Allahabad High Court

Fateh Singh vs Union Of India And Another on 29 October, 2025





HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 


Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:189634
 

 
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 
 
WRIT - A No. - 23893 of 2006   
 
   Fateh Singh    
 
  .....Petitioner(s)   
 
 Versus  
 
   Union Of India And Another    
 
  .....Respondent(s)       
 
   
 
  
 
Counsel for Petitioner(s)   
 
:   
 
Dinesh Kumar, Govind Saran, Tripti   
 
  
 
Counsel for Respondent(s)   
 
:   
 
C.S.C., Praveen Kumar Srivastava, Rajesh Tripathi   
 
     
 
  
 
  
 
 AFR   
 
 
 
Reserved On 08.10.2025  
 
    
 
Delivered on 29.10.2025 
 
 
 
Court No. - 34
 
    
 
 HON'BLE VIKAS BUDHWAR, J.

1. Heard Sri Dinesh Kumar, learned counsel for the writ petitioner and Sri Avinash Chandra Srivastava, learned counsel for the Railways.

2. A joint statement has been made by learned counsel for the parties that they do not propose to file any further affidavit and the petition be decided on the basis of the documents available on record. With the consent of the parties, the petition be decided at the fresh stage.

3. Impugned in the present proceedings at the instance of the writ petitioners no. 1/1 Pushpa wife of late Fateh Singh, 1/2 Om Pal, 1/3 Sukh Pal, 1/4 Brij Raj all sons of Fateh Singh is an order dated 14.06.2023 passed by the second respondent, Divisional Secretary, Commissioner Railway Protection Force, Jabalpur (Central Railway) whereby the claim set up by the legal heirs of the deceased Fateh Singh who was working as Rakshak for the payment of Gratuity, GPF, Insurance, Leave Encashment, Commutation value of the family pension and regular pension on month to month basis was negated. A mandamus has been sought for paying of the entire retirement dues such as Gratuity, GPF, Insurance, Leave Encashment and Commutation value of family pension and regular pension from month to month basis.

4. Briefly stated the facts are that the original writ petitioner Fateh Singh (since deceased) son of late Vasudeo Singh was appointed as Rakshak in Railway Protection Force on 15.08.1967 and while discharging his duties, he sustained injuries at Mathura Junction while hitting with the shutting bogie, his left leg was amputated and he remained under medical treatment from 24.02.1974 till 14.03.1975. Thereafter, he was declared fit for C-1 post and was asked to report for duty. As per the original writ petitioner he was entitled to be considered for alternative job of waterman, waiting room attendant, retiring room attendant, office peon or watchman but he was accorded posting as Safaiwala which according to original writ petitioner was not suitable. Consequently, a notice came to be issued by the original writ petitioner under Section 80 of the CPC and thereafter, the original writ petitioner preferred Original Suit No. 46 of 1977 before the Court of 11th Additional Munsif, Agra being Sri Fateh Singh Vs. Union of India seeking mandatory injunction against the defendants therein and respondents herein to absorb him in the alternative job and further declaration had been sought that the alternative job be accorded to him since 14.03.1975 while absorbing him. During the pendency of the suit, the original writ petitioner was discharged on 19.03.1977 with retrospective effect.

5. The Original Suit No. 46 of 1977 (Fateh Singh Vs. Union of India) came to be decreed on 18.10.1979 by the court of 11th Additional Munsif, Agra, the operative portion is quoted hereinunder.-

"????

Suit with costs decree ???? ???? ??? ????????? ?? ???? ???? ???? ?? ???? ???? ?? alternative job ??? as refused under law, absorb ?? ??? ?? declaration ?? ???? ???? ?? ?? defendant ?? post ?? ???? ?? alternative job ??? with effect frorm 14-03-75 absorb ?? ???? ?? failure illegal ? invalid ??? ??? plaintiff???? ?? ??? service ??? continue ???? ???

18.10.79?

6. Assailing the judgment and the decree dated 18.10.1979 passed by 11th Additional Munsif, Agra in Original Suit No. 46 of 1977 Union of India/respondents herein preferred Civil Appeal No. 50 of 1980 (Union of India Vs. Fateh Singh) before the court of Second Additional District Judge and the appeal came to be allowed on 10.08.1983, operative portion of the order is quoted hereinunder.-

?This appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the learned Addl. Munsif is hear by set aside with the observation made above in the circumstances of the parties shall hear their own costs.

