Bombay High Court
Chief Engineer Development ... vs Surya Kirti Enterprises Through ... on 10 February, 2021
Bench: K.K. Tated, R. I. Chagla
14-ia-2541-2019.doc
jsn
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.2541 OF 2019
IN
FIRST APPEAL (ST.) NO.28864 OF 2019
Chief Engineer Development Planning, ...Applicant /
BMC Appellant (Orig.
Respondent
No.2.)
Versus
Surya Kirti Enterprises & Anr. ...Respondents
----------
Mr. S.K. Mishra, Senior Counsel with Shital Mane - Tadke for
the Applicant.
Mr. Vishwajit Sawant, Senior Advocate with Kirit J. Hakani
with Niyati Hakani with Fenil Sangoi for the Respondents.
----------
CORAM : K.K. TATED &
R.I. CHAGLA, JJ.
DATE : 10TH FEBRUARY, 2021
ORDER :
Sharayu
P. Khot
1. Heard learned Counsel for parties.
Digitally
signed by
Sharayu P.
Khot
Date:
2021.02.15
2. By this application the Applicant acquiring body is
12:05:27
+0530
seeking condonation of delay in fling the First Appeal under
Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
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(for short 'said Act') to challenge the award dated 11th July,
2019 passed by the Presiding Offcer, Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Offcer, Nagpur in Application
No.17/KOK/MUM (SU)/2018.
3. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
Appellant / Applicant submits that in the present proceedings
the Applicant acquired the Respondent/Claimants land
admeasuring 306.60 Sq. mtrs. He submits that the Land
Acquisition Offcer awarded compensation of sum of
Rs.2,06,05,819/-. The Respondents preferred application before
Presiding Offcer, Land Acquisition Offcer, Nagpur in which
additional compensation of Rs.6,56,45,527/- i.e. total sum of
Rs.8,62,51,346/- with interest at the rate of 9% from the date of
award till the date of payment was awarded. Learned Senior
Counsel further submits that the compensation awarded in
favour of the Respondent is on higher side. Therefore, they fled
present First Appeal.
4. Learned Senior counsel for the Applicant further submits
that in the present proceedings the Presiding Offcer passed the
award dated 11th July, 2019. Thereafter, Applicants have fled
application for getting certifed copy of the order on 15th July,
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2019. The same was received by them on 16th July, 2019 and
thereafter they have preferred First Appeal before this Court
on 8th November, 2019.
5. Learned Senior Counsel for the Applicant submits that
Municipal Corporation being a statutory body as well as being a
large body it requires sanction and taking of opinion from
several departments for fling the Appeal. In the present
proceedings initially they forwarded the copy of the order to
the DP department and the DP department then forwarded the
proposal to the Municipal Commissioner. He further submits
that as soon as the sanction received from the Municipal
Commissioner, the same was intimated to the Legal
Department. Thereafter the concerned Law Offcer drafted the
First Appeal and sent the draft to the Senior Counsel and DE
Department for fnalisation of the draft Appeal memo. Learned
Senior Counsel further submits that as soon as the Legal
Department received the fnal draft Appeal memo from the
Senior Counsel, the Chief Engineer, DP Department was
informed that they have to pay Court fees of Rs.3 lakh and to
make arrangement for payment. He submits that as soon as
they received the Court Fees, they fled First Appeal on 8th
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November, 2019. In support of this contention, learned Senior
Counsel relies on paragraphs 17 and 18 of the Civil Application,
which read thus:-
"17. The applicants submit that as the Hon'ble Land
Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Offcer
Nagpur at Nagpur allowed the appeal of the
respondent No. 1 (Claimant) and enhancement of the
compensation amount i.e. total consideration of
Rs.8,62,51,346/- along with interest of 9% from the
date of Award i.e. from 25.5.2018 till the actual
payment of additional compensation. The applicants
submit that the said order was challenged by this
applicant by fling the present frst Appeal before this
Hon'ble Court.
