A.D.P. Rajkumar vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh
2021 Latest Caselaw 2211 AP

          *HONOURBLE SRI JUSTICE D.V.S.S. SOMAYAJULU


                       +   WP.No.1922 of 2021


% 30.06.2021
# A.D.P.Rajkumar
                                                           ... Petitioner


Vs.
$ The State of Andhra Pradesh
Rep., by Chief Secretary to Government,
Revenue (CT) Department,
Andhr Pradesh Secretariat,
Velagapudi,
Amaravathi & 3 others


                                                    ... Respondents




! Counsel for the petitioner : Sri Goda Siva


! Counsel for the Respondents : G.P. for Services-I and
                                  Smt. Kavitha Gottipati


< Gist:


> Head Note:


? Cases referred:
1
    1997 (6) SCC 473
2
    2006 (5) ALD 30
                                      2




           HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE D.V.S.S.SOMAYAJULU


                          WP.No.1922 of 2021
O R D E R:

This writ petition is filed for the following reliefs:

"To issue a direction, order or writ of Mandamus

(a) Declaring the action of the 2nd Respondent in issuing CCST's Ref.No.C2/02/2018, dated 05.05.2020; and 05.05.2020 as arbitrary, contrary to the judgment in Writ Petition No.6640 of 2014 and batch, dated 02.12.2016 on the file of the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and State of Andhra Pradesh and C.A.No.3300 of 2018 dated 2.5.2019 illegal, unjust, without jurisdiction and thereby violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India;

(b) Consequently, direct the Respondents to restore the seniority position of the Petitioner as prevailing prior to the issuance of the orders impugned herein and reckoning the seniority of the Respondents 3 and 4 herein only from date of issuance of G.O.Ms.No.72 Rev.(CT.III) Department dated 20.1.2001 and G.O.Ms.No.1369 Rev. (CT.III) Department dated 30.12.2003 and review the promotions made based on the revision of seniority attempted by the orders impugned herein;

(c) Declare that this Writ Petition is liable to be allowed with exemplary costs for having thrust this unwarranted lis on the Petitioner and direct payment of the same by State and to ensure accountability recover the costs so awarded from the personal funds of the officers held responsible including the incumbent of the office of the 2nd Respondent as on the date of passing of the orders impugned herein and pass such other orders.."

The petitioner before this Court is seeking the above

reliefs.

As per this writ petition, he was absorbed as Senior

Assistant in the Commercial Taxes Department on

29.12.1999. Later, he got promotions and by the date of

filing the writ petition, he is a Superintendent Grade-I. The

un-official respondent Nos.3 and 4, according to the writ

petitioner, were working in a State Government undertaking

called "Andhra Pradesh Rice Fed", which was closed down.

Respondent Nos.3 and 4 from Andhra Pradesh Rice Fed were

appointed because of the benevolent attitude of the

Government as Junior Assistants on 29.11.1993 and

24.02.1994 respectively in the Commercial Tax Department.

As per the pleadings, the respondent Nos.3 and 4, who are on

the verge of retrenchment were absorbed as Junior Assistants

in November, 1993 and February 1994. However, after

joining the Government service, they prevailed upon the

Government to issue certain Government Orders by which

they were promoted as Senior Assistants. G.O.Ms.No.72 dated

20.01.2001 was issued in case of respondent No.4 and

G.O.Ms.No.1369 dated 30.12.2003 was issued in case of

respondent No.3 With certain conditions under the said GOs

the respondent No.3 was appointed as a Senior Assistant on

21.05.2004 and respondent No.4 was appointed as a Senior

Assistant on 05.02.2005.

The petitioner claims the seniority in the post of Senior

Assistant vis-a-vis respondent Nos.3 and 4. However,

because of the correspondence etc., continued by respondent

Nos.3 and 4, the Government issued G.O.Ms.Nos.880 and

881 dated 25.06.2007 conferring "retrospective seniority" with

benefits to respondent Nos.3 and 4 from the date of their

joining into the Government Department namely Commercial

Tax Department i.e from 29.11.1993 and 24.02.1994. As a

result of this Government action, they were placed far above

the petitioner and others in the seniority list. This was the

subject matter of the challenge in Original Application

No.4893 of 2008 and the batch before the Andhra Pradesh

Administrative Tribunal.

The Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal upheld

these two Government Orders. Against the same,

W.P.No.6640 of 2014 and batch were filed. This High Court

by its order dated 02.12.2016 allowed the writ petition and

set aside G.O.Ms.Nos.880 and 881. The matter was carried

to the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, which partially

modified the order passed by this High Court. As per the

petitioner, by balancing the interest of all the parties,

financial benefits alone were given to respondent Nos.3 and 4

and not seniority. The petitioner, who tried to implead in the

Supreme Court and was unsuccessful filed the present writ

petition seeking to set aside the order dated 05.05.2020 by

which the seniority of the respondent Nos.3 and 4 was placed

at 141-A and 141-B in the seniority list and above the

petitioner.

The second respondent-State filed its counter. Apart

from setting out the facts, they have justified the issuance of

G.O.Ms.Nos.880 and 881 as the correction of a mistake and

the absorption of respondent Nos.3 and 4 in an equivalent

post with effect from 29.11.1993 and 24.02.1994.

They also plead that because of the orders passed by

the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.3300 of 2018

and the batch, the order of the Hon'ble High Court in

W.P.No.6640 of 2014 and batch "lost in its entirety" and all

consequential orders became void. It is also argued by the

State that in view of the orders passed by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court, respondent Nos.3 and 4 are entitled to be

placed higher in the seniority list than the petitioner. They

urge that the order in Civil Appeal No.3300 of 2018 and batch

is not applicable to the petitioner as he is not a party to the

lis. It is also urged that as the attempt of the petitioner to

implead in the Supreme Court and his application alleging

contempt were also dismissed as he is a third party to the

litigation, and so the orders in W.P.No.6640 of 2014 and

batch or of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal

No.3300 of 2018 are not applicable.

Irrespective of the above, it is also contended that the

respondent Nos.3 and 4 joined in the Commercial Taxes

Department on 29.11.1993 and 24.02.1994 as Junior

Assistant and the petitioner only joined on 06.05.1994.

Therefore, it is urged that respondent Nos.3 and 4 are in any

way senior to the petitioner.

On behalf of respondent Nos.3 and 4 also, after the facts

are set out, it is urged that the order of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court is for the purpose of seniority and monetary benefits

and is only limited to the parties to the lis. It is also urged by

these two respondents that they have superior qualifications

and have joined earlier in point of time. It is also urged that

the petitioner is not a party to the Civil Appeal No.3300 of

2018 and batch before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India or

party to the writ petition before this Court. The Contempt

application filed by the petitioner is also dismissed by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and therefore, it is urged that

the petitioner cannot claim any relief. The essential points

are thus similar in the counters of all the respondents.

CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT:

The facts are not in dispute. It is also not in dispute

that the respondents, who were working in a Corporation

called Rice Fed would have been logically retrenched when

the Corporation was closed down. They were absorbed into

the State Government as a Junior Assistants by virtue of

Government Orders, which have certain conditions. After

working for sometime, they were absorbed as Senior

Assistants in a higher scale by the two Government Order

Nos.72 and 1369.

G.O.Ms.No.72 dated 20.01.2001 deals with respondent

No.4 and it contained the following three conditions:

1) They shall not claim the emoluments relating to a Senior Assistant post from any date earlier to that on which they actually join as Senior Assistant.

2) They shall not claim in that post the basis that they should have been appointed as Senior Assistant from any earlier date.

3) They shall pass relevant tests prescribed for the post of Senior Asst. in Commercial Tax Department within period of one year from the

date of joining as Senior Assistant in Commercial Tax Department.

G.O.Ms.No.1369 pertaining to the other

respondents dated 30.12.2003 clearly stated that Sri

Y.Sambasiva Rao was appointed as Senior Assistant in

the Office of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes

"Prospectively". It is clear that respondent Nos.3 and 4

have agreed to these conditions and have joined the

services.

Thereafter, based on representations, two

Government Order Nos.880 and 881 were issued in the

name of respondent Nos.3 and 4 conferring them

"retrospective seniority" as Senior Assistants from their

date of joining in the Department i.e. from 29.11.1993

and 24.02.1994 respectively. This was challenged before

the high Court of Andhra Pradesh in WP.Nos.6640, 6650,

6658 and 7394 of 2014. A Division Bench of the Hon'ble

High Court went through the facts and passed a detailed

judgment. The petitioners therein were affected by this

retrospective promotions and they filed writs where the

present respondent Nos.3 and 4 are the respondents in

the writ also. In para 4 of the judgment, the grievance of

the petitioners was noted as follows:

4. The main grievance of the writ petitioners is that they were selected and directly recruited in the Department of Commercial Taxes and that to the detriment of persons already working in the Department, the unofficial respondents cannot be granted absorption

in a higher post with retrospective effect, especially after the method of direct recruitment to such higher post had already been abolished in 1998.

