Bombay High Court
Arti Ramesh Kangutkar vs Anna Rocky Fernandes And Anr on 19 December, 2023
Author: Prithviraj K. Chavan
Bench: Prithviraj K. Chavan
2023:BHC-AS:38533 1-APPEAL-764-2009-final.doc
Shailaja
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.764 OF 2009
Arti Rajesh Karangutkar ]
Adult, Aged about 33 years, ]
R/o 117/3402, Kannamwar Nagar - 2, ]
Vikhroli [E], Mumbai 400 083. ] Appellant/Original
Complainant
Vs.
1. Anna Rocky Fernandes ]
116/3365, 2nd Floor, ]
Kannamwar Nagar, Vikhroli (E), ]
Mumbai - 400 083. ] Respondent/Original
Accused
2. State of Maharashtra ]
(Formal Party) ] Respondents
.....
Mr. Abhijeet A. Desai a/w Mr. Karan Gajra a/w Ms. Daksha
Punghera a/w Mr. Vijay Singh, for Appellant.
Mr. Dinesh Jain, for Respondent No.1.
Ms. G.P. Mulekar, , A.P.P, for Respondent No.2-State.
.....
CORAM : PRITHVIRAJ K. CHAVAN, J.
RESERVED ON : 7th DECEMBER, 2023.
PRONOUNCED ON : 19th DECEMBER, 2023.
JUDGMENT:
1. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order of
acquittal rendered by the Metropolitan Magistrate 50th Court,
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Vikroli, Mumbai on 1st September, 2008 in C.C No.1578/SS of
2007, thereby acquitting respondent No.1-accused of an offence
punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881 (for short "N.I Act").
2. Appellant and respondent No.1 were friends and neighbours.
In the month of January, 2007, the appellant had advanced a
friendly loan of Rs.3,00,000/- to respondent No.1, pursuant to
respondent No.1's request as she was in financial need due to the
ailment of her husband who was suffering from blood cancer as well
as daughter of respondent No.1 was also in need of financial help as
she was undergoing a training as an Air Hostess.
3. The appellant, on humanitarian grounds, lent an amount of
Rs.3,00,000/- to respondent No.1 by way of loan, which she
promised to refund by the end of June, 2007. It is the contention
of the appellant that in lieu of the said amount, respondent No.1
had issued four cheques, details of which are as under;
(a) Cheque No.445883 dated 24th July, 2007 for
Rs.1,25,000/-;
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(b)Cheque No.445881 dated 24th May, 2007 for
Rs.1,25,000/-;
(c) Cheque No.445260 dated 24th July, 2007 for
Rs.25,000/- and
(d) Cheque No.445882 dated 23th June, 2007 for
Rs.25,000/-.
The cheques were drawn on UTI Bank Limited Ghatkopar which
was subsequently known as Axis Bank. Upon instructions of
respondent No.1, the appellant had deposited the cheques in the
Bank as respondent No.1 could not repay the amount till June,
2007.
4. The appellant had initially deposited two cheques of
Rs.1,25,000/- each in the Axis Bank on 3 rd October, 2007 at it's
Mulund Branch. On 5th October, 2007, she received a memo from
the Axis Bank informing her that cheques deposited by her were
dishonoured for insufficiency of funds.
5. A legal notice dated 8th October, 2007 was issued to
respondent No.1 calling upon her to repay the amount of
Rs.3,00,000/- within a period of 15 days. It was duly received by
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respondent No.1 on 11th October, 2007. The notice was not replied
by respondent No.1 which resulted in filing of the complaint against
her by the appellant-complainant in the Court of Metropolitan
Magistrate, Vikhroli bearing Complaint No.1578/SS/2007 under
section 138 of the N.I Act in order to enforce the legal liability.
6. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate, after recording the
evidence of the complainant as well as respondent No.1 acquitted
respondent No.1 of the offence punishable under section 138 of the
N.I. Act.
