Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 4070 AP
Judgement Date : 6 September, 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, AMARAVATI
****
CRIMINAL PETITION No. 7020 of 2014
Between:
K.Venkatachalam Chetty,
S/o.Late K.Narayana Chetty, Aged about 69 years,
R/o.Dandapalli Road, Kothapeta,
Palamaner Town, Palamaner Post and Mandal,
Chittoor District, Andhra Pradesh.
... Petitioner/A.1
And
1. The State of A.P., Represented by Station House Officer,
Palamaner Police Station, Chittoor District through Public
Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Amaravati.
.... Respondent/Complainant
2. K.V.Ramana Reddy, S/o.Not known to the petitioner,
Aged not known, Working as Zonal Manager,
A.P.Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited,
Palamaner, Chittoor District,
Andhra Pradesh. .... Respondent/Defacto Complainant
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 06-09-2023
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA
1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers
may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes/No
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters / Journals? Yes/No
3. Whether His Lordship wish to
see the fair copy of the Judgment? Yes/No
DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA, J
2
* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA
+ CRIMINAL PETITION No.7020 of 2014
% 06-09-2023
Between:
K.Venkatachalam Chetty,
S/o.Late K.Narayana Chetty, Aged about 69 years,
R/o.Dandapalli Road, Kothapeta,
Palamaner Town, Palamaner Post and Mandal,
Chittoor District, Andhra Pradesh.
... Petitioner/A.1
And
1. The State of A.P., Represented by Station House Officer,
Palamaner Police Station, Chittoor District through Public
Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Amaravati.
.... Respondent/Complainant
2. K.V.Ramana Reddy, S/o.Not known to the petitioner,
Aged not known, Working as Zonal Manager,
A.P.Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited,
Palamaner, Chittoor District,
Andhra Pradesh. .... Respondent/Defacto Complainant
! Counsel for Petitioner : Sri N.Bharat Babu
^ Counsel for Respondents : Asst.Public Prosecutor (State)
< Gist:
> Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1. AIR 1992 SC 604
2. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 976
3. (2019) 16 SCC 739
This Court made the following:
3
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA
CRIMINAL PETITION No.7020 of 2014
ORDER:
In this Criminal Petition filed under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "Cr.P.C") the
petitioner/A.1 seeks to quash the criminal proceedings against
him in Crime No.123 of 2014 of Palamaner Police Station,
Chittoor District, registered for the offence under Section 420
IPC.
2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the
learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for the State.
3. The facts in issue are that APIIC/Government have
acquired the lands in Sy.No.532-2 Ac.0.12 cents; Sy.No.533-4
Ac.2.44 cents; Sy.No.533-5 Ac.1.58 cents and in Sy.No.533-6
Ac.1.48 cents, through Award No.2/Genl./95-96, dated
18.09.1995 for establishment of the Industrial Development
Area at Palamaner, Chittoor District. The said lands were
handed over to APIIC by the Revenue Department on
25.02.2002 and ever since, the possession was taken and the
lands were under the control of APIIC. It is further alleged that
during the inspection, on 23.04.2014, the APIIC officials have
observed that somebody laid fencing to the subject land and a
ground breaking ceremony was performed. On enquiry, they
came to know that one of the land owners namely,
K.Venkatachalam Chetty, has given a power of attorney in
favour of one G.Govardhan in respect of the land to an extent of
Ac.1.48 cents situated in Sy.No.533/6 and they have sold the
said land to 44 different persons for house sites duly making
plots. The Sub-Registrar, Palamaner entertained the illegal
activity and accepted for registration of the said plots in their
favour. As such, the present complaint was filed for taking
action against the petitioner/A.1 and two others.
4. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would submit
that the Government intended to acquire the land to an extent of
Ac.14.54 cents situated in different survey numbers at
Palamaner Village and Mandal and some lands of
Nagamangalam and issued a Draft Notification under Section
4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act on 21.01.1993. He would
further submit that under Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition
Act, within two years from the date of the notification, award
has to be passed, whereas, in the present case, award has been
passed beyond two years. Later, the Writ Petition filed by the
petitioner questioning the land acquisition proceedings was also
dismissed by this Court on 23.07.2001. He would further
submit that after lapse of 20 years, in order to cover up their
laches, a false and fictitious complaint has been lodged on
15.05.2014 by the 2nd respondent. Further, he would submit
that the petitioner/A.1 has not received any compensation for
the land said to have been acquired in Sy.No.533/6. Even
according to the Government, the petitioner is the owner of the
subject land. He would further submit that the dispute is of
civil nature and is to be decided by a competent Civil Court and
the 2nd respondent initiated the present criminal proceedings by
giving the colour of criminal offence and therefore, the
ingredients of Section 420 IPC are not attracting against the
petitioner and hence, the proceedings in the above crime are
liable to be quashed.
5. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor would submit that
the land to an extent of Ac.1.48 cents in Sy.No.533/6 has been
acquired by APIIC/Government for establishment of the
Industrial Development Area at Palamaner and in this
connection, land acquisition proceedings were initiated by the
Land Acquisition Officer and a Draft Notification under Section
4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was submitted to the
Government and the notification was published. Further, he
would submit that since the Land Acquisition Officer/Revenue
Divisional Officer, Madanapalle, was authorized to perform the
functions of the Collector to conduct enquiry under Section 5-A
of the Land Acquisition Act, he invited objections from the
respective land owners and their objections were overruled and
petitioner's land was acquired for establishment of Industrial
Development Area and an Award was passed and immediately,
the APIIC officials had taken over the possession of the subject
land from the Revenue Department on 25.02.2002. He would
further submit that having knowledge about the acquisition of
the land, the petitioner/A.1 executed a GPA in favour of one
G.Govardhan in respect of the land situated in Sy.No.533/6 to
an extent of Ac.1.48 cents and both the petitioner and the GPA
holder in collusion formulated the plots and sold the same to
the third parties with a fraudulent intention, and the allegations
in the complaint are sufficient to constitute the offence under
Section 420 IPC. Therefore, the present criminal proceedings
were initiated against the petitioner/A.1 and he prays to dismiss
the petition.
6. Having perused the relevant facts and contentions made
by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned
Assistant Public Prosecution for the State, in my considered
opinion, the foremost issue, which requires determination in the
instant case is,
Whether the allegations made against the petitioner/A.1 would attract the accusation made against him and whether there are any merits in the criminal petition to allow?
POINT:
7. In a decision reported in State of Haryana & Others Vs.
Ch.Bhajanlal and Others1, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that in
exercise of extraordinary power conferred under Article 226 of
Constitution of India or the inherent powers under Section 482
Cr.P.C, the following categories of cases are given by way of
illustration, wherein, such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down
any precise clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and
inflexible guide, myriad kinds of cases wherein, such power
should be exercised. The relevant guidelines read as under:
―(1) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused;
(2) where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code;
(3) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or 'complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused;
(4) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
AIR 1992 SC 604
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code;
(5) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;
(6) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party;
(7) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.‖
8. As can be seen from the decision supra, the 1st guideline is
to the effect that even if the complaint allegations are accepted
to be true on their face value, if they do not constitute any
offence, then the criminal proceedings against the petitioner/A.1
can be quashed.
9. In the instant case, the petitioner/A.1 is the absolute
owner of the land in Sy.No.533/6 to an extent of Ac.1.48 cents
and admittedly, the Government intended to acquire the land to
an extent of Ac.14.54 cents comprised in different survey
numbers for establishment of Industrial Development Area at
Palamaner and the Land Acquisition Officer-cum-Revenue
Divisional Officer, Madanapalle issued Section 4(1) notification
on 21.01.1993 as mentioned in the Writ Petition No.22968 of
1995 filed by the petitioner/A.1. The Declaration under
Section 6 was published on 24.09.1993 preceded by Section 5-A
enquiry conducted and the petitioner/A.1 expressed his
willingness for acquisition of the land in Sy.No.533/1 to an
extent of Ac.1.05 cents and received compensation to the said
land and admittedly he declined willingness for the land in
Sy.No.533/6 to an extent of Ac.1.48 cents and no compensation
was received by the petitioner/A.1 for the said land. The Award
No.2/Genl./95-96, dated 18.09.1995 was passed and the said
Award reveals that the petitioner/A.1 who is the land owner in
Sy.No.533/6 to an extent of Ac.1.48 cents along with four others
have not consented to be part with their respective lands for the
acquisition. Except that, rest of the owners have consented and
expressed their willingness for acquisition of the lands
@ Rs.40/- per square foot. Accordingly, the Award was passed
on 18.09.1995 and the said Award was enclosed along with the
complaint and the above facts reveal the same.