In para 12, the crux of the dispute is dealt with. It is

reproduced hereunder:

"12. Having rejected the objection relating to maintainability of one of the 4 writ petitions on hand, let us now take up the core issue for consideration. If out of the mass of facts poured over hundreds of pages before us, we segregate the chaff from the grain, it will be clear that the core issue to be decided in these writ petitions is as to whether the 3 unofficial respondents, namely, K. Venkata Ratnam, P. Rama Mohan Rao and Y. Sambasiva Rao are entitled to absorption in the Department of Commercial Taxes in the post of Senior Assistant with effect from 29-11-1993 and 24-02-1994 respectively or not.

(Note: Sri K.Venkata Ratnam is the present respondent

No.4, while Sri Y.Sambasiva Rao is the present respondent

No.3.)

In para 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 the Court held as follows:

14. The most fundamental principle of law that we should remember in cases of this nature is that whenever a State-owned Corporation is wound up, the only right that the employees of such Corporation has, is to be paid all terminal benefits. Merely because the Government was considerate towards them, it does not mean that the employees of the Andhra Pradesh Rice Fed Limited had a right to be absorbed into Government service. The nod given by the Government to absorb all the 34 employees of the A.P. Rice Fed Ltd. including the 3 unofficial respondents in this batch of cases, was out of mercy and not out of any legal right. It must be remembered that

direct recruitment to the post of Junior Assistant in the State Government, was to be by a process of selection conducted by the Public Service Commission. Giving an exemption to such a method of recruitment prescribed by statute, the Government sympathetically considered the cases of all the 34 employees of a liquidated Corporation and absorbed them in different departments, in the post of Junior Assistants. After gaining entry as Junior Assistants, the 3 unofficial respondents started making a claim for appointment to higher posts. Those claims were rejected at the earliest point of time by the Tribunal. The order of the Tribunal was also confirmed by this Court. However, a small leverage was given to the unofficial respondents to make a representation. It is by taking undue advantage of such a leverage, the unofficial respondents successfully won over the Government to grant them the benefit of the post of Senior Assistants.

15. In fact this Court had earlier taken note of the fact that direct recruitment to the post of Senior Assistant had been abolished way back in 1998. In such circumstances, the very grant of a benefit with prospective effect under G.O.Ms. No. 72, dated 20.01.2001, was also completely illegal. This is why the Administrative Tribunal set aside G.O.Ms. No. 72, dated 20.01.2001, at the instance of one Vijaykumar in O.A. No. 3360 of 2001. When the order of the Tribunal setting aside G.O.Ms. No. 72 was challenged by K. Venkata Ratnam and P. Rama Mohan Rao in W.P. No. 1216 of 2002, this Court did not find fault with the Tribunal for setting aside G.O.Ms. No. 72. This Court looked at the case of the unofficial respondents sympathetically and passed a via media order, just to save G.O.Ms. No. 72. We have already extracted paragraphs 7 and 8 of the order in W.P. No. 1216 of 2002.

16. Therefore, it is very clear that the unofficial respondents (1) were not entitled to be absorbed in a higher post than the post of Junior Assistants; (2) were

denied the relief of absorption in a higher post, first by the Tribunal and then by this Court; (3) were granted a small benefit under G.O.Ms. No. 72 after the unofficial respondents litigated again and again; and (4) had G.O.Ms. No. 72, which was set aside by the Tribunal, saved by this Court only out of sympathy.

17. One more interesting fact is that in so far as Sambasiva Rao is concerned, this Court, in its order dated 28.10.2003 passed in W.P. Nos. 4136 and 4137 of 2002 denied him even the benefit of G.O.Ms. No. 72. This order of the Division Bench has attained finality.

18. In the light of the gist of facts narrated in the preceding two paragraphs, we do not know how the Government could have rewritten the entire history under G.O.Ms. Nos. 880 and 881, granting a benefit (1) that the unofficial respondents were not entitled to; and (2) especially after the Tribunal as well as this Court rejected their claim for such a benefit in two earlier rounds.

