Bombay High Court
Duncan Engineering Ltd. Through ... vs Vikas P. Joshi on 21 June, 2021
Bench: Anuja Prabhudessai
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO. 93088 OF 2020
Duncan Engineering Ltd.
(erstwhile Schrader Duncan Ltd.)
Through its Manager
F-33 M.I.D.C Ranjangaon, Karegaon,
Taluka Shirur, Dist. Pune - 412 209.
... Petitioner
v/s.
Ajay C. Shelke
C/o. Adv. R.B. Sharmale,
President, Lokkalyan Majdoor Union,
54, Budhwar Peth, Kakakuwa Mansion,
Laxmi Road, Ganpati Chowk,
Pune 411 002. .... Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO. 93042 OF 2020
Duncan Engineering Ltd.
(erstwhile Schrader Duncan Ltd.)
Through its Manager
F-33 M.I.D.C Ranjangaon, Karegaon,
Taluka Shirur, Dist. Pune - 412 209. ... Petitioner
v/s.
Altaf Y. Sayyad
C/o. Adv. R.B. Sharmale,
President, Lokkalyan Majdoor Union,
54, Budhwar Peth, Kakakuwa Mansion,
Laxmi Road, Ganpati Chowk,
Pune - 411 002. .... Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO. 93100 OF 2020
Duncan Engineering Ltd.
(erstwhile Schrader Duncan Ltd.)
Through its Manager
F-33 M.I.D.C Ranjangaon, Karegaon,
Taluka Shirur, Dist. Pune - 412 209.
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... Petitioner
v/s.
Shri. Ankush H. Tonde
C/o. Adv. R.B. Sharmale,
President, Lokkalyan Majdoor Union,
54, Budhwar Peth, Kakakuwa Mansion,
Laxmi Road, Ganpati Chowk,
Pune - 411 002. .... Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO. 93073 OF 2020
Duncan Engineering Ltd.
(erstwhile Schrader Duncan Ltd.)
Through its Manager
F-33 M.I.D.C Ranjangaon, Karegaon,
Taluka Shirur, Dist. Pune - 412 209. ... Petitioner
v/s.
Shri Arun J. Kumbhar
C/o. Adv. R.B. Sharmale,
President, Lokkalyan Majdoor Union,
54, Budhwar Peth, Kakakuwa Mansion,
Laxmi Road, Ganpati Chowk,
Pune - 411 002. .... Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO. 93037 OF 2020
Duncan Engineering Ltd.
(erstwhile Schrader Duncan Ltd.)
Through its Manager
F-33 M.I.D.C Ranjangaon, Karegaon,
Taluka Shirur, Dist. Pune - 412 209. ... Petitioner
v/s.
Shri. Balu V. Kalamkar
C/o. Adv. R.B. Sharmale,
President, Lokkalyan Majdoor Union,
54, Budhwar Peth, Kakakuwa Mansion,
Laxmi Road, Ganpati Chowk,
Pune - 411 002. .... Respondent
WITH
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WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO. 93056 OF 2020
Duncan Engineering Ltd.
(erstwhile Schrader Duncan Ltd.)
Through its Manager
F-33 M.I.D.C Ranjangaon, Karegaon,
Taluka Shirur, Dist. Pune - 412 209. ... Petitioner
v/s.
Shri. Dnyaneshwar P. Weljali
C/o. Adv. R.B. Sharmale,
President, Lokkalyan Majdoor Union,
54, Budhwar Peth, Kakakuwa Mansion,
Laxmi Road, Ganpati Chowk,
Pune - 411 002. .... Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO. 93093 OF 2020
Duncan Engineering Ltd.
(erstwhile Schrader Duncan Ltd.)
Through its Manager
F-33 M.I.D.C Ranjangaon, Karegaon,
Taluka Shirur, Dist. Pune - 412 209. ... Petitioner
v/s.
Shri. Ganesh R. Dighe
C/o. Adv. R.B. Sharmale,
President, Lokkalyan Majdoor Union,
54, Budhwar Peth, Kakakuwa Mansion,
Laxmi Road, Ganpati Chowk,
Pune - 411 002. .... Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO. 93041 OF 2020
Duncan Engineering Ltd.
(erstwhile Schrader Duncan Ltd.)
Through its Manager
F-33 M.I.D.C Ranjangaon, Karegaon,
Taluka Shirur, Dist. Pune - 412 209. ... Petitioner
v/s.
Shri. Hariom D. Saroj
C/o. Adv. R.B. Sharmale,
President, Lokkalyan Majdoor Union,
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54, Budhwar Peth, Kakakuwa Mansion,
Laxmi Road, Ganpati Chowk,
Pune - 411 002. .... Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO. 93101 OF 2020
Duncan Engineering Ltd.
(erstwhile Schrader Duncan Ltd.)
Through its Manager
F-33 M.I.D.C Ranjangaon, Karegaon,
Taluka Shirur, Dist. Pune - 412 209. ... Petitioner
v/s.
Mahesh M. Kulkarni
C/o. Adv. R.B. Sharmale,
President, Lokkalyan Majdoor Union,
54, Budhwar Peth, Kakakuwa Mansion,
Laxmi Road, Ganpati Chowk,
Pune - 411 002. .... Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO. 93039 OF 2020
Duncan Engineering Ltd.
(erstwhile Schrader Duncan Ltd.)
Through its Manager
F-33 M.I.D.C Ranjangaon, Karegaon,
Taluka Shirur, Dist. Pune - 412 209. ... Petitioner
v/s.
Shri. Manohar Waman Narkhede
C/o. Adv. R.B. Sharmale,
President, Lokkalyan Majdoor Union,
54, Budhwar Peth, Kakakuwa Mansion,
Laxmi Road, Ganpati Chowk,
Pune - 411 002. .... Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO. 93077 OF 2020
Duncan Engineering Ltd.
(erstwhile Schrader Duncan Ltd.)
Through its Manager
F-33 M.I.D.C Ranjangaon, Karegaon,
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Taluka Shirur, Dist. Pune - 412 209. ... Petitioner
v/s.
Shri. Nitin S. Pawase
C/o. Adv. R.B. Sharmale,
President, Lokkalyan Majdoor Union,
54, Budhwar Peth, Kakakuwa Mansion,
Laxmi Road, Ganpati Chowk,
Pune - 411 002. .... Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO. 93097 OF 2020
Duncan Engineering Ltd.
(erstwhile Schrader Duncan Ltd.)
Through its Manager
F-33 M.I.D.C Ranjangaon, Karegaon,
Taluka Shirur, Dist. Pune - 412 209. ... Petitioner
v/s.
Shri. Pandurang D. Yele
C/o. Adv. R.B. Sharmale,
President, Lokkalyan Majdoor Union,
54, Budhwar Peth, Kakakuwa Mansion,
Laxmi Road, Ganpati Chowk,
Pune - 411 002. .... Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO. 93052 OF 2020
Duncan Engineering Ltd.
(erstwhile Schrader Duncan Ltd.)
Through its Manager
F-33 M.I.D.C Ranjangaon, Karegaon,
Taluka Shirur, Dist. Pune - 412 209. ... Petitioner
v/s.
Popat K. Pawar
C/o. Adv. R.B. Sharmale,
President, Lokkalyan Majdoor Union,
54, Budhwar Peth, Kakakuwa Mansion,
Laxmi Road, Ganpati Chowk,
Pune - 411 002. .... Respondent
WITH
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WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO. 93047 OF 2020
Duncan Engineering Ltd.
(erstwhile Schrader Duncan Ltd.)
Through its Manager
F-33 M.I.D.C Ranjangaon, Karegaon,
Taluka Shirur, Dist. Pune - 412 209. ... Petitioner
v/s.
Rupesh J. Pawar
C/o. Adv. R.B. Sharmale,
President, Lokkalyan Majdoor Union,
54, Budhwar Peth, Kakakuwa Mansion,
Laxmi Road, Ganpati Chowk,
Pune - 411 002. .... Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO. 93036 OF 2020
Duncan Engineering Ltd.
(erstwhile Schrader Duncan Ltd.)
Through its Manager
F-33 M.I.D.C Ranjangaon, Karegaon,
Taluka Shirur, Dist. Pune - 412 209. ... Petitioner
v/s.
Sunil D. Nikam
C/o. Adv. R.B. Sharmale,
President, Lokkalyan Majdoor Union,
54, Budhwar Peth, Kakakuwa Mansion,
Laxmi Road, Ganpati Chowk,
Pune - 411 002. .... Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO. 93091 OF 2020
Duncan Engineering Ltd.
(erstwhile Schrader Duncan Ltd.)
Through its Manager
F-33 M.I.D.C Ranjangaon, Karegaon,
Taluka Shirur, Dist. Pune - 412 209. ... Petitioner
v/s.
Shri. Vikas P. Joshi
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C/o. Adv. R.B. Sharmale,
President, Lokkalyan Majdoor Union,
54, Budhwar Peth, Kakakuwa Mansion,
Laxmi Road, Ganpati Chowk,
Pune - 411 002. .... Respondent
WITH
WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO. 93045 OF 2020
Duncan Engineering Ltd.
