Lokesh Kumar Dwivedi vs Bhagauti And 4 Others on 3 April, 2026

Author: Saurabh Lavania

Bench: Saurabh Lavania





HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 


Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC-LKO:23577
 

 
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
LUCKNOW 
 
CONTEMPT APPLICATION (CIVIL) No. - 1109 of 2025   
 
   Lokesh Kumar Dwivedi    
 
  .....Applicant(s)   
 
 Versus  
 
   Bhagauti And 4 Others    
 
  .....Opposite Party(s)       
 
   
 
  
 
Counsel for Applicant(s)   
 
:   
 
Pratap Singh Mehra, Dheeraj Kumar Yadav, Mohammad Gulfam   
 
  
 
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)   
 
:   
 
 
 
   
 
     
 
 Court No. - 7
 
   
 
 HON'BLE SAURABH LAVANIA, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for the applicant.

2. The instant application under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (in short "Act of 1971") has been filed in relation to the order of this Court dated 23.12.2014, passed in Writ Petition No.8219 (MS) of 2014. The order referred is extracted herein under :-

"Heard learned counsel for the petitioner , Sri U.N. Misra, learned counsel for opposite parties no. 1 and 2 and perused the record.

Issue notice to opposite party no. 3 returnable at an early date .

In addition to regular mode of service, liberty is given to the learned counsel for the petitioner to serve notice on respondent no.3 out side the Court.

Office is directed to provide dasti summons to the learned counsel for the petitioner for service on respondent no. 3 out side the court fixing 28.1.2015.

After hearing learned counsel for the parties, who are present today and going through the record as an interim measure, it is provided that till the next date of listing parties shall maintain status quo as exists today in respect to property in dispute .

List on 28.1.2015."

3.After the order dated 23.12.2014, quoted above, three sale deed(s) were executed by the alleged contemnor Smt Shivrani (opposite party No.2). The first sale deed was executed on 22.12.2015 and the second sale deed was executed on 26.11.2015 and the third sale deed was executed on 26.12.2015. The sale deed (s) were executed by the opposite party No.2/ Smt. Shivrani in favour of the opposite party Nos. 2, 3 and 4, respectively

4. Based upon the aforesaid facts it has been alleged in the instant petition that the sale deed(s) were executed in violation of order dated 23.12.2014 and therefore the alleged contemnor be punished under Section 12 of the the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (in short "Act of 1971").

5. On being asked, the counsel for the applicant Shri P.C. Mehta failed to establish/indicate from the record that the order in issue i.e. order dated 23.12.2014 was served upon the alleged contemnor or the alleged contemnor was having knowledge of the order in issue dated 23.12.2014 prior to execution of sale deed(s) on 22.12.2015 and 26.12.2015.

6. Considering the aforesaid, this Court finds that no case under the Act of 1971 is made out. It is for the reason that the petitioner/applicant, who alleges that it is a case of contempt, is under obligation to establish/prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the fact that the contemnor had knowledge of the order in regard to which it has been alleged that contemnor has disobeyed/violated the order and in the instant case the petitioner/applicant has failed to establish/prove the same.

7. Reference on the aforesaid can be made to the observation made in the judgment passed in the case of Mrityunjoy Das and another Vs. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman and others, 2001 (3) SCC 739, particularly para 16. The relevant portion of the report is extracted hereinunder:

"13. Before however, proceeding with the matter any further, be it noted that exercise of powers under the Contempt of Courts Act shall have to be rather cautious and use of it rather sparingly after addressing itself to the true effect of the contemptuous conduct. The Court must otherwise come to a conclusion that the conduct complained of tentamounts to obstruction of justice which if allowed, would even permeate in our society (vide Murray & Co. v. Ashok Kr. Newatia & Anr.). This is a special jurisdiction conferred on to the law courts to punish an offender for his contemptuous conduct or obstruction to the majesty of law. It is in this context that the observations of the this Court in Murray's case (supra) in which one of us (Banerjee, J.) was party needs to be noticed.