7. At the outset, Mr. Desai, learned Counsel for the appellant
contended that the trial Court has committed grave error in both
law and facts in acquitting respondent No.1 since findings returned
by the Magistrate are sans considering the vital admissions given by
respondent No.1 in her cross-examination as well as certain aspects
which were surfaced even during the cross-examination of the
appellant substantiating the appellant's case. Mr. Desai would argue
that the Court below had emphasized more on the source of income
of the complainant which is immaterial in view of the ratio laid
down by this Court in case of Krishna P. Morajkar, S/o Late
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Paras Morajkar Vs. Mr. Joe Ferrao S/o Domnic Ferrao and State of
Goa, 2013 SCC Online Bom 862. He submits that the Court below
wrongly relied upon the provisions of Section 269-SS of the Income
Tax Act which had absolutely no bearing in the given set of facts
and circumstances. The Counsel would argue that in view of the
facts, circumstances and evidence on record, the appeal needs to be
allowed.
8. On the other hand, Mr. Jain, learned Counsel for respondent
No.1 vehemently argued the appellant has failed in making out any
case under section 138 of the N.I Act as the evidence on record is
quite insufficient to hold respondent No.1 guilty for the said
offence. Mr. Jain, at the outset, would argue that the cheques in
question were stolen by the appellant and even signatures over the
same are forged. He also submits that there was no transaction of
any kind between the appellant and respondent No.1, in the sense,
no amount as contended by the appellant was lent to respondent
No.1 by her. Learned Counsel further argued that there is a
violation of the provisions of Section 269-SS of the Income Tax Act
as the amount in question which exceeds Rs.20,000/- is stated to
have been advanced to respondent No.1 in cash and not by cheque.
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9. Learned Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on
certain precedents, which shall be referred hereinafter.
10. The appellant in her affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief
before the Magistrate testified that she lent Rs.3,00,000/- to the
respondent No.1 upon her request on 29 th January, 2007 as she was
in dire need in view of the fact that her husband was suffering from
blood cancer and her daughter had to undergo training for the post
of an Air Hostess. She testified that respondent No.1 promised to
repay the said hand loan by June, 2007 and, therefore, issued four
cheques of following description as enumerated below in favour of
the appellant which were drawn on UTI Bank Limited Ghatkopar
(East) Branch;
(a) Cheque No.445883 dated 24th July, 2007
for Rs.1,25,000/-;
(b) Cheque No.445881 dated 24th May, 2007
for Rs.1,25,000/-;
(c) Cheque No.445260 dated 24th April, 2007
for Rs.25,000/- and
(d) Cheque No.445882 dated 23rd June, 2007
for Rs.25,000/-.
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According to the appellant, all the cheques were signed by
respondent No.1 in her presence and were issued in discharge of
the aforesaid debt. She further testified that two cheques bearing
No.445883 dated 24th July, 2007 and bearing No.445881 dated
24th May, 2007 for an amount of Rs.1,25,000/- were deposited by
her in her account with UTI Bank Limited, Mulund Branch on 3 rd
October, 2007. However, the cheques were dishonoured with a
remark "funds insufficient" and were returned to the appellant on
5th October, 2007. The appellant had produced both original
dishonoured cheques before the trial Court which are marked as
"Exhibit A and Exhibit B" respectively. The memo of the Bank is at
'Exhibit C'.
11. A legal notice dated 8th October, 2007 was served upon
respondent No.1 calling upon her to repay the amount in question
within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice. The notice is
proved at "Exhibit D". The evidence reveals that the notice was
dispatched by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due as well as
Under Certificate of Posting bearing Receipt No.5540 dated 9 th
October, 2007. The notice returned as "unserved" as per postal
remark "U/C". Another envelope of "Under Certificate of Posting"
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did not return and, therefore, there was due service of notice.
Respondent No.1 in her cross-examination admits receipt of notice
which was sent "Under Certificate of Posting". Respondent No.1
has, thus, not disputed the fact of receipt of notice. Since
respondent No.1 neither replied the notice nor complied with the
same, the appellant had filed a complaint under the provisions of
the N.I. Act.
12. It would be interesting to go through the cross-examination
of the appellant by the learned Counsel for respondent No.1 as well
as cross-examination of respondent No.1 herself who stood into the
witness box in order to rebut the presumption which is in favour of
the appellant.
13. The first defence raised by respondent No.1 is that she did
not issue cheques towards repayment of loan inasmuch as she did
not borrow amount from the appellant. Another defence is that her
cheques were stolen from her custody and misused by the appellant.
