Citation : 2016 Latest Caselaw 2637 Bom
Judgement Date : 8 June, 2016
apeal562.14 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.562 OF 2014.
APPELLANT: Deepak Shankarrao Borekar,
aged about 25 years, resident of
Andori, Tq.Deoli, Distt.Wardha.
: VERSUS :
RESPONDENT: The State of Maharashtra,
through Police Station Officer,
Police Station Deoli.
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Mr.Adwait Manohar, Advocate for the appellant.
Mr.S.M.Ukey, Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent.
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CORAM: B.R.GAVAI AND
V.M.DESHPANDE, JJ.
DATE: 8th JUNE, 2016.
ORAL JUDGMENT (Per V.M.Deshpande, J.)
1. Being aggrieved by judgment and order of conviction
passed by learned Sessions Judge, Wardha in Session Case No.46
of 2010, whereby the appellant was convicted for the offence
punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and was
directed to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of
Rs.1000/- and in default of payment of fine to suffer rigorous
imprisonment for two months. The appellant is further held guilty
of the offence punishable under Section 506 of the Indian Penal
Code and on that count he was sentenced to suffer rigorous
imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-, in default
to suffer rigorous imprisonment for fifteen days. The learned
Sessions Judge also convicted the appellant for the offence
punishable under Section 417 of the Indian Penal Code and
directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a
fine of Rs.500/- and in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for
fifteen days, the appellant is before this Court.
2. The facts giving rise to the present appeal, in short, are
as under -
PW 3 Namdeo Bapuraoji Chaudhari was attached to
Deoli Police Station as P.S.I. He was in-charge of the Police
Station on 11th of May, 2006. On the said day, prosecutrix (PW 1)
came to the Police Station and lodged report against the appellant.
Her report was taken by Police Head Constable Arjun. The report
was perused by Namdeo Chaudhari (PW 3) and thereafter he
directed PHC Arjun to register the offence and accordingly an
offence was registered against the appellant vide Crime No.96 of
2006. The investigation of the said crime was taken to himself by
Namdeo Chaudhari (PW 3).
3. Exh.40 is the oral report lodged by the prosecutrix
against the appellant. Her report discloses that appellant resides
in the neighbourhood of the first informant. His father resides at
Mouda however he never comes at Andori where the appellant
and first informant used to reside. Oral report further proceeds
that first informant was on talking term with the appellant since
last six months and he used to visit her house.
About six months ago, the first informant had been to a
'Bhajan Programme" and when after returning to her house she
was pulled by the appellant near a lane and there he committed
forcible sexual intercourse with the first informant. According to
the First Information Report, the time of this occurrence was in
between 00.00 to 1.00 a.m. That time the appellant extended
threat of killing her parents.
The First Information Report further proceeds that after
eight days of the incident when her parents were not available in
house and when only her blind and deaf grand-mother was
present and first informant was sleeping on the bed, since she was
not keeping good health, the appellant came and on the promise
that he will marry with her established sexual relations with her.
The said continued for 3-4 occasions and for every occasion he
gave promise of marriage and had fulfilled his sexual lust. Due
to the sexual relations the first informant became pregnant. That
time said fact was disclosed by first informant to her parents that
she is pregnant from the appellant and when this fact was
disclosed to the appellant, the appellant flatly refused to marry
with the first informant.
4. The Investigating Officer conducted the investigation.
After completion of his entire investigation filed a final report in
the Court of learned Magistrate. The learned Magistrate found
that the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions and
therefore he passed the order of committal. On reaching to the
Court of Sessions the case was registered as Sessions Trial No.46
of 2010. The learned Ad hoc Additional Sessions Judge, Wardha
on 9th of May, 2011 framed a charge against the appellant. He
denied the charges. During the course of trial, the additional
charge was also framed by the learned Session Judge to enhance
punishment under Section 75 of the Indian Penal Code.
5. Three witnesses were examined by the prosecution.
They are PW 1, prosecutrix, PW 2 Latabai, mother of the
prosecutrix and PW 3 Namdeo Chaudhari, the Investigating
Officer.
6. We have heard Shri Adwait Manohar, learned counsel
who was appointed by the Legal Aid Committee to give legal
assistance to the appellant and Shri S.M.Ukey, the learned
Additional Public Prosecutor for the State. With their able
assistance we have also gone through the notes of evidence.
7. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, this
is a clear cut case of consent and the prosecutrix, who was major,
is consenting party and therefore the impugned judgment and
order of conviction cannot sustain. He also submits that there is a
delay in lodging First Information Report. He relies on the Apex
Court decision in the case of Baikunth Singh ..vs.. State of Bihar
and ors. reported in (2008) 14 SCC 766 to buttress his
submission.
8. Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor
would submit that the appellant is guilty of making promise of
marriage to the prosecutrix and thereafter he has fulfilled his
sexual lust. He submitted that in the present case the ingredients
of Section 417 are duly proved by prosecution. He also submits
that the appellant is habitual and in fact in another case of rape he
is convicted by the court below. He therefore submits that appeal
be dismissed.
9. Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code reads as under :-
"90.Consent known to be given under fear or
misconception - A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Code, if the
consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the
person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in
consequence of such fear or misconception."
From the aforesaid, it is crystal clear that if consent is given by the
prosecutrix under a misconception of fact then such consent is
vitiated.
From the evidence of the prosecutrix it is clear that there
were no love relations between the prosecutrix and the appellant.
She has stoutly denied the suggestion given to her that the first
sexual intercourse made with her by the appellant was with her
consent.
Her evidence discloses that she allowed the appellant for
the sexual relations since on every occasion the appellant has
made promise that he will marry with her. Thus, the appellant
has represented the prosecutrix that he will marry with her. Right
from beginning, the appellant was aware that he is making false
assurance that he would marry her and thereafter obtained her
consent. Therefore, the submissions of the learned counsel for the
appellant, in our view, are devoid of any substance. At this stage it
would be useful to refer following paragraphs of the law laid down
by the Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh ..vs..
Naushad, reported in (2013)16 SCC 651.
"17. Section 376 IPC prescribes the punishment for the offence of rape. Section 375 IPC defines the offence of rape, and enumerates six descriptions of the offence. The description "secondly" speaks of rape "without her consent". Thus, sexual intercourse by a man with a
woman without her consent will constitute the offence of
rape. We have to examine as to whether in the present case, the accused is guilty of the act of sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix "against her consent". The
prosecutrix in this case has deposed on record that the accused promised marriage with her and had sexual
intercourse with her on this pretext and when she got
pregnant, his family refused to marry him with her on the ground that she is of "bad character".
18. How is "consent" defined ? Section 90 IPC defines
consent known to be given under "fear or misconception"
which reads as under :
"90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.- A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section
of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to
believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fer or misconception."
Thus, if consent is given by the prosecutrix under a misconception of fact, it is vitiated.
19. In the present case, the accused had sexual
intercourse with the prosecutrix by giving false assurance to the prosecutrix that he would marry her. After she got pregnant, he refused to do so. From this,
it is evident that he never intended to marry her and procured her consent only for the reason of having
sexual relations with her, which act of the accused falls
squarely under the definition of rape as he had sexual intercourse with her consent which was consent
obtained under a misconception of fact as defined under Section 90 IPC. Thus, the alleged consent said to have been obtained by the accused was not
voluntary consent and this Court is of the view that
the accused indulged in sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix by misconstruing to her his true intentions. It is apparent from the evidence that the accused only
wanted to indulge in sexual intercourse with her and was under no intention of actually marrying the prosecutrix. He made a false promise to her and he
never aimed to marry her."
10. The re-appreciation of the evidence of the prosecution
case in our view clearly speaks that the appellant had obtained the
consent of the prosecutrix under a misconception of fact that he
would marry her thereby making her pregnant. In that view of the
matter, the appellant is guilty of committing offence under Section
375 of the Indian Penal Code punishable under Section 376 of the
Indian Penal Code. In paragraph no.23 of the aforesaid report the
Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that a woman's body is not a
man's plaything and he cannot take advantage of it in order to
satisfy his lust and desires by fooling a woman into consenting to
sexual intercourse simply because he wants to indulge in it.
In the present case, as a matter of fact, the appellant was
convicted in Special Case No.7 of 2012 for committing the similar
offence.
11. The learned Judge of the Court below has correctly
appreciated the entire evidence and has given, in our view, the
appropriate punishment to the appellant. Hence, the appeal stands
dismissed.
12. The fees quantified for rendering legal assistance to the
appellant is quantified at Rs.5000/- (Rupees five thousand only).
However, Shri A.S.Manohar, the learned counsel, submits that
instead of giving the said fees to him, it should be given to the
High Court Bar Library.
JUDGE JUDGE
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