18. The applicant say that after the receipt of the
impugned passed by the Land Acquisition Offcer, the
Legal Department has forwarded the copy of the order
to the DP Department and the DP Department then
forwarded the proposal to challenge the order for the
sanction of Hon'ble Municipal Commissioner.
Thereafter, after receiving the sanction of the Hon'ble
Municipal Commissioner, the DP department
intimated to the Legal Department on 12/07/2019 for
challenging the impugned order. Thereafter, the
concerned Assistant Law Offcer drafted the First
Appeal and sent to the Sr. Counsel and DP Department
for fnalisation of the Draft Appeal Memo. On
19/10/2019, the Legal Department received the fnal
draft Appeal Memo from the Sr. Counsel and the Dp
department.. The Applicant further submits that
applicant being statutory body being large body and it
requires sanction from various departments for fling
the Appeal and considering the quantum of work with
various departments of Corporation, the delay has
been caused."
Paragraph 2 of additional Affdavit dated 17th January,
2020 reads thus :-
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"2. It is further stated that Chief Engineer (DP)
department was informed on dt.31.10.2019 that court
fee worth Rs.3,00,000/- (Rs. Three lakhs only) are
required at the time of fling of First Appeal as per
claim in the trial court matter and requested to make
necessary arrangement. Accordingly approval of
Competent Authority was obtained by Ch.E.(DP)
department on 07.11.2019 and appeal was fled on
dt.08.11.2019. It is further submitted that there is
delay of 58 days in fling the present appeal. It is
submitted that the impugned judgement was passed
on 11/07/2019. The MCGM had applied for Certifed
Copy on 15.07.2019 and it received to MCGM on
dt.16.07.2019. The appeal came to be fled on
08/11/2019, i.e. within the period of 120 days from
the date of receipt of the impugned order. Delay so
caused in fling the appeal is not deliberate or
intentional and is caused due to the reasons stated
herein above and in the interim application already
fled."
6. Learned Senior counsel for the Applicant submits that as
per Section 74 of the said Act, the limitation of fling of First
Appeal is 60 days and therefore 60 days can be condoned by
the Court, if Appellant was prevented by suffcient cause from
fling the appeal within the said period. He submits that reading
of paragraphs 17 and 18 of the Interim Application and
paragraph 2 of the additional Affdavit clearly shows that the
Applicant has shown the suffcient cause in fling the First
Appeal in time. He submits that they have fled First Appeal
within 120 days i.e. from the day when they got certifed copy.
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He submits that in the interest of justice the delay in fling the
First Appeal be condoned. If the delay is not condoned in fling
the First Appeal, the Corporation will suffer irreparable loss.
He further submits that the compensation awarded by the
Presiding Offcer, Land Acquisition, Nagpur is three times more.
Hence they have good chance of success in the present First
Appeal.
7. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel for the
Respondent vehemently opposed the application. He submits
that bare reading of the Interim Application shows that, the
Applicant has failed to show suffcient case which prevented
them from fling the Appeal within time. He submits that in the
present proceedings the Applicant fled the First Appeal after
expiry of 120 days from the date of the Award. In support of his
contention, the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent
placed on record the chart showing calculation of the limitation
period. The said chart is taken on record and marked 'X' for
identifcation. The same reads thus:
Sr. Date Event Remarks
No.
1. 11.07.2019 Date of Award. This fact has been recorded
in Para 5(2) of the
Pronounced in presence of Affdavit-in-Reply dated
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the Advocate for the 19/12/2019 but same has
Claimant and Adv for the not been denied by the
MCGM and same is MCGM.
recorded in the Roznama
of the Authority. The said fact is also
recorded in letter dated
Copy of the Award was 12/07/2019 (Exh. A to the
subsequently provided on Affdavit-in-Reply) and the
the same day i.e. After same has not been denied.