(erstwhile Schrader Duncan Ltd.)
Through its Manager
F-33 M.I.D.C Ranjangaon, Karegaon,
Taluka Shirur, Dist. Pune - 412 209. ... Petitioner
v/s.
Shri. Vishal R. Jadhav
C/o. Adv. R.B. Sharmale,
President, Lokkalyan Majdoor Union,
54, Budhwar Peth, Kakakuwa Mansion,
Laxmi Road, Ganpati Chowk, .... Respondent
Pune - 411 002.
...
Ms. Nutan Patankar i/b. Ms. Tanaya Patankar for the
Petitioners in all WPs.
Mr. Nitin Kulkarni for the Respondents.
CORAM: SMT. ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI, J.
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON:21/06/2021
JUDGMENT: -
. Rule. With consent Rule made returnable forthwith.
These Petitions involve a common question of law, hence the
same are heard together and are being decided by this
common Judgment.
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
2. The Petitioner-Employer assails Awards of the
Labour Court-II, Pune. By the impugned Awards, the Labour
Court has held the dismissal orders to be void and inoperative
for non-compliance of provisions under Section 33(2)(b) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'the ID Act') and
directed the Petitioner to reinstate all the Respondent-
workmen with continuity of service, full back wages and all
consequential benefts.
3. The facts giving rise to the present petitions are as
under: -
The Petitioner is engaged in the business of manufacturing
Tube Valves for Automobile Sector. Respondent-workmen
were employed in one of the factories of the Petitioner. They
were served with charge sheets alleging willful
insubordination, disobedience, illegal strike, riotous and
disorderly behaviour, etc. which constituted misconduct under
model standard orders under Sections 24(a), (b), (k), (l), (w)
framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders)
Act. The Petitioner, not being satisfed with the explanation
submitted by the Respondent-workmen, initiated enquiry into
the alleged misconduct. The Enquiry Ofcer recorded a
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
fnding that the Respondent -workmen were guilty of
misconduct. Hence, vide order dated 10/10/2014 the
Petitioner terminated the services of Respondent-workmen
with immediate efect. Aggrieved by the dismissal order, the
Respondent-Workmen raised an industrial dispute, which was
referred to the Labour Court for adjudication, in exercise of
the powers conferred under Section 10 of the ID Act. The
Reference was on the question of validity and legality of
termination of services of the Respondent-Workmen and if so,
whether the Respondent-Workmen were entitled for
reinstatement with continuity of service, back-wages, and
other benefts.
4. The Respondent-workmen fled their statement of
claim before the Labour Court inter alia contending that
dismissal is illegal and void for want of approval under Section
33(2)(b) of the ID Act. It was the case of the Respondent -
workmen that issuance of charge sheet and consequent
dismissal was a result of victimization for having joined the
Union viz. Maharashtra Rajya Rashtriya Kamgar Sangh (INTAK),
which was espousing their cause. The Respondent-workmen
contended that the dismissal order was passed pending the
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
Reference i.e., Ref. (IT) No.17 of 2014 pertaining to the Charter
of Demands raised by the Union of which they were the
members. The Respondent-workmen contended that the
dismissal orders were inoperative, having been passed without
seeking approval from the authority before which the
Reference was pending. On merits the Respondent-workmen
alleged that the enquiry was not fair and proper and that the
fndings recorded by the Enquiry Ofcer as regards the
misconduct were perverse.
5. The Petitioner denied that the issuance of a charge
sheet was an act of victimization. The Petitioner contended
that the Respondent-Workmen had participated in the enquiry,
which was conducted to enquire into the misconduct
committed by them. It was further alleged that the Enquiry
Ofcer upon considering the material on record held the
Respondent-workmen guilty of the charges levelled. The
Petitioner claimed that it was not necessary to seek approval
and denied that the order of dismissal was void or inoperative
for breach of Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act.
6. The Labour Court framed preliminary issues
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
relating to fairness of the enquiry and perversity or otherwise
of the fndings recorded by the Enquiry Ofcer. The Labour
Court, by Part -I Award on the said preliminary issues, held the
enquiry to be fair, proper and in accordance with the principles
of natural justice. The Labour Court further held that there
was sufcient and acceptable evidence before the Enquiry
Ofcer to come to the conclusion that the Respondent-
workmen have committed misconduct mentioned in the
charge sheet. The Labour Court therefore held that the
fndings of the Enquiry Ofcer are based on sufcient and
acceptable evidence and that the same are not perverse and
accordingly answered the preliminary issues in favour of the
Petitioner.
7. Nevertheless, in the fnal awards, which are assailed
in these petitions, the Labour Court interfered with the
punishment and ordered reinstatement mainly on the ground
of non-compliance of the provision under Section 33(2)(b) of
the ID Act. In arriving at these fndings, the Labour Court has
taken note of the fact that the Reference pertaining to the
Charter of Demand was pending adjudication and that the
dismissal orders were issued during pendency of the said
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
Reference without complying with the provisions of Section
33(2)(b) of the ID Act. Relying upon the decision of the
Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Jaipur Zila Sahakari
Bhumi Vikas Bank Ltd. Vs. Ram Gopal Sharma and Ors.
(2002) 2 SCC 224, the Labour Court held that the dismissal
orders which are in contravention of the mandatory provision
of Section 33(2) (b) of the ID Act are void and inoperative. The
Labour Court therefore set aside the said dismissal orders with
direction to the Petitioner to reinstate the Respondent-
workmen with continuity in service, full back wages and all
consequential benefts.
8. The Respondent-Workmen have not challenged the
fndings rendered by the Labour Court on the preliminary
issues viz. fairness of the enquiry and the fndings recorded by
the Enquiry Ofcer with regard to the misconduct. The
challenge raised by the Petitioner in these petitions fled under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India is restricted to the
order of reinstatement with consequential benefts for want
of compliance of Section 33(2) (b) of the ID Act.
9. Ms Nutan Patankar, learned counsel for the
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
Petitioner submits that once a workman fles an application
under Section 33A or raises an industrial dispute resulting in
Reference under Section 10 of the ID Act, the industrial
adjudicator cannot restrict adjudication only to the issue of
non-compliance of provision under Section 33(2)(b) but must
adjudicate the substantive dispute on merits in accordance
with the provisions of the ID Act. She submits that in the
instant case, having held that the enquiry is fair and proper,
and the charges have been proved, the Labour Court was not
justifed in interfering with the dismissal orders and ordering
reinstatement solely on the ground of contravention of
provision under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. In support of
this contention, she has relied upon the decision of the Apex
Court in Punjab National Bank Ltd. Vs. Workmen, AIR 1960
SC 160, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and
Anr. Vs. Satyaprakash (2013) 9 SCC 232, Management of
Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. Vs. S. Balkrishnan 2016 (12) SCC 221
and Managemnt of North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation Vs. Shivsharanappa 2017 (16) SCC 540.
10. Per contra, Mr. Nitin Kulkarni, learned counsel for
the Respondent-workmen submits that the Constitution Bench
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
of the Supreme Court in Jaipur Zila (supra) has resolved the
controversy and has held that the dismissal order in
contravention of Section 33(2)(b) is void and inoperative. He
submits that the decision in Rajasthan S.R.T.C. (Supra) was
based on the peculiar facts of the case whereas in Karur Vysya
(supra) the issue of non-compliance of Section 33(2)(b) has
been kept open. He emphasizes that termination of the
services of Respondent-workmen was clearly in the teeth of
Section 33(2) (b) of the ID Act. In view of the law laid down by
the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, the dismissal
order being void ab initio, the Labour Court was not competent
to go into the justifability of the dismissal order and or the
question relating to the justifability or proportionality of the
dismissal order.
11. Learned counsel for Respondent-workmen has
relied upon the decision in Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Ltd.
Vs. Mackinnon Employees Union 2015 (4) SCC 544, wherein
the Apex Court while considering the impact of non-
compliance of Section 25FFA and 25G of the ID Act has
reiterated the legal principle that if a statutory provision
prescribes a particular procedure to be followed by the
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
Authority to do an act, it should be done only in that particular
manner. It is held that if such procedure is not followed in the
prescribed manner, as provided in the statutory provision, then
such act of the Authority is null and void ab-initio.
12. Ld. Counsel for the Respondent has also relied
upon the decision in S.G. Chemical and Dyes Trading
Employees Union Vs. S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Ltd.
And Ors. 1986 (2) SCC 624 wherein the Apex Court has held
that closure in contravention of the provisions of Section 25-O
of ID Act is illegal. It is emphasized that if the services of a
workman are terminated in violation of any of the provisions of
the Industrial Dispute Act, such termination is unlawful and
inefective, and the workman would ordinarily be entitled to
reinstatement and payment of full back-wages. He submits
that in the instant case, the Petitioner had admittedly not
obtained approval and hence the termination which is in
breach of mandatory provision is void ab-initio. He therefore
contends that the Labour Court was perfectly justifed in
ordering reinstatement with full back-wages and
consequential benefts.
