Bombay High Court
Dockyard Employees Union vs Mazgaon Dock Ltd. on 12 December, 2008
Bench: F.I. Rebello, R.S. Mohite
MGN
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.814 OF 2007
Dockyard Employees Union, )
18, P.J. Kamgar Sadan, )
Nawab Tank Road, Dockyard Road )
Mumbai-400 010. )..Petitioner
Vs.
1.Mazgaon Dock Ltd., )
Dockyard Road, Mazagaon, )
Mumbai-400 010. )
2.Rear Admiral Krishnan, )
Chairman & Managing Director )
Mazgaon Dock Ltd., )
Dockyard Road, Mazagaon, )
Mumbai-400 010. )
3.Mr. R. Dayal, )
General Manager, )
Mazgaon Dock Ltd.,
Dockyard Road, Mazagaon,
Mumbai-400 010.
ig )
)
)
4.Mazgaon Godi Kamgar Sanghatana)
C/o.F.M. Shinde, 79/1443, )
Ramja Nagar, Maharashtra )
Housing Board, Kandivali(E) )
Mum,bai-400 101 )..RESPONDENTS
Mr. Arshad Shaikh with Mr. R.M. Pethe, for the
Petitioner.
Mr. R.S. Pai i/b. Sanjay Udeshi & Co., for
Respondent Nos. 1 and 3.
Mrs. Gayatri Singh for Respondent No.4.
CORAM: F.I. REBELLO &
R.S.MOHITE, JJ.
DATED: 12th December, 2008
JUDGMENT (PER F.I. REBELLO, J.):
. Rule. Heard forthwith.
2. Petitioner is a Trade Union registered under
the provisions of the Trade Unions Act. It has
amongst its members workmen working with respondent
No.1, which is a State or other authority or
(-2-)
instrumentality within the meaning of Article 12 of
the Constitution of India and hence amenable to the
writ jurisdiction of this Court. Respondent Nos. 2
and 3 are sued in their capacity as Chairman and
Managing Director and General Manager of respondent
No.1. Respondent No.4 is the intervenor Union which
has also membership amongst workmen engaged by
respondent No.1. Since 10th February, 1992 pursuant
to cancellation of certificate of Recognition
granted to the Association of Engineering Workers,
there
is no recognised/representative union of the
workmen. The 1st Respondent in the year 1992 had
decided to form a bargaining Council consisting of
some management representative and two
representatives each, from the then four registered
trade unions for the purpose of resolving disputes
of their employees. Presently there are nine unions
on the bargaining Council.
3. The respondent company has entered into
various settlements under Section 2(p) read with
Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, in the
matter of various service conditions. One such
settlement was entered into on 17th September, 1998.
The unions had fulfilled their obligations under the
Memorandum of Settlement dated 17th September, 1998.
Pursuant to further negotiations settlements were
signed on 14th May, 2003, 8th July, 2003, 13th July,
(-3-)
2004, 19th October, 2004 and 20th October, 2005.
According to the petitioners their members have
accepted the settlements and have fulfilled their
obligation under each of the aforesaid settlements.
A promotion policy was formulated and which has been
amended from time to time resulting in what is known
as Promotion Rules. Under the promotion Rules, the
normal pre-requisite for promotion for the post of
Special Grade to the Post of Mistry, is that, the
incumbent should have three years confirmed service
in
Special Grade and the ratio of vacancy would be
1:20 on total strength of Skilled Grade I, Skill
Grade II, Highly Skilled and Special Grade and the
minimum average report as per A.A.Rs. for past
three years without any adverse remarks and with
good conduct and attendance.
