Citation : 2017 Latest Caselaw 8340 Bom
Judgement Date : 2 November, 2017
LPA.169.10
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT NAGPUR, NAGPUR.
...
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO.169/2010
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 3887/2001
Tukaram s/o Tulsiram Nakhate
Aged about 32 years, occu: service
R/o village Mokhara, Tah. Paoni
Dist.Bhandara. .. APPELLANT
versus
1) Presiding Officer
School Tribunal, Nagpur (Chandrapur).
2) Pragatishil Shikshan Sanstha
Through its President :
Shri Vilas Deorao Raghute
Aged about 30 years, R/o Raghute Bhawan
Dighori Naka, Nagpur.
(Amendment carried out as per Court's order
dated 15.12.2010)
3) The Head Mistress
Raghute High School, Palora (Chouras)
Tah.Paoni, Dist. Bhandara.
4) Education Officer (Secondary)
Zilla Parishad, Bhandara
Dist. Bhanrada.
5) Shri V.U. Gadwe,
Clerk
Raghute High School, Palora, (Chouras)
Tah.Paoni ,Dist. Bhanadra. .. RESPONDENTs
::: Uploaded on - 06/11/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 07/11/2017 01:17:24 :::
LPA.169.10
2
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Dr. A.H. Jamal, Advocate for the appellant
Mrs. M.A. Barabde, AGP for respondents 1 & 4
Nobody for respondents 2,3 and 5
................................................................................................................................................
CORAM: B.P. DHARMADHIKARI &
MRS. SWAPNA JOSHI, JJ.
DATED: 2nd November, 2017
ORAL JUDGMENT: (PER B.P.DHARMADHIKARI, J.)
1. Heard Dr. Jamal, for the appellant and learned AGP for respondents 1
and 4. Nobody appears for respondent nos.2,3 and 5.
2. The judgment delivered by School Tribunal on 11.4.2001 dismissing
Appeal No. STC 1/1997 preferred by present appellant-Tukaram, was questioned by
him before the learned single Judge in Writ Petition No.3887/2001. The learned single
Judge has dismissed that petition on 7th December, 2009. These concurrent judgments
are questioned in present Letters Patent Appeal.
3. Dr. Jamal contends that provisions contained in Section 7 of the
Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act,
1977 and Rule 40 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of
Service) Rules,1981 (henceforth abbreviated to " the Act of 1977" and "the Rules of
1981" respectively) have been totally lost sight of. He relies upon the Division Bench
judgment, in the case of Chandrakant Lone vs. Chhatrapati Shivaji Education Society
LPA.169.10
and others, reported at 1988 Vol.I CLR page 175, particularly paragraph 6 to submit
that though provisions may be held to be directory, a substantial compliance therewith
must be demonstrated. He submits that appellant-Tukaram was working in a granted
school since 1991 and he has been orally terminated on 6.12.1996. This fact and legal
implications flowing therefrom are totally ignored by School Tribunal as also by
learned single Judge. He further submits that as appellant had put in about 6 years
of service and was a permanent employee, resignation submitted by him (if any)
ought to have been of duration of three months. Resignation of a shorter duration
could have been accepted by management after demanding a proportionate amount
for shortfall from appellant or then after deducting that amount from his dues, that is
not the defence anywhere before School Tribunal. He further states that acceptance
of alleged resignation by management on 7.12.1996 is not even pleaded in written
statement before School Tribunal and hence finding, in that respect, is perverse.
4. He invites attention to police complaint lodged by Tukaram on
8.12.1996 and sequence of events disclosed therein, to show that from 5 th December
1996 pressure was brought on Tukaram to complete registers/musters in a particular
way and, for that purpose, he was even required to visit the residence of President
of educational society. He submits that when he pointed out that information filled in
was true and as per law, the President did not like it and he was threatened.