Pronouncement to both the
Parties. The said Order was The aforesaid fact is
also ready by the Adv for substantiated from the
the MCGM in the court Statement of the MCGM in
room. Para 18 of the IA that the
DP department intimated to
the legal department on
12/07/2019 for challenging
the impugned Award.
2 08/09/2019 In view of the aforesaid
facts, the period of 60 days
expired on 08/09/2019 as
calculated below:
11/07/201 31/07/201 21
9 9
01/08/201 31/08/201 31
9 9
01/09/201 08/09/201 8
9 9
The period which court can
condone is of 60 days from
expiry of last day of fling
the appeal i.e. 07/11/2019
and that the Hon'ble Court
cannot condone the delay if
appeal is fled after
07/11/2020. The 60 days
are computed as below:-
09/09/201 30/09/201 22
9 9
01/10/201 31/10/201 31
9 9
01/11/201 07/11/201 7
9 9
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3. 08/11/2019 Date of Presentation of the
above Appeal. The same is
late by 1 day from the
prescribed limit of 60/120
days.
4. 11/11/2019 Date of fling of the above
Appeal. The same is
delayed by 4 days from the
prescribed limit of 60/120
days.
8. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents submits
that this chart shows that the First Appeal has been fled by the
Applicant beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, there is
no question of entertaining the Interim Application.
9. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents submits that
at the time of calculating the limitation period, the date of
communication or knowledge of the order is relevant which in
the present case is the date of the order itself as it was
pronounced in Court in the presence of the learned Advocate
for the Applicant. There is no question of excluding the frst day
on which the award is passed. In support of this contention, he
relied upon the case of D. Saibaba Vs. Bar Council of India &
Anr.1 and in particular paragraph Nos.9 to 14, which read
thus:-
1 (2003) 6 SCC 186
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"9. So far as the commencement of period of limitation for
fling the review petition is concerned we are clearly
of the opinion that the expression 'the date of that
order' as occurring in Section 48AA has to be
construed as meaning the date of communication or
knowledge of the order to the review-petitioner.
Where the law provides a remedy to a person, the
provision has to be so construed in case of ambiguity
as to make the availing of the remedy practical and
the exercise of power conferred on the authority
meaningful and effective. A construction which would
render the provision nugatory ought to be avoided.
True, the process of interpretation cannot be utilized
for implanting a heart into a dead provision; however,
the power to construe a provision of law can always be
so exercised as to give throb to a sinking heart.
10. An identical point came up for the consideration of
this Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh Vs. The
Deputy Land Acquisition Offcer & Anr., (1962) 1 SCR
676. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
contemplates an application seeking reference to the
Court being fled within six months from the date of
the Collector's award. It was held that 'the date of the
award' cannot be determined solely by reference to
the time when the award is signed by the Collector or
delivered by him in his offce. It must involve the
consideration of the question as to when it was known
to the party concerned either actually or
constructively. If that be the true position, then
placing a literal and mechanical construction on the
words 'the date of the award' occurring in the relevant
section would not be appropriate. It is fair and just
that a decision is communicated to the party whose
rights will ultimately be affected or who will be
affected by the decision. The knowledge, either actual
or constructive, of the party affected by such a
decision, is an essential element which must be
satisfed before the decision can be brought into force.
Thus construed, the making of the award cannot
consist merely of the physical act of writing an award
or signing it or even fling it in the offce of the
Collector ; it must involve the communication of the
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said award to the party concerned either actually or
constructively. A literal or mechanical way of
construing the words 'from the date of the Collector's
award' was held to be unreasonable. The court
assigned a practical meaning to the expression by
holding it as meaning the date when the award is
either communicated to the party or is known by him
either actually or constructively.
11. The view taken in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh's
case (supra) by two-Judges Bench of this Court was
affrmed by a three- Judges Bench of this Court in
State of Punjab Vs. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum & Anr.,
(1964) 1 SCR 971. This Court added that the
knowledge of the award does not mean a mere
knowledge of the fact that an award has been made ;
the knowledge must relate to the essential contents of
the award.