Admittedly, neither any report of theft was lodged by respondent
No.1 with any Police Station nor any intimation was given by her to
the Banker to stop payment of alleged stolen cheques which is
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evident from the substantive evidence of Bank Officer examined on
behalf of respondent No.1.
14. Turning back to the cross-examination of the appellant by
respondent No.1 wherein it has been elicited that the appellant and
respondent No.1 were close friends who were working in a
Company known as "Max Newyork Life". Relations between them
were just like members of family and both were on visiting terms to
one another's house. Cross-examination further reveals that
respondent No.1 had demanded money from the appellant in the
year 2007 which was paid by the appellant to her in cash. The cross
further reveals that the appellant did not acknowledge receipt of the
amount or executed any document after paying the amount since
relations were very close and friendly, which appears to be quite
obvious. Cross also reveals that after obtaining the cheques, the
appellant advanced the amount to respondent No.1. The appellant
had further stated in her cross-examination that she can prove the
source of income from where she had paid an amount of
Rs.3,00,000/- to respondent No.1. It is further surfaced in the
cross-examination that all the aforesaid cheques were given by
respondent No.1 to her on 29 th January, 2007. The cross further
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indicates that all cheques were in the handwriting of respondent
No.1.
15. Having substantiated and reinforced the case of the appellant
in cross-examination on behalf of respondent No.1, it is surprising
as to how the Counsel in the state of bafflement attempted to falsify
vital admissions already elicited hereinabove through the mouth of
the appellant. Certain questions were put to the appellant again by
the learned Counsel which were already denied by her. Once
having substantiated the fact as regards demand and payment of
Rs.3,00,000/- in cash as well as the signature of respondent No.1
over the subject cheques, respondent No.1 is estopped from putting those
suggestions that neither the amount in question was lent by the appellant
nor the cheques were signed by respondent No.1. It is pertinent to note
that the cross-examination not only substantiated the material facts but
also reveals that the appellant had deposited the cheques in question in
the Bank as per the instructions given by respondent No.1.
16. Respondent No.1 in her affidavit in lieu of examination-in-
chief testified that she never approached the complainant for any
friendly loan nor issued any cheques as alleged. She had never
informed the appellant that her husband was suffering from blood
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cancer and her daughter wanted to undergo training for the post of
an Air Hostess. Interestingly, in her evidence, respondent No.1
testified that cheques bearing No.445881 and 445883 of UTI Bank
were lost by her about which she had informed the Bank. She
testified that she had never issued the cheques in favour of the
appellant and even signatures over the cheques were not made by
her. When she was cross-examined on behalf of the appellant, she
admitted of not filing any Police complaint as regards lost cheques,
however, she maintains that she did inform her Bank about lost
cheques. Evidence of respondent No.1 is to be accepted with a
pinch of salt for a simple reason that bank employee examined by
her in support of alleged lost cheques viz. D.W.2 - Moulik Shah
testified that from the application form which was brought by the
witness in the Court, it revealed that the signature over the
application form vis-a-vis the cheque/s is not matching but, the
cheques were not returned for that reason as it has been proved by
the appellant and this witness that the cheques were returned for
"Insufficient funds" and not on account of difference in the
signatures. Admittedly, the concerned cheque book was issued in
favour of respondent No.1. It is not the case of respondent No.1
that since the cheques were lost, she had informed the Bank to stop
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payment of the cheques. This witness (D.W. 2 - Moulik Shah) also
testified that he is not aware whether any application to that effect
was given by respondent No.1 or informed the Bank about lost
cheques. He testified that since he is not a handwriting expert, he
cannot make a positive statement as to whether signatures over the
cheques in question were made by respondent No.1. As such, even
this witness has not supported respondent No.1-accused. It is
surprising as to how Counsel for respondent No.1 argued before
this Court that the cheques were stolen by the appellant which was
not the defence taken during trial.
17. There is one more interesting fact surfaced during the cross-
examination of the appellant wherein the appellant admits that
before the cheques were dishonoured, respondent No.1 had filed a
Non Cognizable Offence bearing No.725 of 2007 on 18 th May,
2007 under section 504 of the I.P.C with the Police Station
whereupon the concerned Police Inspector had summoned both of
them. This is irrelevant in the given set of facts as it seems that due
to an acrimony which arose after the transaction in question,
respondent No.1 had lodged NC complaint against the appellant.