According to him, in such atmosphere under coercion and putting Tukaram under
fear of assault, resignation was obtained in a back date. He submits that complaint
LPA.169.10
lodged to police officers on 8.12.1996 narrates all these facts but its cognizance has
not been taken by School Tribunal. Learned counsel submits that mere non-mention
of date "05.11.1996" as the date on which resignation was shown to have been
obtained in police complaint, cannot be held to be fatal in present circumstances. He
contends that thus there is total non-application of mind, not only by School Tribunal
but also by learned single Judge to the relevant facts and hence the impugned
judgments need to be quashed and set aside.
5. Learned AGP submits that Rule 40 of the Rules of 1981 also envisages
a resignation with prior notice of one month. Material on record does not show that
Tukaram was a permanent employee duly approved, regularly recruited and,
therefore, he ought to have submitted the resignation three months in advance. She
submits that learned single Judge has looked into the police complaint and found that
grievance of asking an ante-dated resignation does not figure in. He further states
that, in this situation, various judgments of this Court which comment upon scheme of
Rule 40 and Section 7 have been looked into and thereafter a possible view has been
reached. According to her, there is no jurisdictional error or perversity and hence
Letters Patent Appeal needs to be dismissed.
6. Perusal of challenge as presented to School Tribunal through Appeal
under section 9 reveals narration of story which commences in December, 1996. It is
pleaded that President of society devised a plan and obtained resignation under
LPA.169.10
duress by confining him in house of one Deorao Raghute on 6.12.1996. The fact that
it was ante-dated also appears therein. The filing of police complaint on 8.12.1996
has also been pleaded. Earlier, he has stated that he joined employment from
3.9.1991 and at that time the school was not receiving grant-in-aid. By order dated
15.7.1993 he was continued as Junior Clerk until further orders. The oral termination
on 6.12.1996 is also pleaded. Appellant-Tukaram has then pointed out that on
9.12.1996 he was not allowed by Headmaster to sign the muster roll though he was
present in the School for the whole day. He has also alleged that he was not
permitted to perform his legitimate duties.
7. In reply, respondents have denied all these facts.
8. The judgment delivered by School Tribunal on 11th April, 2001 takes
note of ante-dated resignation, of the police complaint or plea of not permitting the
appellant to sign the muster on 9.12.1996 or not allowing to perform his duties with
effect from 10.12.1996. It also records that from 1995 the School was receiving 25 per
cent grants. The School Tribunal has found that Tukaram was initially appointed as
Laboratory Attendant and later on as Junior Clerk with effect from 15.7.1993. However
while framing points for adjudication first point framed by School Tribunal is, whether
alleged oral termination order dated 6.12.1996 issued by respondent is legal and
valid. It has been answered in affirmative. The School Tribunal has found that there
was resignation letter dated 5.11.1996 signed by Tukaram and a resolution dated
LPA.169.10
7.12.1996 passed by the Sanstha accepting the same. It has also observed that
Tukaram was informed about acceptance on 9.12.1996 under registered post. In
paragraph 27, the School Tribunal has found that respondent no.4 before it, namely,
Shri Bhure was validly appointed after termination of Tukaram and appeal filed by
Tukaram was time-barred. In paragraph 27 itself, it mentions that resignation tendered
on 5.11.1996 was accepted on 7.11.1996 and Tukaram could have filed report to
Police Station on the next day, but he filed the complaint on 8.12.1996. It is also
observed that during said period, he could have withdrawn said resignation but he did
not do so. The period of limitation therefore started from 5.11.1996 and Appeal before
School Tribunal was filed on 4.1.1997. Therefore, resignation letter was not obtained
under threat but it was a voluntary act of appellant. In paragraph 28 while summing
up, the School Tribunal observes that the resignation letter dated 5.11.1996 was
accepted by management vide resolution dated 7.12.1996 hence plea of oral
termination was not sustainable. After acceptance of resignation on 7.12.1996 the
appellant filed the Appeal on 4.1.1997 and, therefore, the Appeal was within limitation.
