Ramesh Kumar Tiwari vs State Of U.P. And Another
2025 Latest Caselaw 10330 ALL

Allahabad High Court

Ramesh Kumar Tiwari vs State Of U.P. And Another on 10 September, 2025

Author: Shekhar Kumar Yadav

Bench: Shekhar Kumar Yadav

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 


Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:160870
 

 
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 
 
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 5334 of 2018   
 
   Ramesh Kumar Tiwari    
 
  .....Appellant(s)   
 
 Versus  
 
   State of U.P. and Another    
 
  .....Respondent(s)       
 
   
 
  
 
Counsel for Appellant(s)   
 
:   
 
Atharva Dixit, Narendra Kumar Tiwari, Pranav Tiwary, Rakesh Kumar Tripathi, Vimlendu Tripathi   
 
  
 
Counsel for Respondent(s)   
 
:   
 
Arun Kumar Tiwari, Arvind Kumar Singh, Ashok Kumar Verma, Deo Prakash Singh, G.A., Neeharika Singh, Pushpraj Yadav, Sadrul Islam Jafri   
 
     
 
 Court No. - 83
 
   
 
  
 
HON'BLE SHEKHAR KUMAR YADAV, J.     

1. Heard Sri Manish Tewary, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Pranav Tiwary, learned counsel for the appellant, Sri N.I. Zafri, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Arun Kumar Tiwary, learned counsel for O.P. No. 2, learned A.G.A. and perused the record.

2. This appeal, filed under Section 14-A (1) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the SC/ST Act), challenges the summoning order dated August 6, 2018, passed by the Special Judge (SC/ST Act)/2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Chitrakoot, in Criminal Complaint Case No. 29 of 2017 (Shayam Lal vs. Ramesh Kumar Tiwari). The Special Court took cognizance of the offenses under Sections 323, 504, 506 IPC, and Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act and summoned the appellant.

3. This court while admitting the present criminal appeal on 24.09.2018 had passed the following order:-

" Vakalatnama filed by Sri Ashok Kumar Verma, Advocate on behalf of opposite party no.2 today in the Court, is taken on record.

The present appeal has been filed under section 14-A(1) of S.C./S.T. Act against the impugned summoning order dated 6.8.2018 passed by Special Judge (S.C./S.T. Act)/2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Chitrakoot in Criminal Complaint Case No.29 of 2017 (Shayam Lal Vs. Ramesh Kumar Tiwari), under sections 323, 504, 506 IPC and 3(1) x S.C./S.T. Act, P.S. Karvi, District Chitrakoot.

Heard learned counsel for the appellant, learned counsel for opposite party no.2, learned AGA for the State and perused the record.

Learned counsel for the appellant contends that impugned summoning order has been passed without due application of mind in mechanical manner; that the appellant was the then Basic Shiksha Adhikari of District Chitrakoot and the opposite party no.2, who was head master, was attached to the office of Basic Shiksha Adhikari; that feeling aggrieved with above administrative order of attachment, opposite party no.2 moved an application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. on 30.3.2010 with false allegations that on 18.2.2010, the appellant allegedly abused him with caste name, assaulted him and threatened him of life within his office; that learned Magistrate vide order dated 26.4.2010 treated the application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as complaint (Annexure No.17) and vide order dated 3.8.2010 required the S.D.M., Karvi to verify the veracity of allegations made in complaint (Annexure No.18); that learned S.D.M., Karvi upon inquiry submitted detailed inquiry report dated 13.10.2010 holding that unparliamentary language was used by the complainant and no incident of abusing or marpeet was committed by the appellant (Annexure No.19); that despite this inquiry report, learned Magistrate vide order dated 12.4.2012 passed summoning order against the appellant (Annexure No.21); that feeling aggrieved, the appellant approached this Court through application under section 482 Cr.P.C. No.14326 of 2012 and upon hearing both the parties, this Court vide order dated 30.4.2018 quashed above summoning order dated 12.4.2012 and remitted back the complaint for afresh disposal (Annexure No.1); that the learned trial court in passing the impugned summoning order dated 6.8.2018 again repeated the same order without taking into consideration the report of S.D.M., Karvi as well as order passed by this Court on application under section 482 Cr.P.C. at Annexure No.1; that undisputedly, the impugned incident is not alleged to have taken place at a public place; that the complaint has been filed with absolutely false and baseless allegations being aggrieved with the order of attachment of complainant to the head office; that the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