In paras 20 to 22 the conclusions are as follows:

20. Today by the orders passed in G.O.Ms. No. 880 and 881, the Government had overreached the orders of this Court dated 28.10.2003 passed in W.P. Nos. 1216 of 2002 and 4136 and 4137 of 2002. Therefore, the Government Orders G.O.Ms. Nos. 880 and 881 were completely contrary (1) to the statutory rules, (2) to the orders passed by this Court as well as the Tribunal, and (3) to all principles of law governing the rehabilitation of persons from Corporations that are wound up.

21. On facts, as we have indicated earlier, Sambasiva Rao was absorbed only as Junior Assistant on 29.11.1993, as seen from paragraph 9 of G.O.Ms.No.880. Similarly, Venkata Ratnam and Rama Mohan Rao were absorbed only as Junior Assistants on 24.02.1994. G.O.Ms. No. 72, the operative portion of which we have

extracted earlier, made it very clear that these 3 unofficial respondents should not claim any benefit from an earlier date whether it be seniority or emoluments. While so, the orders in G.O.Ms. Nos. 880 and 881 had completely destroyed the spirit of G.O.Ms. No. 72, even the benefit granted under which, was questioned by the Tribunal and a compromise formula advocated by this Court to save the same.

22. In view of the same, the writ petitions are liable to be allowed and the order of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, all the writ petitions are allowed, the orders of the Tribunal are set aside and G.O.Ms. Nos. 880 and 881, dated 25.06.2007 are set aside. The 3 unofficial respondents are not entitled to the benefit of absorption in the category of Senior Assistants either with effect from 29.11.1993/24.02.1994 or with effect from any date anterior to what was offered to them under G.O.Ms. No. 72, dated 20.01.2001 with prospective effect. There will be no order as to costs. (Emphasis supplied)

Questioning the same, the unofficial respondents filed

SLP. Since the SLP was disposed by a short order and it is

the subject matter of the submissions, the same is being

reproduced hereunder:

"We have heard learned senior counsel for the parties.

What emerges is that the State Government in its wisdom considered it appropriate to give the benefits to the appellants retrospectively from the date of their absorption as Junior Assistants and not from the date they were appointed as Senior Assistants.

The grievance made by the private respondents, which resulted in the impugned order, is that their seniority has been affected in this process as they were

directly appointed in the year 1994 as Senior Assistants while the appellants were appointed as Junior Assistants in 1993. The grant of retrospective seniority and benefits places them higher in the seniority list for consideration of promotion.

It is this fact which has weighed with the High Court in the impugned order taking into consideration that the appellant would have no inherent right to get the benefit of retrospective seniority.

We are of the view that the balance has to be maintained between the rights of the appellants and the private respondents.

The appellants ought not to be deprived of the benefits which the state Government in its wisdom has considered fit to confer on them insofar as the monetary aspects are concerned. Thus, to that extent we modify the impugned order by limiting the conferment of benefits to the appellants by the State Government giving them retrospective monetary/service benefits (except seniority) for all purposes from the date of their appointment originally as Junior Assistants. We are, however, simultaneously of the view that this should not disturb the seniority inter se affecting the private respondents and, thus, the seniority be maintained as it was before the State Government conferred the retrospective financial benefits.

We order accordingly and modify the impugned order to the aforesaid extent and the appeals stand disposed of accordingly."

This order is being reproduced in detail in this order

since it is relied upon by both parties. The petitioner claims

that by virtue of these orders, the respondents are not

entitled to any benefits while the respondents claim that the

impugned orders dated 05.05.2020 by which they were given

certain benefits are correct and strictly in accordance with the

orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. By virtue of

this, the promotion lists were changed and in the proposed

promotion list, the unofficial respondents are placed at serial

No.141-A and 141-B and the petitioner is at 146.

Therefore, the question for consideration is: what is the

interpretations to be placed on the judgment of the Division

Bench and the modified order given by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court. As Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer in his inimitable style

says every decision has a 'sublime essence and general

content'. This is what we call the ratio of a decision. If the

judgment of the Division Bench is seen carefully, it is very

clearly states that the orders passed in G.O.Ms.Nos.880 and

881 are completely contrary to (a) the statutory rules (b) to

the orders passed by this Court as well as the Tribunal and

(c) to all the principles of law governing the rehabilitation of

persons from Corporations that are wound up(para 20). In

para 21, the Division Bench noted that the unofficial

respondents could not claim any benefit from an earlier date

whether its seniority or emoluments in terms of

G.O.Ms.No.72. The Bench held that G.O.Ms.Nos.880 and 881

completely destroyed the spirit of G.O.Ms.No.72. Ultimately,

in para 22, while setting aside the orders of the Tribunal and

allowing the writ petitions, the Division Bench held as follows:

"the three unofficial respondents are not entitled to the

benefit of absorption in the category of Senior Assistants

either with effect from 29.11.1993/24.02.1994 or with effect

from any date anterior to what was offered to them under

G.O.Ms.No.72 dated 20.01.2001 with prospective effect.