Dated: August/10th, 1983.?

7. The original writ petitioner thereafter preferred Second Appeal No. 2658 of 1983 which came to be allowed on 10.03.1997 operative portion whereof is quoted hereinunder.-

?In view of the discussion I am of the considered view that the defendant has not exhausted the entire procedure of finding an alternative job for him and he should have been given a job suitable to his disability i.e. keeping in view of his choice and as such lower appellate court?s finding suffers from infirmity and are liable to be disturbed. I maintain the finding of the lower court. The finding of the appellate court cannot be maintained as it is purely a technical view and it is also not supported by law at all. I also do not agree that suit for declaration does not lie. The suit in the present form is maintainable as the respondent has been asked to perform his duties by offering alternative job of his choice.

In view of the aforesaid observations, the judgment of the lower court is maintained and the judgment of the appellate court is set aside and the defendant is to expedite the offering of job to the appellant within four months from the date of passing of this judgment. The appeal is allowed.?

8. Thereafter, the writ petitioner was accorded appointment and joining on 10.11.1997 on the post of peon. Ultimately, the original writ petitioner superannuated on 30.11.2002. Since post retirement, the original writ petitioner was not accorded the retirement dues so the original writ petitioner preferred the present writ petition seeking following reliefs.-

?a) Issue writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents No. 2 pay the entire retirement dues such as gratuity, G.P.F. Insurance, leave encashment and commutation value of family pension with order of payment of regular pension month by month.

(b) Issue writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent no. 2 pay interest at the rate of 18% per annum owing to delayed payment.

(d) Award cost of the petition to the petitioner.?

9. During the pendency of the present writ petition, the original writ petitioner, Fateh Singh expired on 06.08.2018 leaving behind the heirs being the wife and three sons. A substitution application came to be preferred which was allowed on 11.03.2024. A writ petition came to be preferred by the wife of the deceased Writ-A No. 4406 of 2023 for grant of family pension, gratuity, insurance etc. which came to be disposed of on 11.04.2023 requiring the respondents herein to decide the claim of the writ petitioner. The second respondent, Divisional Security Commissioner, Railway Protection Force, Jabalpur (Central Railway) proceeded to pass an order dated 14.06.2023 rejecting the claim of the writ petitioners for the grant of family pension, the same was challenged by way of amendment which was allowed on 11.03.2024, amended prayer is quoted hereinunder.-

(aa) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 14.06.2023 passed by respondent no. 2.

10. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner has sought to argue that the order dated 14.06.2023 passed by the second respondent cannot be sustained for the simple reason that the writ petitioners are entitled for grant of family pension, GPF, insurance, leave encashment and other retiral dues particularly when there happens to be a decree of the trial court in favour of the original writ petitioner Argument is that merely because, the original writ petitioner was accorded joining on 10.11.1997 on the post of peon would not take away the period from 24.02.1974 to 09.11.1997 for the commutation of pension. Submission is that it is on account of the challenge raised by the respondents to the judgment and decree dated 18.10.1979 of the trial court in an appeal, the original writ petitioner could not be accorded joining to the suitable post at appropriate time and post setting aside of the judgment and order of lower appellate court in second appeal, the writ petitioner was accorded joining, thus, the entire period whereby the original writ petitioner was restrained from performing the duties is to be counted for the purposes of payment of pension.

11. Sri Avinash Chandra Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that a period of 20 years qualifying service is a pre-requisite for the grant of pension as per the rules and regulations of the railways and here in the present case, the actual working of the original writ petitioner is much below 20 years as he had only worked from 15.08.1967 till 24.02.1974 and in the second spell from 10.11.1997 to 30.11.2002, thus, the period when the original writ petitioner had not actually worked would not be counted for the purposes of computation of pension. Thus, according to him, the order negating the claim of the writ petitioner for pension cannot be said to be illegal.

