Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati

Puvvala Rama Mohan Rao vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh, on 9 July, 2024

:«4
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

TUESDAY, THE NINTH DAY OF JULY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
AND

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NYAPATHY VIJAY

WRIT PETITION NO: 35103 OF 2018

Between:

Puvvala Rama Mohan Rao, S/o Laxmi Kanthaiah aged about 6S years, Oca
Sub-Registrar Graded-li Allur, Retired, H.No., 13-1-367/9, Near Saibaba

Temple Street, Srinivasa Nagar, Narsaraopet, Guntur District.

...PETITIONER

AND

1.
The State of Andhra Pradesh, rep. by its Principal Secretary, Revenue
(Vig.VI) Department, Secretariat, Velagapudi, Amaravati, Guntur
District.

2. The State of Andhra Pradesh, rep. by its Special Chief Secretary,
Revenue (Vigilance-ll) Department Secretariat, Velagapudi, Amaravati;
Guntur District.

3.
The Commissioner and Inspector General of Registration and Stamps
Department, Andhra Pradesh Vijayawada, Krishna District.
0
4. The Director and Inspector General of Registration and Stamps,
' Vijayawada, Krishna Distript.

li
5. the Deputy Inspector General of Registration and Stamps, Nellore.
Ve'rli

.6/ The-District Registrar (MV and Audit), Nellore.

...RESPONDENTS

Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in
the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may

be pleased to issue an appropriate Writ, Order or Direction more

particularly one in the nature of Writ of Certiorari, to call for the records
relating to the impugned order passed in O.A.No. 6769 of 2015 dt. 18-12-

2017 on the file of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal at

Hyderabad, and quash the same, and consequently set aside the order
passed by the 2nd respondent in Memo No. 279085A/ig.ll(2)/2012-B dt. 28-
5-2015 confirming the orders passed by the 1st respondent in G.O.Ms.No.
104 dt. 15-2-2013.

Counsel for the Petitioner(s): SRI. R GOPI MOHAN

Counsel for the Respondents 1 to 6 : SRI SRINIVAS, AGP FOR
SERVICES I

Counsel for the Respondents : GP FOR REGISTRATION AND STAMPS

The Court made the following: ORDER
■ , li 'iiiSi-'-

*HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
AND
*HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NYAPATHY VIJAY

+WRIT PETITION. No.35103 OF 2018
%09.07.2024

#1. Puwala Rama Mohan Rao
S/o, Laxmi Kanthaiah,
Aged about 63 years,
Occ: Sub-Registrar
Graded-II, Allur,
Retired H.No.,13-1-367/9,
Near Saibaba Temple Street,
Srinivasa Nagar,
Narsaraopet,
Guntur District.

Petitioner
And:
$1. The State of Andhra Pradesh,
rep. by its Principal Secretary,
Revenue (Vig. VI)
Department, Secretariat,
Velagapudi, Amaravati,
Guntur District and others.
....Respondents.

ICounsel for the petitioner : Sri R. Gopi Mohan
^Counsel for the respondents : Sri Srinivas, learned Assistant
Government Pleader for Services-I
for the respondents

<Gist:
>Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1. (2003) 4 see 364
2, (1995) 6 sec 749
3. (2022) 1 sec 373
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
AND
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NYAPATHY VIJAY
WRIT PETITION. No.35103 OF 2018

1. Puwala Rama Mohan Rao
S/o. Laxmi Kanthaiah,
Aged about 63 years,
Occ: Sub-Registrar
Graded-II, Allur,
Retired H.No.,13-l-367/9>
Near Saibaba Temple Street,
Srinivasa Nagar,
Narsaraopet,
Guntur District.

Petitioner

And: I
1. The State of Andhra Pradesh,
rep. by its Principal Secretary,
Revenue (Vig. VI)
Department, Secretariat,
Velagapudi, Amaravati,
Guntur District and others.
..../Respondents.

DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 09.07.2024.
APHC010178692018

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3470]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)

TUESDAY ,THE NINTH DAY OF JULY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR
PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARl
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NYAPATHY VIJAY
WRIT PETITION NO: 35103/2018
Between:

Puvvala Rama Mohan Rao ...PETITIONER

AND

The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Petitioner:

1.RGOPI MOHAN

Counsel for the RespondentfS):
1.GP FOR REGISTRATION AND STAMPS (AP)
2.GP FOR SERVICES I (AP)
The Court made the following order; (perHon'ble Sri Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari)

Heard Sri R. Gopi Mohan, learned counsel for the petitioner appearing
through virtual mode and Sri Srinivas, learned Assistant Government Pleader
for Services-I for the respondents.

2. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has
been filed challenging the order dated 18.12.2017 passed in O.A.No.6769 of
2015, by which the A.P Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad (in short, the
Tribunal) has dismissed the present petitioner's O.A.
2

3. The petitioner retired from service as Sub-Registrar Grade-11
while working at Aliur of Sri Potti Sreeramulu Nellore District on 31.10,2010 on
attaining the age of superannuation.

4. Before retirement the petitioner was issued with the charge memo
dated 25.01.2010 by the Deputy Inspector General of Registration and
Stamps, Nellore. The charges read as under;-
"Charqe-I:-

That Sri P Ramamohan Rao, Sub-Registrar, Allur formerly Joint Sub-
Registrar-ll Registrar Office (O.B), Nellore while discharging the
duties p Joint Sub Registrar-ll, Registrar Office (O.B), Nellore had
committed a grave misconduct, by deliberately Registering 44
Documents by violating the Market Value Guidelines and adopting in
AudTRpl^frt Documents as remarked in the internal
Audit Report Numbers 11, 28, 46 and 79 of 2008 and 1 and 36 of
2009 causing huge loss of revenue of Rs.9,19,870/- to the
. „

Government excheguer, thereby violating Departmental instructions
and contravened Rule 3 of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (CC&A)
Rules, 1964.

Thus, Sri P.Ramamohan Rao, Sub Registrar, Allur while
discharging duties as Joint Sub Registrar-ll, Registrar Office (OB)
Nellore by his above mentioned Acts has exhibited lack of integrity
devotion to duty and conduct unbecoming of a Public Servant and
thereby contravened Rule-3 of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (CC&A)
Rules, 1974.
Charge No-ll

ip H Rao, Sub Registrar, Allur while discharging
the duties as Joint Sub Registrar-ll, Registrar Office (O.B) Nellore had
committed a grave misconduct by deliberately registering the
Government Lands as remarked in the Internal Audit Report Nos 46
and 79 of 2008 and 1 and 36 of 2009 at Registrar Office (O.B), Nellore
by colluding with the parties by violating the Section 22-A of
Kegistration Act and instructions in Circular Memos Nos G1/38719/93
dated 13.07.1995 and Memo No.G 1/15653/06, dated 13 11 2006
wunout obtaining the Mandal Revenue Officers No Objection
Certificates/without duly confirm the same by the District Collectors
concerned, with ulterior motive registered the Government Lands and
thereby contravened Rule-3 of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services
(Conduct) Rules. 1964."
'•I-

5. The District Registrar, Nellore was appointed as Enquiry Officer.
He submitted the enquiry report on 08.12.2011, after making enquiry. The
copy of the enquiry report was supplied to the petitioner and the petitioner filed
his representation/written statement. Thereafter, the Deputy Inspector General
of Registration and Stamps submitted report to the Government for taking
necessary action, as the applicant had retired from service in the meantime,
the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.104 Revenue (VIG.VI) Department, dated
15.02.2013 imposing penalty of withholding of 100% pension permanently,
besides recovery of loss of revenue of Rs.9,19,870/- to the Government
exchequer. The punishment was imposed after consultation with the Andhra
Pradesh Public Service Commission.

