition stands dismissed.
(ii) The Interim Application, if any, also stands
disposed.
[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]