Per contra, learned AGA and learned counsel for opposite party no.2 supported the impugned order. The learned counsel for opposite party no.2 submitted that the incident in question did take place at public place outside the office. Upon being asked as to whether it is mentioned in any para of the complaint, the learned counsel for opposite party no.2 failed to show any such whisper in complaint or in statements under sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C.

The matter requires consideration.

Admit.

Summon the lower court record and list after four weeks for final hearing.

Till the next date of listing, the operation of impugned order dated 6.8.2018 passed by Special Judge (S.C./S.T. Act) / 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Chitrakoot in Criminal Complaint Case No.29 of 2017 (Shayam Lal Vs. Ramesh Kuamr Tiwari), under sections 323, 504, 506 IPC and 3(1) x S.C./S.T. Act, P.S. Karvi, District Chitrakoot, shall remain stayed. "

4. The encapsulated facts of the case that the complainant, Shyam Lal, a headmaster, filed a complaint against the appellant, Ramesh Kumar Tiwari, who was the then District Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Chitrakoot. The complaint alleged that on February 18, 2010, at the appellant's office, a verbal argument over an administrative order of attachment escalated, leading the appellant to physically assault and verbally abuse the complainant with caste-based slurs. The complainant alleged that the verbal abuse was intended to humiliate him because he belongs to a Scheduled Caste. Learned Special Court, after examining the complainant under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and witnesses under Section 202 Cr.P.C., concluded that there was a prima facie case against the appellant and proceeded to summon him.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the summoning order was passed without proper application of mind. He contended that the complaint was an act of personal vendetta, filed in retaliation for an administrative order passed by the appellant. It is contended that the appellant was the then Basic Shiksha Adhikari, and the complainant, being aggrieved with an administrative order of attachment, filed the complaint with false allegations. It is also submitted that alleged offence is committed in discharge of official duty by the appellant, therefore, it is incumbent for the court to examine allegations against the accused to decide whether previous sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is required to be obtained from government before taking cognizance in the matter. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that before summoning of accused appellant there was a requirement of a prior sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) as the alleged offense was committed in the discharge of the appellant's official duty. Citing the Supreme Court judgment in N.K. Ganguly v. CBI, New Delhi (2016) 2 SCC 143, it was urged that a summoning order against a public servant cannot be passed without a valid sanction from the Government. It was submitted that in the absence of such sanction, the cognizance taken by the trial court is illegal and the summoning order is liable to be set aside.

6. The counsel further stressed that the alleged incident did not take place in a "public view" as required by Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act, as it occurred inside a private office. He cited the Supreme Court's ruling in Hitesh Verma v. The State of Uttarakhand to support the argument that the offense under the SC/ST Act requires the incident to be committed in "public view." The appellant's counsel also highlighted the lack of corroborating evidence and the delay in filing the complaint.

7. It is further submitted that in an earlier round, this Court had quashed the previous summoning order dated 12.04.2012 and remitted the matter for fresh consideration under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

8. It is further submitted that despite a detailed inquiry report by the SDM, Karvi, dated 13.10.2010 exonerating the appellant, the learned trial Court repeated the summoning order on 06.08.2018 without considering the report.

