Bombay High Court
Mrs. Anjana Mehta Wd/O Dr. ... vs Coal India Limited, A Govt. Of ... on 4 February, 2021
Bench: Pushpa V. Ganediwala
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
WRIT PETITION No.4104 OF 2017
(Shri Gurjit singh s/o. Late Gopal Singh Vs. Coal India Limited and another)
and
WRIT PETITION No.4318 OF 2017
(Mrs. Anjana Mehta wd/o. Deceased Dr. Surendraprasad Mehta Vs. Coal India Limited and
others)
__________________________________________________________________________
Office Notes, Office Memoramda of Coram,
appearances, Court's orders of directions Court's or Judge's orders.
and Registrar's Orders.
_________________________________________________________________________________
Mr. S.A. Pathak, Advocate for Petitioner in WP 4318/2017.
Mr. M.M. Sudame, Advocate for Petitioner in WP 4104/2017.
Mr. A.M. Ghare, Advocate for Respondents in WP 4318/2017.
CORAM : DIPANKAR DATTA, CJ. &
PUSHPA V. GANEDIWALA, J.
DATE : 4th FEBRUARY, 2021
1. Writ Petition No.4104/2017 and Writ Petition
No.4318/2017 are taken up for consideration together, since the
point of law involved therein is common.
2. The petitioner in Writ Petition No.4104/2017, at the
material time, was working as a General Manger (Finance) under
the Western Coalfields Limited (hereafter "the W.C.L.", for short).
Disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner vide
charge-sheet dated 22nd August, 2012 on the ground of
unauthorized absence from duty. In a duly constituted inquiry,
the charge levelled against the petitioner was established
resulting in an order of removal from service being passed. The
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order of removal is the subject matter of challenge in separate
proceedings initiated according to law.
3. The petitioner in Writ Petition No.4318/2017 is the widow
of Dr. Surendraprasad Mehta (since deceased). At the material
time, the deceased was holding the post of Medical
Superintendent in the W.C.L. Prosecution was launched against
the deceased under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section
13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereafter "the
P.C. Act", for short). The deceased stood trial before the Special
(Central Bureau of Investigation) Court, Nagpur. Vide judgment
and order dated 9th December, 2009, the Special Court convicted
the deceased under Section 7 of the P.C. Act and sentenced him
to suffer simple imprisonment for three months. The Special
Court also convicted the deceased for offence punishable under
Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act and
sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years and
to pay fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default to suffer further simple
imprisonment for three months. Both sentences were directed to
run concurrently. Upon such conviction and sentence, the
deceased preferred an appeal before this Court. During the
pendency of the appeal, he breathed his last. However, based on
the aforesaid conviction, the deceased was dismissed from service
by the W.C.L.
4. In the backdrop of the aforesaid factual narrative, the
claim in both the writ petitions is for release of financial benefits
on account of leave encashment dues of the petitioner in Writ
Petition No.4104/2017 and of the deceased husband of the
petitioner in Writ Petition No.4318/2017.
5. On behalf of the petitioners, Mr. S.A. Pathak and Mr. M.M.
Sudame, learned Advocates have referred to the provisions of
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Section 52(10) of the Mines Act, 1952 (hereafter "the Mines Act",
for short) to contend that notwithstanding removal/dismissal
from service, the petitioners are entitled to leave encashment
dues. Heavy reliance has been placed on the decision of a
coordinate Bench of this Court dated 26 th November, 2010 in
Writ Petition No.3430/2010 (Pramod s/o. Gulabchand Baid Vs.
Coal India Limited and another ). It has been brought to our
notice that the decision in Pramod (supra) was carried to the
Supreme Court in a Special Leave Petition, which stands
dismissed by an order dated 18 th April, 2011. Not only that, a
curative petition was filed which also stands dismissed by an
order dated 6th August, 2013. Based on the decision in Pramod
(supra), learned advocates for the petitioners have urged us to
extend similar relief since, according to them, the claims of the
petitioners are squarely covered thereby.
6. In Pramod (supra), the petitioner was a Finance Manager,
who had suffered an order of dismissal on 27 th January, 2009.
He had claimed leave encashment of 220 days earned leave with
full pay and 219 days half pay leave after deduction of Coal
Mines Provident Fund as per Section 52(8) of the Act. His
request was spurned by the W.C.L. by a communication dated
30th April, 2010 on the ground that Rule 7.2 of the Coal India
Service Rules (hereafter "the Service Rules", for short) creates a
bar for payment of leave encashment dues to any officer whose
service is terminated on disciplinary ground. The coordinate
Bench, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Jaswant
Singh Gill Vs. Bharat Coking Coal Limited and others, reported in
(2007) 1 SCC 663, proceeded to hold that Rule 7.2 was in
conflict with Section 52 of the Act and, therefore, was arbitrary
and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the
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impugned communication dated 30th April, 2010 was set aside
and the respondents directed to release leave encashment dues to
the petitioner within a period of three months.