6. The petitioner filed the revision upon which the Government vide
G.O.Rt.No.1108 Revenue (vig.ll) Department dated 08.12.20t4 modified the
punishment to the extent of recovery which was limited to Rs. 1,45,580/-
instead of Rs.9,19,870/-. The punishment of 100% cut in pension was
confirmed. The petitioner's review petition was also rejected on 28.05.2015.

7. Challenging the order dated 28.05.2015, the petitioner filed
O.A.No.6769 of 2015 before the Tribunal which has been dismissed by the
order dated 18.12.2017 impugned in the writ petition.
8.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was
not afforded any opportunity of hearing before imposing the punishment of
100% cut in pension. In this regard, he has referred to Ex.P4, letter
No.AI/5/2010, dated 14.03.2012, and referring to Para No;9 thereof he
contends that the proposed punishment therein was 5% cut in pension for a
period of 5 years, under Rule 9 (2) (a) of Andhra Pradesh Revised Pension
Rules, 1980, but instead of the punishment as proposed, the order of
punishment of 100% cut in pension was passed for which no opportunity of
hearing was afforded.
4

9. Learned Assistant Governrrient Pleader submits that against the
proposed punishment of 100% cut in pension, the petitioner was issued a
show cause notice dated 13.07.2012 granting the petitioner opportunity to file
response and the petitioner also filed the response. After considering the
petitioner's response the order of punishment was passed.
10. The petitioner has not annexed the copy of the memo dated
13.07.2012 by which opportunity was afforded to him to show cause with
respect to the proposed punishment of 100% cut in pension'. However, the
same has been brought on record' by the counter affidavit.

11.
A perusal of the memo dated 13.07.2012 shows, in paragraph
Nos.5 and 6 thereof that, the proposed punishment was withholding of 100%
pension permanently, besides recovery. It further shows that the petitioner
was issued the show cause notice' Those paragraphs read as under:-
5. Government have examined' the final Written Statement of
Defence of the Charged Officer in the light of the findings of the
Regular Enquiry Officer and therefore Government have
provisionally decided to impose a penalty of withholding of 100%
pension permanently besides recovery of huge loss of revenue of
Rs.9,19,870/- to the Government exchequer, against Sri
P.Ramamohan Rao, Sub Registrar Grade-11 (Retired) under Rule 9 of
Andhra Pradesh Revised Pension Rules, 1980.
6.
Sri P.Ramamohan Rao, Sub Registrar Grade^ll (Retired) Is,
therefore, directed to show cause as to why a penalty of
withholding of 100% pension perrhanently besides recovery of
huge loss of revenue of Rs.9,19,870/- to the Government
exchequer should not be imposed on him for the above said
lapses within (15) days from the date of receipt of this memo. He is
also informed that if no reply is received within the stipulated time of
15 days, it will be construed that he has no explanation to offer and.
further action will be taken based on the material available without any
notice. A copy of Regular Enquiry Officer report-is enclosed herewith."

12. The order of punishment dated 15.02.2013 also makes reference
of the proposed punishment of 100% cut in pension as also the opportunity
afforded to the petitioner and the response to the show cause notice filed by
the petitioner.
ii

m
13. In view of the above, the submission of the learned counsel for
the petitioner that the order of 100% cut in pension has been passed in
violation of the principles of natural justice is contrary to record and being
misconceived is rejected.

14.
Both the charges against the petitioner have been proved in
departmental enquiry. In the exercise of the writ jurisdiction we do not find
any scope of interference with those finding, as nothing has been brought on
record nor argued that those findings suffer from perversity or illegality or on
any of the grounds on which judicial review may be permissible.

15. In B. C. Chaturvedi (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held that
the Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate
authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent
findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority
held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent
with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the
mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary
authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no
reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere
with the condusion or the finding.

