Allahabad High Court
Mahesh Chandra vs Nageshwar Nath And 4 Others on 17 September, 2025
Author: Jaspreet Singh
Bench: Jaspreet Singh
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:56778
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
SECOND APPEAL No. - 153 of 2025
Mahesh Chandra
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
Nageshwar Nath And 4 Others
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s)
:
Mrinal Chandra, Avadhesh Kumar Shukla
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant.
2. The instant second appeal has been preferred against the concurrent judgment and decree dated 30.05.2025 passed by the First Additional District Judge, Bahraich in Civil Appeal No.64/1998 whereby the defendants first appeal was dismissed and the judgment and decree dated 09.02.1998 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Bahraich in Regular Suit No.106/1989 has been confirmed, as a consequence, the suit filed for specific performance of contract was decreed which has been affirmed by the First Appellate Court.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant while assailing the two concurrent judgments and decrees has submitted that both the courts below have erred in not considering that a decree of specific performance is discretionary in nature and unless it is just and equitable, the decree cannot be passed. It was also urged that the two courts have not considered the impact of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short, 'the Act of 1963') while decreeing the suit and dismissing the appeal and in such circumstances, the decree is bad in the eyes of law.
4. The Court has considered the aforesaid submissions and has also perused the material on record.
5. Briefly, the facts are that the predecessor-in-interest of the present appellant had executed a registered agreement to sell with the plaintiffs-respondents. In terms of the aforesaid registered agreement to sell dated 02.02.1987, the land in question was sought to be sold for a total sale consideration of Rs.40,000/- and in furtherance thereof, a sum of Rs.20,000/- was paid by the plaintiffs-respondents as earnest money. The remaining sum was to be paid within three years. It was the case of the plaintiffs-respondents that the plaintiffs had offered the remaining sale consideration to the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant, who evaded to execute of the sale-deed and thereafter the plaintiffs-respondents sent a legal notice to the defendants of the suit, which was not responded and thereafter the suit came to be filed on 24.04.1989.
6. The suit was contested by the defendants raising question of undue influence relating to the agreement to sell dated 02.02.1987 and it was also contested on the ground that the plaintiffs-respondents was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract and also in light of the aforesaid hardship caused to the defendant as it was alleged that land was wrongly contracted to be sold as it also had construction which was not mentioned in the agreement and in such circumstances, the decree of specific performance may not be passed.
7. The matter was contested and the trial Court by means of the judgment and decree dated 09.02.1989 decreed the suit. The matter was escalated by the defendants while filing a civil appeal under Section 96 CPC bearing No.64/1998, wherein the defendant had even filed his cross objections. However, both were dismissed by the first appellate Court on 30.05.2025 against which the instant second appeal has been preferred.
8. As far as the applicability of Section 20 the Act of 1963 is concerned, this aspect has been noted by this Court in Arjun Prasad and others v. Ganesh Prasad and others, 2023 SCC OnLine All 364 and it has been noticed more specifically in Paragraphs 47 to 51 of the said report.
9. Noticing the said, it would indicate that it is not merely in a mechanical manner that Section 20 the Act of 1963 applies only for the hardship of the defendants. This applies equally to the plaintiff and the defendant both. In any case, if a party is pleading the hardships then there has to be proper pleadings and evidence in this regard. Nothing has been demonstrated to indicate the evidence to support any such alleged hardship and moreover the findings recorded by the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court could not be shown to suffer from vice of arbitrariness or perversity which may persuade to this Court to entertain the aforesaid appeal.
10. It is also to be noticed that in the agreement to sell, the balance consideration was to be paid within three years, whereas the record indicates that the amount was offered to the original defendant, who did not accept the amount. Thereafter, the suit was filed in the year 1989 even though the time as provided in the agreement was of three years which was to expire sometime in the year 1990. It cannot be said that the defendant suffered any special difficulty or there were certain legal impediments which if taken note of would create a valid ground for the trial Court to have refused a decree of specific performance and in the alternate grant the refund of the earnest money. Accordingly, in this context, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant does not impress the Court.
11. As far as the submission raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that a decree of specific performance being discretionary in nature, it is not in all situations that even though a decree can be passed, the trial Court is bound to do so.
12. Noticing the aforesaid submission, the fact remains that are no mitigating circumstances in favour of the defendant-appellant or there is nothing on record to indicate that the conduct of the plaintiffs-respondents was such that it disentitled to have a decree of specific performance in their favour.
13. The record indicates that the two Courts have recorded a clear finding that the plaintiff has been ready and willing to perform his part of contract and in such circumstances the discretion considering the fact that the agreement to sell was executed in the year 1987 and more than three decades have passed that the suit has been pending and now matter has taken up in second appeal before this Court.
14. The two Courts have taken a complete view and have passed the judgment and decree on the basis of the material on record, which cannot be said to be perverse.
15. In view of the aforesaid, this Court does not find that any substantial question of law arises in the instant second appeal. Accordingly, it is dismissed at the admission stage. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Jaspreet Singh,J.)
September 17, 2025
Rakesh/-