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
13. I have perused the records and considered the
submissions advanced by learned counsel for the respective
parties.
14. It is not in dispute that the Respondent-Workmen
were served with charge sheets for committing several acts of
misconduct. They participated in an enquiry into the alleged
misconduct and that the Enquiry Ofcer held them guilty of
the said misconduct. The Petitioner dismissed the services of
Respondent-Workmen during the pendency of a Reference
relating to Charter of Demands, without payment of one
month wages and seeking approval as per the mandate of
Section 33 (2)(b) of the I.D. Act. In a Reference made under
Section 10 of the I.D. Act, the Labour Court recorded a fnding
that the inquiry is fair and proper and that the fndings of the
Inquiry Ofcer are based on the material on record and are not
perverse. The Labour Court has held the termination to be
illegal and void solely on the ground of non-compliance of
Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act.
15. There is no challenge to the fndings recorded by
the Labour Court on the preliminary issues, viz. fairness of the
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
enquiry and perversity or otherwise of the fndings recorded
by the Enquiry Ofcer on the alleged misconduct. The
challenge is restricted to the order of reinstatement for non-
compliance with the provisions of Section 33 (2)(b) of the ID
Act. Though the learned counsel for the respective parties
have argued at great length and cited several decisions, the
central issue is whether non-compliance with the proviso to
Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act would ipso facto entitle the
Respondent-workmen to be reinstated with all consequential
benefts or whether, having held the misconduct to be proved,
the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the
dismissal order, notwithstanding non-compliance of the
mandatory provision under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act.
16. In order to appreciate the submissions and answer
the above questions it would be advantageous to consider the
scope and ambit of the provisions of Sections 33 and 33A of
the ID Act as well as the law on the subject. The relevant
portion of Section 33 and Section 33A of ID Act read as under: -
"Sec. 33. Conditions of service, etc., to remain
unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency
of proceedings.
(1) During the pendency of any conciliation
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proceeding before a conciliation ofcer or a Board or
of any proceeding before an arbitrator or] a Labour
Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an
industrial dispute, no employer shall--
(a) in regard to any matter connected with the
dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the workmen
concerned in such dispute, the conditions of
service applicable to them immediately before the
commencement of such proceeding; or
(b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute,
discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or
otherwise, any workmen concerned in such
dispute, save with the express permission in
writing of the authority before which the
proceeding is pending.
(2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in
respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in
accordance with the standing orders applicable to a
workman concerned in such dispute or, where there are
no such standing orders, in accordance with the terms
of the contract, whether express or implied, between
him and the workman,--
(a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected
with the dispute, the conditions of service
applicable to that workman immediately before
the commencement of such proceeding; or
(b) for any misconduct not connected with the
dispute, or discharge or punish, whether by
dismissal or otherwise, that workman: Provided
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that no such workman shall be discharged or
dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for
one month and an application has been made by
the employer to the authority before which the
proceeding is pending for approval of the action
taken by the employer.
(3) xxx
Sec. 33A. Special provision for adjudication as to
whether conditions of service, etc., changed during
pendency of proceedings. - Where an employer
contravenes the provisions of section 33 during the
pendency of proceedings before a conciliation
ofcer, Board, an arbitrator, a Labour Court,
Tribunal or National Tribunal], any employee
aggrieved by such contravention may, make a
complaint in writing, in the prescribed manner,
(a) to such conciliation ofcer or Board, and the
conciliation ofcer or Board shall take such
complaint into account in mediating in, and
promoting the settlement of, such industrial
dispute; and
(b) to such arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or
National Tribunal and on receipt of such
complaint, the arbitrator, Labour Court,
Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may
be, shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it
were a dispute refer ed to or pending before
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it, in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and shall submit his or its award to the
appropriate Government and the provisions of
this Act shall apply accordingly. "
17. Section 33 of the I.D. Act, as it stood prior to 1956
amendment, imposed a total ban on change of service
conditions to the prejudice of workman or discharge or
dismissal of the workman during the pendency of any
conciliation proceeding or any other proceeding before a
Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an
industrial dispute. The object was to protect the workman
concerned against victimization for having raised an industrial
dispute and further to ensure adjudication of pending
industrial proceedings in a peaceful atmosphere. The efect of
the unamended section was that pending an industrial dispute,
the employer could not alter the service conditions and or pass
discharge or dismissal order even in a matter not connected
with the pending dispute. Section 33 was therefore amended
in the year 1956.
18. Section 33, as amended in the year 1956 makes a
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
broad division between action proposed to be taken by the
employer regarding any matter connected with the dispute on
the one hand and action proposed to be taken regarding a
matter not connected with the dispute pending before the
authority. To be more specifc Sub-Section (1) of Section 33
deals with matters connected with the pending dispute and
imposes a ban on change of service conditions or discharge or
dismissal of the workman save with the express permission in
writing of the authority before which the proceeding is
pending. Whereas Sub-Section (2) of Section 33 deals with the
alterations in the conditions of service as well as discharge or
dismissal of workman concerned in any pending dispute where
such alteration or such discharge or dismissal is in regard to a
matter not connected to the pending dispute.
19. It is to be noted that clause (a) of Sub-Section (2) of
Section 33 recognizes the right of the employer to make an
alteration in the condition of service so long as it does not
relate to a matter connected to a pending dispute. Clause (b)
of Sub-Section (2) of Section 33 enables the employer to
dismiss or discharge the workman for any misconduct not
connected with the dispute provided the concerned employee
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is paid wages for one month and the employer makes an
application to the authority before which the proceeding is
pending for approval of the action taken.
20. In P.H. Kalyani v/s. M/s. Air France Calcutta, AIR
1963 SC 1756, the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court while approving the view in Strawboard Mfg. Co. vs.
Govind, AIR 1962 SC 1500 held that the proviso to Section
33(2)(b) contemplates the three conditions mentioned therein
viz. (i) dismissal or discharge (ii) payment of wages for one
month and (iii) making of an application for approval, to be
simultaneous and to be part of the same transaction.
21. In P.H. Kalyani (supra), the workman was dismissed
for misconduct. Application was fled by the employer under
Section 33(2)(b) for approval of action taken and a complaint
fled by the workman under Section 33A challenging the
legality of the action taken. The Labour Court held that the
dismissal was justifable and therefore, accorded approval to
the action taken and dismissed the Application under Section
33A of the Act. It was urged that the Labour Court having held
that the inquiry was biased and in violation of principles of
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natural justice, it was not open for Labour Court to consider
the justifability of the dismissal. It was in this context that the
Apex Court held that it was open to the Tribunal to go into the
propriety of an order of dismissal itself when there is a defect
in the domestic inquiry. The Apex Court held that if inquiry is
not defective, the Labour Court has only to see whether there
was a prima facie case for dismissal and whether the employer
had come to the bona fde conclusion that the employee was
guilty of misconduct and upon being satisfed that there was
no unfair labour practice and victimization, grant approval
which would relate to the date of the order of dismissal. It is
further held that if the inquiry is defective for any reason, the
Labour Court will also have to consider for itself, on the
evidence adduced before it, whether the dismissal was
justifed. However, coming to the conclusion on its own
appraisal of evidence adduced before it that the dismissal was
justifed, its approval of the order of dismissal made by the
employer in a defective enquiry would still relate back to the
date when the order was made.
22. The scope of the enquiry to be held by the Labour
Court and Industrial Tribunal while granting or refusing
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approval for the discharge or dismissal of the workman under
Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act has been explained by the Apex
Court in a recent decision in John D'souza Vs. Karnataka State
Road Transport Corporation 2020 I CLR 198. The Apex Court
held that Section 33(2)(b) contemplates an enquiry by way of
summary proceedings as to whether a proper domestic
enquiry has been held to prove the misconduct so attributed
to the workman and whether he has been aforded reasonable
opportunity to defend himself in consonance with the
principles of natural justice. The object of such an enquiry is to
lift the veil to fnd out that there is no hidden motive to punish
the workman or an abortive attempt to punish him for a non-
existing misconduct.
23. The Apex Court reiterated that such summary
proceedings are not akin and at par with its jurisdiction to
adjudicate an 'industrial dispute' nor does it clothe it with a
power to peep into the quantum of punishment. Referring to
the previous judgments including the judgment of three judge
Bench in Punjab National Bank (supra), the Apex Court has
held that in the frst stage the Labour Court/Tribunal has to
consider whether or not a prima facie case for discharge or
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
dismissal is made out on the basis of the domestic enquiry, if
such enquiry does not sufer from any defect, viz. it has not
been held in violation of principles of natural justice and
conclusion arrived at by the employer is bona fde or that there
was no unfair labour practice for victimization of the workman.