10. However, as per Section 11-A of Land Acquisition Act,
1894, within two years from the date of notification, award has
to be passed, whereas, in the present case, award has been
passed beyond two years.
11. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to Section 11-A of
The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 reads as follows:
―11A. Period shall be which an award within made. - The Collector shall make an award under section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceeding for the acquisition of the land shall lapse: Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984), the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement.‖
12. As per the above provision, the draft notification issued
under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was approved by
the Collector vide Proceedings in Roc.L7/17458/88, dated
02.12.1992 and the draft declaration issued under Section 6 of
the Land Acquisition Act was also approved by the Collector vide
Proceedings in Roc.D12/17458/88, dated 28.08.1993,
CTR/199. But, the Award was passed on 18.09.1995, which is
beyond two years from the date of the publication of the
Declaration.
13. The first and foremost contention of the petitioner/A.1 is
with regard to lapse of acquisition on account of non-passing of
the impugned award within a period of two years from the date
of issuance of the final notification as contemplated
under Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act is no longer res
integra.
14. As per Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, the
Collector should make an Award under Section 11 within a
period of two years from the date of publication of
Section 6 declaration and if no Award is made within that
period, the entire proceedings of such acquisition of lands
should lapse. In the instant case, the date of publication
of Section 6 declaration was 28.08.1993. The 2nd
respondent/Zonal Manager should have passed the Award on or
before 27.08.1995, whereas, the Award was passed on
18.09.1995. Since the Award had not been passed within the
mandatory period of two years from the date of the publication
of the Declaration, the entire acquisition proceedings lapsed.
The non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 11-
A of the Land Acquisition Act vitiated the entire proceedings.
15. Further, the 2nd respondent stated in the complaint that
the above lands were handed over to APIIC by the Revenue
Department on 25.02.2002 and ever since, the APIIC has been
in possession of the said lands and lodged a complaint on
15.05.2014. The said fact is seriously disputed by the
petitioner/A.1.
16. The question as to whether the possession was in
symbolic or actual, fell for consideration, could all depend upon
the facts and circumstances of the case. In the instant case, the
possession of the subject land was taken by APIIC from the
Revenue Authorities on 25.02.2002 as alleged in the complaint.
But, whether the said possession was taken under the
Panchanama or not, is not indicated in the complaint by the 2nd
respondent. It is necessary to note that when a panchanama for
delivery of possession of the lands was conducted and the
panchanama was signed by one of the officers of the Revenue
Department, it is not open to the 2nd respondent to dispute
about the taking possession of the lands and it is a
common sense that the lands cannot be physically put in
possession of anybody, and it is only a paper delivery by duly
conducting panchanama on the spot wherein, handing over of
the possession is recorded. In the complaint it does not indicate
that under the panchanama the possession of the property was
delivered to APIIC by the Revenue Authorities. This assertion
would undoubtedly go to show that the possession of the land
was not taken by APIIC. If the possession of the land was
handed over to the APIIC by the Revenue Authorities, they
would have intimated to the Registering Authorities about the
acquisition of the properties in respective survey numbers not to
entertain any registrations thereon, but, they did not do so.
