Laxminarayan S/O Narayandas Jaju vs State Of Maharashtra
2002 Latest Caselaw 782 Bom

JUDGMENT

S.A. Bobde, J.

1. This petition challenges exercise of suo motu powers by the State Government under Section 45 of The Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, (the Act, for short). The only issue which needs determination is : whether the State Government has exercised the powers conferred on it by Section 45 of the Act, within the prescribed period of three years, as contemplated in Section 45 of the Act. Section 45 of the Act, reads as follows :

"(1) In all matters connected with this Act, the State Government shall have the same authority and control over the officers authorised under Section 27, the Collectors and the Commissioners acting under this Act, as they do in the general and revenue administration. (2) The State Government may, suo motu or on an application made to it by the aggrieved person, at any time, call for the record of any inquiry or proceedings under sections 17 to 21 (both inclusive) for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any inquiry or proceedings (or any part thereof) under those sections and may pass such order thereon as it deems fit, after giving the party a reasonable opportunity of being heard;

Provided that, nothing in this sub-section shall entitle the State Government to call for the record of any inquiry or proceedings of a declaration or part thereof under Section 21 in relation to any land, unless an appeal against any such declaration or part thereof has not been filed within the period provided for it and a period of three years from the date of such declaration or part thereof has not elapsed.

Provided further that, no order shall be passed under this section so as to affect any land which is already declared surplus and distributed according to the provisions of this Act;

Provided also that the revisional jurisdiction under this section shall be exercised only where it is alleged that the land declared surplus is less than the actual land which could be declared surplus.

(3) The State Government may, subject to such restrictions and conditions as it may impose by notification in the Official Gazette, delegate to the Commission the power conferred on it by Sub-section (2) of this section or under any other provisions of this Act except the power to make rules under Section 46 or to make an order under Section 49".

2. There is no dispute about the fact that the period of limitation is liable to be reckoned from 31-10-1984. It is on that date that the Surplus Land Determination Tribunal, Babulgaon, after a remand, excluded the shares of the major sons of the petitioner to the extent of 46.14 acres and further excluded 12.38 acres as pot kharab land and came to the conclusion that the petitioner holds 66.38 acres. In view of the fact that the surplus, land held by the petitioner was 2.24 acres, the S.L.D.T. has dropped the proceedings since this piece of land would have amounted to a fragment.

3. Thereafter, in Revision, the Additional Commissioner, Amravati Division, issued suo motu notices under Section 45 of the Act. The question is whether the Additional Commissioner, Amravati Division, Amravali, has exercised the powers under Section 45 of the Act within a period of three years from the date of declaration or part thereof, i.e. from 31-10-1984.

4. The petitioner, in paragraph 4 of the petition, has raised the question of limitation. He had also raised this question in reply by way of preliminary objection that were filed before the Additional Commissioner, Amravati on 11-12-1987.

5. Mr. Mohta, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the date, on which the Additional Commissioner exercised the powers under Section 45 of the Act must be taken to be the date on which notice was issued to the petitioner. According to the petitioner, the said notice, at Annexure-B of the petition, was issued on 2-11-1987. This is admitted by the respondent in the affidavit of the Tahsildar, S.L.D.T., Babhulgaon, who has stated that suo motu proceedings under Section 45(2) of the Act, have been initiated by issuing the notice to the landlord on 2-11-1987. Thus, according to the Tahsildar, the suo motu proceedings were initiated by issuance of the notice to the landlord on 2-41-1987 and not on any other date.

6. Mr. Deopujari, learned A.G.P. for the respondent submitted that the Tahsildar has also stated in his affidavit that the contention of issuance of suo motu notice, was recorded in the record, on 27-10-1987 and that should be taken to be the date on which the suo motu proceedings were initiated. This contention is not acceptable. The decision to initiate suo motu proceedings must be distinguished from initiation of the suo motu proceedings. The later has obviously been done on 2-11-1987 and not on earlier date. The date 2-11-1987 being beyond the period of three years from 31-10-1984, the proposed initiation of suo motu proceedings under Section 45 of the Act, in the present case, must be held to be barred by Section 45 of the Act.

7. In this view of the matter, the petition is, therefore, allowed in terms of prayer Clause (A) of the petition, with no order as to costs.