It therefore, answered the point No.1 framed by it in affirmative and dismissed the
Appeal. Thus, there is some inconsistency and vagueness in observations contained
in paragraph 27 and paragraph 28 as Appeal needed to be filed within 30 days of
the cause of action.
9. The judgment delivered by learned single Judge looks into these facts
and finds nothing wrong with consideration of controversy by School Tribunal. Learned
LPA.169.10
Single Judge noticed that in police complaint lodged on 8.12.1996, the fact that
resignation was required to be ante-dated is not pleaded. Resignation letter is found
to be written by Tukaram in his own handwriting and taking overall view of the matter,
the learned single Judge has dismissed the Writ Petition.
10. Perusal of police complaint filed by Tukaram on 8.12.1996 specifically
points out all events taking place after 5.12.1996. He has submitted that under duress
and threat resignation was obtained from him by President and these events have
taken place on next date i.e. 6.12.1996. Thus, he has specifically pleaded that
resignation was obtained from him on 6.12.1996 and that resignation carries the date
5.11.1996. In this situation, mere fact that it was required to ante-dated by itself cannot
be held to be fatal as contention that resignation was obtained under duress and threat
very much exists in police complaint.
11. Perusal of Rule 40 of Rules of 1981 reveals that a permanent
employee can leave service after giving three calender months' notice and non-
permanent employee may leave service after giving one calender month's notice. The
resignation letter in this matter is dated 5.11.1996 and it states that Tukaram has
resigned on 5.11.1996. It is therefore no notice, either of one month duration or then
notice of three months.
12. It may be pointed out here that as per judgment of this Court in the
LPA.169.10
case of Anna Manikrao Pethe vs. Presiding officer School Tribunal and others,
reported in 1997 (3) Mh.L.J. 697, the Tribunal is supposed to frame preliminary issue
regarding the nature of employment. The said Division Bench judgment also expected
the School Tribunal to frame preliminary issue about the grant of approval by
Education Department. The full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of St.Ulai
High School and another vs. Devendra Jagannath Singh reported in 2007(1)Mh.L.J.
597 has deleted requirement of framing the last issue. However, had the School
Tribunal framed two earlier issues, the nature of employment of Tukaram could have
very well come on record. In that case, whether he was a permanent employee and
therefore he should have given notice of three months' duration or not, could have
been anwered. As that issue has not been framed, nothing can be said with certainty
about it.
13. The issue framed by School Tribunal itself presupposes oral termination
on 6.12.1996. The resignation given by Tukaram is on 5.11.1996 and he has requested
the management to accept it. It is not the case of Management that on 6.12.1996
Tukaram was informed that his resignation was accepted and, therefore, he was
relieved. Though the School Tribunal observes that resignation was accepted by
Management on 7.12.1996, said date is not pleaded anywhere in written statement
by the Management. If there is any intimation to Tukaram that his resignation was
accepted and therefore he was relived, that letter also does not find any consideration
in the judgment of School Tribunal. If story of Management that it accepted resignation
LPA.169.10
on 7.12.1996 is correct, there could not have been any oral termination, even on
6.12.1996.
14. We, therefore, find that the facts at hand needed an in-depth
consideration in the light of the records and police complaint lodged by appellant-
Tukaram. The School Tribunal ought to have framed preliminary issues as directed by
this Court in its two judgments mentioned supra and, after answering those
preliminary issues only scrutiny on merits of controversy should have been
undertaken. Admittedly that has not been done.
15. In this situation, we quash and set aside the judgment dated 11th
April, 2001 delivered by School Tribunal in Appeal STC No. 1/1997 and restore the
Appeal back to the file of School Tribunal. Parties are directed to appear before School
Tribunal on 15.12.2017 and to abide by its further instructions in the matter. The
School Tribunal shall decide the preliminary issues as mentioned supra first, within
next two months and thereafter, if necessary, consider merits of controversy and
pass final judgment in next three months.
16. With these directions, we partly allow the Letters Patent Appeal and
dispose it of. No costs.
JUDGE JUDGE sahare
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