Had the cheques in question were either stolen or lost,
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respondent No.1 would have lodged a report, which she did
not.
18. From the aforesaid discussion, it is apparent that the appellant
had proved beyond doubt as regards advance of Rs.3,00,000/- to
respondent No.1 as a hand loan against which respondent No.1
issued two subject cheques which came to be dishonoured for want
of sufficient funds in her account.
19. The cross-examination of the appellant as well as evidence of
respondent No.1 substantiated all the material facts as stated by the
appellant in her complaint. Respondent No.1 had failed to
substantiate her defence and failed to rebut the statutory
presumptions under sections 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act. The
explanation appended to Section 138 explains the meaning of the
expression 'debt or other liability' for the purpose of Section 138.
This expressions necessarily means a legally enforceable debt or
other liability. This section treats dishonoured cheque as an
offence, if the cheque has been issued in discharge of any debt or
other liability. Indeed, cheques came to be issued by respondent
No.1 in discharge of the debt. The explanation leaves no manner of
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doubt that to attract an offence under section 138, there should be
legally enforceable debt or other liability subsisting on the date of
drawal of the cheque. It has been substantiated that on the date of
drawal of the cheques, there was a legally enforceable debt in
subsistence. Respondent No.1 had failed to rebut the aforesaid
presumption in light of the aforesaid discussion of evidence and
facts. Neither her own evidence nor evidence of the employee of
the AXIS Bank is helpful in rebutting the presumption; rather, it had
substantiated and buttressed the case of the appellant rendering the
evidence of respondent No.1 otiose. Had there been some element
of truth in the alleged loss of cheques, respondent No.1 would have
definitely informed the Bank or lodged a report with the Police. It is
also surprising to note as to how only four cheques alleged to have
been stolen from the cheque book? It is equally surprising as to
where the other two cheques are, if four cheques were lost. The
silence of the respondent No.1 on this crucial aspect renders her
testimony doubtful. It is also surprising to note as to why
respondent No.1 did not make any attempt to prove the fact that
the signatures over the cheques were forged. This is nothing short
of subterfuge.
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20. It would be apposite to place reliance on a judgment of the
Supreme Court in case of M/s Kumar Exports Vs. M/s. Sharma
Carpets in Criminal Appeal No.2045 of 2008 (arising out of Special
Leave Petition (Criminal) No.955 of 2007) wherein the Hon'ble
Supreme Court discussed the scope of Section 139 and 118 of the
N.I. Act. Paragraph 11 and 12 are extracted below;
"11. The use of the phrase "until the contrary
is proved" in Section 118 of the Act and use
of the words "unless the contrary is proved" in
Section 139 of the Act read with definitions
of "may presume" and "shall presume" as given
in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, makes it at
once clear that presumptions to be raised
under both the provisions are rebuttable.
When a presumption is rebuttable, it only
points out that the party on whom lies the
duty of going forward with evidence, on the
fact presumed and when that party has
produced evidence fairly and reasonably
tending to show that the real fact is not as
presumed, the purpose of the presumption is
over. The accused in a trial under Section 138
of the Act has two options. He can either
show that consideration and debt did not
exist or that under the particular
circumstances of the case the non-existence of
consideration and debt is so probable that a
prudent man ought to suppose that no
consideration and debt existed. To rebut the
statutory presumptions an accused is not
expected to prove his defence beyond
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reasonable doubt as is expected of the
complainant in a criminal trial. The accused
may adduce direct evidence to prove that the
note in question was not supported by
consideration and that there was no debt or
liability to be discharged by him. However,
the court need not insist in every case that the
accused should disprove the non-existence of
consideration and debt by leading direct
evidence because the existence of negative
evidence is neither possible nor contemplated.
At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of
the passing of the consideration and existence
of debt, apparently would not serve the
purpose of the accused. Something which is
probable has to be brought on record for
getting the burden of proof shifted to the
complainant. To disprove the presumptions,
the accused should bring on record such facts
and circumstances, upon consideration of
which, the court may either believe that the
consideration and debt did not exist or their
non-existence was so probable that a prudent
man would under the circumstances of the
case, act upon the plea that they did not exist.