The approval must follow when no defect is detected. The
second stage comes when the Labour Court /Tribunal fnds
that the domestic enquiry sufers from one or the other legal
ailment. In that case, the Labour Court/Tribunal shall permit
the parties to adduce their respective evidence and on
appraisal thereof the Labour Court/Tribunal shall conclude its
enquiry whether the discharge or any other punishment
including dismissal was justifed.
24. It has been emphasized that power to permit the
parties to lead evidence in respect of the legality and propriety
of the domestic enquiry held into the misconduct of a
workman, cannot be exercised mechanically, without frst
examining the material led in the domestic enquiry, as if it is an
essential procedural part of the enquiry to be held under
section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. Referring to the decision of the
Punjab National Bank (supra), the Apex Court has held that
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the order of dismissal even if approved under Section 33(2)(b)
would not attain fnality and that if an industrial dispute is
raised on such a dismissal, the order of dismissal passed even
with a requisite permission obtained under Section 33 has to
face the scrutiny of Tribunal.
25. Section 33A gives an option to the employee
aggrieved by contravention of Section 33 to make a complaint
in writing, in the prescribed manner, to the Conciliatory
Authority or Adjudicatory Authority before whom the
conciliation or other proceedings are pending. Until the
enactment of Section 33A, in the year 1950, the sole remedy
which the employee could avail for breach of Section 33 was to
raise an industrial dispute and to move the Appropriate
Government for its Reference to a Tribunal under Section 10 of
the ID Act. Recourse to this provision involved delay and left
the redress of the grievance entirely in the discretion of the
appropriate Government. Section 33A was enacted to obviate
this situation.
26. This section demarcates the scope of the action to
be taken by the Conciliatory Authority and Adjudicatory
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Authority. When a complaint is made to the Conciliatory
Authority, viz. a Conciliation Ofcer or the Board, such
authority is required to take such complaint into account in
bringing about settlement of the complained dispute. The
Conciliation Ofcer or the Board is not empowered to
adjudicate upon the dispute. It is within the exclusive domain
of the Adjudicatory Authority viz. Arbitrator, Labour Court,
Tribunal or National Tribunal to adjudicate upon the dispute, as
if it were a dispute referred under Section 10 of the ID Act.
Such adjudication must be in accordance with the relevant
provisions of the ID Act and the Adjudicatory Authority is
required to submit its Award to the Appropriate Government.
27. In Punjab Beverages (supra), the Apex court
considered the efect of contravention of Section 33(2)(b) on
an order of dismissal passed in breach of Section 33, viz.
whether such breach would render the order of dismissal void
and inoperative, which would entitle the workman to say that
he continues to be in service and is entitled to receive wages.
In this context the Apex Court considered the scope of the
enquiry under Section 33A. Referring to the judgment of
Automobile Products of India Ltd. and Equitable Coal Co. and
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Punjab National Bank (supra) the Apex Court held that -
"11. It will found therefore be seen that the frst issue
which is required to be decided in a complaint fled by
an aggrieved workman under Section 33A is whether
the order of discharge or dismissal made by the
employer is in contravention of Section 33. The
foundation of the complaint under Section 33A is a
contravention of Section 33 and if the workman is
unable to show that the employer has contravened
section 33 in making the order of discharge or
dismissal, the complaint would be liable to be rejected.
But, if the contravention of section 33 is established,
the next question would be whether the order of
discharge or dismissal passed by the employer is
justifed on merits. The Tribunal would have to go into
this question and decide whether, on the merits, the
order of the discharge or dismissal, passed by the
employer, is justifed and if it is, the tribunal would
sustain the order, treating the breach of Section 33 as
a mere technical breach. Since, in such a case, the
original order of discharge or dismissal would stand
justifed, it would not be open to the tribunal, unless
there are compelling circumstances, to make any
substantial order of compensation in favour of the
workmen. In fact, in Equitable Coal Co.'s case an
order of compensation made by the Tribunal in favour
of the workmen, was reversed by this Court. The
Tribunal would have to consider all the aspects of the
case and ultimately, what order would meet the ends
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of justice would necessarily have to be determined in
the light of the circumstances of the case. But this
much is clear that a mere contravention of Section 33
by the employer will not entitle the workman to an
order of reinstatement, because enquiry under Section
33A is not confned only to the determination of the
question as to whether the employer has contravened
section 33 but even if such contravention is proved, the
tribunal has to go further and deal with the merits of
the order of discharge or dismissal."
28. In Strawboard Mfg. Co. (supra) and Tata Iron and
Steel Co. Ltd. Vs. S.N. Modak, AIR 1966 SC 380 a two Benches
consisting of three learned Judges of the Apex Court had
taken a view that if the approval is not granted under Section
33(2) (b) of the ID Act, the order of dismissal becomes
inefective from the date it was passed and therefore the
employee becomes entitled to wages from the date of
dismissal to the date of disapproval of the application. This
was contrary to the view expressed in Punjab Beverages
(supra), which had held that non approval of the order of
dismissal or failure to make application under Section 33(2)(b)
would not render the order of dismissal inoperative but would
only render the employer liable to punishment under Section
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31 of the Act, with the remedy to the employee available
either to fle a complaint under Section 33A or by way of
raising an industrial dispute to be adjudicated in a Reference
under Section 10 (1)(d) of the ID Act.
29. In view of these conficting views, a Reference
came to be made to the Constitution Bench in Jaipur Zila
(supra). The Reference involved two questions. The frst was
with regard to the date from which the order of dismissal
would become inefective i.e., from the date of dismissal order
or from the date of rejection of approval. The second question
was whether failure to make an application under Section 33(2)
(b) would render the dismissal order inoperative. The
Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court answered the
questions thus: -
" 13. The proviso to Section 33(2)(b), can be seen from
its very unambiguous and clear language, is
mandatory. This apart, from the object of Section
33and in the context of the proviso to Section 33(2)(b),
it is obvious that the conditions contained in the said
proviso are to be essentially complied with. Further any
employer who contravenes the provisions of Section
33 invites a punishment under S.31(1) with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six
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months or with fne which may extend to Rs.1000/- or
with both. This penal provision is again a pointer of the
mandatory nature of the proviso to comply with the
conditions stated therein. To put it in other way, the
said conditions being mandatory, are to be satisfed if
an order of discharge or dismissal passed under Section
33(2)(b) is to be operative. If an employer desires to
take beneft of the said provision for passing an order
of discharge or dismissal of an employee, he has also to
take the burden of discharging the statutory obligation
placed on him in the said proviso. Taking a contrary
view that an order of discharge or dismissal passed by
an employer in contravention of the mandatory
conditions contained in the proviso does not render
such an order inoperative or void, defeats the very
purpose of the proviso and it becomes meaningless. It is
well-settled rule of interpretation that no part of
statute shall be construed as unnecessary or
superfluous. The proviso cannot be diluted or
disobeyed by an employer. He cannot disobey the
mandatory provision and then say that the order of
discharge or dismissal made in contravention of Section
33(2)(b) is not void or inoperative. He cannot be
permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. The
interpretation of statute must be such that it should
advance the legislative intent and serve the purpose
for which it is made rather than to frustrate it. The
proviso to Section 33(2)(b) afords protection to a
workman to safeguard his interest and it is a shield
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against victimization and unfair labour practice by the
employer during the pendency of industrial dispute
when the relationship between them are already
strained. An employer cannot be permitted to use the
provision of Section 33(2)(b) to ease out a workman
without complying with the conditions contained in the
said proviso for any alleged misconduct said to be
unconnected with the already pending industrial
dispute. The protection aforded to a workman under
the said provision cannot be taken away. If it is to be
held that an order of discharge or dismissal passed by
the employer without complying with the requirements
of the said proviso is not void or inoperative, the
employer may with impunity discharge or dismiss a
workman.
14. Where an application is made under Section 33(2)
(b) proviso, the authority before which the proceeding
is pending for approval of the action taken by the
employer has to examine whether the order of
dismissal or discharge is bona fdee whether it was by
way of victimization or unfair labour practicee whether
the conditions contained in the proviso were complied
with or not, etc. If the authority refuses to grant
approval obviously it follows that the employee
continues to be in service as if order of discharge or
dismissal never had been passed. The order of dismissal
or discharge passed invoking Section 33(2)
(b) dismissing or discharging an employee brings an end
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of relationship of employer and employee from the
date of his dismissal or discharge but that order
remains incomplete and remains inchoate as it is
subject to approval of the authority under the said
provision. In other words, this relationship comes to an
end de jure only when the authority grants approval. If
approval is not given, nothing more is required to be
done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed
that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been
passed. Consequence of it is that the employee is
deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all
the benefts available. This being the position there is
no need of a separate or specifc order for his
reinstatement. But on the other hand, if approval is
given by the authority and if the employee is aggrieved
by such an approval, he is entitled to make a complaint
under Section 33A challenging the order granting
approval on any of the grounds available to him.