12. In The Assistant Transport Commr., Lucknow & Ors.
Vs. Nand Singh, (1979) 4 SCC 19, the question of
limitation for fling an appeal under Section 15 of the
U.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1935, came up for
the consideration of this Court. It provides for an
appeal being preferred 'within thirty days from the
date of such order'. The taxation offcer passed an
order on October 20/24, 1964 which was received by
the person aggrieved on October 29, 1964. The appeal
fled by him was within thirty days ____ the prescribed
period of limitation, calculated from October 29, 1964,
but beyond thirty days of October 24, 1964. It was
held that the effective date for calculating the period
of limitation was October 29, 1964 and not October 24,
1964.
13. In Raj Kumar Dey & Ors. Vs. Tarapada Dey & ors.,
(1987) 4 SCC 398, this Court pressed into service two
legal maxims guiding and assisting the Court while
resolving an issue as to calculation of the period of
limitation prescribed, namely, (i) the law does not
compel a man to do that which he could not possibly
perform, and (ii) an act of the court shall prejudice no
man. These principles support the view taken by us
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hereinabove. Any view to the contrary would lead to
an absurdity and anomaly. An order may be passed
without the knowledge of anyone except its author,
may be kept in the fle and consigned to record room
or the fle may lie unattended, unwittingly or by
carelessness. In either case, the remedy against the
order would be lost by limitation though the person
aggrieved or affected does not even know what order
has been passed. Such an interpretation cannot be
countenanced.
14. How can a person concerned or a person aggrieved be
expected to exercise the right of review conferred by
the provision unless the order is communicated to or
is known to him either actually or constructively? The
words 'the date of that order', therefore, mean and
must be construed as meaning the date of
communication or knowledge, actual or constructive,
of the order sought to be reviewed."
10. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents further
submits that the Appeal fled by the Applicant was lodged on
8th November, 2019 and same is fled on 11th November, 2019.
He further submits that under Section 74 of the said Act, the
Appeal is required to be fled in the Registry and merely not
lodging of the Appeal. Therefore, the present Appeal is barred
by limitation and the same is required to be dismissed with
costs.
11. In support of this contention the learned Senior counsel
for the Respondent relies on the judgment in the case of Ashok
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Shankar Gholap Vs. Krishnarao H. Deshmukh & Anr.2. He
submits that in this matter, this Court held that at the time of
fling of the proceedings, the offce objections are required to be
removed. If there are offce objections then that cannot be
treated as fled. In support of this contention, he relied upon
paragraph 7 of this judgment, which reads thus:-
"7. Mr. Bhandare has also argued that even assuming
that the election petition is presented and thereafter
on the same day the copies of the election petition are
subsequently presented, that itself will amount to non-
compliance with Section 81, Sub-section (3) because
the section provides that the election petition should
be accompanied by the requisite number of copies of
the election petition. Hence the election petition must
be presented along with the copies. If the copies are
fled subsequently, it will amount to non-compliance
with the section. He has pointed out that in the case
Satya Narain v. Dhuja Ram, which was a case in
appeal from the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana
High Court, the Punjab and Haryana High Court had
held that if the requisite number of spare copies of the
election petition were not fled along, with the petition
in the High Court, the defect would not be cured
subsequently even, within the period of limitation
prescribed for fling an election petition. On the facts
of that case the High Court had, held that such spare
copies were fled beyond the period of limitation. I
have not had the beneft of looking at the judgment of
the Punjab and Haryana High Court in question. The
Supreme Court has not considered this aspect of the
question at ail-Hence the decision of the Supreme
Court does not throw any light on this aspect of the
matter. Looking, however, merely to the language of
Section 81(3) would not be conclusive on a matter like
2 1979 SCC Online Bom 217.
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this. It is true that the words used in the section are
".... petition shall be accompanied by.... copies".
Therefore, prima facie it would appear that what Mr.