3. Under the Settlement of 1998 and the
promotion policy there was a Special one time
concession for promotion from Special Grade to
Mistry and was applicable to those operatives who
were already in the Special Grade or promoted to
Special Grade as on 1st October, 2004. This
concession of waiver of mandatory service of three
years as Special Grade was made available till 30th
September, 2010. According to the petitioners
fifteen members of the Union became eligible and due
for promotion to the post of Mistry from the dates
(-4-)
ranging from 1st April, 2006 to 1st October, 2006
depending on the date on which they were confirmed
in the Special Grade and having completed six months
of probation period. The chart annexed to the
Petition show that out of 15 employees one was
confirmed on 1st February, 2006, seven were
confirmed in the Special Grade on 19th September,
2006, 3 were confirmed on 27th April, 2004 and four
were confirmed on 1st October, 2004. As there were
clear vacancies the Unions and the Bargaining
Council approached
ig the General Manager, seeking
implementation of the agreed terms relating to
promotion. Finally by letter dated 19th January,
2007 demanded to pass the orders of promotion
immediately. As the frequent requests and reminders
had no effect, the petitioners through their
Advocates served a notice on 5th March, 2007 to
promote the employees who were eligible. Though the
employees are eligible and there being clear
vacancies the respondents have withheld
intentionally the promotion of their members to
enable others to supersede their members. Persons
who have superseded, it is submitted, are those who
had not sent the declaration accepting the
settlement and have thereafter pursuant to
opposition accepted the same. According to the
petitioners only the fifteen members set out in the
list are eligible for promotion and the present
(-5-)
petition has been filed as raising industrial
dispute is not an equally efficacious remedy and,
therefore,, the reliefs as prayed.
5. Reply has been filed on behalf of respondent
Nos. 1 to 3. The following preliminary objections
have been raised.
(a) The petitioners union represents the workmen
of the 1st respondent company who are covered by the
provisions of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(hereinafter referred to as the I.D.Act). The
subject matter involved relates to alleged claim of
promotion of employees referred to in Exhibit "C".
This is a dispute falling within the purview of the
I.D.Act. As the petitioners have alternative
remedy, hence petition is not maintainable.
(b) The petitioners have allegedly raised a
dispute with regard to the promotion of those
workmen to the post of Mistry disregarding their
seniority. The claim for promotion is contrary to
settlement dated 20th October, 2005, award dated 7th
October, 2006 in Reference (IT) No.61 of 2004 and
the minutes of the meeting dated 6th March, 2007.
The petition as filed is not maintainable.
(c) The petitioner union has not impleaded the
(-6-)
affected workmen who were promoted to the post of
Mistry in accordance with the provisions of the
settlement dated 20th October, 2005 and Award dated
7th October, 2006 and the minutes of the meeting
dated 6th March, 2007. On this ground also the
petition is liable to be dismissed.
(d). As per the minutes of the meeting held on
6th March, 2007 all the unions have agreed that
while effecting promotions to the employees under
the settlement,
seniority of the employees should
not be adversely affected. In the circumstances the
promotion of the employees in Special Grade to the
post of Mistry is required to be considered along
with the seniority of the eligible employees.
Further to the settlement of 17th September, 1998
between the respondent No.1 and the Unions there
have been subsequent settlements in respect of
promotion policy, etc. The last being on 20th
October, 2005. In terms of Clause 6 of the
settlement dated 20th October, 2005 all the Unions
have agreed for amendment of the promotion policy as
set out in Appendix-II to the settlement. The said
settlement dated 20th October, 2005 stood modified
by Award dated 7th October, 2006 in Reference (IT)
No.61 of 2004 and the minutes of the meeting dated
16th March, 2007. Clause 6 of the settlement reads
as under:-
(-7-)
"The promotion of employees shall continue
to be governed as per the Promotion Rules of
the MOS dated 14th May, 2003 as amended
thereunder on 8th July, 2003 and 19th
October, 2004 and as further amended now as
addendum to Appendix-II to this MOS.
Management shall consider release of
additional vacancies as necessary in respect
of ratio-based posts in consultation with
signatory Unions."
6. According to the management the Union cannot
seek promotion of the workmen as Mistry disregarding
seniority in Special Grade. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3
have specifically denied that the employees referred
to in Exhibit "C" are entitled to get automatic
promotion from the dates referred to in Exhibit "C".
6. From the averments in the pleadings and the
contentions raised, we will first have to deal with
the following issues:-
(i) Whether a Writ Petition is maintainable at
the instance of a Union in respect of conditions of
service of their employees pursuant to settlements
under Section 2(p) and 18 of the I.D. Act, 1947?
(-8-)
(ii) If the dispute partakes of an industrial
dispute, can the Union without taking recourse to
the remedy under the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, invoke the extra ordinary
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 in
respect of individual rights of its members?
