Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 6283 Bom
Judgement Date : 5 July, 2022
1 WP / 6907 / 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
951 WRIT PETITION NO. 6907 OF 2022
RAVINDRA ONKAR PATIL AND ANOTHER
VERSUS
SHILABAI UTTAMBHAI PATIL AND OTHERS
...
Advocate for Petitioners : Mr. Shah Subodh P.
Advocate for the respondents : Mr. R.N. Dhorde, Sr. Advocate
h/f. Mr. V.R. Dhorde
...
CORAM : MANGESH S. PATIL, J.
DATE : 5 JULY 2022 ORAL ORDER :
Heard. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Mr. Dhorde
waives service. At the joint request the matter is taken up for disposal
at the stage of admission.
2. The petitioners are the original plaintiffs who had filed a
suit for declaration about being the tenants in the suit properties and for
perpetual injunction restraining the respondents - defendants from
obstructing their possession. Both the sides had filed applications for
temporary injunction. The trial court granted the temporary injunction in
favour of the petitioners and rejected the application of the
respondents. Both the sides challenged the common order by
separate appeals. The lower appellate court has quashed, set aside
and reversed the order of the trial court. It has refused to confirm
injunction in favour of the petitioners but granted it in favour of the
respondents.
2 WP / 6907 / 2022
3. The learned advocate Mr. Shah would strenuously submit
that it is a suit for injunction to protect possession. There was enough
material on the record to substantiate their claim of being in possession
of the suit properties. The question of title was irrelevant. The
respondents without putting up any counter claim sought temporary
injunction against the petitioners to the effect that they shall not
obstruct their possession, however, no such relief was available to be
had in view of the peculiar wording of clause (a) of Order XXXIX Rule 1
of the Code of Civil Procedure, as interpreted by this court in the matter
of Nanasaheb S/o Sakharam Bhalekar Vs. Dattu S/o Dhondiba
Bhalekar and others; 1991 Mh.L.J. 685. He would submit that the
discretion that was exercised by the trial court was judicious. There
was no perversity or arbitrariness. The lower appellate court without
pointing out as to how the discretion exercised by the trial court was
misplaced, has undertaken a fresh scrutiny and substituted his
discretion in the place exercised by the trial court. Such a course was
not available. The order of the trial court was neither perverse nor
arbitrary and the lower appellate court in an appeal under section 104
r/w. Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure could not have caused
any interference.
4. Learned advocate Mr. Shah would further submit that
in-fact the observations and conclusions drawn by the appellate court
are palpably perverse and clearly ignore the material on the record. It
3 WP / 6907 / 2022
also does not refer to the circumstances indicating possession of the
petitioners over the suit properties.
5. Learned senior advocate Mr. Dhorde for the respondents
supports the order under challenge. He would submit that the
circumstances relied upon by the petitioners and the trial court have
been rightly met by the lower appellate court. The petitioners
themselves are unsure as to the stand to be taken. Initially, they
claimed to be the owner of the suit properties. While filing the suit, they
changed their version and claimed to be tenants. He would further
submit that apart from the fact that the issue regarding tenancy cannot
be gone into by a civil court, the petitioners had approached the
authorities under the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act.
Their claim of being tenants has been turned down. In view of such
inconsistent stands being taken by the petitioners, they were not
entitled to claim any discretionary relief. The lower appellate court has
rightly caused interference and reversed the order.
6. I have carefully considered the rival submissions and
perused the papers. It is quite apparent that for whatever reasons, the
petitioners have now changed their stand and merely claim to be
tenants in the suit properties. This implies that they admit the title of
the respondents no. 1 to 3 who are real sisters of the petitioner no. 1.
7. It is trite that in such kind of matters, the evidence
regarding possession is vital. Even a trespasser or a person in settled
4 WP / 6907 / 2022
possession of the property is entitled to hold the possession so long as
he is not dis-possessed by following the due process of law.