Section 33A is available only to an employee and is
intended to save his time and trouble inasmuch as he
can straightaway make a complaint before the very
authority where the industrial dispute is already
pending between the parties challenging the order of
approval instead of making eforts to raise an
industrial dispute, get a reference and thereafter
adjudication. In this view, it is not correct to say that
even though where the order of discharge or dismissal
is inoperative for contravention of the mandatory
conditions contained in the proviso or where the
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approval is refused, a workman should still make a
complaint under Section 33A and that the order of
dismissal or discharge becomes invalid or void only
when it is set aside under Section 33A and that till such
time he should sufer misery of unemployment in spite
of statutory protection given to him by the proviso to
Section 33(2)(b). It is not correct to say that where the
order of discharge or dismissal becomes inoperative
because of contravention of proviso to Section 33(2)
(b), Section 33A would be meaningless and futile. The
said Section has a defnite purpose to serve, as already
stated above, enabling an employee to make a
complaint, if aggrieved by the order of the approval
granted.
15. The view that when no application is made or the
one made is withdrawn, there is no order of refusal of
such application on merit and as such the order of
dismissal or discharge does not become void or
inoperative unless such an order is set aside
under Section 33A, cannot be accepted. In our view,
not making an application under Section 33(2)(b)
seeking approval or withdrawing an application once
made before any order is made thereon, is a clear case
of contravention of the proviso to Section 33(2)(b). An
employer who does not make an application
under Section 33(2)(b) or withdraws the one made,
cannot be rewarded by relieving him of the statutory
obligation created on him to make such an application.
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If it is so done, he will be happier or more comfortable
than an employer who obeys the command of law and
makes an application inviting scrutiny of the authority
in the matter of granting approval of the action taken
by him. Adherence to and obedience of law should be
obvious and necessary in a system governed by rule of
law. An employer by design can avoid to make an
application after dismissing or discharging an employee
or fle it and withdraw before any order is passed on it,
on its merits, to take a position that such order is not
inoperative or void till it is set aside under Section 33A
notwithstanding the contravention of Section 33(2)
(b) proviso, driving the employee to have recourse to
one or more proceeding by making a complaint under
section 33A or to raise another industrial dispute or to
make a complaint under Section 31(1). Such an
approach destroys the protection specifcally and
expressly given to an employee under the said proviso
as against possible victimization, unfair labour practice
or harassment because of pendency of industrial
dispute so that an employee can be saved from
hardship of unemployment.
16. xxx
17.xxx
18.In view of what is stated above, we respectfully
agree with and endorse the view taken in the case of
Strawboard and Tata Iron & Steel Co. and further state
that the view expressed in Punjab Beverages on the
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question is not the correct view. The question raised in
the beginning of this judgment is answered
accordingly. "
30. In Indian Telephone Industries Ltd. and anr. v/s.
Prabhakar H. Manjuare and anr. (2003) 1 SCC 320, the Apex
Court considered the question whether the management was
entitled to pass an order of dismissal again after the earlier
order of dismissal was rendered void and inoperative for
breach of Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. In the said case, the
order of the Tribunal holding dismissal to be invalid for non-
compliance of the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) had attained
fnality. The employer, treating non-compliance as a mere
technical breach once again passed a dismissal order without
further inquiry and without paying wages for the period
between frst dismissal and second dismissal. The Tribunal,
relying upon Punjab Beverages, granted approval, which order
was afrmed by a learned Single Judge. The Division Bench, in
an Appeal, set-aside the order and held that the workman shall
be deemed to be in continuous service with all consequential
benefts. The Apex Court, following the law laid down in
Jaipur Zila, held that refusal to grant approval rendered the
dismissal order void and inoperative. It was held that the frst
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order having attained fnality, it was not open for the employer
to make a second application for approval, that too without
paying full wages and that such application was nothing but an
act of victimization.
31. A similar question was raised before this Court in
AIR India Ltd. v/s. V.M. Mhadgut and anr. in Writ Petition
No.2818 of 2003, wherein the Approval Application was
withdrawn reserving liberty to fle a fresh application.
Subsequently, the workman was reinstated and on the very
next date he was placed under suspension. The workman was
thereafter dismissed for having committed misconduct which
was the subject matter of the earlier enquiry. The
management forwarded to the workman his wages for one
month and thereupon moved an application for approval under
Section 33(2)(b). Relying upon the decision of the Supreme
Court in Jaipur Zila, the Tribunal held that since the frst
application was withdrawn, there was no approval and
consequently the workman was deemed to be in service. It
was further held that it was not permissible to grant
permission to fle a fresh application upon withdrawal of the
frst application. The Tribunal dismissed the Application inter
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alia on a ground that the order of dismissal was nullity.
32. Relying upon the decisions of the Apex Court in
Jaipur Zila and Indian Telephone Industries Ltd. (supra),
learned Single Judge of this Court (as his Lordship then was)
held that the original order of dismissal was rendered void and
inoperative in view of withdrawal of the previous application
for approval. The workman was therefore entitled to continue
in service and to the payment of his wages in accordance with
law. The second dismissal order was held to be in breach of
Section 33(2)(b) for failure to pay back wages from the date of
the frst order of dismissal. It has been held that in such
situation, the breach of Section 33(2)(b) could not be treated
as only a lapse and that no fresh order of termination could be
passed without paying full back wages, by merely efectuating
the requirement of one month's notice. The earlier order of
dismissal being void and inoperative the workman was held to
be entitled for all consequential benefts. It is further held
that the consequence of refusal, withdrawal, or non-fling of
application for approval invalidates the order of dismissal,
however, it does not obliterate the underlying misconduct in
the disciplinary proceedings. Hence, it is not necessary for the
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employer to hold a fresh disciplinary inquiry. It is held that the
object of Section 33(2)(b) is to prevent victimization of
workman or unfair labour practice during the pendency of the
Reference.
33. At this stage, it would also be relevant to refer to
the decision of Apex Court in United Bank of India Vs.
Sidhartha Chakraborty AIR 2007 SC 3071. In this case the
workman, who was dismissed for acts of misconduct, had
raised an industrial dispute, which was referred for
adjudication under Section 10 of the ID Act. The Reference
was on the question of legality and validity of order of
dismissal pending the proceedings of the Labour Court for
non-compliance of the provisions of Section 33 (2)(b) of the ID
Act. The Tribunal held that the enquiry was fair, proper and in
compliance with the principles of natural justice and, further
held that the imposition of the punishment of dismissal was
justifed. In a challenge before the learned Single Judge, it was
contended that the principles of doctrine of prospective
overruling would be applicable as the decision in Punjab
Beverages (supra), was holding the feld at the time the action
was taken. This plea was negatived by the learned Single
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Judge and relying upon the subsequent decision in Jaipur Zila
it was held that the decision in Punjab Beverages, having been
overruled, cannot have any application. The Division Bench
afrmed the order of the learned Single Judge and held that
the workman would be entitled to reinstatement with full back
wages.
34. In an appeal against the said order, the Apex Court
referred to paragraph 13 of the judgment in Jaipur Zila
(supra) and reiterated that the proviso to section 33(2)(b) of
the ID Act afords protection to a workman to safeguard his
interest and it is in the nature of a shield against victimization
and unfair labour practice by the employer during pendency of
an industrial dispute. The Apex Court held that the judgment
of the learned Single Judge as afrmed by the Division Bench
does not sufer from any infrmity. The Apex Court therefore
did not interfere with the order of reinstatement, however,
considering the peculiar facts of the case, the background in
which the disciplinary action was taken, and the position in law
as it stood at the relevant time, the Apex Court restricted the
quantum of back wages to Rs.2,00,000/- and granted liberty to
the Bank to take action in terms of Section 33(2)(b) of the ID
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Act.
35. A similar view has been taken by the Division Bench
of the Delhi High Court in DTC Vs. Premchand, Ex Sweeper,
176 (2011) DLT 476. The challenge in the said case was to the
order of reinstatement for want of approval under Section
33(2)(b) of the ID Act. It was contended that since the
proceedings under 33(2)(b) were dismissed for want of
prosecution, it was obligatory to address the controversy on
merits. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court relying
upon the decision of Jaipur Zila (supra) held that the provision
under Section 33(2)(b) is mandatory and rejected the
contention of the Management that when an application under
Section 33(2) (b) was dismissed for want of prosecution, the
same cannot be given the status of non-approval. Referring to
the decision of the Apex Court in Engineering Laghu Udyog
Employees Union vs. Judge Labour Court and Industrial
Tribunal and Anr. (2003) 12 SCC 1 Hon'ble Delhi High Court
held that: -
"13. At this juncture, it is worthwhile to refer to law
laid down in Engineering Laghu Udyog Employees
Union (supra). In the said case, a three-judge Bench
of the Apex Court referred to the decisions in Gujarat
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Steel Tubes Ltd. V. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor
Sabha, 1980 (2) SCR 145 and P.H. Kalyani (supra) and
expressed the view as follows:-
'When in terms of the proviso
appended to clause (b) of Section 33 of the
Act, an approval is sought for and is refused
the order of dismissal becomes void. If an
approval is not obtained still, the order of
punishment cannot be given efect to. It is,
therefore, not correct to contend that the
tribunal in a reference under section 10 of
the Act, when passes an order recording a
fnding of misconduct, brings life into the
dead. Unfortunately, the Court did not take
notice of the binding decisions in Motipur
Sugar Factory's case (supra) and Firestone's
case (supra).