(iii) Can the reliefs prayed for be granted in the
absence of those workmen who have already been
promoted and occupying the posts in respect of which
posts the
petitioners are claiming promotion for
their members.
(iv) On merits have the petitioners made out any
case, if the petition is otherwise maintainable to
get the reliefs as prayed for.
7. We proceed to answer the first issue. The
petitioner is a registered union having the right to
sue or being sued. It seeks to sue the respondent
Nos. 1 to 3 for the purported violation of the
promotion policy pursuant to the settlements dated
17th October, 1998 and further settlements. The
last settlement was entered into on 20th October,
2005. Can the petitioner, not being a citizen,
contend that its fundamental rights or the
fundamental rights of its members having been
violated, they can maintain this Petition. Workmen
(-9-)
who are affected by the non-promotion are not
parties to the petition? The promotion policy does
not affect any of the fundamental rights of its
members under Article 19; it may still be possible
to contend that based on the averments that the
action of the Respondents is violative of Article 14
of the Constitution of India. The rights, if any,
created by the settlement or promotion policy are
not statutory rights, but conditions of service
binding on Respondent No.1 pursuant to a settlement.
Conditions of
service may be contained in the
certified standing orders applicable to respondent
No.1 establishment or if not certified, the model
standing orders as also by settlements or awards.
If the Respondent No.1, which is a State has laid
down a procedure under which its workmen are
eligible to be considered for promotion, the
Respondent No.1 cannot depart from that procedure.
Rights created by a settlement are enforceable. The
petitioners, therefore, could have brought the
petition under Article 226 as a collective body, for
enforcing the rights of its members. The rights
claimed are not the rights of the Union but a right
which each member of the union would have, for
non-consideration for promotion to the post of
Mistry.
8. In this context let us examine the position
(-10-)
of law. We may point out that the learned Counsel
for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment in
D.S.Veer Ranji vs. Ciba Speciality Chemicals (I)
Ltd. and Ors., 2002 I CLR 267 to contend that the
petition against the respondent No.1 would be
maintainable. In our opinion the judgment of the
Full Bench in D.S. Veer Ranji (supra) clearly does
not answer the issue raised here. The issue there
was in respect of companies which were private
limited companies not falling under the expression
'State' or
other instrumentality. The issue was
whether a writ could go to such a company. That was
the issue answered in those petitions.
. In Gadde Venkateswara Rao vs. Government of
Andhra Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1966 S.C. 828 the
Supreme Court was considering the issue as to
whether the petitioner therein had a locus standi to
maintain the petition. The issue there was whether
the petitioner who was a member of the Trust could
maintain the petition. The Court held that the
personal right need not be in respect of a
proprietary interest. It can also relate to an
interest as a trustee and as such the petitioner had
locus standi to maintain the petition.
. Answering the issue the Court held that
Article 226 of the Constitution confers a very wide
(-11-)
power on the High Court to issue directions and
writs of the nature mentioned therein for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part
III or for any other purpose. Apart from persons
claiming under a fundamental right others who claim
any other rights can also approach the Court seeking
exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction. The
article does not describe the class of persons
entitled to apply, but it is implicit in the
exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction, that
the
relief asked for must be one to enforce a legal
right. The right that can be enforced under Article
226 ordinarily, has to be personal or individual
right of the petitioner himself, though in the case
of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo
warranto this rule may have to be relaxed or
modified.