9. Learned counsel for the complainant/respondent no. 2 vehemently opposed the appeal. He argued that the Special Court, after a meticulous examination of the preliminary evidence, was satisfied that a prima facie case was made out. He contended that at the stage of summoning, the court is not required to conduct a mini-trial or weigh the evidence meticulously, but only to see if a sufficient ground exists for proceeding. The counsel asserted that the complaint and the statements of the witnesses clearly established the commission of the offenses. He argued that the office of a government official is a public place, and therefore, the "public view" requirement was satisfied. He cited the case of Swaran Singh v. State through Standing Counsel and others, (2008) 8 SCC 435, to argue that the location of the offence, even if a private place, can be considered "in public view" if the public has access or can witness the incident.

10. This Court, after a thorough review of the record and consideration of the arguments, finds no merit in the appeal. The purpose of a summoning order is not to decide the guilt or innocence of the accused, but to determine whether there is sufficient ground to proceed. At this stage, the court only needs to be satisfied that a prima facie case exists.

11. The Supreme Court, in numerous pronouncements, has reiterated that the revisional or appellate court should not interfere with a summoning order unless it is found to be patently illegal, without jurisdiction, or based on no evidence at all. The order of the Special Judge demonstrates a clear application of judicial mind to the facts and the preliminary evidence. The court examined the complainant and two witnesses and found their statements to be consistent and credible enough to constitute a prima facie case.

12. It is also relevant to note that the SC/ST Act is a special legislation enacted with the avowed object of protecting members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes from indignities, humiliations and atrocities. The Statement of Objects and Reasons (SOR) emphasizes that stringent provisions were introduced to prevent such offences and to provide relief to victims. In this background, courts should be circumspect in interfering at the threshold, unless the order suffers from patent illegality.

13. Specifically, on the issue of "public view," the law is well-settled. As per the precedent in Swaran Singh (supra), the "public view" requirement does not necessarily mean a public street or a market. It can be a place that is visible to the public, even if it is a private place. An office of a District Basic Shiksha Adhikari, where the public, including other officials and visitors, frequent, can be considered a place within public view, especially when the complaint and witness statements confirm that the incident occurred in a manner that could be seen or heard by others. The argument that the place was a private office is therefore untenable.

14. So far as the argument regarding the need for a prior sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is concerned, the same is also not sustainable. Section 197 Cr.P.C. provides a safeguard to a public servant to protect them from frivolous or vexatious prosecution for acts committed "while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. However, this protection is not a blanket immunity for all criminal acts. The test is whether the alleged act has a reasonable nexus or connection with the official duty. An act of assault, physical violence, or use of caste-based slurs cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be considered a part of a public servant's official duty. The Supreme Court in D. Devaraja v. Owais Sabeer Hussain (2020) 7 SCC 695 observed that "the protection under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. is not an absolute shield for public servants." The court further held that while a public servant can claim protection for acts done in excess of their duty, a criminal act like assault or rape, or a corrupt act like accepting a bribe, cannot be said to have been done in the discharge of official duty.

15. The principle established in N.K. Ganguly v. CBI (supra) and other similar cases is that an act is protected if it is so integrally related to the official duty that it cannot be separated. However, an act of verbal abuse with caste-based slurs and physical assault is a private wrong with criminal overtones, and has no reasonable connection with the discharge of an administrative function. A Basic Shiksha Adhikari is empowered to issue administrative orders, but not to physically assault or verbally abuse a subordinate. Such actions are wholly outside the scope of official duty. Therefore, the trial court was not required to obtain a sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. before taking cognizance.

16. The plea of the appellant regarding the false nature of the complaint and the delay in its filing are matters of defense that can be raised during the trial. The trial court is the proper forum to examine the merits of the case, including the credibility of the witnesses and the alleged contradictions in their statements. This Court, in its appellate jurisdiction, will not pre-emptively decide the veracity of the allegations.

17. Based on the preliminary evidence and the legal principles governing the issuance of summoning orders, this Court finds that the Special Court was well within its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offenses and summon the accused. The impugned order is neither illegal nor perverse, and there is no miscarriage of justice that warrants interference.

18. In light of the above, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed.

(Shekhar Kumar Yadav,J.)

September 10, 2025

RPD