Apart from adducing direct evidence to prove
that the note in question was not supported
by consideration or that he had not incurred
any debt or liability, the accused may also rely
upon circumstantial evidence and if the
circumstances so relied upon are compelling,
the burden may likewise shift again on to the
complainant. The accused may also rely upon
presumptions of fact, for instance, those
mentioned in Section 114 of the Evidence Act
to rebut the presumptions arising under
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Sections 118 and 139 of the Act. The accused
has also an option to prove the non-existence
of consideration and debt or liability either by
letting in evidence or in some clear and
exceptional cases, from the case set out by the
complainant, that is, the averments in the
complaint, the case set out in the statutory
notice and evidence adduced by the
complainant during the trial. Once such
rebuttal evidence is adduced and accepted by
the court, having regard to all the
circumstances of the case and the
preponderance of probabilities, the evidential
burden shifts back to the complainant and,
thereafter, the presumptions under Sections
118 and 139 of the Act will not again come to
the complainant's rescue.
12. The defence of the appellant was that he
had agreed to purchase woolen carpets from
the respondent and had issued the cheques by
way of advance and that the respondent did
not supply the carpets. It is the specific case
of the respondent that he had sold woolen
carpets to the appellant on 6.8.1994 and in
discharge of the said liability the appellant
had issued two cheques, which were
ultimately dishonoured. In support of his case
the respondent produced the carbon copy of
the bill. A perusal of the bill makes it evident
that there is no endorsement made by the
respondent accepting the correctness of the
contents of the bill. The bill is neither signed
by the appellant. On the contrary, the
appellant examined one official from the
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Sales Tax Department, who positively asserted
before the Court that the respondent had
filed sales tax return for the Assessment Year
1994-95 indicating that no sale of woolen
carpets had taken place during the said
Assessment Year and, therefore, sales tax was
not paid. The said witness also produced the
affidavit sworn by the respondent indicating
that during the year 1994-95 there was no
sale of woolen carpets by the respondent.
Though the complainant was given sufficient
opportunity to cross-examine the said
witness, nothing could be elicited during his
cross-examination so as to create doubt about
his assertion that no transaction of sale of
woolen carpets was effected by the
respondent during the year 1994-95. Once
the testimony of the official of the Sales Tax
Department is accepted, it becomes evident
that no transaction of sale of woolen carpets
had taken place between the respondent and
the appellant, as alleged by the respondent.
When sale of woolen carpets had not taken
place, there was no existing debt in discharge
of which, the appellant was expected to issue
cheques to the respondent. Thus the accused
has discharged the onus of proving that the
cheques were not received by the holder for
discharge of a debt or liability. Under the
circumstances the defence of the appellant
that blank cheques were obtained by the
respondent as advance payment also becomes
probable and the onus of burden would shift
on the complainant. The complainant did not
produce any books of account or stock
register maintained by him in the course of
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his regular business or any acknowledgment
for delivery of goods, to establish that as a
matter of fact woolen carpets were sold by
him to the appellant on August 6, 1994 for a
sum of Rs.1,90,348.39. Having regard to the
materials on record, this Court is of the
opinion that the respondent failed to establish
his case under Section 138 of the Act as
required by law and, therefore, the impugned
judgment of the High Court is liable to be set
aside".
21. In order to rebut the presumption, it was incumbent upon the
accused to bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon
consideration of which, the Court may either believe that
consideration and debt did not exist or their non-existence was so
probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances of the
case, act upon the plea that they did not exist. As already stated,
nothing has been brought on record to rebut the presumption by
the respondent No.1. There is absolutely nothing in the evidence of
respondent No.1 to infer, even remotely, that neither the amount in
question was lent by the appellant nor had she issued any cheques
in discharge of the said debt. The reason for which respondent No.1
is said to have borrowed the amount from the appellant viz. ailment
of her husband (blood cancer) and the training of her daughter as
an Air Hostess, she could have adduced some evidence in order to
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bolster the said aspect, which she did not. Respondent No.1 also
could have relied on the presumption of fact, for instance, those
mentioned in section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act to rebut the
presumptions under section 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act.
22. The statutory notice, complaint and evidence of the respective
parties, if juxtaposed, would unerringly point out the fact that the
respondent No.1 did borrow an amount of Rs.3,00,000/- from the
appellant and issued cheques in question in discharge of a debt.