. In Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs. Roshan Kumar
Haji Bashir Ahmed & Ors., (19076) 1 SCC 671, the
petitioner a rival in the trade sought a writ of
certiorari to quash the license granted to his rival
on the ground that it suffered from defect of
jurisdiction. After analysing the law, the Court
held, that in order to have locus standi to invoke
the extra ordinary jurisdiction, an applicant should
ordinarily be one who has a personal or individual
right in the subject-matter of the application. As
(-12-)
a general rule, infringement of some legal right or
prejudice to some legal interest inhering in the
petitioner is necessary to give him locus standi in
the matter. The expression "ordinary" would
indicate that this is not a cast-iron rule. It is
flexible enough to take in those cases where the
applicant has been prejudicially affected by an act
or omission of an authority, even though such
applicant has no proprietary or even a fiduciary
interest in the subject-matter. That apart, in
exceptional cases
ig even a stranger or a person who
was not a party to the proceedings before the
authority, but has a substantial and genuine
interest in the subject-matter of the proceedings
will be covered by this rule. In so far as the writ
of certiorari is concerned, the Court categorised
the applicants in the context of locus standi (i)
'person aggrieved'; (ii) 'stranger'; (iii)
'busybody or meddlesome interloper. The Court held
that in case of a busybody or meddlesome interloper
petitions at their instance should not be
entertained. The distinction between the other two
categories of applicants, though real, is not always
well-demarcated. In the category of persons
aggrieved would fall in two concentric zones; a
solid central zone of certainty, and a grey outer
circle of lessening certainty in sliding centrifugal
scale, with an outermost nebulous fringe or
(-13-)
uncertainty. Applicants falling within the central
zone are those whose legal rights have been
infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the
category of 'persons aggrieved'. All persons in the
outer zone may not be 'persons aggrieved'.
9. On behalf of the petitioner learned Counsel
drew our attention to the observations in The Mumbai
Kamgar Sabha vs. M/s.Abdulbhai Faizullabhai and
ors., AIR 1996 SC 1455. The Court held that when
the Union files a petition it represents the workmen
a collective noun, as it were, the numerous humans
whose presence is indubitable in the contest, though
formally invisible on the party array. These
observations were made in the context of an order in
a reference pertaining to bonus which was espoused
by the Union. It is in that context that the Court
said that it is enough from the facts of this case
for the Court to take the Union as an akin for the
totality of the workmen involved in the dispute.
Applying the ratio of the judgment in Mumbai Kamgar
Sabha (supra) the petitioner is no stranger as it
had entered into a settlement with Respondent No.1
and to that extent would be a person aggrieved if
the promotion policy is not followed.
10. The question of locus standi will have
therefore, to be considered on the touchstone of the
(-14-)
issue before the Court as to whether the union is
aggrieved by the action of the employer. This must
result in enquiring whether the rights of the
workmen are affected which are based on a settlement
or promotion policy which the union as the
bargaining agent on behalf of its member can pursue.
In such matters it must be held that the Union is no
stranger. it is a person interested or aggrieved
and can invoke the extra ordinary jurisdiction on
behalf of its members, if the duty cast on
Respondent
No.1 is public or statutory duties. The
duty to the public must flow from the statute,
prerogative common law, charter, custom or even
contract. Mandamus is available remedy whenever
there be injustice by violating public duty by any
person or body. The Court then must reach out, to
undo it or for doing justice. The petitioner,
therefore, can maintain the petition.
11. Is the issue raised an industrial dispute
and as such not open to the Union to invoke the
extra ordinary remedy as it has alternative and
efficacious remedy under the I.D.Act 1947. The
petitioners have approached this Court on the basis
that there exists a settlement and a promotion
policy under which their members are entitled to be
promoted. The respondent employer has raised a
contention that the promotion policy has been
(-15-)
amended by subsequent settlements and joint
discussions between all unions including the
petitioners. Can, therefore, the Union be precluded
from maintaining the petition, on the ground that
there are remedies available under the Industrial
Dispute Act. The issue as to whether a Union could
maintain a petition in the matter of service
conditions of employees came up for consideration
before the Supreme Court in U.P. State Bridge
Corporation Ltd. & Ors. vs. U.P. Rajya Setu
Nigam S.
Karamchari Sangh, (2004) 4 S.C.C.268.
S.C.C.268
Workers were dismissed due to unauthorised absence.
