Allahabad High Court
Smt. Chanda Bibi vs State Of U.P. And Another on 26 September, 2025
Author: Pramod Kumar Srivastava
Bench: Pramod Kumar Srivastava
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:175132-DB
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL U/S 413 BNSS No. - 541 of 2025
Smt. Chanda Bibi
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and Another
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s)
:
Sudhir Kumar Singh Parmar, Virendra Singh Parmar
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
G.A.
Reserved on 24.09.2025
Delivered on 26.09.2025
Court No. - 42
HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.
HON'BLE PRAMOD KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.
(Delivered by: Hon'ble Pramod Kumar Srivastava, J.)
Heard Mr. V.S. Parmar, learned Counsel for the appellant and Mr. Shashi Shekhar Tiwari, learned A.G.A. on behalf of the State.
Present criminal appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 31.07.2025 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge/F.T.C. Court No.2, Prayagraj in Sessions Trial No.1307 of 2013, arising out of Case Crime No.170 of 2013, under Sections 376D, 452, 323, 504, 506 IPC, Police Station Manda, District Prayagraj.
Factual matrix in brief is that appellant/victim moved an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the Court concerned stating that she is widow and poor lady and her children are doing labour work and she lonely lives in a house and prepare Bidi for her livelihood. It is also mentioned therein that respondent Nurai and Nasru are her neighbours. Respondent always kept her bad intention towards the appellant but she always resisted. On 08.04.2013, when appellant was alone in her house, accused Nurai and Nasrulla entered into her house, beaten her. On 25.05.2013 at about 12 in the night when appellant was sleeping then respondent entered into her house after jumping the wall from outside and caught hold her on the cot. The appellant made effort to scream but respondent put Katta on her head and closed her mouth and committed rape on her and threatened her. After fleeing away of the accused persons, the appellant made noise and after hearing her screaming neighbours arrived there. The First Information Report with respect to said incident was registered on the order of the Court.
After investigation, the charge-sheet was filed against respondent Nurai and accused Nasrulla under Sections 376D, 452, 323, 504, 506 IPC and charges were framed accordingly. The accused persons denied from charges and claimed to be tried.
During trial, on 14.04.2024 accused Nasrulla has died, therefore, vide order dated 15.06.2024, trial court abated the case against accused Nasrulla.
In support of prosecution case, PW-1 Appellant/victim, PW-2 Dr. Shweta Yadav, PW-3 Diwan Singh, second Investigating Officer, PW-4 Dr. V.C. Budhani, PW-5 Arvind Kumar Pandey, Police witness and PW-6 Brijesh Dwivedi, first Investigating Officer were produced and examined before the Court below.
The judgement of acquittal was passed on the ground that appellant has stated that she is 45 years old and she have seven children aged 27, 25, 22, 18, 15, 11 and 10 years. The trial court also found that Nurai is father-in-law of the appellant's son and there was matrimonial dispute between daughter of Nurai and son of the appellant. Trial court also found that prior to alleged incident, one FIR under Section 376 IPC has also been lodged by the appellant/informant against other persons. Trial court also found that during medical examination, doctor has not found spermatozoa and injury on the private part of the victim and doctor has stated that he cannot give definite opinion with regard to commission of rape. Trial court also noticed that by the defence side it was stated that respondent/accused Nurai has filed a criminal case against victim and her son with regard to demand of dowry and causing cruelty towards his daughter and this case was filed as a counterblast. No other public witnesses were examined and testimony of the appellant was not found of sterling quality. Under such circumstances, the trial court found that the prosecution could not prove his case beyond doubt and the accused was given benefit of doubt and judgment of acquittal was passed.
Challenging the impugned judgment, Sri Shashi Shekhar Tiwari, learned AGA submits that the trial Court has erred in appreciating the evidence on record. He further submits that victim clearly stated that she was forcibly caught hold by the accused persons on the cot and respondent and other accused committed rape on her, therefore, there was no occasion to disbelieve the prosecution story. He further submits that it is not necessary for the prosecution to produce a public witness where such type of offence occurred in the privacy of a house and where public witnesses are not required to be present. He further submits that trial court has given undue weightage to the defence version. He further submits that the witnesses are intact and have supported the prosecution case and the findings recorded by the trial Court is not one of the possible view. Submission, therefore, is that the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court requires serious consideration and reversal and the accused herein is liable to be convicted.
We have considered the submissions and have perused the record.
Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to take note of law on the appeal against acquittal.