Defences as raised by respondent No.1 are unacceptable and
unbelievable. Respondent No.1 had failed to discharge the said
onus. The ratio laid down by the Supreme Court would be squarely
applicable to the present set of facts.
23. Mr. Desai, learned Counsel for the appellant while assailing
the impugned judgment contended that the Court below patently
erred in applying the provisions of Section 269-SS of the Income
Tax Act to the facts of the present case inasmuch as section 269-SS
of the Income Tax Act clearly envisages that any amount above
Rs.20,000/- ought to be accepted by payee by way of cheque or
draft in contrary to which the same shall be barred and/or penalized
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under Section 271 of the Income Tax Act. Mr. Desai submits that
bar under section 271 should not prejudice the merits of case and
shall, therefore, not be applicable.
24. A bare look at Section 269-SS of the Income Tax Act would
reveal that the said bar is applicable to a person who accepts deposit
by way of cash and not to a person who makes or offers any money
to the payee and, therefore, even if the said bar is made applicable
to the present case, the same shall apply to respondent No.1 who
had accepted the amount of Rs.3,00,000/- from the appellant by
way of cash for which punishment is contemplated under Section
271 of the Income Tax Act. Learned Magistrate has, indeed,
committed a grave error of law by misreading the provisions of
Section 269-SS of the Income Tax Act by holding that the appellant
had failed to prove the source of her income who appears to have
been influenced by the submissions made on behalf of respondent
No.1 as regards bar under Section 269-SS of the Income Tax Act.
The learned Magistrate had, therefore, committed illegality
and grave error. Mr. Desai has, therefore, rightly placed reliance
on a judgment of this Court in the case of Krishna P. Morajkar, S/o
Late Paras Morajkar (supra). Relevant portion of the judgment is
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extracted below;
"19. There is another aspect of the matter. The
learned Counsel for the respondent pointed out
that in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra)
attention of the Supreme Court was possibly
not drawn to the actual wording of Section
269SS of the Income Tax Act. He submitted
that Section 269SS of the Income Tax Act, in
fact, does not cast any burden upon a person
making advance in cash to record it in his
returns and does not prevent any such cash
advance from being made. It may be useful to
quote provisions of Section 269SS and 271D of
the Income Tax Act as under:
Section 269SS : No person shall, after the 30th
day of June, 1984, take or accept from any
other person (hereafter in this section referred
to as the depositor), any loan or deposit
otherwise than by an account payee cheque or
account payee bank draft, if, -
(a) the amount of such loan or deposit or the
aggregate amount of such loan and deposit; or
(b) on the date of taking or accepting such loan
or deposit, any loan or deposit taken or
accepted earlier by such person from the
depositor is remaining unpaid (whether
repayment has fallen due or not), the amount
or the aggregate amount remaining unpaid; or
(c) the amount or the aggregate amount
referred to in clause (a) together with the
amount or the aggregate amount referred to in
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clause (b), is twenty thousand rupees or more:
Provided that the provisions of this section
shall not apply to any loan or deposit taken or
accepted from, or any loan or deposit taken or
accepted by -
(a) Government;
(b) any banking company, post office savings
bank or co-operative bank;
(c) any corporation established by a Central,
State or Provincial Act;
(d) any Government company as defined in
section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of
1956);
(e) such other institution, association or body
or class of institutions, associations or bodies
which the Central Government may, for
reasons to be recorded in writing, notify in this
behalf in the Official Gazette:
[Provided further that the provisions of this
section shall not apply to any loan or deposit
where the person from whom the loan or
deposit is taken or accepted and the person by
whom the loan or deposit is taken or accepted
are both having agricultural income and neither
of them had any income chargeable to tax
under this Act.]
Section 271D - (1) If a person takes or accepts
any loan or deposit in contravention of the
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provisions of section 269SS, he shall be liable
to pay, by way of penalty, a sum equal to the
amount of the loan or deposit so taken or
accepted.
(2) any penalty imposable under sub-section (1)
shall be imposed by the joint Commissioner.