8. Though there have been consistent revenue entries
indicating ownership and possession of the respondents no. 1 to 3 for
years together, the proceedings in the form of change in revenue
entries was initiated. Talathi had submitted the prescribed information
to the Tahsildar in a requisite form mentioning that the petitioners were
in possession. Though Tahsildar and thereafter even the Sub Divisional
Officer specifically concluded that the respondents no. 1 to 3 were the
owners of the property, the conclusion drawn by Tahsildar that the
petitioners were in possession has not been reversed by the learned
Sub Divisional Officer.
9. Pertinently, though the fact has been subsequently denied
in the written statement of the respondent no. 4, the statement of
adjoining owners recorded before the Tahsildar purportedly
demonstrates that even the respondent no. 4 was a signatory and
admitted petitioners' possession over the suit properties. Except the
denial in the written statement, neither the respondents no. 1 to 3
independently nor even the respondent no. 4 ever seem to have raised
any objection in respect of this circumstance. At this juncture, the
conclusion drawn by the Tahsildar that the petitioners were in
possession though they were not the owners of the suit properties
stands as it is.
5 WP / 6907 / 2022
10. The lower appellate court has clearly misread this piece of
evidence. In spite of a specific conclusion drawn by the Tahsildar, the
learned Judge has concluded that Tahsildar had held the petitioners to
be not in possession.
11. The afore-mentioned circumstances are indicative of the
fact that even if the petitioners prima facie are unable to demonstrate
any right in them to hold back the possession of the suit property, at
this stage of the proceeding even this much material was indeed
sufficient to exercise the discretion in favour of the petitioners. The trial
court had exercised it for the reasons recorded in the order.
By no stretch of imagination, the conclusion drawn by the trial court
could be said to be either perverse, arbitrary or capricious.
12. It is trite that the courts exercising powers under section
104 r/w. Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure have inherent
limitation. They can cause interference only if the order passed by the
lower court is perverse or arbitrary and not otherwise. It was therefore
imperative for the lower appellate court to have objectively
demonstrated as to how the order of the trial court granting injunction
to the petitioners was perverse or arbitrary. Without demonstrating it, it
had no jurisdiction to cause any interference.
13. As far as the relief of temporary injunction being claimed
by the respondents, admittedly, there is no counter claim. In the
petitioners' suit, they are claiming temporary injunction not to obstruct
6 WP / 6907 / 2022
their possession. Going by the wordings of clauses (a), (b) and (c) of
Rule 1 of Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, there is a
marked distinction as to the circumstances under which the parties to a
suit can claim injunction. It is only under clause (a) that defendant
would be entitled to claim temporary injunction to protect the suit
properties. It is only when the property in dispute is in danger of being
wasted, damaged or alienated that the defendant can claim temporary
injunction. The relief of injunction as regards protection of possession is
concerned it falls under clause (c). Only the plaintiff is entitled to claim
temporary injunction. This is what has been laid down by this court in
the matter of Nanasaheb V. Dattu (supra).
14. Without understanding the niceties of such provisions, the
learned Judge of the lower appellate Court has even illegally set aside
the order of the trial court refusing temporary injunction granted to the
respondents - defendants.
15. The writ petition is allowed.
16. The judgment and order passed by the lower appellate
court is quashed and set aside and the one passed by the trial court is
restored.
17. At this juncture, the learned senior advocate Mr. Dhorde
for the respondents submits that the lower appellate court had directed
the parties to maintain status quo which order was in operation from
7 WP / 6907 / 2022
24-06-2022 till 04-07-2022 and the same may be continued till the
respondents approach the Supreme Court.
18. The learned advocate Mr. Shah strenuously opposes the
request. He submits that in-fact during the pendency of the appeal, the
operation of the order passed by the trial court was not stayed till
24-06-2022 and it was only thereafter that the lower appellate court
had directed the parties to maintain status quo till yesterday.
19. Considering the nature of the dispute, the order of status
quo continues for a period of three weeks to enable the respondents to
approach the Supreme Court.
20. Rule is made absolute in above terms.
[ MANGESH S. PATIL ] JUDGE arp/
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