16. Para No. 12 of B. C. Chaturvedi (supra) reads as under:-

12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of
the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is
meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to
ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily
correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on
charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is
concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent
officer or whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or
whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the
findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority
entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and
authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must
be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence
Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to
disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and
A

conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is
entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The
Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate
authority to re- appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own
independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may
interfere where the authority held the proceedings, against the ■
delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural
justice or in violation of statutory rujes prescribing the mode of inquiry
or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority
is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no
reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may
interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as
to make it appropriate to the facts of each case."
17. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submits that the

punishment is disproportionate to the proved charges.
18. In Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial
Bank and others vs. P.C.Kakkar\ the Honble Apex Court on the point of
proportionality in administrative law after summarizing the position observed
and held' that unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or
the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal, there is
no scope for interference: It was further observed that to shorten the litigation,

it may in exceptional and rare cases impose appropriate punishment by
recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In the normal course if the

punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would, be appropriate to
direct the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the
penalty imposed. The Hon'ble Apex Court further observed that a Court feels
that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, it must record reasons for
coming to such a conclusion. Mere expression that the punishment is
shockingly disproportionate would not meet the requirement of law.
19.
It is apt to refer Paragraph Nos. 10 to. 14 of Chairman (supra) as
under:-

10.
In Union of India and Anr. vs. G. Ganayutham, this Court
sunimed up the position relating to proportionality in paragraphs 31'
and 32, which read as follows: (SCC pp. 478-80, paras 31-32)

^ (2003) 4 SCC 364
7

"31. The current position of proportionality in administrative law in
England and India can be summarized as follows:

(1) To judge the validity of any administrative order or statutory
discretion, normally the Wednesbury test is to be applied to find out if
the decision was illegal or suffered from procedural improprieties or
was one which no sensible decision-maker could, on the material
before him and within the framework of the law, have arrived at. The
court would consider whether relevant matters had not been taken into
account or whether irrelevant matters had been taken into account or
whether the action was not bona fide. The court would also consider
whether the decision was absurd or perverse. The court would not
however go into the correctness of the choice made by the
administrator amongst the various alternatives open to him. Nor could
the court substitute its decision to that of the administrator This is the
Wednesbury test.
(2) The court would not interfere with the administrator's decision
unless it was illegal or suffered from procedural impropriety or was
irrational in the sense that it was in outrageous defiance of logic or
moral standards. The ppssibility of other tests, including proportionality
being brought into English administrative law in future is not ruled out.
These are the CCSU (1985 AC 374) principles.
(3)(a) As per Bugdaycay, Grind and Smith as long as the Convention
is not incorporated into English law, the English courts merely exercise
a secondary judgment to find out if the decision-maker could have, on
the material before him, arrived at the primary judgment in the manner
he has done.

(3)(b) If the Convention is incorporated in England making available
the principle of proportionality, then the English courts will render
primary judgment on the validity of the administrative action and find
out if the restriction is disproportionate or excessive or is not based
upon a fair balancing of the fundamental freedom and the need for the
restriction thereupon.
(4)(a) The position in our country, in administrative law, where no
fundamental freedoms as aforesaid are involved, is that the
courts/tribunals will only play a secondary role while the primary
judgment as to reasonableness will remain with the executive or
administrative authority.' The secondary judgment of the court is to be
based on Wednesbury and CCSU principles as stated by Lord Greene
and Lord Diplock respectively to find if the executive or administrative
authority has reasonably arrived at his decision as the primary
authority.

(4)(b) Whether in the case of administrative or executive action
affecting fundamental freedoms, the courts in our country will apply
the principle of 'proportionality' and assume a primary role, is left
open, to be decided in an appropriate case where such action
is
alleged to offend fundamental freedoms. It will be then necessary to
8

decide whether the courts will have a primary role only if the freedoms
under Articles 19, 21 etc. are involved and not for Article 14.