A writ petition filed by a worker was dismissed with
the direction to raise an industrial dispute. A
second Writ Petition was filed by Respondent Union
which was allowed and the order of termination
quashed. The Division Bench upheld the judgment of
the single Judge. In Appeal preferred before the
Apex Court the orders of the High Court were set
aside. While considering whether the Writ Petition
would be maintainable, the Court noted that the
rights and obligations sought to be enforced by the
Respondent Union in the Writ Petition are those
created by the Industrial Disputes Act. Reliance
was placed in the judgment in Premier Automobiles
Ltd. v. Kemlekar Shantaram Wadke, 1976 (1)
S.C.R.427. The Supreme Court noted that though the
observations in Premier Automobiles Ltd. (supra)
(-16-)
were in the context of jurisdiction of the Civil
Court, nevertheless it would need a very strong case
indeed, for the High Court to deviate from the
principle, that where a specific remedy is given by
the statute, the person who insists upon such remedy
can avail of the process as provided in that statute
and in no other manner. The Court considered the
observation in D.K.Yadav vs. J.M.A. Industries
1993 (3) S.C.C. 259. Certified Standing Orders
have been held to constitute statutory conditions of
service, though the Certified Standing Orders do not
constitute "Statutory Provisions" in the sense that
dismissal or removal of an employee in contravention
of the certified standing orders would not be a
contravention of statutory provisions enabling the
workman to file a writ petition for their
enforcement placing reliance on Rajasthan Transport
Corporation & Anr. vs. Krishna Kant & Ors., 1995
(5) SCC 75. Thus standing orders and/or settlements
by themselves would not constitute statutory
provisions, violation of which would enable the
union to approach this Court on the ground of breach
of statutory conditions of service. It is in the
context that the Court held that the petitioner
union must first raise an industrial dispute and the
extra ordinary jurisdiction was not the appropriate
remedy.
(-17-)
12. This judgment came up for consideration in
U.P.State Spinning Co. Ltd. vs. R.S.Pandey &
Anr., (2005) 8 SCC 264.
264 The Court noted that there
are two well recognised exceptions to the doctrine
of exhaustion of statutory remedies. First is when,
the proceedings are taken before a forum under a
provision of law which is ultra vires, it is open to
a party aggrieved thereby, to move the High Court
for quashing the proceedings, on the ground that
they are incompetent without a party being obliged
to wait until
those proceedings run their full
course. Secondly, the doctrine has no application
when the impugned order has been made in violation
of the principles of natural justice. The Court
then added that when the proceedings themselves are
an abuse of process of law, the High Court in an
appropriate case can entertain a writ petition.
13. If, therefore, a dispute pertains to an
industrial dispute or individual dispute and where
statutory remedy is available under the I.D. Act,
unless there be exceptional circumstances the writ
jurisdiction ordinarily cannot be invoked. On the
facts, in the instant case, there are disputes as to
the promotion policy itself based on which the
members of the petitioner union con claim right to
be considered for promotion. In that context in our
opinion in so far as the Union is concerned as they
(-18-)
have a remedy of raising an industrial dispute or if
there be a breach of settlement of invoking the
remedy under the provisions of the I.D.Act, the Writ
Petition as filed would not be maintainable and on
this count the petition is liable to be dismissed.
. We, however, make it clear that if
individual rights of an employee have been affected
on account of non-promotion even if the settlement
cannot be considered as statutory, a petition
against a
State or other authority could still be
entertained if otherwise their rights have been
infringed. The respondent No.1 would be bound to
follow the settlement or promotion policy pertaining
to conditions of service as a public authority.
Failure to comply or acting contrary would give a
workman the right to move this Court to contend that
the action of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 is arbitrary
being in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India. Consequently a petition at the instance
of a workmen could still be maintainable. We do not
foreclose such a petition, if filed and that can be
decided on its own merits.
14. It is alleged that workmen who are not
entitled have been promoted to the exclusion of
those who had the right to be considered. In such a
case the petitioner ought to have joined all those
(-19-)
persons as parties, who are already promoted, to
which posts the petitioners claim on behalf of its
members of such persons right is bound to be
affected if this Court allows the petition. Such
persons would be necessary parties to the petition.
In the absence of their joinder, the petition will
be liable to be dismissed considering the reliefs as
prayed for. If the reliefs sought would have been
granted, it would have resulted in persons who are
not before the Court having to suffer the
consequences of
an adverse order of this Court
without having an opportunity of being heard. In
our opinion on this count also the petition is
liable to be dismissed.