(emphasis supplied)
A plain reading of Section 269SS shows
that no person can accept any loan or deposit
of a sum of Rs.20,000/- or more otherwise than
by an account payee cheque or account payee
bank draft. It does not say that a person cannot
advance more than Rs.20,000/- in cash to
another person. It is clear that the restriction
on cash advances was in fact on the taker and
not the person who makes the advance. The
penalty for taking such advance or deposit in
contravention of provisions of Section 269SS
was to be suffered by one who takes the
advance. Therefore, it was obviously
impermissible to invoke these provisions for
preventing a person from recovering the
advance which he has made".
25. It is thus clear that no person should accept any loan or
deposit of a sum of Rs.20,000/- or more otherwise than by an
account payee cheque or account payee bank draft. The provision
does not say that a person cannot advance more than Rs.20,000/-
in cash to another person. Restriction on cash advances was, in fact,
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on the taker and not on the person who makes an advance. The
penalty for taking such advance or deposit in contravention of
provisions of Section 269-SS was to be suffered by the taker who
accepts the advance. The learned Magistrate has wrongly invoked
the aforesaid provisions while dismissing the complaint. As such, the
provisions of Section 269-SS and 271D of the Income Tax Act have
absolutely no bearing over the case in hand and, therefore, the
impugned judgment and order of acquittal rendered by the
Magistrate is unsustainable and, therefore, needs to be quashed and
set aside.
26. The learned Magistrate had rendered the judgment in most
cryptic and perfunctory manner, in the sense, neither the facts have
been clearly stated nor the evidence has been properly discussed.
The learned Magistrate has also misinterpreted and misread the
legal position as envisaged not only under sections 138 and 139 of
the N.I. Act but also the provisions of Section 269-SS of the Income
Tax Act. The learned Magistrate has failed to appreciate vital
admissions in the cross-examination of the appellant as well as
D.W.2 - Moulik Shah in it's correct perspective which have been
elicited at the time of recording evidence. Thus, the findings
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arrived at by the Court below are patently illegal and perverse and,
therefore, need to be set aside.
27. Corollary of the aforesaid discussion is that the appeal needs
to be allowed and as such, it is allowed. The impugned judgment
and order rendered by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate in C.C.
No.1578/SS of 2007 is reversed.
28. Respondent No.1 - original accused is found guilty and,
therefore, is convicted of an offence punishable under section 138
of the N.I. Act.
29. Before awarding sentence, respondent No.1 needs to be
heard and, therefore, list the matter on 19th December, 2023.
30. Today, Appellant - original complainant is present alongwith
her Advocate.
31. Respondent No.1-accused, despite specific instructions to the
Counsel appearing on her behalf is absent. Even the Counsel
appearing for respondent No.1 - accused is absent.
KEPT BACK AT 2.30 P.M
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32. Despite keeping the matter back in the morning session,
respondent No.1-original accused is absent, so also the Advocate
representing her.
33. Due to absence of the respondent No.1-accused, there is no
occasion to hear her on the point of sentence. Nevertheless, absence of
the respondent No.1-accused will not detain this Court from
pronouncing the judgment of conviction and awarding the sentence.
34. Considering the overall facts, circumstance and evidence on
record, following sentence would meet the ends of justice. As such,
following order is expedient;
:ORDER:
[a] Appeal is allowed.
[b] The judgment and order of acquittal
rendered by the Metropolitan Magistrate 50th
Court, Vikhroli, Mumbai on 1st September, 2008 in
C.C No.1578/SS of 2007 is quashed and set aside.
[c] Respondent No.1-accused is convicted
of an offence punishable under Section 138 of
the N.I. Act.
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[d] Respondent No.1-accused is sentenced
to undergo simple imprisonment of one year
and shall pay fine of Rs.5,00,000/-.
[e] In default of payment of fine,
respondent No.1-accused shall undergo simple
imprisonment for four months.
[f] Upon recovery of fine, an amount of
Rs.3,00,000/- be paid to the appellant.
[g] Since Respondent No.1-accused is
absent, the judgment and order of this Court
shall be certified to the concerned Court in
view of Section 388 of the Criminal Procedure
Code.
[h] The learned Magistrate shall thereafter
proceed in accordance with section 388 (2) of
the Criminal Procedure Code by taking
appropriate steps of issuing conviction warrant.
[i] Record and Proceeding be remitted to
Metropolitan Magistrate 50th Court, Vikhroli,
Mumbai.
35. Appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
[PRITHVIRAJ K. CHAVAN, J.]
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