17. Admittedly, the possession of the lands has been under
the control of the petitioner/A.1 and the Revenue records reflect
the name of the petitioner as an owner of the said land. If the
Revenue Authorities handed over the subject property to an
extent of Ac.1.48 cents in Sy.No.533/6 to the APIIC, the Pahanis
would have shown that APIIC is the owner of the said land. On a
perusal of the Pahanis, dated 29.05.2014, filed along with this
petition, the name of the pattadar was shown as Venkatachalam
Chetty i.e., the petitioner/A.1 for the above land in Sy.No.533/6.
Apart from Pahanis, Adangal copy was also filed along with the
petition, wherein, the name of the pattadar was shown as
Venkatachalam Chetty i.e., the petitioner/A.1 for the above said
land. Further, the statement of Encumbrance on Property, dated
26.05.2014 issued by the Sub-Registrar, Palamaner, would also
show that as per the records of S.R.O., from 24 years i.e., from
01.01.1990 to 25.05.2014 the land to an extent of Ac.1.48 cents
in Sy.No.533/6 was in the name of the petitioner/A.1 and
G.Govardhan. In the light of the above documents, it clearly
indicates that the subject property has been in possession of the
petitioner/A.1. Therefore, there is no merit in the contentions
raised by the respondents and there is no explanation as to why
the Revenue Department did not change the entries in the
Revenue records. In the instant case, the 2nd respondent lodged
the present complaint to cover up laches converting the civil
dispute by giving criminal colour alleging that the petitioner/A.1
sold the property to third parties. But, there was no
documentary proof to prove the same. On other hand, the Award
itself discloses that the petitioner/A.1 and four others have not
consented to part with the land for acquisition in respective
survey numbers.
18. Even otherwise, as per Section 24(2) of New Land
Acquisition Act, 2013 i.e., Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, in any acquisition proceedings if award
is passed five years prior to the commencement of the Act and
possession was not taken, the land acquisition proceedings shall
be deemed to have lapsed and remedy left to the Government to
initiate acquisition proceedings afresh.
19. In the instant case, the Award was passed on 18.09.1995
i.e., 18 years prior to the commencement of the Act and the
possession was not taken as stated supra, which is evident from
the Revenue records i.e., Pahanis and Adangal and
Encumbrance Certificate, as referred to above to show that the
petitioner/A.1 is the owner of the subject land. Therefore, the
acquisition proceedings said to have been initiated in the year
1993 got lapsed by the operation of Law.
20. Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 reads as follows:
―24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.-
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act.‖
21. In the light of the above provision, the land acquisition
proceedings initiated by the Land Acquisition Officer deemed to
have been lapsed.
22. In the present case, possession of the subject land has not
been taken as alleged in the complaint and the compensation for
the subject land was not deposited and apart from that the
Award reveals that the petitioner/A.1 who is the land owner in
Sy.No.533/6 to an extent of Ac.1.48 cents along with four others
have not consented to be part with their respective lands for the
acquisition. The 2nd respondent initiated the present criminal
proceedings by giving criminal colour to the civil dispute instead
of taking appropriate steps by following the provisions under the
Land Acquisition Act.
23. In Mitesh Kumar J.Sha Vs. State of Karnataka and
others2, wherein, at Para Nos.29, 43, 45, 46 and 47 the Hon'ble
Apex Court held as follows:
―29. Coming to the facts of the case at hands, the contested contention between the parties is that the builder company had sold four excess flats beyond its share, in terms of the JDA and
2021 SCC Online SC 976
supplementary agreement entered into between the parties.
Respondent No. 2 contends that builder company which was entitled to sell only 9 flats in its favour, has instead executed sale deed for 13 flats in total. Thus, the company simply could not have sold the flats beyond 9 flats for which it was authorized and resultantly cannot evade criminal liability on a mere premise that a civil dispute is already pending between the parties.
