Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 12906 Bom
Judgement Date : 18 December, 2023
2023:BHC-AS:38177-DB
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.10512 OF 2023
Isha Exim carrying on business }
through Mr. Prabal Kumar Kundu, of }
Kolkata inhabitant and having its, }
office at P-586, Block-N, }
New Alipore, Kolkata - 700053 } ...Petitioner
Versus
1. Union of India through, }
The Secretary, Department of Revenue }
Ministry of Finance having its office }
North Block, New Delhi - 110 001 }
2. Commissioner of Customs (NS-I), }
Mumbai Zone II, JNCH }
Having his office at Jawaharlal Nehru }
Customs House, Nhava Sheva }
Dist- Raigad }
Maharashtra. PIN - 400707 }
3. Deputy Commissioner of Customs (NS-I) }
Gr.I&IA, Jawaharlal Nehru Customs House}
Having his office at Jawaharlal Nehru }
Customs House, Nhava Sheva, }
Dist- Raigad }
Maharashtra. PIN - 400707 } ...Respondents
-----
Mr. Prakash Shah, Mr. Aansh Desai i/b. Pythagoras, for the Petitioner.
Mr. Jitendra B. Mishra i/b. Ms. Maya Majumdar, for the Respondents.
------
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CORAM : G.S. KULKARNI &
JITENDRA JAIN, JJ.
RESERVED ON : 23rd October 2023 PRONOUNCED ON : 18th December 2023
Judgment (per Jitendra Jain, J.) :-
. Rule, made returnable forthwith. Respondents waive service.
By consent of parties, heard finally.
2. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
mounts a challenge to an Order-in-Original (O-I-O) dated 11 th November
2022 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Customs, Jawaharlal Nehru
Customs House, Nhava Sheva, District Raigad. The challenge to such
order is primarily on the ground that the said order is in complete
defiance of an order dated 31 March 2017 passed by the Authority for
Advance Rulings (AAR) under the Chapter V B of the Customs Act, 1962
(the Act) containing Sections 28E to 28M.
3. Briefly the facts are :- The petitioner is primarily engaged in
the business of import of various edible products including products of
betel nut (processed supari). The petitioner has been importing various
forms of supari stated to be unflavoured betel nuts (supari) and API betel
nuts (supari). The petitioner is importing the said goods from only two
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suppliers namely Asian Import & Export Co. Ltd., Thailand and Maung
Maung Soe Family Co. Ltd., Myanmar. Such imports are received at
Chennai and JNPT port.
(i) On 31st March, 2017, on an application made by the petitioner, the
Authority for Advance Ruling (AAR) ruling made the following
observations:-
"12. In view of the above, we rule as under :-
The goods sought to be imported, namely; 'unflavoured supari', 'flavoured supari', 'API supari' and 'Chikni supari' being processed Betelnut products which do not contain specified ingredients, namely; lime, kath and tobacco but containing other flavouring material / additives are classifiable under Customs Tariff Heading 2106 90 30."
(emphasis supplied)
(ii) On 25th November, 2017, the petitioner imported betel nuts from
Indonesia at the Chennai port and classified the same as
'unflavoured supari'. These goods were assessed under the Custom
Tariff Heading (CTH) 21069030 as 'unflavoured supari'. However,
the officer of DRI did not permit the cargo to be cleared on the
ground that the petitioner has mis-classified the goods. The
petitioner challenged the said action by filing a writ petition before
the Madras High Court inter alia contending that classification issue
is resolved by the AAR vide order dated 31st March, 2017 wherein
the AAR has given a ruling that 'unflavoured supari' is to be
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classified under CTH 21069030. The Madras High Court in its
judgment reported in 2018 (13) GSTL 273 observed that the seizure
memo is contrary to the ruling passed by the AAR as well as the
stand taken by the Commissioner of Customs before the said
authority and, therefore, the detention of the cargo by the revenue
authority was wholly unjustified. This order has attained finality.
(iii) Subsequently, the petitioner imported unflavoured supari from
Myanmar by classifying the same under CTH 21069030 vide Bill of
Entry No.8077228 dated 30th March, 2022. Respondent no.3 passed
an O-I-O dated 11th November, 2022 rejecting the classification of
the goods imported on 30th March, 2022 under CTH 21069030 and
ordered the same to be classified under heading 0802 on the ground
that the CESTAT Chennai Bench in the case of S.T. Enterprises vs.
Commissioner of Customs1 and in the case of Ayush Business
Overseas vs. Commissioner2 has taken a view that the betel nuts
imported by these parties fall under Chapter 8 and not under Chapter
21 of CTH. Furthermore, an appeal filed by Ayush Business
Overseas to the Supreme Court against the said order of the
CESTAT, Chennai Bench was dismissed and, therefore, would result
1 2021 (378) E.L.T. 514 (Tri. - Chennai) 2 2021 (378) E.L.T. A 142 (SC)
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into change of law for not following the decision of the AAR in the
case of the petitioner. It is on this backdrop that the present petition
is filed challenging the O-I-O dated 11th November, 2022 passed by
respondent no.3.
