Citation : 2008 Latest Caselaw 73 Bom
Judgement Date : 30 June, 2008
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR
Criminal Writ Petition No.677 of 2007
Shri Dinesh son of Wasudeo Wanjari,
aged about 32 years,
resident of Plot No. 25-A, Deshpande
Layout, Wardhman Nagar,
Nagpur. .... Petitioner.
Versus
1. State of Maharashtra,
through Lakadganj Police
Stastion, Ngpur.
2.
Shri Subhashchandra son of
son of Wireshwar Limye,
aged about 58 years,
occupation - business,
resident of 'Rudraksha Bhawan,
Plot No. 116, Rail Toli,
Ravi Shankar Ward, Civil
Lines, Gondia.
3. Shri Mukund son of Wireshwar
Limye,
aged about 65 years,
occupation - Retired,
resident of Apartment No.
G-2, Riddhi Siddhi
Apartment, Hindustan Colony,
near University Campus, off
Amravati Road, Nagpur.
4. Shri Arun son of Namdeolal
Aakre,
aged adult, occupation -
business, resident of
Aakre Building,
New Shukrawari,
Nagpur. ..... Respondents.
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2
*****
Mr. A. Shelat, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mrs. T.D. Khade, Additional Public Prosecutor for
respondent no.1.
Mr. Ambarish Joshi, Advocate for the respondent nos. 2
and 3.
*****
CORAM : A.H.JOSHI, J.
Date : 30th June,2008.
ORAL JUDGMENT :
1. Rule.
ig Rule is made returnable forthwith.
Heard learned Advocate Mr. A. Shelat for the petitioner
and learned Advocate Mr. Ambarish Joshi for respondent
nos. 2 and 3. Service on respondent no.4 is not
necessary in view that no effective steps have been
taken to serve him.
2. Petitioner had filed a complaint under Section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
3. Trial Court has ordered issue of process by
order dated 28th August, 2006. This order of issue of
process was challenged by accused by filing a Revision
Application under Section 397 of Criminal Procedure
Code in Sessions Court.
4. Learned Sessions Court allowed the Revision
Application and dismissed the complaint by quashing the
order of issue of process.
5. On perusal of the Judgment, it reveals that
the learned Judge found that it was not a case of issue
of cheque for a debt, in as much that it was a cheque
issued by Company under the signatures of its Chairman
and Directors, in the name of the same Company, i.e.,
for all purposes, it was a cheque in own name.
6. This Judgment is challenged by filing the
present Writ Petition.
7. Learned Advocate for the petitioner urged that
it was wholly unnecessary on the part of the Revisional
Court to have gone into the facts and merits of the
case, further that the Revision would not lie in the
light of observations contained in two reported
judgments in cases of [1] Adalat Prasad Vs. Rooplal
Jindal & others [2004 (4) Mh. L. J. 274], and [2]
Subramanium Sethuraman Vs. State of Maharashtra &
another [(2004) 13 SCC 324].
8. Learned Advocate then tried to distinguish his
case from the reported Judgment of this Court in case
of V.K. Jain & ors. Vs. Pratap V. Padode & another
[2005 (3) Mh. L.J. 778]. Relying on reported Judgment
of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Aneeta Hada Vs.
M/s. Godfather Travels & Tours Pvt. Ltd. [2008 (3) ALL
MR 881], learned Advocate further argued that whether a
case could be filed without arraying the Company as a
party is a matter of reference to Larger Bench, and in
the light of this situation, he has made out a case for
entertaining present Writ Petition, grant of relief by
way of setting aside impugned order and restoring the
case for hearing and disposal according to law.
9. In order to test the submissions, this Court
has perused the record with the petition and reply.
10. As far as the tenor and description of the
cheque, subject-matter, is concerned, it has been
narrated in paragraph no.5 of the Judgment of the
Revisional Court. Factual correctness of this paragraph
is not in dispute. It shall be better to refer by
quotation para 5 of the said Judgment which reads as
follows:-
"5. It will be clear from the impugned cheque which is document no.4 in this case that the cheque no. 985807 for
Rs.1,00,00,000/- dated 24-12-2005 was issued by the Chairman cum Managing Director of Gas Suvidha Petrochemical Ltd., to M/s. Gas Suvidha Petrochemical
Ltd. It was an account payee cheque. The accused no. 2 and 3 said to have signed on this cheque."
[quoted from page Nos. 22 and 23 of the Writ Petition
Paper-book].
11.
It is then seen that on question of law, the
learned Sessions Judge has dealt with in para 8 about
the question of locus standi of the complainant to file
complaint against other Directors of a Company when the
complainant claims that he was still a Director of same
Company. The discussion in this regard as is seen in
paragraph 8 reads as follows:-
"8. It is further to be noted that there is no even averment in the complaint to point out that the complainant was authorised to file complaint. The cheque was issued in the name of the company. When the complainant himself branded as
one of the Director of the said Company, he could also be prima facie held liable to be arrayed as accused along with accused no.2 and 3. In what capacity the complainant could file complaint regarding the cheque which was account payee and was drawn in the name of said company of which complainant besides accused no. 2 and 3 being directors could file complaint is
neither made clear nor understandable. ....."
[quoted from page 24 of the writ petition paper-book]
12. Coming to the question of maintainability of
Revision Application, this Court finds that in the
judgments in cases of Adalat Prasad Vs. Rooplal Jindal
& ors. [supra] and Subramanium Sethuraman Vs. State of
Mah. & another [supra], the question before Hon'ble
Supreme Court about correctness of law laid down in
case of K.M. Mathew was relating to jurisdiction of the
Magistrate to recall the process.