43. On an earlier occasion, in case of G. Sagar Suri v. State of UP8, this Court has also observed:--
―8. Jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code has to be exercised with a great care. In exercise of its jurisdiction High Court is not to examine the matter superficially. It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of civil nature, has been given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut of other remedies available in law. Before issuing process a criminal court has to exercise a great deal of caution. For the accused it is a serious matter. This Court has laid certain principles on the basis of which High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. Jurisdiction under this Section has to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.‖
45. Applying this dictum to the instant factual matrix, it can be safely concluded that the present case clearly falls within the ambit of first, third and fifth category of the seven categories enlisted in the above said judgment. The case therefore warrants intervention by this Court, and the High Court has erred in dismissing the petition filed by the Appellants under section 482 CrPC. We find that there has been attempt to stretch the contours of a civil dispute and thereby essentially impart a criminal color to it.
46. Recently, this Court in case of Randheer Singh v. The State of U.P.10, has again reiterated the long standing principle that criminal proceedings must not be used as instruments of harassment. The court observed as under:--
―33. ....There can be no doubt that jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. should be used sparingly for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses criminal offence or not depends on the nature of the allegation and whether the essential ingredients of a criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. There can be no doubt that a complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. The High Court has, however, to see whether the dispute of a civil nature has been given colour of criminal offence. In such a situation, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal
proceedings as held by this Court in Paramjeet Batra (supra) extracted above.‖
47. Moreover, this Court has at innumerable instances expressed its disapproval for imparting criminal color to a civil dispute, made merely to take advantage of a relatively quick relief granted in a criminal case in contrast to a civil dispute. Such an exercise is nothing but an abuse of the process of law which must be discouraged in its entirety.‖
24. In another decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in
Prof.R.K.Vijayasarathy and another Vs. Sudha Seetharam
and another3 it was held as follows:
18. Section 420 of the Penal Code reads thus: ―420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.--Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.‖
19. The ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 420 are as follows:
19.1. A person must commit the offence of cheating under Section 415; and 19.2. The person cheated must be dishonestly induced to
(a) deliver property to any person; or
(b) make, alter or destroy valuable security or anything signed or sealed and capable of being converted into valuable security.
20. Cheating is an essential ingredient for an act to constitute an offence under Section 420.
25. In the light of the judgments referred to above, the remedy
available for the 2nd respondent is to approach the Civil Court
seeking an appropriate remedy by way of cancellation of the
registered sale deed if executed by the petitioner/A.1 in favour of
the third parties and to initiate land acquisition proceedings
3 (2019) 16 SCC 739
afresh as stated above. Admittedly, the Land Acquisition Officer
has not communicated the acquisition of the subject property in
Sy.No.533/6 to the Sub-Registrar, Palamaner and did not
inform not to entertain any registrations from the date of
handing over the possession of the property to
APIIC/Government i.e., on 25.02.2002.
26. In the light above discussion, whether the possession was
taken or not, as alleged in the complaint, has to be established
in a proper Forum i.e., in a Civil Court. Essentially, these
disputed questions of fact constitute a civil case, which has to
be adjudicated in a Civil Court by adducing evidence. Instead,
the 2nd respondent initiated the present proceedings by giving a
colour of a criminal offence. It does not meet the strict standard
of proof required to sustain a criminal accusation.
27. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that
the 2nd respondent made an attempt to abuse the authority so
as to do injustice. It would be an abuse of process of the Court
to allow any action, which would result injustice and prevent the
promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, Court would be
justified to quash any proceedings, if it finds that the initiation
or continuance of it amounts to abuse of process of the Court or
quashing of these proceedings would otherwise, serve the ends
of justice. In fact, no offence is committed by the petitioner/A.1.
Therefore, this Court finds that it is a fit case to exercise the
inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C to
quash the proceedings in Crime No.123 of 2014 of Palamaner
Police Station, Chittoor District, registered for the offence under
Section 420 IPC against the petitioner/A.1.
28. Resultantly, the criminal petition is allowed and the
proceedings against the petitioner/A.1 in Crime No.123 of 2014
of Palamaner Police Station, Chittoor District, are hereby
quashed.
As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions, pending if any,
shall stand disposed of.
JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA 06.09.2023 DNS/ Mjl/* L.R.Copy to be marked
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA
CRIMINAL PETITION No.7020 OF 2014
06.09.2023 DNS Mjl/* L.R.Copy to be marked
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