12. I have heard the submission so made across the bar and perused the record carefully.

13. Facts are not in issue. It is not in dispute that the original writ petitioner Fateh Singh was appointed as a Rakshak in Railway Protection Force on 15.08.1967 and post receiving of injuries his left leg was amputated and he was under medical treatment from 24.02.1974 till 14.03.1975 thereafter on 14.03.1975 he was declared fit for C1 post and was offered alternate job of sweeper. Records reveal that the original writ petitioner did not join the post of sweeper which was offered as an alternate employment and got served a notice under Section 80 CPC upon the respondents on the premise that he was entitled to alternate job of waterman, waiting room attendant, retiring room attendant, office peon or watchman. Thereafter, on 19.03.1977 the original writ petitioner was discharged from service with retrospective effect and on 07.02.1977, the original writ petitioner instituted Original Suit No. 46 of 1977 before the Court of 11th Additional Munsif, Agra seeking mandatory injunction against the defendants therein and respondents herein to accord alternate appointment and to absorb him with a further relief to the extent that a declaration be issued to the defendants therein respondents herein to accord alternate job and absorption with effect from 14.03.1975 and the failure on the part of the respondents herein defendant therein as invalid and inoperative. The said suit came to be decreed on 18.10.1979 by the Court of 11th Additional Munsif, Agra in toto.

14. A Civil Appeal No. 50 of 1980 came to be preferred by respondents being Union of India Vs. Fateh Singh which came to be allowed on 10.08.1983 setting aside the judgment and order of the trial court. Aggrieved against the same, the original writ petitioner preferred Second Appeal No. 2658 of 1983 which came to be allowed while maintaining the judgment and order of the trial court and setting aside the order of the appellate court with a further direction to the defendants therein and respondents herein to expedite the offering of job to the writ petitioner within four months from the date of passing of the judgment. Accordingly, on 10.11.1997 the original writ petitioner was accorded joining on the post of peon and he superannuated on 30.11.2002. Since the pensionary benefits were not paid to the original writ petitioner so the present writ petition was preferred and during the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition, the original writ petitioner expired on 06.08.2018 and the legal heirs who are writ petitioners herein preferred a substitution application which was allowed. A writ petition also came to be preferred by Smt. Pushpa being the widow of the deceased being Writ-A No. 4406 of 2023 for grant of post retiral benefits which came to be disposed of on 11.04.2023 requiring the respondents herein to decide the representation of the wife of the deceased which ultimately came to be rejected on 14.06.2023.

15. In order to address the issue what is relevant would be the decree of the trial court which stood affirmed in a second appeal by this Court. Importantly, the suit seeking mandatory injunction against the respondents therein and the respondents herein to absorb the original writ petitioner in alternate job and a further declaration sought that the alternate job be accorded since 14.03.1975 while absorbing him stood decreed by the trial court vide judgment and the decree dated 18.10.1979 in toto. Thus, what was required of the respondents was to offer alternate employment to the original writ petitioner with effect from 14.03.1975 and to accord continuity. The judgment and decree of the trial court was though upset by the first appellate court on 10.08.1983 but in a second appeal preferred by the original writ petitioner before this Court on 10.03.1997, the judgment and the decree of the trial court was maintained while setting aside the judgment and the order of the lower appellate court and a direction to expedite the offering of the job to the original writ petitioner thereafter, the original writ petitioner was accorded appointment and he assumed charge while joining the post of peon on 10.11.1997. As a matter of fact, the law is well crystallized that the Act of the Court does not harm any of the parties and bearing in mind the said principles of law in the facts of the case, the net legal consequences would be that the original writ petitioner would be treated to be in continuity in service since 14.03.1975 as directed by the trial court and affirmed in second appeal by this Court.

16. Certainly, the position might have been different once the judgment and the order of this Court in the second appeal maintaining the decree of the trial court was set aside or modified but once the judgment and the decree of the trial court has been maintained by this court in second appeal requiring the respondents herein to expedite the offering of the job to the writ petitioner within four months then in extenso the mandatory injunction granted by the trial court for absorbing and according continuity from 14.03.1975 would come into play.

17. A Division Bench of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 22808 of 2003 (Union of India Vs. Praveen Kumar & others) decided on 22.05.2003 had the occasion to consider a position akin to the present case wherein the following was observed.-

?Thus in view of the above, whatever may be the merits and correctness of the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal earlier in its judgment and order dated 2.4.2002 it was not open to the petitioner Union of India to reopen the issue sitting as an appellate authority over and above the Tribunal. It had been assigned a limited role of execution/implementation of the order passed by the Tribunal and by no stretch of imagination it could have the competence to sit in appeal against the said judgment, and thus, the order dated 7.5.2002 passed by the petitioner Union of India has rightly been set aside by the judgment and order dated 31.3.2003. We find no force in the submissions made by Shri B.N.Singh placing reliance upon the judgment in Rajiv Yadav (supra) as the facts of the said case are quite distinguishable and the ratio of the said judgment has no application in the instant case. Once it is held that one vacancy available for insider candidate in U.P. was meant for the candidate of the general category that could not be filled up by the reserved category candidate. The respondent no. 1 had legitimate expectation for allocation against the said vacancy.