Bhandare contends is correct, namely that the copies
must accompany the election petition at the time
when it is presented. However, the section need not be
construed so literally. The purpose of the section, is to
ensure that copies are immediately available for
service on the respondents so that the hearing of the
election petition is not unnecessarily delayed at the
initial stage. Bearing this purpose in mind, if the
copies are given by the Petitioner on the same day or
soon after the presentation of the election petition at
the time of removal of objections, it cannot be said
that the Petitioner has violated Section 81(3) of the
Act because the copies are supplied in such a case by
the Petitioner within a reasonable time for service on
the Respondents and his conduct does not cause any
unreasonable delay in proceeding with the hearing of
the election petition at the initial stage, provided, of
course, the copies are given by the Petitioner within
the period of limitation prescribed under the
Representation of the People Act, 1951. Hence it
cannot be said that simply because copies are
furnished subsequently by the Petitioner though on
the same day his petition is liable to be dismissed for
non-compliance with Section 81(3) of the Act.
Compliance with the provisions of Section 81(3) of the
Act, however, after the expiry of the period of
limitation, is not permissible. The petition must be
presented as prescribed under Section 81(3) within
the period of limitation."
12. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent further relied
on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Satya Narain
Vs. Dhuja Ram & Ors.3. He submits that Supreme Court
categorically held in paragraph 13 that, if the proceeding is
3 (1974) 4 SCC 237
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fled with some objections then that not to be treated as fled,
paragraph 13 reads thus:-
"13. Keeping in the forefront the proper functioning of
democracy, the principal object of the Act is purity of
elections. When therefore, an election of a returned
candidate is challenged under the Act, expeditious
trial of the election dispute is sought to be enforced by
the legislature making all safeguards against delay.
Trial has to be necessarily expedited to rid the
candidate as well as the constituency interested in the
result of the election, of any taint or suspicion of
corrupt practices which are again clearly enumerated
in the Act. To take, therefore, another important
object of the Act, viz., expeditious, disposal of an
election petition, by section 86(6) "the trial of an
election petition shall, so far as is practicable
consistently with the interests of justice in respect of
the trial, be continued from day to day until its
conclusion, unless the High Court fnds the
adjournment of the trial beyond the following day to
be necessary for reasons, to be recorded". Again under
section 86(7), " every election petition shall be tried
as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be
made to conclude the trial within six months from the
date on which the election petition is presented to the
High Court for trial". Further section 87(1) introduces
the Civil Procedure Code only subject to the provisions
of the Act and of any rules made thereunder. Section
87(2) makes a deeming provision for application of
the Evidence, Act only subject to the Act. Therefore,
there is no scope for free play in the application of the
provisions of those two Acts. The very object of
expeditious trial will be defeated if the presentation of'
the election petition should be treated casualty and
lightly permitting, all kinds of devices to delay the
ultimate trial. The purpose of enclosing the copies of
the election petition for all the respondents is to
enable quick despatch of the notice with the contents
of the allegations for service on the respondent or
respondents so that there is no delay in the trial at
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this very initial stage when the election petition is
presented. If there is any halt or arrest in progress of
the case, the object of the Act will be completely
frustrated. We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that
the 1st part of section 81(3) with which we are mainly
concerned in this appeal is a peremptory provision
and total, non-compliance with the same will entail
dismissal of the election petition under section 86 of
the Act."
13. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent submits that,
since in the present proceedings, the award was passed on 11th
July, 2019, in the presence of the learned Advocate for the
Applicant, they had knowledge about the order of Land
Acquisition Offcer. Therefore, limitation will start from the
date of knowledge i.e. 11th July, 2019. In support of this
contention, he relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in the
case of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Energy
Transmission Corporation Ltd. & Ors.4, paragraph 6 of the said
judgment reads thus:-
"6. In Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board v. Central
Electricity Regulatory Commission & Ors., (2010) 5
SCC 23, the issue that arose before this Court was
whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be
invoked for allowing the aggrieved person to fle an
appeal under Section 125 of the Act after more than
120 days from the date of communication of the
decision of the tribunal. It adverted to the anatomy of
Section 125 and the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity
4 Civil Appeal No.1315 of 2010 decided on 1st March, 2017.
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(Procedure, Form, Fee and Record of Proceedings)
Rules, 2007 and opined thus:-
"25. Section 125 lays down that any person
aggrieved by any decision or order of the Tribunal
can fle an appeal to this Court within 60 days from
the date of communication of the decision or order
of the Tribunal. Proviso to Section 125 empowers
this Court to entertain an appeal fled within a
further period of 60 days if it is satisfed that there
was suffcient cause for not fling appeal within the
initial period of 60 days. This shows that the period
of limitation prescribed for fling appeals under
Sections 111(2) and 125 is substantially different
from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act
for fling suits etc. The use of the expression `within
a further period of not exceeding 60 days' in Proviso
to Section 125 makes it clear that the outer limit for
fling an appeal is 120 days. There is no provision in
the Act under which this Court can entertain an
appeal fled against the decision or order of the
Tribunal after more than 120 days."
14. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent submits that
the reasons given in the present Interim Application shows
that the fle was moving from one department to another and
therefore, the delay on their part to fle the First Appeal in this
Court. However, the applicants failed to show a suffcient
ground for condonation of delay. In support of this contention,
he relies upon the judgment in the case of Postmaster General
& Ors.Vs. Living Media India Ltd and Anr.5, paragraph Nos.27
5 (2012) 3 SCC 563
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and 28 of the said judgment read thus:-
"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were
well aware or conversant with the issues involved
including the prescribed period of limitation for taking
up the matter by way of fling a special leave petition
in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a
separate period of limitation when the Department
was possessed with competent persons familiar with
court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and
acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why
the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely
because the Government or a wing of the Government
is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of
condonation of delay when there was no gross
negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafde, a
liberal concession has to be adopted to advance
substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts
and circumstances, the Department cannot take
advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on
account of impersonal machinery and inherited
bureaucratic methodology of making several notes
cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies
being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody including the
Government."
15. On the basis of these submissions, learned Senior Counsel
for Respondents submits that there is no sum and substance in
the present Interim Application and same is required to be
dismissed with costs.
16. We heard both sides at length. It is to be noted that in a
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present proceedings the Presiding Offcer passed award on 11th
July, 2019 and thereafter the application for certifed copies of
award was made on 15th July, 2019 and same was received on
16th July, 2019. They fled the First Appeal on 8th November,
2019. The chart given by the Senior Counsel for the
Respondents shows that the Appellant fled First Appeal after
expiry of 120 days. Bare reading of the said chart which is
reproduced above shows that the Respondents have calculated
the frst day i.e. the day on which the award was passed which
is not correct. Whenever days are calculated for the limitation
purpose, the day on which the order is passed is not required to
be taken into account. In the present case, if limitation period is
calculated from 12th July, 2019, then the First Appeal is fled
on the 119th day. Same view has been taken by the Karnataka
High Court in the case of The Deputy Commissioner and Special
Land Acquisition Offcer, Bengaluru Vs. M/s. S.V. Global Mill
Ltd., Chennai6. In paragraph Nos.92 and 96, the Court held
thus:-
"92. Thus, there can be no exception to the period of
limitation to fle an appeal to the High Court and the
60 days has to be computed after application of
Sections 12, 13 and 14 of the Limitation Act. In other
6 ILR 2020 KAR 1897
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words, while applying the period of limitation
prescribed under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act in the
matter of fling an appeal to the High Court against the
judgment and Award of the reference court, while
considering as to whether the appeal fled is within
the period of 60 days, the exclusion of time as
envisaged under Sections 12, 13 and 14 must be made
applicable. In our view, such an interpretation would
also be in consonance with Article 300A of the
Constitution, which recognizes the Constitutional
right of a person to his property as no person can be
deprived of such a Constitutional right except by
authority of law. The same is also in line with the
interpretation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
vis-à-vis other special statutes. Further, on a reading
of Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act, there is no bar, either
express or implied, which excludes application of
Sections 12 to 14 of Limitation Act. On the other hand,
if a mechanical interpretation is given to the words
"within sixty days from the date of the Award" and the
expression "a further period not exceeding sixty
days", without taking into consideration Sections 12,
13 and 14 of the Limitation Act, it would result in
violation of the Constitutional right of a land-loser to
seek enhancement by fling an appeal to the High
Court and also disable him from seeking enhancement
of compensation. The application of Sections 12 to 14
of Limitation Act is in order to advance justice as the
reasons for exclusion of the periods mentioned in
those Sections while computing the limitation period
are those which are beyond the control of the party
seeking to fle an appeal to the High Court. In the same
vein Section 4 of the Limitation Act is applicable.