4. Submissions of the Petitioner :- The petitioner would contend
that the classification issue in its own case has been decided by the AAR
vide order dated 31st March, 2017 which has attained finality since the
same was not challenged before the higher forum and, therefore, relying
upon Section 28J(1) of the Act would contend that the said ruling is
binding on the respondents. The petitioner would further contend that
mere dismissal of the appeal filed by parties before the Supreme Court
against the orders passed by Chennai Bench of the Tribunal cannot be
considered as a change of law so as to contend that the advance ruling is
not binding under Sub-section (2) of Section 28J of the Act. The
petitioner would further contend that the respondents are mis-reading
Chapter 3 which does not apply to the product imported by the petitioner
and the correct classification has to be under Chapter 21 of CTH which
defines betel nut product and which reads thus :-
"Betel nut product as supari" means any preparation containing betel nuts, but not containing any one or more of the following ingredients, namely : lime, katha (catechu), and tobacco, whether or not containing any other ingredients, such as cardamom, copra and menthol."
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5. The petitioner would, therefore, contend that the O-I-O passed
on 11th November, 2022 which is impugned in the present petition is
wholly without jurisdiction and, therefore, the relief sought in the petition
be granted.
6. Submissions of the Respondents:- The respondents would
contend that the O-I-O is an appealable order and, therefore, the
petitioner should be relegated to an alternate remedy. The respondents
have relied on various decisions, for the said proposition, refusing to
entertain writ jurisdiction. Alternatively, the respondents would contend
that on account of decision rendered by the CESTAT Chennai Bench in
case of S.T. Enterprises (supra) and Ayush Business Overseas (supra)
and the appeal against the said order having been dismissed by the
Supreme Court, the ruling given by the AAR is not binding as per Sub-
section (2) of Section 28J of the Customs Act and, therefore, the
respondents were justified in passing the impugned order. The
respondents, therefore, prayed for dismissal of present petition on the
ground of an alternate remedy and also on merit.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the
respondents and with their assistance. We have perused the records of the
present petition.
ppn 7 44.wp-10512.23(j).doc Analysis and Conclusion :-
8. It is a well settled in law that the assessee can invoke writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, despite an
alternate statutory remedy of an appeal interalia on the ground that there
is a breach of fundamental rights, breach of natural justice, order passed
is without jurisdiction or there is a challenge to the vires of the statute. In
these circumstances, the Court can exercise writ jurisdiction inspite of
appeal remedy being available to the petitioner.
9. Section 28J of the Customs Act, 1962 reads thus:-
" 28J. Applicability of advance ruling -
(1) The advance ruling pronounced by the authority under section 28-I shall be binding only,-
(a) on the applicant who had sought it;
(b) in respect of any matter referred to in sub-section (2) of section 28H;
(c) on the [Principal Commissioner of Customs or Commissioner of Customs], and the customs authorities subordinate to him, in respect of the applicant.
(2) The advance ruling referred to in sub-section (1) shall be binding as aforesaid unless there is a change in law or facts on the basis of which the advance ruling has been pronounced."
10. Section 28J (1) provides that the advance ruling pronounced
by the authority shall be binding not only on the applicant who had
sought it but also on the Principal Commissioner of Customs or
Commissioner of Customs and the customs authorities subordinate to
him, in respect of the applicant. However, Section 28J (2) provides that
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the advance ruling shall be binding unless there is a change of law or
facts on the basis of which the advance ruling has been pronounced. In
the present proceedings, the only contention raised by the respondents is
that because of change in law on account of dismissal of appeal by the
Supreme Court against the order passed by CESTAT in case of other
assessees, advance ruling is not binding.
11. We do not agree with the contentions as urged by the
Respondents for more than one reason. The decision of the CESTAT,
Chennai Bench in case of S.T. Enterprises and Ayush Business Overseas
certainly cannot be a binding precedent on High Court nor can it be
binding on all the authorities/assessees throughout the country. The
decision of the Chennai Bench of CESTAT is binding interse between the
parties before the Tribunal and not the petitioner or the authorities having
jurisdiction over the petitioner. The dismissal by the Supreme Court
without going into merits of the case acts only as res judicata between the
parties before the Court and same cannot be said that CESTAT bench
decision amounts to a declaration of law. Therefore dismissal of appeal by
the assessees before the Chennai Bench of CESTAT, by the Suprme Court
does not attract provisions of Section 28 J(2) of the Act for not following
decision of the advance ruling rendered in the petitioner's own case.