32. Finally, we come to the present case. It is not contended before
us that any fundamental freedom is affected. We need not therefore
go into the question of 'proportionality'. There is no contention that the
punishment imposed is illegal or vitiated by procedural impropriety. As
to 'irrationality', there is no finding by the Tribunal that the decision is
one which no sensible person who weighed the pros and cons could
have arrived at nor is there a finding, based on material, that the
punishment is in "outrageous" defiance of logic. Neither Wednesbury
nor CCSU tests are satisfied. We have still to explain "Ranjit Thakur".
11. The common thread running through in all these decisions is
that the Court should not interfere with the administrator's decision
unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was
shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in
defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated
in the Wednesbury's case the Court would not go into the correctness
of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court
should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The
scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making
process and not the decision.
12.
To put difference unless the punishment imposed by the
Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience
of the Court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to
certain litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose
appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support
thereof. In a normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly
disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary
Authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.
13. In the case at hand the High Court did not record any reason as
to how and why it found the punishment shockingly disproportiona te.
Even there is no discussion on this aspect. The only discernible
reason was the punishment awarded in M.L. Keshwani's case. As was
observed by this Court in Balbir Chand vs. Food Corporation of India
Ltd. and Ors., even if a co-delinquent is given lesser punishment it
cannot be a ground for interference. Even such a plea was not
available to be given credence as the allegations were contextually
different.

14. A Bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of
honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the
customers. Every officer/employee of the Bank is required to take all
possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank and to discharge his
duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do
nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer. Good conduct and
discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every
officer/employee of the Bank. As was observed by this Court in
9

Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari
Patnaik, it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or
profit resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted without
authority. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a
Bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and :
operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is
by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges
against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious:
These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High •
Court."

20. In B. C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and others^, the Hon'ble
Apex Court held that the disciplinary authority and on appeal the appellate
authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the
evidence with a view to. maintain discipline. They are invested with the

discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the hiagnitude or
gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power
of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty
and impose some other penalty. It the punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High
Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the
disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to
shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose
appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.

21. In Union of India and others vs. Ex. Constable Ram Karan^,
I

the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the well-ingrained principle of law is that it is
the disciplinary, or the appellate authority in appeal, which is to decide the
nature of punishment to be given to the delinquent employee, keeping in view
the seriousness of the misconduct committed by such an employee. It is not
open for the Courts to assume and usurp the function of the disciplinary
authority. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the said case observed that the High
Court fell in error in interfering with the punishment, which could lawfully be
imposed by the departmental authorities for the proven misconduct. The High

^ (1995) 6 see 749
^ (2022) 1 see 373
10

Court should not have substituted its own discretion for that of the authority.
What punishment was required to be imposed, in the facts and circumstances
of the case, was a matter which fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
competent authority and the interference made by the High Court was found
not sustainable in law.

22.
It is apt to refer Para Nos.23 to 27 of Union of India (supra) as
under:-

'23. The well ingrained principle of law is that it is the disciplinary
authority, or the appellate authority in appeal, which is to decide the
nature of punishment to be given to the delinquent employee. Keeping
in view the seriousness of the misconduct committed by such an
employee, it is not open for the Courts to assume and usurp the
function of the disciplinary authority. .
24.
Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the
disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the
Court, normally the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority
should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty.
The scope of judicial review on the quantum of punishment is
available but with a limited scope. It is only when the penalty imposed
appears to be shockingly disproportionate to the nature of misconduct
that the Courts would frown upon. Even in such a case, after setting
aside the penalty order, it is to be left to the disciplinary/ap pellate
authority to take a call and it is not for the Court to substitute its
decision by prescribing the quantum of punishment. However, it is only
in rare and exceptional cases where the court might to shorten the
. litigation may think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of
punishment in place of punishment awarded by the competent
authority that too after assigning cogent reasbns.
25.
The principles have been culled out by a three Judge Bench of
this Court way back in B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and Others
wherein it was observed as under:

18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the
disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact
finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with
a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to
impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or
gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising
the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own
conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the
punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate
authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would
appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate
11

authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation,
it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate
punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof."
26. It has been further examined by this Court in Lucknow
Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Now Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank)
and Another vs. Rajendra Singh as under:

"19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and
summarised as follows:

19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the
quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is
essentially the domain of the departmental authorities.
19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of
disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of
punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority.
19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the
punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where
such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court.
19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as
shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against
the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit
the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority
with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself
cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case.
19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above,
would be in those cases where the codelinquent is awarded lesser
punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of
misconduct were identical or the codelinquent was foisted with more
serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is
found that the employee concerned and the codeiinquent are equally
placed. However, there has to be a complete parity betw,een the two,
not only in respect Of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well
after the service of chafgesheet in the two cases. If the codelinquent
accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology,
lesser punishment to him would be justifiable."
27. Adverting to the facts of the instant case, the High Court, in our
considered view, fell in error in interfering with the punishment, which
could lawfully be imposed by the departmental authorities for his
proven misconduct. The High Court should not have substituted its
own discretion for that of the authority. What punishment was required
to be imposed, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was a
matter which fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent
authority and the interference made by the High Court is in a cavalier
manner while recording the finding of penalty to be disproportionate
M

without taking into consideration the seriousness of the misconduct
committed by the respondent which is unpardonable and not
sustainable in law."

23.
The learned Tribunal has observed that the proved Charge No-II'
is a case of registration of documents relating to prohibited lands covered by
Section 22-A of the Registration Act. 19G8, without obtaining no objection
certificate or confirmation from the District Collector. The petitioner
contravened Section'22-A of the Registration Act deliberately. Considering the
gravity of the proved Charges I and II, the learned Tribunal found the
punishment of 100% cut in pension, as not disproportionate. The recovery for
loss to the exchequer has already been reduced to Rs. 1,45,580/- from
Rs.9,19,870/-.

24.
The case of Chairman (supra) related to a Bank Officer and it
was observed that a Bank Officer is required to exercise higher standards of
honesty and integrity. Every officer/employee of the Bank is required to take
all possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank and to discharge his
duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing
which is unbecoming of a Bank officer.

25.
In our view, the petitioner in the present case was also required to
exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He was dealing with the
property of the State and was required to take all possible steps to protest the
interests of the State, which Was in the list under Section 22-A of the
Registration Act. In view of the findings recorded on the charges and the
gravity of the charges we do not feel that the punishment imposed is
shockingly disproportionate.

26.
We are of the considered view that in the matters of the present
nature, where the charge is proved against the petitioner, a Sub- Registrar in
the Registrar Office that he deliberately registered the Government land
colluding with the parties and violating Section 22-A of the Registration Act,
1908 and the memo, the punishment as imposed is not disproportionate.
13

Considering the gravity of the charges the punishment imposed on the
petitioner does not touch our consciousness so
as to make out a case for
interference in the exercise of writ jurisdiction.
27.
We do not find any illegality in the order of the Tribunal. The Writ
Petition IS dismissed.

28.
No order as to costs.

As a sequel thereto
miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall also
stand closed.

Sd/- Wl. SRINIVAS
ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
//TRUE COPY//

SECTION OFFICER

One Fair Copy to the Hon'ble SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
(For His Lordship's kind perusal)
One Fair Copy to the Hon'ble SRI JUSTICE NYAPATHY VIJAY
(For His Lordship's kind perusal)
To,

1. One CC to SRI R GOPI MOHAN Advocate [OPUC]
2. Two CCS to GP for SERVICES I, High Court of Andhra Pradesh. [OUT]
3. Two CCs to GP for REGISTRATION AND STAMPS, High Court of
Andhra Pradesh [OUT]
4. 9 L.R. Copies.

5. The Under Secretary, Union, of India, Ministry of Law, Justice &
Company Affairs, New Delhi.

6. The Secretary, A.P. High Court Advocates Association, High Court of
A.P. at Amaravati, Guntur District.
7. Three CD Copies
Madhu
HtGy COURT
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A. iT'
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i i»ATE^09/07/2024
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ORDER

DISMISSING THE WP WITHOUT COSTS