Thus, a pedantic interpretation of the 2013 Act must
be avoided. It must be interpreted in such a manner
that the judicial dicta with regard to the applicability
of a distinct limitation period under the Special Act in
light of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act on the one
hand, is balanced with the Constitutional right of a
land-loser on the other hand. This would also advance
the cause of justice of the stake holders involved in
the acquisition of land under the 2013 Act as in the
instant case.
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AND
"96. We have already interpreted Section 74(1) of 2013 Act
in light of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act by
holding that Section 5 thereof is not applicable
whereas Section 4 and Sections 12, 13 and 14 are
applicable while computing the period of limitation of
60 days + 60 days. As already noted, there is no
indication as to when the certifed copy was delivered
to the appellant even though it was prepared on
01/12/2018 and the appellant was required to appear
on 10/12/2018. In the instant case, while we accept
the contentions of learned counsel for the respondent
that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to
Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act and there cannot be any
condonation of delay as contemplated under the said
Section in the instant case, nevertheless, Sections 4,
12 to 14 of the Limitation Act are applicable to Section
74(1) of the 2013 Act while computing the period of
sixty days + sixty days under Section 74(1) of the
2013 Act. Further, we do not venture to condone any
delay that has occurred in fling of this appeal under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act as the same is not
applicable to Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act."
17. In the present proceedings, the Appeal is fled after taking
opinion and sanction from several departments. It is correct
that whenever the Appeal is fled on behalf of any institution,
the decision is required to be taken by responsible offcer.
Considering these facts, we are of the opinion that the
Applicant has made out a case that they prevented by suffcient
cause in paragraph 18 of Interim Application.
18. The judgment relied by the learned Senior Counsel for
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Respondent in the matter of Ashok Gholap (Supra) is not
applicable in the present case as it is under Section 81 of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951, where the provisions
are altogether different. Similarly the judgment in the matter of
Satya Narain (Supra) is also not applicable. The judgment in
the case of ONGC (Supra) is also not applicable. Similarly the
judgment in D. Saibaba Vs. Bar Council of India (Supra) is also
not applicable. In the matter of Postmaster (Supra) the
Supreme Court held that, if suffcient cause is shown delay can
be condoned.
19. Considering all these facts and the applicant prevented by
suffcient cause and the judgment of the Karnataka High Court
in the case of S.V. Global (Surpa) we are of the opinion that the
Appellant has made out case for allowing this Interim
Application for condonation of delay. Hence the following
order:-
(a) The delay in fling First Appeal is condoned;
(b) The Applicant to pay cost of Rs.50,000/-.
14-ia-2541-2019.doc
(c) Cost to be paid to the Respondent No.1 within a
period of two weeks from today and place on record the receipt
to that effect, failing which the Interim Application shall stand
dismissed without reference to the Court.
(d) Interim Application stands allowed accordingly.
[R.I. CHAGLA J.] [K.K. TATED, J.]
