Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati

Dr. Iqbal Hyder vs Dr. A. Ravi on 31 January, 2023

       HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE D.V.S.S.SOMAYAJULU


                     C.C.No.1171 of 2022
O R D E R:

This Court has heard Dr.Iqbal Hyder, the party-in-

person, and learned senior counsel Sri Y.V.Ravi Prasad

appearing for the respondents.

2. This contempt case is filed alleging that respondents

have willfully disobeyed the order dated 20.09.2021 in

W.P.No.14684 of 2021 passed by this Court.

3. The order is to the following effect:

Learned standing counsel for the University appears and states that the counter is being filed today. He also submits that in view of the interim order passed in W.P.No.9677 of 2021, by which the University was directed to go with the interviews, but not to declare the results, the University is only conducting the interviews, but it will not disclose the results or announce the same. In that view of the matter, he submits that there is no urgency for hearing the matter today and that the matter can be heard after the counter is filed. The proof of service filed shows that notices to respondents 5 and 6 are served on them but they do not appear through a counsel.

List on 20.10.2021.'

4. The party-in-person argued the matter at length and

points out that despite the undertaking granted to this Court

that they will not disclose the results, the respondents on

07.02.2022 disclosed the results and selected two candidates.

He submits that this is a willful disobedience of the Court's

order. According to him, an undertaking given to the Court

cannot also be breached or overlooked. He submits that a

breach of undertaking is also contempt. He relies upon case

law to the effect. He points out that a reading of the order of

appointment issued to third parties on 07.02.2022 shows that

the appointment orders are subject to the outcome of the writ

petitions including W.P.No.9677 of 2021 and W.P.No.14684 of

2021. Therefore, it is contended that the respondents are

aware of the existence of the writ orders and this is the reason

why they made the appointments subject to the result of the

writ petitions. With regard to the contention raised by the

respondents that the interim order was not extended beyond

the particular point of time, the petitioner relies upon

N.Mahalakshmi and others v. Principal Secretary (LA)

and others1, wherein it is held as follows:

8. Thus, by this order, I convey to the Bar at large that specific extension of interim orders is not necessary in cases where there are interim orders, with a direction to list the matters after certain date or after a few weeks, and the matter is not listed or not taken up by the Court on that date. In such eventuality, the interim orders shall continue to be in operation till the matter is listed and taken up for hearing and a specific order vacating the interim orders is passed by the Court.

9. At the cost of repetition, I make it clear that if the Court grants an interim order in the first instance for a limited period, and simultaneously directs the matter be listed after a few weeks or after a certain date, then the interim orders granted earlier shall continue to remain in force till the matter is listed before the Court or till a specific order vacating the earlier interim orders is passed by the Court.

5. Relying on this judgment and other judgment to a

similar effect, the party-in-person submits that the

respondents are guilty of willful breach and should be

punished.

2016 (6) ALT 727

6. Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents

also argues the matter at length. He does not doubt the

proposition of law that an undertaking given to the Court is

also like an order passed and if the respondents commit a

breach, they are liable for punishment. However, learned

senior counsel submits that each case has to be decided on

its own facts and a universal principle cannot be applied. He

points out that the language used in the order is also

important and in W.P.No.9677 of 2021, he submits that this

Court granted an order which is reproduced in para 5 of the

counter/reply. He points out that the respondents were

permitted to proceed with the selections, but they shall not

issue appointment orders to the selected candidates till

21.06.2021. He lays stress on the word 'till' and argues that

the Court limited the operation of the order till a particular

period/date only. He points out that in W.P.No.14684 of

2021, in which the present contempt is filed, this Court took

note of this order based upon the submissions made by the

counsel for the University. Learned senior counsel submits

that the interim order granted in W.P.No.9677 of 2021 was

being extended to specific dates and till the date of the next

posting. He points out that after 07.05.2021, the order was

extended "till 28.06.2021 and till 26.07.2021, so on and again

they were extended 'till' 09.11.2021. Thereafter, W.P.No.9677

of 2021 and W.P.No.14684 of 2021 were directed to be listed

together.

7. Relying upon the reply affidavits filed and also copies of

the cause lists that were filed, learned counsel points out that

both the writ petitions were being called together and were

listed on 09.11.2021, 10.11.2021, 15.11.2021 and

07.02.2022. He also points out that by virtue of the Covid

Pandemic, the Division Bench of this Court passed general

orders extending all subsisting interim orders till 15.11.2021.