We may further notice that
P.H.Kalyani's case (supra) has also recently
been followed by another Constitution Bench
in Jaipur Zilla Sahakari Bhoomi Bikas Bank
Ltd. Vs. Ram Gopal Sharma and Others, 2002
(2) SCC 244.'
14. In view of the aforesaid pronouncement of law,
there can be no scintilla of doubt that when there is
no approval by the industrial adjudicator on an
application preferred under Section 33(2)(b) of the
Act, the order of dismissal is ab initio void. What is ab
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initio void, as has been held in the case of Gujarat
Steel Tubes Ltd. (sura), is void and does not exist.
Once the order of dismissal did not exist, the relation
between the employer and the employee continued
and there was no severance of status. The reference
that was made to the labour court was in respect of
the selfsame charges and when there has been no
approval as requisite under Section 33(2)(b) of the
Act, the question of addressing the said reference on
merits by the labour court was totally unwarranted
because the said order had already paved the path of
extension. The labour court does not adjudicate a lis
in the vacuum. Ergo, we do not fnd any in the
approach of the labour court and the stamp of
approval given by the learned Single Judge."
36. Similarly, in Top Securities Ltd. Vs.
Subhashchandra Jha, 191 (2012) DLT 361, the question before
the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court was whether non-
compliance of the provision of section 33(2)(b) of ID Act would
ipso facto render the order of dismissal inefective and
whether the employee, in such circumstances would be
required to fle an application under Section 33A of the ID Act
for having the said order of dismissal being declared as void ab
initio. Relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in Punjab
National Bank (supra), Hindustan General Electrical
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Corporation Ltd. Vs. Vishwanath Prasad and Anr., 1971 (2)
SCC 605 and the decision of this Court in Batuk K. Vyas Vs.
Surat Borough Municipality and ORs. 1952 II L.L.J. 178 it was
contended that there was distinction between the violation of
provision of Section 33(2)(b) and adjudication under Section
33A of the ID Act. It was contended that in the proceedings
under Section 33A, the Tribunal was not only required to
consider whether the provisions of Section 33(2)(b) had been
contravened but had to enter upon an adjudication with regard
to the substantive dispute qua dismissal/termination.
37. The Division Bench of Delhi High Court held that
though the decisions in Punjab National Bank, the Hindustan
General Electrical Corporation and Batuk Vyas (supra) tend to
support the arguments, the same would be of no use in view of
the ratio laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex
Court in Jaipur Zila. Referring to paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of
the decision in Jaipur Zila the Division Bench of the Delhi High
Court held that -
"20. As would be noticed upon a reading of the above
extract, the Supreme Court specifcally provided that
Section 33A is available only to an employee and is
intended to save his time and trouble inasmuch as he
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
can straight away make a complaint before the very
authority where an industrial dispute is already
pending between the parties challenging the order of
approval instead of making eforts to raise an
industrial dispute, get a reference and, thereafter, an
adjudication. It is also clearly pointed out that the
employer who does not make an application under
Section 33(2)(b) or withdraws the one made, cannot
be rewarded by relieving him of the statutory
obligation created on him to make such an application.
As such, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion
that the non-compliance of the mandatory provisions
of Section 33(2)(b) of the said Act would by itself
amount to the order of dismissal being void or
inoperative. If this happens, it is not at all necessary
for an employee to fle a complaint under Section 33A
to have the order of dismissal/termination set-aside
following an adjudication on merits.
21. It is therefore, abundantly clear that the
employee may fle a complaint with regard to the
relief that is required to be given to the employee in
respect of the contravention of the provisions of
Section 33. In other words, where no application
seeking an approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the said
Act is made by the employer, the employee may yet
make a complaint under Section 33A seeking relief of
reinstatement and payment of back wages. It is that
dispute which will be taken up by the Industrial
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
Tribunal which will obviously go into the question as
to whether there has been or there has not been
compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section
33(2)(b) of the said Act. Once the Tribunal comes to
the conclusion that the mandatory provisions have
been contravened, the only thing that needs to be
done by the Tribunal is to direct that the employee be
given an appropriate relief by way of reinstatement
and by making an order with regard to back wages.
The Tribunal is not required to go into the question of
as to whether the dismissal was good or bad, on
merits".
38. In a subsequent decision, in Rajasthan S.R.T.C.
(supra) a two Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
considered the question whether in a proceeding under
Section 33A of the ID Act, the workman would be entitled for
reinstatement with continuity of service for breach of Section
33(2)(b) of the ID Act. In a complaint fled by a workman under
Section 33A of the ID Act the Tribunal held that the charge was
duly proved but ordered reinstatement with full back wages
and continuity in service in view of non-compliance of Section
33(2)(b) of the ID Act. This was in view of the law laid down by
the Constitution Bench in Jaipur Zila (supra). The award was
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upheld by the learned Single Judge and by the Division Bench.
The employer challenged the order before the Apex Court.
The Apex Court rejected the contention that the enquiry under
Section 33A is confned only to the determination of the
question of alleged contravention of the provision of Section
33 by the employer. While quashing the orders of the courts
below, the Apex Court referred to the decision in Jaipur Zila
and upon considering the law laid down in Punjab National
Bank and P.H. Kalyani vs. M/s. AIR France Calcutta, AIR 1963
SC 1756, held: -
23. In the present case, the Tribunal accepted that
during this very short span of service as a daily wager
the respondent had committed the misconduct which
had been duly proved. Having held so, the Tribunal
was expected to dismiss the Complaint fled by the
respondent. It could not have passed the order of
reinstatement with continuity in service in favour of
the respondent on the basis that initially the appellant
had committed a breach of Section 33(2) (b) of the
Act. It is true that the appellant had not applied for
the necessary approval as required under that section.
That is why the Complaint was fled by the respondent
under Section 33A of the Act. That Complaint having
been fled, it was adjudicated like a reference as
required by the statute. The same having been done,
and the misconduct having been held to have been
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
proved, now there is no question to hold that the
termination shall still continue to be void and
inoperative. The de jure relationship of employer and
employee would come to an end with efect from the
date of the order of dismissal passed by the appellant.
In the facts of the present case, when the respondent
had indulged into a misconduct within a very short
span of service which had been duly proved, there was
no occasion to pass the award of reinstatement with
continuity in service..."
39. In Karur Vysya Bank (supra) the workman had fled
a complaint under Section 33A of the ID Act. The Tribunal
recorded a fnding that the enquiry was fair and proper and
upon considering the evidence on record held that the
dismissal was unjustifed. The ld. Single Judge as well as the
Division Bench did not go into the validity of the dismissal
order and afrmed the Award for want of approval under
Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. Setting aside the said order, the
Apex Court held that once the tribunal had reached the
conclusion that the domestic enquiry held against the
workman was proper, no further scrutiny or investigation of
the correctness of the fndings recorded could have been
made unless the said fndings disclosed perversity. In
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considering the scope of the inquiry under Section 33A, the
Apex Court reiterated the principles in Rajasthan S.R.T.C.
(supra) and enunciated the law on issue thus: -
"10. Section 33-A of the Act enjoins upon the
industrial adjudicator a twin duty. The frst is to fnd
out as to whether the employer has contravened the
provision of Section 33 (in the present case by not
fling an application seeking approval under Section
33(2)(b) of the Act) . However, a fnding on the above
question would not be conclusive of the matter and
the industrial adjudicator is required to answer the
further question as to whether the dismissal or such
other punishment as may have been imposed on the
workman is justifed in law. The issue of sustainability
of the punishment imposed naturally has to be
decided within the contours of the reference
jurisdiction as indicated above. That Section 33A of
the Act enjoins upon the industrial adjudicator the
aforesaid twin duties is once again clear from a recent
pronouncement of this court in Rajasthan SRTC vs.
Satyaprakash, wherein this Court had the occasion to
consider the long line of decisions taking the said view
eventually culminating in what had been recorded in
para 23 of the decision in Rajasthan SRTC...."
40. In Shivsharanappa (supra), the Division Bench had
afrmed the order of the ld. Single Judge that the dismissal of
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the workman was void ab-initio for want of approval under
Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. A three Judge Bench of the
Apex Court, while setting aside the said order, reiterated the
view expressed in Rajasthan S.R.T.C. and Karur Vysya Bank
Ltd (supra) that a fnding on the question as to whether the
employer has contravened the provision of Section 33(2)(b)
would not be conclusive of the matter and the Industrial
Adjudicator is required to answer the further question as to
whether the dismissal or such other punishment as may have
been imposed on the workman is justifed in law.