Thus in view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the petitioner Union of India while passing the order dated 7.5.2002 had acted without competence/jurisdiction as it had never been assigned the role to function as an appellate authority over the judgment and order of the Tribunal. It has been assigned a limited role of the execution of the judgment and order dated 2.4.2002. The order has rightly been set aside by the Tribunal vide judgment and order dated 31.3.2002. The case does not present any special feature warranting interference by this Court in a limited jurisdiction of judicial review.

The petition is, therefore, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.?

18. The judgment in the case of Praveen Kumar (supra) was subject matter of challenge in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No 3004 of 2004 (Union of India Vs. Praveen Kumar and another) which came to be dismissed on 29.11.2004.

19. Apart from the same, it is also not the case of the respondents that despite offering of an alternate job, the original writ petitioner did not join the post in question, however, the circumstances are converse that is the original writ petitioner was agitating his claims before the competent court of law which came to be endorsed by a judicial side in the second appeal by this Court while affirming the judgment and decree of the trial court.

20. Hon'ble Apex Court in Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board Vs. C. Muddaiah : (2007) 7 SCC 689 had the occasion to consider the issue the following was observed -

?32. We are of the considered opinion that once a direction is issued by a competent court, it has to be obeyed and implemented without any reservation. If an order passed by a court of law is not complied with or is ignored, there will be an end of the rule of law, If a party against whom such order is made has grievance, the only remedy available to him is to challenge the order by taking appropriate proceedings known to law. But it cannot be made ineffective by not complying with the directions on a specious plea that upholding of such argument would result in chaos and confusion and would seriously affect and impair administration of justice. The argument of the no such directions could have been issued by the court. In our judgment. Board, therefore, has no force and must be rejected.

33. The matter can be looked at from another angle also. It is true that relevant provisions of law and issue appropriate directions keeping in view such provisions. There may, however, be cases where on the facts and in the circumstances, the court may issue necessary directions in the larger interest of justice keeping in view the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Take a case, where ex facie injustice has been meted out to an of justice, employee. In spite of the fact that he is entitled to certain benefits, they had not been given to him. His representations have been illegally and unjustifiably turned down. He finally approaches a court of law. The court is unfairly and with oblique motive deprived of those benefits. The court, in the convinced that gross injustice has been done to him and he was wrongfully circumstances, directs the authority to extend all benefits which he would have obtained had he not been illegally deprived of them. Is it open to the authorities in such case to urge that as he has not worked (but held to be illegally deprived), he would not be granted the benefits? Upholding of such plea would amount to allowing a party to take undue advantage of his own wrong. It would perpetrate injustice rather than doing justice to the person wronged.

34. We are conscious and mindful that even in absence of statutory provision, normal rule is "no work no pay". In appropriate cases, however, a court of law may, nay must, take into account all the facts in their entirety and pass an appropriate order in consonance with law. The court, in a given case, may hold that the person was willing to work but was illegally and unlawfully not allowed to do so. The court may in the circumstances, direct h the authority to grant him all benefits considering "as if he had worked". It, therefore, cannot be contended as an absolute proposition of law that no direction of payment of consequential benefits can be granted by a court of even if they had been finally confirmed by the Apex Court of the country (as law and if such directions are issued by a court, the authority can ignore them has been done in the present case). The bald contention of the appellant Board, therefore, has no substance and must be rejected.?

21. Since the judgment and decree of the trial court as maintained in the second appeal by this Court has attained finality and has a binding effect upon the respondents and coupled with the fact that the original writ petitioner was at each and every point of time willing to work on the post in question, thus, the premise on which the claim for post retiral benefits has been negated by virtue of the impugned order cannot be sustained.

22. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 14.06.2023 passed by the second respondent, Divisional Security Commissioner, Railway Protection Force, Jabalpur (Central Railway) is set aside. A mandamus is issued to the second respondent to accord post retiral benefits which are admissible under rules to the writ petitioner while treating the original writ petitioner, Fateh Singh (since deceased) to have completed 20 years of service so as to entitle him for the payment of post retiral benefits within a period of four months from the date of production of certified copy of the order after considering the competing claims, if any.

(Vikas Budhwar,J.)

October 29, 2025

Rajesh