Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 4026 Bom
Judgement Date : 4 March, 2021
23-sast-2863-2020 with ia-1994-2020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SECOND APPEAL (ST) NO.2863 OF 2020
Smt.Saraswati Mukundrao Algude
(Deceased)
Shri.Mahadev Mukundrao Algude & Ors. ..Appellants
Vs.
Mr.Bhagwan Sahebrao Algude & Ors. ..Respondents
----
Mr.Avinash B. Avhad for the Appellants.
Digitally signed
Nilam by Nilam Kamble
Kamble Date: 2021.03.05
17:30:54 +0530 Mr.V.S. Talkute for Respondent Nos.1 to 5 and 7.
----
CORAM : C.V. BHADANG, J.
DATE : 04th MARCH 2021
P.C.:
1. The appellants are the original Defendant Nos.1 to 7.
The respondent Nos.1 to 7 (Original Plaintiffs) had filed RCS No.
159 of 2004 against the appellants and others for partition and
separate possession of several properties as described in the plaint.
The suit was resisted on behalf of the appellants.
2. The learned trial Court framed the following issues:
Sr.No. Issues
1 Do the plaintiffs prove that, the suit properties
are joint family properties of them and defendants no.1 to 8 ?
N.S. Kamble page 1 of 8 23-sast-2863-2020 with ia-1994-2020
2 Do the defendants prove that, there was partition of the suit properties between the parties in 1967 ?
3 Do the defendants prove that, all the ancestral properties are not included in the suit as suit properties ?
4 Are the plaintiffs entitled to partition ? If yest, what would be their share ?
5 Are the plaintiffs entitled to separate possession of the suit properties as prayed for ?
6 Are the plaintiffs entitled to permanent injunction as prayed for ?
7 What order and decree ?
3. The parties led oral and documentary evidence. The
learned trial Court by a judgment and decree dated 28 th February
2017 decreed the suit. Feeling aggrieved the appellants challenged
the same before the learned District Judge in Regular Civil Appeal
No.152 of 2017.
4. The learned District Judge by the impugned judgment
and decree dated 17th December 2019 has partly allowed the appeal,
thereby modifying the decree passed by the trial Court. The
N.S. Kamble page 2 of 8 23-sast-2863-2020 with ia-1994-2020
operative part of the judgment of the First Appellate Court may be
reproduced thus :-
"ORDER
1. The appeal is partly allowed.
2. The decree passed in R.C.S. No.159/2004 dated 28/02/2017 is modified to the extent of clause No.2.
3. The clause No.2 of the decree is replaced as under:-
(2) The plaintiffs No.1 to 5, 7, the defendant No.2 to 7, 8A, 10 to 13, 14 to 17, 18A to 18E, 19 to 22 and 34A to 34C are entitled to partition and separate possession in respect of suit properties more particularly described in paragraph No.1 of the plaint as follows:
(A) Plaintiffs No.1 to 5 and defendants No.34A to 34C are jointly entitled to 7/30th share in the suit properties.
(B) The defendants No.2 to 7 and 8A are jointly entitled to 7/30th share in the suit properties. (C) Plaintiff No.7 is entitled to 7/30th share in the suit properties.
(D) The defendants No.10 to 13 are jointly entitled to 7/30th share in the suit properties. (E) The defendants No.14 to 17, 18A to 18E, 19 and 20 are jointly entitled to 1/30th share in the suit properties.
(F) The defendants No.21 and 22 are jointly entitled to 1/30th share in the suit properties.
N.S. Kamble page 3 of 8 23-sast-2863-2020 with ia-1994-2020
4. Rest of the decree passed by Ld. Trial Court is confirmed.
5. Decree be drawn up accordingly."
Feeling aggrieved the appellants are before this Court.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and
the learned counsel for the contesting respondent Nos.1 to 7.
Perused record.