41. In Ravindra (supra), an application for approval was
withdrawn. In a complaint under Section 33A, the employees
had sought interim relief of reinstatement or full back wages
on the ground that the dismissal was in breach of mandatory
provision under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. Learned Single
Judge of this Court while declining to grant the interim relief
observed that even if it is prima facie found that there is
contravention of provisions of Section 33(2)(b), on account of
withdrawal of approval application, it is still open for the
employer to prove the misconduct of the employee in a
complaint under Section 33A. It was further held that when the
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fnal relief of reinstatement depends and hinges upon
misconduct being proved by the employer and the relief of
reinstatement also being dependent on that aspect, grant of
interim relief would be impermissible.
42. It is to be noted that in Ravindra (supra) the
question before the learned Single Judge of this Court was not
relating to the scope of enquiry under Section 33A or the
efect of contravention of Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act but,
the question was whether the employees were entitled for
interim relief in proceedings fled under Section 33A of the ID
Act. While answering the said question the learned Single
Judge of this Court referred to the decisions in Punjab
National Bank, P.H. Kalyani and Jaipur Zila (supra) and
observed that even after withdrawal of the application under
Section 33(2)(b), it is still open for the employer to prove the
misconduct of the employees in the complaint fled under
Section 33A of the ID Act. Sufce it to say that a judgment of
a court operates as a precedent only for what it decides and
not for general or casual observation. In this case, as noted
above the main issue before the learned Single Judge was
regarding grant of interim relief in a complaint under Section
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33A of the ID Act and the observations made by the learned
Single Judge in the process of answering the said issue cannot
be considered as a binding precedent.
43. A conspectus of the aforesaid decisions of the
Hon'ble Apex Court would indicate that prior to the decision in
Jaipur Zilla, the prevalent view as refected in Automobile
Product of India Ltd., Equitable Coal Company Ltd., and
Punjab National Bank (supra) was that the breach of Section
33 does not render the dismissal order void and inoperative.
Once a complaint is fled under Section 33A and/or a dispute is
raised, the Tribunal has to deal not only with the question of
contravention but also with the merits of the order of
dismissal. This view was followed and reiterated by the Apex
Court in Punjab Beverages (supra) wherein it was held that
even when contravention of mandatory provision is
established, the Tribunal is required to decide whether the
dismissal or discharge order is justifed on merits, and if it is, to
sustain the order of dismissal or discharge by treating the
contravention as a mere technical breach.
44. The decision of the Constitution Bench in Jaipur
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Zilla (supra) was necessitated because of confict in
Strawboard Manufacturing Co. and Tata Iron and Steel Co. on
the one hand and Punjab Beverages on the other. The Apex
Court has considered the question whether the contravention
of Section 33 would render the order of dismissal void or
inoperative for breach of Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. The
Constitution Bench has clearly held that (i) the provision under
Section 33(2)(b) is mandatory; (ii) Order of dismissal or
discharge though brings an end to the relationship of
employer and employee from the date of the order, the order
remains inchoate as it is subject to the approval of the
authority under the provision; (iii) the employer-employee
relationship comes to an end de jure only with grant of
approval; (iv) Contravention of the mandatory provision,
refusal to grant approval or withdrawal of approval application
renders the dismissal or discharge order void and inoperative
and it would be deemed that the order of dismissal or
discharge had never been passed; (v) The employee dismissed
or discharged in contravention of the mandatory provision is
deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the
benefts available, without a separate or specifc order of
reinstatement; (vi) If the approval is given, the employee is
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
entitled to make a complaint under Section 33A challenging
the order of approval on any of the grounds available.
45. In the subsequent decisions a two Judge Bench in
Rajasthan S.R.T.C. and Karur Vysya Bank (supra) and a three
Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shivsharanappa
(supra) have taken a view that when there is a challenge to the
dismissal or discharge order in a Reference under Section 10 or
complaint under Section 33A, which is to be treated as a
Reference under Section 10, the Tribunal/ Labour Court has to
deal not only with the question of contravention of Section
33(2)(b) of the ID Act but also with the merits of the order of
dismissal.
46. It is well-settled that ratio laid down in the decision
must be judged in the background and facts of the case and
that the observations cannot be read divorced from peculiar
facts and context in which made. In this context, it is relevant
to note that in Rajasthan S.R.T.C., (supra), a daily wage
employee appointed for a term of three months had
committed several acts of misconduct in a short span of
service and was dismissed w.e.f. 20 th November 1987, for
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misconduct which had been duly proved. The employee had
questioned the legality of the dismissal order in a suit. The
Civil Court had held the charge to be proved and the suit was
dismissed in the November 1994. The employee did not
challenge the fndings recorded in the Civil Suit but fled a
complaint under Sec.33A, without disclosing that the suit had
been dismissed. A daily wage employee, who had not
completed 240 days of service, was ordered to be reinstated
with continuity in service only on the ground of breach of
Section 33(2)(b). In this factual background, a two Judge
Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court set-aside the order of
reinstatement.
47. The Hon'ble Supreme Court though referred to the
decision of Jaipur Zila (supra), did not distinguish the ratio laid
down but relying mainly upon the previous decision in Punjab
National Bank (supra) the two Judge Bench reiterated that
the employee would not succeed in obtaining an order of
reinstatement merely by proving contravention of Section 33.
It is held that after such contravention is proved it would still
be open to the employer to justify the impugned dismissal on
the merits. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the
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complaint under Section 33A having been adjudicated upon as
a Reference and misconduct having been proved, the order of
dismissal would not be void and inoperative for non-
compliance of Section 33(2)(b). It may be mentioned that this
is the same view taken earlier in Punjab Beverages, which has
been overruled by the Constitution Bench in Jaipur Zila.
48. In Karur Vysya Bank, a two Judge Bench of the
Apex Court considered the issue and followed the proposition
laid down in Rajasthan S.R.T.C. In Shivsharanappa, a three
Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court again considered
the question whether the contravention of provision under
Section 33(2)(b) is conclusive or whether the Tribunal is
required to consider the justifability of the dismissal order on
merits. The Hon'ble Supreme Court did not refer to the
decision of Jaipur Zilla but has endorsed the view in
Rajasthan S.R.T.C. and Karur Vysya Bank that a fnding on the
question as to whether the employer had contravened the
provisions of Section 33(2)(b), would not be conclusive of the
matter and the Industrial Adjudicator is required to answer the
further question as to whether the dismissal or such other
punishment as may have been imposed on the workman is
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
justifable in law.
49. In this regard, it would be relevant to refer to
paragraph 12 of the Judgment in Karur Vysya Bank, wherein
the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed thus:-
"12. While considering the issue, the Court noted in
paragraph 6 of the judgment that the object behind
enacting Section 33as it stood prior to its amendment
in 1956, was to allow continuance of industrial
proceedings pending before any authority/
court/tribunal prescribed by the Act in a peaceful
atmosphere undisturbed by any other industrial
dispute. In course of time, it was felt that the un-
amended Section 33 was too stringent, for it placed a
total ban on the right of the employer to make any
alteration in conditions of service or to make any order
of discharge or dismissal even in cases where such
alteration in conditions of service or passing of an order
of dismissal or discharge, was not in any manner
connected with the dispute pending before an
industrial authority. Section 33 was, therefore,
amended in 1956 to permit the employer to make
changes in conditions of service, or to discharge or
dismiss employees in relation to matters not connected
with the pending industrial dispute. At the same time, it
was also felt necessary that some safeguards must be
simultaneously provided for the workmen, and
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
therefore a provision was made that the employer must
make an application for prior permission if the
proposed change in the service conditions, or the
proposed dismissal/discharge is in connection with a
pending dispute. In other cases where there is no such
connection, and where the workman is to be discharged
or dismissed, (i) frstly there has to be an order of
discharge or dismissal, and then it was laid down in the
proviso to Section 33(2)(b) that, (ii) the concerned
workman has to be paid wages for one month, and (iii)
an application is to be made to the authority concerned
before which the earlier proceeding is pending, for
approval of the action taken by the employer."
50. It is not in dispute that Jaipur Zila still holds the
feld and by virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution of India,
the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Jaipur Zila is a
binding precedent. Reliance is placed on the decision of the
Apex Court in Ofcial liquidator Vs. Dayanand and Ors.,
(2008) 10 SCC 1 and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v/s. Pranay
Sethi, 2017 16 SCC 680.
51. It is sought to be contended that Jaipur Zila did
not consider the situation where the workman chooses to opt
for Reference under Section 10 challenging his dismissal on
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
various grounds including the ground of non-compliance of
Section 33(2)(b). It is contended that the Constitution Bench
has not dealt with the procedure to be followed or issues to be
decided in such Reference. As noted above, the decision in
Jaipur Zila emphasizes the mandatory nature of the proviso of
Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act and conclusively holds that non-
compliance of this mandatory provision renders the dismissal
or discharge order void and inoperative.
52. The clear and categorical pronouncement of the
Constitution Bench would indicate that an order of dismissal or
discharge remains incomplete and inchoate till the grant of
approval under the mandatory provision of Section 33(2)(b).