7. Per contra, Mr. A.M. Ghare, learned Advocate appearing
for the respondents has invited our attention to the various
provisions of the Act, starting from its preamble. It is his
contention that the Act was introduced for regulation of labour
and safety in mines and having regard to the provisions
contained in Section 2(h) and Section 17 of the Act read with
Section 52(10) thereof as well as the provisions contained in the
Coal Mines Regulations, 1957 (hereafter 'the Regulations", for
short), the legal position seems to be clear that the Act provides
benefits for those who are actually employed in mines and
similar such benefits cannot be extended to officers/executives of
the W.C.L. like the petitioner in Writ Petition No.4104/2017 and
the deceased husband of the petitioner in Writ Petition
No.4318/2017, who neither had the expertise to work a mine
nor had physically worked in a mine. It is also contended before
us that Regulation 31 of the Regulations lay down the
qualification a manager, within the meaning of Section 2(h) read
with Section 17 of the Act, is required to possess and the
petitioner in Writ Petition No.4104/2017 and the deceased
husband of the petitioner in Writ Petition No.4318/2017 having
not possessed such qualification, merely because the petitioner in
Writ Petition No.4104/2017 was designated as a Finance
Manager would not mean that he is to be treated as a manager in
the sense the term is used either in the Act and/or the
Regulations. That apart, it has been brought to our notice that
the decision in Pramod (supra) was rendered heavily relying on
the decision in Jaswant Singh Gill (supra), which has since been
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overruled by a larger Bench decision of the Supreme Court in
Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Mahanadi Coalfields Limited
Vs. Sri Rabindranath Choubey, reported in (2020) SCC Online
SC 470. It is the specific contention of Mr. Ghare that the
provisions of the Act as well as the Regulations were not brought
to the notice of the coordinate Bench while it decided Pramod
(supra) and, therefore, such decision cannot now be said to lay
down good law. Based on the aforesaid submissions, it is urged
by him that the writ petitions be dismissed.
8. The decision in Pramod (supra) having been rendered by a
coordinate Bench, the same is binding on us unless of course we
propose to take a different view. Even if we propose to take a
different view, the normal course would require us to express our
reason(s) therefor and to frame the question(s) indicating the
point(s) of disagreement for being decided by a larger Bench.
However, we are absolved of following this normal rule in view
of the overruling of the decision of the Supreme Court in Jaswant
Singh Gill (supra) by the later larger Bench decision in
Rabindranath Choubey (supra) as a consequence whereof, the
plinth on the basis of which Pramod (supra) was decided no
longer survives.
9. Having said so, we proceed to examine the rival claims
and to record our reasons for which we feel that the petitioners
are not entitled to relief of the nature, claimed in these writ
petitions. However, before venturing in that direction, we
consider it proper to seek guidance from the Supreme Court on
how a statute is to be read, understood, and interpreted. We can
do no better than quote a passage from the decision in Reserve
Bank of India Vs. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co.
Ltd., reported in (1987) 1 SCC 424, reading as follows:
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"33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context.
They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the
text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither
can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is
best which makes the textual interpretation match the con-
textual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it
was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read,
first as a whole and then section by section, clause by
clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is
looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of
the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the
sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and
appear different than when the statute is looked at without
the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we
must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each sec-
tion, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and
designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act.
No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be con-
strued in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that ev-
ery word has a place and everything is in its place. ***"
10. As has rightly been pointed out before us, the preamble of
the Act says that the purpose of the legislation is to amend and
consolidate the law relating to the regulation of labour and safety
in mines. The entire Act, therefore, has to be read keeping in
mind why it was enacted and what is the mischief that was
sought to be remedied by reason of introduction of such a
legislation. Learned Advocates for the petitioners have sought to
draw inspiration from Section 52(10) of the Act. However,
before reading Section 52(10), it would be necessary to read
Section 52 from its marginal note. The marginal note says
"Annual Leave with Wages". If one proceeds to read one sub-
section after another in Section 52, it would be found that it is
primarily relatable to entitlement to and release of wages to any
person employed in a mine. The word 'wages' has not been
defined in the Act, but is defined in the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947. Wages are ordinarily paid to workmen/labourers. Officers/
executives are not paid wages in the sense the term is used with
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reference to workmen/labourers. We have failed to comprehend
as to how officers/executives of the W.C.L. could stoop so low, so
as to seek leave encashment dues by falling back on the
provisions of Section 52 of the Act which, by its very nature,
deals with wages payable to persons employed in mines, and the
petitioners, by their own admission, were not so employed. In
paragraph 12 of Writ Petition 4104/2017, the petitioner himself
has admitted that he had worked in the Finance Department on
surface for more than 30 years right from the time he was
appointed as a Management Trainee (Finance) till his
upgradation as General Manager (Finance). We do quite
understand that inspiration was sought to be drawn from Section
52(10) read with Section 2(h) of the Act because the latter refers
to a manager. However, the term manager in Section 2(h) and
Section 17 read with Regulation 31 of the Regulations would
mean only those managers, who have the requisite qualifications
to work a mine and are comprehended within the meaning of the
words "a person is said to be 'employed' in a mine", wherever
used in the Act. Neither the petitioner in Writ Petition 4104/2017
nor the husband of the petitioner in Writ Petition No.4318/2017
had essential qualifications of a manager and had not worked in
mines, and since they do not belong to the class of
workmen/labour for whose benefit the Act was introduced, the
petitioners have no right in law to claim leave encashment
benefits, which otherwise were due to them but for the orders of
removal on disciplinary ground and dismissal consequent to
conviction recorded by the Special Court, in view of the clear
provision in Rule 7.2 of the Service Rules. In our considered view,
the provisions of the Act do not apply to officers and executives
of the W.C.L. and Rule 7.2 of the Service Rules, being part of
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service conditions of officers and executives of the W.C.L., any
claim in respect of leave encashment dues must necessarily be
dealt with bearing in mind such rule, which is quite reasonable
and non-discriminatory. There is, thus, hardly any occasion for us
to hold that Rule 7.2 is in conflict with the provisions contained
in Section 52 of the Act, far less any other provision of law.
9. We hold that the respondents had correctly invoked Rule
7.2 of the Service Rules and also that the petitioners are not
entitled to any relief.
10. The writ petitions, devoid of any merit, are dismissed.
There shall be no orders as to costs.
(PUSHPA V. GANEDIWALA, J.) (CHIEF JUSTICE)
DWW