In the case of Bannareddy and others vs. State of Karnataka and others, (2018) 5 SCC 790, in paragraph 10, the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the power and jurisdiction of the High Court while interfering in an appeal against acquittal and in paragraph 26 it has been held that "the High Court should not have reappreciated the evidence in its entirety, especially when there existed no grave infirmity in the findings of the trial Court. There exists no justification behind setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, especially when the prosecution case suffers from several contradictions and infirmities"
In Jayamma vs. State of Karnataka, 2021 (6) SCC 213, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to explain the limitations of exercise of power of scrutiny by the High Court in an appeal against against an order of acquittal passed by a Trial Court in the following words: "The power of scrutiny exercisable by the High Court under Section 378, CrPC should not be routinely invoked where the view formed by the trial court was a ''possible view'. The judgment of the trial court cannot be set aside merely because the High Court finds its own view more probable, save where the judgment of the trial court suffers from perversity or the conclusions drawn by it were impossible if there was a correct reading and analysis of the evidence on record. To say it differently, unless the High Court finds that there is complete misreading of the material evidence which has led to miscarriage of justice, the view taken by the trial court which can also possibly be a correct view, need not be interfered with. This self-restraint doctrine, of course, does not denude the High Court of its powers to re-appreciate the evidence, including in an appeal against acquittal and arrive at a different firm finding of fact."
In a judgement of this Court in Virendra Singh vs. State of UP and others, 2022 (3) ADJ 354 DB, the law on the issue involved has been considered. For ready reference, paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 are quoted as under:
"10. In the case of Babu vs. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Paragraphs 12 to 19 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted as under:-
"12. This court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be more, the probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P. AIR 1974 SC 2165; Shambhoo Missir & Anr. v. State of Bihar AIR 1991 SC 315; Shailendra Pratap & Anr. v. State of U.P. AIR 2003 SC 1104; Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699; Budh Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. AIR 2006 SC 2500; State of U.P. v. Ramveer Singh AIR 2007 SC 3075; S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (D) by his LRs. & Ors. AIR 2008 SC 2066; Arulvelu & Anr. Vs. State (2009) 10 SCC 206; Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P. (2009) 16 SCC 98; and Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 445).
13. In Sheo Swarup and Ors. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227, the Privy Council observed as under:
"...the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses...."
14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See: Tulsiram Kanu v. The State AIR 1954 SC 1; Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216; M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200; Khedu Mohton & Ors. v. State of Bihar AIR 1970 SC 66; Sambasivan and Ors. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412; Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85; and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and Anr. (2007) 3 SCC 755).
15. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415, this Court reiterated the legal position as under:
"(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."
16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450, this Court re-iterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.
17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh @ Ram Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368, the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that an "order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused."
18. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne alias Baijnath & Ors. (2009) 4 SCC 271, this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances includes:
i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position;
ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record;
iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice;
iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case;
v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court;
vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal.
A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State by Public Prosecutor, Madras (2009) 10 SCC 401.
19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference."
11. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972 has observed that while deciding appeal against acquittal, the High Court has to first record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusion arrived by it is wholly untenable which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal.
12. The aforesaid judgments were taken note of with approval by Supreme Court in the case of Anwar Ali and another vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2020) 10 SCC 166, Nagabhushan vs. State of Karnataka (2021) 5 SCC 222, and Babu (supra) in Achhar Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2021) 5 SCC 543."
Similar view has been reiterated by Hon'ble Apex Court in Rajesh Prasad vs. State of Bihar and another, (2022) 3 SCC 471.
On perusal of record, we find that First Information Report was lodged after two months of the alleged incident. The appellant/victim is a woman aged about 45 years having seven children and some of them are major. As per testimony of the appellant, she had lodged one FIR under Section 376 IPC against some other persons prior to the alleged incident. There are major contradictions in her statement, as in her complaint she has stated that she lives alone while in her statement she admitted that her family and children are living together. It also transpires from her medical examination that no spermatozoa was found and as per statement of doctor, no definite opinion with regard to rape can be given. It is also not disputed that daughter of respondent Nurai is married with son of appellant and Nurai has filed a case against the appellant and her son for the demand of dowry and causing cruelty prior to the said incident. The victim in her cross examination has deviated from her earlier statement and more inconsistencies have occurred in her statement, therefore, her testimony could not be found sterling quality. Though, it is correct that this the case of sexual assault where no eye-witness is required to be present on the spot but trial court correctly found that if the sole testimony of the victim was found sterling quality and wholly reliable, then only charges could be established but, prosecution has failed to establish the charges levelled against respondent.
In such view of the matter, we, therefore, find that the court below has taken possible view of the matter on appreciation of entire evidence on record, which cannot be substituted by this Court taking a different view as per the law discussed above.
Accordingly, the appeal is rejected.
(Pramod Kumar Srivastava,J.) (J.J. Munir,J.)
September 26, 2025
S.A.