15. Let us examine some factual aspects of the
matter. In terms of Clause 23 of the Settlement
dated 17th September, 1998 entered into, for skilled
and above category, the promotion policy was to be
evolved under Clause 23 separately covering all the
employees within a period of six months from the
date of signing of the settlement. The promotion
policy have since been formulated. Under the
promotion policy there is a provision for special
one time concession for various posts. There is a
concession for promotion from skilled Grade II to
highly skilled, from special grade to Mistry. We
may reproduce this special one time concession for
(-20-)
Mistry which reads as under:-
SPECIAL ONE TIME CONCESSION FOR PROMOTION
FROM SPECIAL GRADE TO MISTRY:
APPLICABLE TO THOSE OPERATIVES WHO ARE
ALREADY IN SPECIAL GRADE OR ARE PROMOTED TO
SPECIAL GRADE AS ON 1ST OCTOBER, 2004.
(a) Those operatives who are in Special Grade and
have signed the
igUndertakings prior to 30th
September, 2004 will be considered for promotion to
the Grade of Mistry on 1st October, 2004, provided
that they meet the following criteria:
months probation time,
(ii) They are in the zone for promotion as
per the Seniority criteria of the Revised
Promotion Rules.
(iii) They have fulfilled all other criteria
of the revised Promotion Rules.
(iv) A clear vacancy exists as per the ratio
applicable to day i.e. 1:20.
(-21-)
(b) Those Operatives who sign the undertaking on 1st
October, 2004 and prior to or on 16th November, 2004
and are promoted to Special Grade on 1st October,
2004 will be considered for promotion of Mistry on
1st April, 2005, provided that prior to promotion,
they meet the following criteria:-
(i) Completed 6 months probation time in
Special Grade.
(ii)
Fulfilled all other criteria as per
Revised Promotion Rules.
(iii) They are in the zone of promotion as
per the Seniority criteria of the Revised
Promotion Rules.
(iv) A clear vacancy exists as per the ratio
applicable to day i.e. 1:20.
(c) For such operatives, at para.(b) above the post
of Mistry will be kept vacant till 1st April, 2005
from the vacancies as calculated at para.(a) and (b)
above. (d) For promotions effected on or after 1st
October, 2005 to Mistry and Chargehands posts, Ratio
for calculating vacancy for promotion to Mistries
and Chargehands posts will become 1:15 and 1:45
respectively with effect from 1st October, 2005,
(-22-)
subject to satisfactory implementation of Multi
Trade and Production Norms Rules.
(e) This concession of waiver of mandatory
service of 3 years as Special Grade will be
available only till 30th September, 2010."
. Thus it would be clear that in terms of this
Special Concession, the Operatives already in
Special Grade or are promoted to Special Grade as on
1st October, 2004 would be entitled to the Special
One
Time Concession as set out above. It is not as
if others holding the post of Special Grade are not
entitled for promotion, only that they will be
covered by clause (d). Clause (e) merely sets out
that the concession of waiver of mandatory service
of three years as special grade will be available
only till 30th September, 2010. In respect of
employees who were eligible for the one time
concession if they could not be accommodated on the
post of Mistry in the absence of a vacancy being
available, they can be considered for promoted upto
30th September, 2010. It does not mean that those
who had not filed undertaking as set out therein
were not entitled for the one time concession.
Concession would be restricted to those who had
filed undertaking. Even this promotion policy in
terms of the reply filed by the employer company was
modified by subsequent settlement dated 20th
(-23-)
October, 2005. At the instance of one of the
Unions, respondent No.3 herein, there was a
reference which was numbered as I.T. No.61 of 2004.
This reference came to be disposed of in terms of
the pursis Exhibit U-1 and an award came to be
passed. The said pursis was basically placing on
record the settlement of 28th September, 2006 which
contained the promotion policy as modified. That
promotion policy now would be governed by the
provisions of the Award in terms of the settlement.
Considering
these aspects in our opinion even on
merits at the instance of the Union it would not be
possible to grant the reliefs as prayed for. We
make it clear that dismissal of this petition will
not stand in the way of the Union raising an
industrial dispute if so advised.
16. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits
that some of their members have already been
promoted. We make it clear that as we have not gone
into the individual cases and if promotion has
already been affected, disposal of this petition
would not affect promotions already made if in law
they could be made.
17. In the light of the above, Rule discharged.
There shall be no order as to costs.
(-24-)
(R.S.MOHITE, J.) (F.I.REBELLO, J.)