(emphasis again supplied)

Therefore, a reading of the entire judgment would make

it clear that the two Government Order Nos.880 and 881 and

were set aside in their entirety. It was made clear that the

said Government Orders are contrary to the law and to the

earlier orders. Ultimately, it was held that the present

respondent Nos.3 and 4 are only entitled to what was offered

to them under G.O.Ms.No.72 with effect from 20.01.2021 and

with prospective effect.

The order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is also

reproduced above. The present respondents are the

appellants before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Civil

Appeal. At un-numbered para 3, the Hon'ble Supreme Court

noticed that the grant of retrospective seniority and benefits

places them higher in the seniority list. Thereafter, in the

unnumbered para 5, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the

balance has to be maintained between the rights of the

appellants and private respondents. The Hon'ble Supreme

Court held that the present respondents who are appellants

therein are entitled to the "monetary aspects" as the benefit.

Therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that to that extent

the judgment of the High Court is modified by "limiting the

conferment of benefits to the appellants by the State

Government giving them retrospective monetary/service

benefits (except seniority) for all purposes, from the date of

their appointment as Junior Assistants".

As per the settled law on the law of interpretation, the

entire judgment has to be read. The Hon'ble Supreme Court

decided that the benefit conferred on the respondent Nos.3

and 4 which is protected is the "monetary aspect". That is

why they have carefully said to "that extent we modified the

impugned order by "limiting the conferment of benefits to the

appellants of the State Government giving them retrospective

monetary/service benefits "except seniority". This is also

made clear that by the other two paras of the order, wherein

the Supreme Court held that the seniority must be

maintained as it was before the State Government conferred

the retrospective financial benefits and modified the Division

Bench order to the aforesaid extent.

Therefore, from a reading of the entire judgment, it is

clear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not interfere with

the entire judgment of the Division Bench nor did it say that

G.O.Ms.Nos.880 and 881 are valid.

In the humble opinion of this Court, the Hon'ble

Supreme Court balanced the rights of the parties. The words

in the last para of page 2 of the order show that the order is

modified to "that extent by limiting the benefits which are

monetary and service benefits". The specific use of the words

"except seniority" cannot be lost sight of. The Hon'ble

Supreme Court highlighted this portion and held that the

appellants are not entitled to seniority. In the conclusion also

the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the seniority should be

maintained as it was before the state gave the benefits.

The following three aspects are important in interpreting

any judgment. (a) the facts of the case (b) the statement of

law applicable to the facts of the case and (c) the

conclusions/judgment passed on the above two.

If the judgment of the Division Bench is seen in these

background, in para 12, the laws and fact were separated and

the "chaff was separated from the grain". The crux of the

issue namely whether the present respondents (unofficial

respondents) are entitled to retrospective promotion or not

was highlighted. The law on the subject was discussed

thereafter and ultimately it is concluded in paras 20 to 22

that the present respondent Nos.3 and 4 are not entitled to

any retrospective seniority from the dates mentioned in the

order and that they could only claim what was offered to them

under G.O.Ms.No.72 dated 21.01.2001 with prospective

effect. This is the substance of the finding of the Division

Bench. In the opinion of this Court this was not set aside in

its entirety; it was only modified to the extent mentioned

above by using the words for "monetary benefits to that

extent and except seniority".

Therefore, this Court has to agree with the petitioner

that as far as seniority is concerned, respondent Nos.3 and 4

are only entitled to what was offered by G.O.Ms.No.72 dated

20.01.2001 and that too with prospective effect.

The other contention which had to be answered is

whether the petitioners conduct in pursuing the contempt

application and implead application disentitle him to seek any

relief. It is argued as the petitioner filed a contempt

application and an implead application, both of which were

dismissed, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief.