"The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the Courts of law since the image of such a majesty in the minds of the people cannot be led to be distorted. The respect and authority commanded by Courts of Law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the entire democratic fabric of the society will crumble down if the respect for the judiciary is undermined. It is true that the judiciary will be judged by the people for what the judiciary does, but in the event of any indulgence which even can remotely be termed to affect the majesty of law, the society is bound to lose confidence and faith in the judiciary and the law courts thus, would forfeit the trust and confidence of the people in general."

14. The other aspect of the matter ought also to be noticed at this juncture viz., the burden and standard of proof. The common English phrase "he who asserts must prove" has its due application in the matter of proof of the allegations said to be constituting the act of contempt. As regards the 'standard of proof', be it noted that a proceeding under the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the Court in terms of the provisions of the Contempt of Court Act is quasi criminal, and as such, the standard of proof required is that of a criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to be established beyond reasonable doubt. The observations of Lord Denning in Re Bramblevale 1969 3 All ER 1062 lend support to the aforesaid. Lord Denning in Re Bramblevale stated:

"A contempt of court is an offence of a criminal character. A man may be sent to prison for it,. It must be satisfactorily proved. To use the timehonoured phrase, it must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. It is not proved by showing that, when the man was asked about it, he told lies. There must be some further evidence to incriminate him. Once some evidence is given, then his lies can be thrown into the scale against him. But there must be some other evidence.... Where there are two equally consistent possibilities open to the Court, it is not right to hold that the offence is proved beyond reasonable doubt."

15. In this context, the observations of the Calcutta High Court in Archana Guha v. Ranjit Guha Neogi 1989 (II) CHN 252 in which one of us was a party (Banerjee, J.) seem to be rather apposite and we do lend credence to the same and thus record our concurrence therewith.

16. In The Aligarh Municipal Board and Others v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union and Others MANU/SC/0075/1970 : 1970CriL J1520 , this Court in no uncertain term stated that in order to bring home a charge of contempt of court for disobeying orders of Courts, those who assert that the alleged contemners had knowledge of the order must prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. This Court went on to observe that in case of doubt, the benefit ought to go to the person charged.

17. In a similar vein in V.G. Nigam and others v. Kedar Nath Gupta and another MANU/SC/0419/1992 : 1992CriL J3576 , this Court stated that it would be rather hazardous to impose sentence for contempt on the authorities in exercise of contempt jurisdiction on mere probabilities.

18. Having discussed the law on the subject, let us thus at this juncture analyse as to whether in fact, the contempt alleged to have been committed by the alleged contemners, can said to have been established firmly without there being any element of doubt involved in the matter and that the Court would not be acting on mere probabilities having however, due regard to the nature of jurisdiction being quasi criminal conferred on to the law courts. Admittedly, this Court directed maintenance of status quo with the following words - "the members of the petitioner-Sangha who were before the High Court in the writ petition out of which the present proceedings arise". And it is on this score the applicant contended categorically that the intent of the Court to include all the members presenting the Petition before this Court whereas for the Respondent Mr. Ray contended that the same is restricted to the members who filed the writ petition before the High Court which culminated in the initiation of proceeding before this Court. The Counter affidavit filed by the Respondents also record the same. The issue thus arises as to whether the order stands categorical to lend credence to the answers of the respondent or the same supports the contention as raised by the applicants herein - Incidentally, since the appeal is pending in this Court for adjudication, and since the matter under consideration have no bearing on such adjudication so far as the merits of the dispute are concerned, we are not expressing any opinion in the matter neither we are required to express opinion thereon, excepting however, recording that probabilities of the situation may also warrant a finding, in favour of the interpretation of the applicant. The doubt persists and as such in any event the respondents being the alleged contemners are entitled to have the benefit or advantage of such a doubt having regard to the nature of the proceeding as noticed herein before more fully."

8. On the aforesaid aspect of the case, this Court also took note of the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Prashant Chandra Vs. Harish Gidwani, Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Range 2, (2024) 8 ILRA 428 : 2024 SCC OnLine (All) 4848.

9. The instant application is accordingly dismissed.

(Saurabh Lavania,J.)

April 3, 2026

ML/-