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12. Even otherwise, the facts of S.T. Enterprises' case (supra) as
stated in paras 2 and 3 of the said decision are also different and therefore
even on facts same is distinguishable from the facts of the petitioner. In
the case of S.T. Enterprises the revenue's case was that Areca nuts is a
prohibited item for import as the CIF value of the goods was lesser than
Rs.251/- per Kg. Furthermore, in the case of S.T. Enterprises, there was
a finding that as per report, "process" stated by the importer have not
been undertaken to make the betel nut "product of betel nut" to merit
classification under CTH 2106 which is not the case in the impugned
proceedings before us. The CESTAT, Chennai Bench in para 11 observed
that based on chemical examiner's report the betel nuts were not
subjected to any processes. However, on the contrary report in the case of
the petitioner before us certifies that processes were carried out on betel
nut and therefore even on this count decision in the case of S.T.
Enterprises is not applicable.
13. The Chennai Bench in the above referred decision in the case
of S.T. Enterprises (supra) in in paragraph 20 observed in relation to
reliance on the ruling in case of M/s.Excellent Betelnut (which was cited
by the assessee therein) that said ruling would apply only to the parties
therein, and is not binding precedent for other cases. If it is the contention
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of the respondents before us that the decision of the Chennai Bench by
virtue of dismissal of the appeal by the Supreme Court has become the
law, then the finding of the Chennai Bench that the advance ruling in
case of M/s.Excellent Betelnut (supra) is not binding precedent for other
cases but it is binding to the parties to the litigation only, then by the very
same logic the advance ruling in the case of the petitioner is binding on
the respondents and not the decision of CESTAT Chennai Bench and
same gets confirmed by the Supreme Court. Therefore by their own
showing the reliance placed by the respondents on the decision of the
Chennai Bench of CESTAT is misconceived to invoke provisions of
section 28 J(2) of the Act.
14. It is also important to note that the decision of the AAR
dated 31st March 2017 in the case of petitioner's own case has not been
challenged by the respondents before the higher forum. The respondents
did make an attempt for review of the said ruling by filing an application
before the AAR which came to be dismissed on 30 th March 2022 wherein
the respondents have once again raised an issue of classification. The
said rejection by the AAR dated 30th March 2022 is also not challenged
before the higher forum. It is also important to note that this rejection
was on 30th March 2022 which is post the decision of the CESTAT
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Chennai Bench in case of S.T. Enterprises (supra) and also dismissal of
the appeal by the Supreme Court in case of Ayush Business Overseas
(supra), both being dated 26th February 2021 and 19th March 2021
respectively. Therefore, the respondents have accepted the ruling in the
case of the petitioner dated 31st March 2017 now they cannot be heard to
contend that the ruling is not binding.
15. The decision of the Madras High Court in the petitioner's
own case referred to hereinabove dated 18 th January 2018 also holds that
the seizure memo of the respondents therein is contrary to the ruling
pronounced by the AAR in case of the petitioner. This observation has
also not been challenged before any higher judicial forum which also
amounts to the respondents having accepted the ruling pronounced by
the AAR in case of the petitioner.
16. In the ruling pronounced by the AAR dated 31st March 2017,
respondents have accepted in paragraph 7, the classification under
Chapter Heading 21. The said paragraph 7 reads thus :-
"7. It is noticed that the comments in respect of said application were called for from Principal Commissioner of Customs, Chennai-II and Commissioner of Customs (Nhava Sheva-II). Commissioner of Customs, Chennai-II agreed with the applicant that the subject items are classifiable under Chapter Heading 21069030 as "Betelnut Product as Supari."
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Therefore, even on this count, the said respondents cannot
contend otherwise.
17. Therefore, looked from any angle, the ruling dated 31st
March 2017 passed by the AAR in the petitioner's own case is binding
under Section 28 J (1) on the petitioner and the respondents as there
being no change in law post the said decision and the said decision
having been accepted by the respondents in the absence of any further
challenge before the higher forum.
18. Now coming to the contention of the respondent on alternate
remedy, the respondents have relied on various decisions, which in our
view, are not applicable to the facts of the present petition. The decision
relied upon by the respondents pertains to the challenge at the show
cause notice stage where the jurisdiction was not under challenge. On
the contrary, the decision relied upon by the respondents in case of
Assistant Commissioner of State Tax & Ors. Vs. M/s. Commercial Steel
Ltd.3 holds that an assessee can invoke writ jurisdiction if the action is
in excess of jurisdiction. In the instant case, as observed by us, the
respondents have passed the O-I-O contrary to the provisions of Section
28J of the Act and, therefore, the same is without jurisdiction. In view of
3 2021 (52) GSTL 385 (SC)
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the above discussion that the impugned order is passed without
jurisdiction, writ petition is maintainable. The petitioner hence ought not
to be relegated to take recourse to an appellate remedy.
19. For the reasons stated above, the impugned O-I-O dated 11 th
November 2022 is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute
in terms of prayer clause (a). No costs.
JITENDRA JAIN, J. G. S. KULKARNI, J.
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