6. Mr.Avhad the learned counsel for the appellants has
raised two grounds. First that the suit properties were already
partitioned in the year 1967 and therefore the subsequent suit for
partition was not maintainable. Secondly, it is submitted that there
was a consolidation scheme implemented in the village where the
earlier survey numbers were converted into gat numbers. It is
submitted that once the suit properties have been converted into gat
numbers after consolidation the suit for partition was not
maintainable.
In the submission of the learned counsel, the act of the
plaintiffs in seeking partition of the land, after their consolidation
would tantamount, to challenging the consolidated scheme, itself
N.S. Kamble page 4 of 8 23-sast-2863-2020 with ia-1994-2020
which is prohibited by Section 36A of the Maharashtra Prevention of
Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act ('the Act' for
short).
7. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed
reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Yashwant
Ramchandra Dhumal deceased by L.Rs. Ashok Yeshwant Dhumal
and Others V/s. Shankar Maruti Dhumal & Another1.
Except these there are no other contentions raised.
8. Mr.Talkute, the learned counsel for the contesting
respondent has supported the impugned judgment. It is submitted
that the theory of the earlier partition of the year 1967 has been
negatived by both the Courts below and that finding of fact properly
recorded is not amenable to challenged. Insofar as the ground
based of the consolidation of holdings is concerned, it is submitted
that the consolidation cannot change the nature of the properties or
the title.
1 2001 (2) Mh.L.J. 576
N.S. Kamble page 5 of 8
23-sast-2863-2020 with ia-1994-2020
9. I have carefully considered the circumstances and the
submissions made. With the assistance of the learned counsel for
the parties I have gone through the record.
10. Insofar as the first ground is concerned the defence
about the earlier partition of the year 1967 has not been accepted by
both the Courts below. The said finding of fact has been properly
recorded on the basis of the evidence led. It is now well settled that
in the absence of a finding of fact being shown to be perverse and
against the weight of the evidence no substantial question of law
arises. Thus the contention insofar as the partition of the year 1967
which has concurrently been negatived, to my mind does not give
rise to any substantial question of law.
11. Coming to the issue of consolidation it is true that the
suit properties have been consolidated in the year 1970. However,
it is difficult to see as to how such consolidation can bring about the
nature of the property or its title. The properties were found to be
joint family properties and they would continue to be so, even after
consolidation. Thus the mere fact that the plaintiffs are seeking a
partition of the suit property which have been subject matter of a
consolidation scheme cannot tantamount the plaintiffs challenge the
N.S. Kamble page 6 of 8 23-sast-2863-2020 with ia-1994-2020
consolidation scheme itself, which is prohibited under Section 36A
of the said Act.
12. The reliance placed on the decision in the case of
Yashwant Ramchandra Dhumal to my mind is misplaced, inasmuch
as that was not a case which arose out of a suit for partition. In that
case property bearing block Nos.1428 and 1429 were subject matter
of dispute and this Court found that the manner in which the two
blocks were formed was admitted.
13. The appellants therein had filed a suit claiming that
they had given possession of the land Survey No.199/4-B + 5 to the
respondent No.1 only for a period of three years from 1972 to 1975
in consideration from a loan taken for the respondent No.1.
Further according to the plaintiff after the expiry of the
period of three years the possession of the respondent No.1 became
unauthorized and unlawful. It was in these circumstances, that the
suit was filed for possession in the year 1969.
14. In these circumstances, the trial Court held that it had
no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of the bar under Section
N.S. Kamble page 7 of 8 23-sast-2863-2020 with ia-1994-2020
36A of the said act. In my considered view, the case clearly turned
on its own facts.
15. The First Appellate Court has dealt with the ground
based on the consolidation, from paragraph 26 of the judgment and
has found, and to my mind rightly so, that the fact that the
properties have undergone a consolidation would not change the
status or the nature of the properties, if there were otherwise held to
be ancestral properties. In the circumstances, the second ground
also cannot be accepted.
16. The appeal is without any merit and it is accordingly
dismissed, with no order as to costs.
Decree be drawn accordingly.
C.V. BHADANG, J.
N.S. Kamble page 8 of 8
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