Therefore, the submission of counsel for the respondents in

conclusion is that the interim order, which is granted for a

specific period, was not extended. He relies upon the

language used and the words like 'till then' to support his

contention that the extensions were for specific periods only

and that once the period expires, the interim order

automatically expires. He points out that this matter being

listed along with W.P.No.9677 of 2021; no effort was made by

the party-in-person to seek extension of the interim order.

Therefore, he submits that by virtue of this, there is no willful

disobedience of the order, which was not extended to the date

of the alleged contempt. He also relies upon a Division Bench

judgment of the combined High Court in W.P.No.7631 of 2016

in support of his contention.

8. COURT: This Court after considering the submissions

made notices that a lot of case law was submitted by the

party-in-person in support of his contention that an interim

order passed till a certain date will continue to operate till it is

expressly varied or modified. It is also submitted that if for

any reason, the matter could not be heard, the time bound

stay orders do not cease to be effective by efflux of time.

Petitioner essentially relied upon judgments of the Allahabad

High Court in support of his contention and the judgment of

the A.P.High Court in Mahalakshmi's case (1 supra). The

legal rationale behind this proposition is that a party should

not suffer for the actions of the Court. This is an accepted

principle - that a party should not suffer

(actus curiae neminem gravabit).

9. In the judgment of the learned senior single Judge of

this Court in Mahalakshmi's case (1 supra), the findings at

para 8 and 9 are reproduced earlier.

10. In Mahalakshmi's case an order of status quo was

passed with a direction to list the matter on 27.07.2016.

From 27.07.2016, the matter was posted to 03.08.2016 when

a request for extension of the order was made. In these

circumstances, the learned single Judge came to the

conclusion that if the matter is not listed or not taken up by

the Court, the interim order will continue to operate.

11. In that case, the single Judge was dealing with a

situation where the matter was not listed or was not taken up

by the Court. In those circumstances, learned single Judge

held that the interim order shall continue to be in operation

till the matter is listed and taken up for hearing and a specific

order vacating the interim order was passed by the Court.

Such a fact situation does not exist in the present contempt

case. This writ petition was directed to be listed along with

W.P.No.9677 of 2021. The dates on which the matter was

adjourned were also spelt out in the counter affidavit and the

cause lists are also filed as documents. On none of these

dates, a request was made to the Court to extend the interim

order that was granted. This is an essential fact which makes

a difference to the applicability of this case to the present

facts. The law of precedents is also clear. A little difference in

facts can make a difference in the precedential value. (State

of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan-(2011) 7 SCC 639).

12. There is also a practice prevalent in this Court of getting

matters posted under the caption 'for extension of interim

orders'. The petitioner did not make any effort to file an

application for extension of the interim order under the

caption for extension of interim orders.

13. However, in the present case, in which the Contempt is

filed, the order allegedly flouted is not an open ended order,

but is an order limited to a particular period. The words used

in the orders are 'till then' or 'extended till'. These cannot be

lost sight of. They set out a clear outer limit or end point. The

Division Bench order relied upon by the respondents is also

applicable, wherein the Division Bench held that the

expression 'in the mean time' takes a colour from the context

and that the outer limit is fixed by virtue of the said words. To

a similar effect is the judgment in N.Rathinasabapathy and

others v. K.S.Palaniappa Kandar and others2. The

decision in Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana3, also

records the following:

12. The term of the order of the learned Judge, in our opinion, does not leave any manner of doubt whatsoever that the interim order was only extended from time to time. The interim order having been extended till a particular date, the contention raised by the respondents herein that they were under a bona fide belief that the injunction order would continue till it was vacated cannot be accepted."

14. It is also settled law that in a contempt jurisdiction, the

quality of proof is very high and almost on par with a criminal

case. The existence of a 'mental intention' to willfully and

wantonly disobey the order should also be present. The law

on the subject is well settled and need not be repeated here

once again.

15. If the present case is examined against the backdrop of

the orders passed by this particular Court and the standard

of proof in contempt, it is it clear that the petitioner is not

(1996) 7 SCC 205

(2007) 3 SCC 470

able to prove that there is a willful, wanton disobedience of