The decision of the Constitution Bench does not indicate that
an order in breach of 33(2)(b) can be subsequently validated in
a reference or in a complaint under section 33A. On the
contrary, the dictum is that an order of dismissal, in breach of
this mandatory provision is ab initio void and does not severe
the employer-employee relationship, consequently, the
employee is deemed to continue in service. Hence,
contravention of the mandatory provision, either due to non-
payment of one-month wages or non-fling of approval
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
application or withdrawal or rejection of approval application,
would entitle the employee for reinstatement with all
consequential benefts. This is the principle in Jaipur Zila
which has been followed and relied upon in United Bank of
India (supra), wherein in a Reference under Section 10, the
dismissal order was held to be void for non-compliance of
proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act and the workman was
ordered to be reinstated with full back wages even though the
inquiry was held to be fair and proper, and order of dismissal
was justifed. It will therefore be wrong to distinguish the
judgment as confned to the interpretation of Section 33(2)(b)
and or to uphold the contention of learned counsel for the
Petitioner that the judgment did not consider the scope of
inquiry in a compliant under Section 33A or in a Reference
under Section 10 of the ID Act.
53. The decision of the Apex Court in Indian Telephone
Industries (supra) and the decision of this Court in Air India
(supra) further emphasizes that withdrawal of the approval
application invalidates the order of dismissal, and the workman
would be entitled to full back wages as if his services were
never terminated. Such an employee cannot be dismissed by
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
issuing a fresh dismissal order without paying the full back
wages from the date of the frst order of dismissal till the
second order of dismissal. It is thus crystal clear that
contravention of Section 33(2)(b), which renders the dismissal
order void ab initio and entitles the workman to reinstatement
with all consequential benefts cannot be treated as a technical
breach. Treating the contravention as a mere technical breach
and validating a void order subsequently in a Reference under
Section 10 or Complaint under Sec. 33A of the ID Act by giving
an opportunity to the employer to justify the action of
dismissal on merits would be contrary to the dictum of the
Constitution Bench in Jaipur Zila (supra). Moreover, such
interpretation as sought to be expounded by the counsel for
the Petitioner is not in harmony with the object of the
provision and does no efectuate the object of legislature.
54. An employee, who is dismissed in breach of Section
33(2)(b) can legitimately claim to continue to be in the
employment, notwithstanding the order of dismissal or
discharge. What are the rights available and what is the
remedy open to such employee, when the employer refuses to
reinstate and /or to pay wages, has been considered by the
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
Apex Court in T.N. State Transport Corporation v/s.
Neethivilangan, Kumbakonam (2001) 9 SCC 99. The Apex
Court has held thus :-
"16. From the conspectus of the views taken in the
decisions referred to above the position is manifest
that while the employer has the discretion to initiate a
departmental inquiry and pass an order of dismissal or
discharge against the workman the order remains in an
inchoate state till the employer obtains order of
approval from the Tribunal. By passing the order of
discharge or dismissal de facto relationship of
employer and employee may be ended but not the de
jure relationship for that could happen only when the
Tribunal accords its approval. The relationship of
employer and employee is not legally terminated till
approval of discharge or dismissal is given by the
Tribunal. In a case where the Tribunal refuses to accord
approval to the action taken by the employer and
rejects the petition fled under Section 33 (2)(b) of the
Act on merit the employer is bound to treat the
employee as continuing in service and give him all the
consequential benefts. If the employer refuses to grant
the benefts to the employer the latter is entitled to
have his right enforced by fling a petition under Article
226 of the Constitution. There is no rational basis for
holding that even after the order of dismissal or
discharge has been rendered invalid on the Tribunals
rejection of the prayer for approval the workman
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
should sufer the consequences of such invalid order of
dismissal or discharge till the matter is decided by the
Tribunal again in an industrial dispute. Accepting this
contention would render the bar contained in Section
33(1) irrelevant. In the present case as noted earlier
the Tribunal on consideration of the matter held that
the employer had failed to establish a prima facie case
for dismissal/discharge of the workman, and therefore,
dismissed the application fled by the employer on
merit. The inevitable consequence of this would be that
the employer was duty bound to treat the employee as
continuing in service and pay him his wages for the
period, even though he may be subsequently placed
under suspension and an enquiry initiated against him."
55. It is thus well settled that if the employer refuses
to reinstate or pay wages to a workman, notwithstanding
undisputed breach of Section 33(2)(b), such workman is
entitled to have his right enforced by fling petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution, without testing validity of the
order of dismissal either in a Reference under Section 10 or in
a complaint under Section 33A of the ID Act. The workman
also has an option of seeking wages under Section 33C of the
ID Act without a specifc order of reinstatement. The question
which therefore arises is whether a workman, who chooses to
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
question breach of Section 33(2)(b), either by fling a complaint
under Section 33A or by raising an industrial dispute, can be
deprived of such relief, and be compelled to adjudicate the
dispute on merits. An afrmative answer to this question
would be contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court in
Jaipur Zila and T.N. State Transport Corporation (supra) and
would lead to an anomalous consequence. In as much as the
workman, who chooses to enforce his right under Article 226
of the Constitution or claim wages under Section 33C would be
entitled to the reliefs without testing validity of the dismissal
order on merits. Whereas, an employee, who opts to raise an
industrial dispute or fle a complaint under Section 33A would
be deprived of the benefts of immediate reinstatement and
wages. Despite being out of service and having lost his means
of livelihood, he would be compelled to fght a prolonged legal
battle in adjudication of dispute on merit. Hence, an
employee who takes recourse to a statutory remedy either by
raising an industrial dispute or fling a complaint under Section
33A for breach of statutory protection, would be in a
disadvantageous position as compared to an employee who
chooses to fle a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
or an application under Section 33C of the ID Act.
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
56. It is also relevant to note that giving an opportunity
to the employer to justify the order of dismissal/discharge
would deprive the workman from working and earning his
wages till adjudication of the dispute on merits. On the
contrary giving such opportunity would lead to rewarding an
employer who by design, avoids complying with the statutory
mandate, which expressly gives protection to an employee
against possible victimization and unfair labour practice.
Hence, such an interpretation, as canvassed by the learned cou
nsel for the Petitioner, would be tantamount to putting a
premium on an unlawful act of engaging in unfair labour
practice and/or victimization.
57. In this context it would be relevant to refer to
'Principles of Statutory Interpretation' 13 th edition-2012 by
Justice G. P. Singh wherein it is observed that it is the duty of a
Court to avoid hardship, inconvenience, injustice, absurdity,
and anomaly while selecting out of diferent interpretations.
The doctrine must be applied with great care and in case
absurd inconvenience is to be caused that interpretation has to
be avoided. In the instant case, interpreting the provision in
Megha WPST_93088_2020 & GROUP MATTERS (1).doc
the manner canvassed by learned counsel for the Petitioner
would lead to an anomalous result causing hardship and
injustice to an employee who resorts to a statutory remedy
and protecting and rewarding an employer who chooses to
violate a statutory provision. It is therefore not permissible to
accede to such interpretation, which would result in
anomalous consequences, defeat the protection envisaged
under the Section and render the proviso otiose.
58. Reverting to the facts of the case, it is not in
dispute that the Reference relating to Charter of Demands was
pending. As it is evident from the averments in para 6 of the
written statement, the Petitioner was aware of pendency of
the Reference. The Petitioner has dismissed the Respondent-
workman during the pendency of the said Reference without
complying with the mandatory provision of Section 33(2)(b).
Non-compliance of this mandatory provision renders the
dismissal order void and non-est. The employer-employee
relationship not having been legally terminated, the Petitioner
is bound to treat the Respondent workmen as continuing in
service and give them all consequential benefts.
Consequently, the Respondent-workmen, are entitled for
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reinstatement with consequential benefts. Hence, I am
unable to accede to the contention that the misconduct having
been proved on merits, the Labour Court could not have
passed an order of reinstatement, notwithstanding
contravention of Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. In my
considered view, the decision of the Labour Court is in
accordance with the principles laid down by the Constitution
Bench in Jaipur Zila (supra) and hence the Labour Court was
justifed in ordering reinstatement with consequential
benefts. It is however clarifed that Respondent-Workmen will
be entitled for reinstatement provided they have not attained
the age of superannuation during the interregnum period.
Respondent-Workmen, who have attained the age of
superannuation will be entitled for wages from the date of
dismissal till the date of superannuation.
59. Subject to the above clarifcation, the petitions are
dismissed. Under the circumstances no order as to costs.
(SMT. ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI, J.).
60. Learned counsel for the Petitioner states that by
order dated 05/10/2020 this Court had granted ad-interim
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relief in terms of prayer clause (c) and the same is continuing
till date. She prays for continuation of the interim relief so as
to enable the Petitioner to challenge the order before the
Hon'ble Supreme Court.
61. In the light of the aforesaid statement, interim
order to continue for a period of four weeks.
(SMT. ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI, J.).