In the opinion of this Court, the petitioner wrongly

pursued a relief in the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In an implead

application, as per the settled law, the Court will see whether

the presence of the petitioner is necessary for effectively

disposing the case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the

presence of the petitioner, as he is not a party to the lower

Court proceedings, is not necessary and for both of these

reasons dismissed both the contempt and implead

applications.

In service law and in election law, the litigation may be

between parties to the lis, but the effect of the litigation would

be on many others. In election petitions; the election of a

candidate is challenged, but the effect is on the whole

electorate who has to again elect a fresh candidate. Similarly,

in service law also the effect of a decision between parties to a

lis may have a cascading or a ripple effect on parties who are

not before the Court. Thus in effect they are judgments in

'rem'. When their rights are affected, the parties would

definitely have what is popularly known as a cause of action

to ventilate their grievances before the Court. The law on the

subject is also clear. In K. Ajit Babu and Ors. v. Union of

India (UOI) and Ors.1, when a similar issue about right to

challenge an order by a person who is not a party to the

original lis , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows in

para 4 and in para 7:

4. .......................................................................... .......Often in service matters the judgments rendered either by the Tribunal or by the Court also affect other persons, who are not parties to the cases. It may help one class of employees and at the same time adversely affect another class of employees. In such circumstances the judgments of the Courts or the Tribunals may not be strictly judgments in personam affecting only to the parties to the cases, they would be judgments in rem. In such a situation, the question arises; what remedy is available to such affected persons who are not parties to a case, yet the decision in such a case adversely affect to their rights in the matter of their seniority. In the present case, the view taken by the Tribunal that the only remedy available to the affected persons is to file a review of the judgment which affects them and not to file a fresh application under Section 19 of the Act...................................

The decision given by the Tribunal, unless reviewed or appealed against, attains finality. If such a power to review is permitted, no decision is final, as the decision

1997 (6) SCC 473

would be subject to review at any time at the instance of party feeling adversely affected by the said decision. A party in whose favour a decision has been given cannot monitor the case for all times to come. Public policy demands that there should be end to law suits and if the view of the Tribunal is accepted the proceedings in a case will never come to an end. We, therefore, find that, a right of review is available to the aggrieved persons on restricted ground mentioned in O. 47 of the CPC if filed within the period of limitation.

7. For the aforesaid reasons, the order of the Administrative Tribunal dated 14-8-1987 passed in O.A. No. 47 of 1990 is set aside and the case is sent back to the Tribunal for decision on merits preferably within three months from the date of receipt of the copy of the judgment. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs."

A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in

S.Sai Babu v. Director General of Fire Services and

others2 also took a similar view. The ratio of these two

decisions applies to this case.

Even otherwise, this Court holds that the order of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in which implead petition or the

contempt application are not orders "on merits", which have

effectively decided, the claim of the petitioner with regard to

the seniority or his position in the list vis-a-vis the unofficial

respondents. The petitions were dismissed on the ground

that the present petitioner is not a party before the Division

Bench and ultimately what is being questioned before this

2006 (5) ALD 30

Court in the present writ is the order dated 05.05.2020 which

is issued basing on the States interpretation of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court's order. Respondent Nos.3 and 4 are now

included at Serial 141-A and 141-B. In the opinion of this

Court, the inclusion of the respondents at 141-A and 141-B

above the present petitioner' has given him the cause of

action to file the present writ petition. The objections raised

by all the respondents about the effect of the orders of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the implead application and the

contempt application in Civil Appeal No.3300 of 2018 are

therefore overruled.

As mentioned above, this Court is of the opinion that

the order of the Hon'ble Division Bench in WP.No.6640 of

2014 and batch are only partially modified and the

respondent Nos.3 and 4 are not entitled to claim seniority

over the petitioner. Therefore, there shall be a direction

setting aside the CCST's Ref.No.C2/02/2018, dated

05.05.2020 and directing the respondents to restore the

seniority of the petitioner by reckoning the service of the

respondent Nos.3 and 4 only as per G.O.Ms.No.72 dated

20.01.2001 and G.O.Ms.No.1369 dated 30.12.2003 and to

immediately review the promotion.

Prayers (a) and (b) of the writ are granted. Prayer (c) is

however rejected.

With the above reasons, the writ petition is allowed. No order

as to costs. As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions, pending

if any, shall stand closed.

___________________________ D.V.S.S.SOMAYAJULU, J Date: 30.06.2021 L.R. copy be marked KLP