13. What is laid down in case of Adalat Prasad has
been reiterated in case of Subramanium Sethuraman,
where attempt was made to persuade Hon'ble Supreme
Court that the procedure in a warrant case would be
different, which contention has been declined.
14. In case of V. K. Jain & ors. Vs. Pratap V.
Padode & another [supra], at paragraph 27, this Court
has in categoric terms held that a Revision Application
would lie against an order of issue of process in the
background of cases of Adalat Prasad and Subramanium
Sethuraman. Learned Advocate Mr. Shelat submits that,
while deciding V.K. Jain's case, contents of para 16 of
the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Adalat
Prasad are not properly considered by this Court. For
ready reference, Para 16 of case of Adlat Prasad is
quoted below:-
"16. It is true that if a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence, issues
process without there being any allegation against the accused or any material
implicating the accused or in contravention of provision of Sections 200 and 202, the order of the Magistrate may be vitiated, but then the relief an aggrieved accused
can obtain at that stage is not by invoking section 203 of the Code, because the Criminal Procedure Code does not contemplate a review of an order. Hence in the absence of any review power or inherent
power with the subordinate criminal Courts, the remedy lies in invoking section 482 of
Code."
Apart from para 16, it is not shown that any other
discussion or finding, rendered in Adalat Prasad's case
is not considered.
15. It is seen from paras 10 and 16 of V.K. Jain's
case that this Court has given due consideration and
has dealt with the dictum given in cases of Adalat
Prasad as well as Subramanium.
16. It is as vivid as illuminated in day light
that the question before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was
whether Mathew's case laid down a correct law. The
question was not as to whether in order to challenge an
order of issue of process, Revision Application under
Section 397 or 401 of Criminal Procedure Code would be
barred in contrast with jurisdiction of this Court
under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code.
17.
Learned Advocate for the petitioner wants this
Court to read between the lines and infer from para 16
of the judgment in case of Adalat Prasad and hold that
the order of issue of process is a holy cow and beyond
reach, except under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure
Code.
18. In case the submission of learned Advocate Mr.
Shelat is accepted, its essential fallout is to render
the jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 401 of Criminal
Procedure Code unavailable. This submission would
create a barrier on the revisional jurisdiction which
is not spelt out from the language of these Sections or
any precedent.
The submission that case of V.K. Jain does not
lay down law correctly is without any foundation, and
is rejected.
19. In so far as the judgment in case of Aneeta
Hada Vs. M/s. Godfather Travelrs & Tours Pvt. Ltd., is
concerned, this Court has noted from impugned judgment
that Revisional Court has not dismissed the complaint
on the ground that 'the Company was not made a party,'
though it was a case of dishonur of cheque issued by
and on behalf of Company.
20. The emphasis given by Sessions Court, while
dismissing the complaint is on the fact that cheque was
issued by the Company through Chairman with Director in
the name of the very Company, and has been dishonoured,
and this dishonour is being used by another Director of
the same Company.
21. Thus, the facts leading to dismissal of
complaint are drastically different. The question of
law involved in case of Aneeta Hada Vs. Godfather
Travels & Tours Pvt. Ltd. is not even remotedly
involved in the case.
22. By way of last limb of submission, learned
Advocate Mr. Shelat has argued that while holding that
the complaint is not maintainable, and on going into
factual details, the learned Sessions Judge has
actually stepped into enquiry of facts and merits of
the case.
the discussion, which
Upon testing this submission, it is seen that
has led to dismissal of case
pertains to the conclusions which ex facie emerge from
the tenor of cheque, and when on what prima facie
appears from the contents of complaint and documents
produced and if it reveals that allegations do not
conform to the bare description of offence, this type
of scrutiny does not amount to adjudication of facts.
This submission is raised without any factual
foundation for the ground urged.
23. In these premises, the petitioner has failed
to make out any case to show that the judgment of
Revisional Court was erroneous and rendered without
jurisdiction.
24. Revisional Court was, thus, within its bounds
and has not pre-judged the facts before trial, as
alleged. The Revisional Court has ruled on the facts
which were ex facie emerging and no formal proof of
fact of tenor of cheque was required, as the said
document was relied upon by complainant himself.
25. It is seen that the Court issuing process has
noted one after other dates material for Section 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act, and has only reckoned
the days of limitation.
26. The Magistrate has not touched the aspect
which could have occurred to the mind of the Judge by
bare perusal of the cheque that it was drawn by the
Company in its own name, was a crossed and Account
Payee cheque.
27. The order of issue of process, on the other
hand, reveals to be a product of total non-application
of mind.
28. The Magistrate could have noted that bare
perusal of cheque does not, in any manner, suggest that
it was issued in favour of the complainant. On this
ground alone as well, complaint was liable to be
dismissed.
29. In the premises discussed in the foregoing
paragraphs, it would be uncharitable to urge, much less
to hold, that the Revisional Court
overstepped or gone into appreciation of evidence and has either
pre-judged the issue before trial.
30. This Court is satisfied that the Revisional
Court has arrived at conclusions which optionlessly
fell from the facts on record and the Revision
Application has been rightly allowed.
31. In the circumstances, Writ Petition does not
merit interference, and Rule is discharged.
JUDGE
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