Allahabad High Court
Director Higher Education Lucknow And ... vs Vipin Kumar And Ors. on 17 October, 2025
Author: Rajan Roy
Bench: Rajan Roy
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:65748-DB
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
SPECIAL APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 210 of 2020
Director Higher Education Lucknow And Another
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
Vipin Kumar And Ors.
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s)
:
C.S.C
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
Yashovardhan Swarup, Savitra Vardhan Singh, Sharad Kumar Srivastava, Shubham Tripathi, Surya Prakash Singh, Vatsala
Court No. - 1
HON'BLE RAJAN ROY, J.
HON'BLE RAJEEV BHARTI, J.
(C.M. Application No.45826 of 2020)
1. This is an application seeking condonation of delay in filing the special appeal.
2. Heard learned counsel for the appellants, Sri Sharad Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for opposite party nos.1, 2 & 3 and Sri Surya Prakash Singh, learned counsel for opposite party nos.4 and 5.
3. This is an appeal challenging the judgment dated 24.05.2019 passed in Writ Petition No.14653 (S/S) of 2019. The appeal is delayed by 402 days as on 06.08.2020 which is the date of filing of the appeal. The judgment impugned is dated 24.05.2019. As per para 3 of the affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay, the judgment came to the knowledge of Regional Higher Education Officer and he vide his letter dated 24.06.2019 referred the matter to Director of Higher Education, Prayagraj who in turn vide his letter dated 12.09.2019 directed for appropriate action regarding filing of special appeal. It is not disclosed as to whom this direction was given. Nevertheless, there is a clear gap of two and a half months between the letter dated 24.06.2019 and the direction of the Director dated 12.09.2019 about which there is no explanation. As per para 5, the Directorate of Higher Education forwarded the matter to the State Government. The administrative department after due examination referred the matter to the Law Department. No date has been disclosed nor any document has been annexed with the affidavit which could throw some light as to when this happened. Be that as it may, the next date given in the affidavit is 07.02.2020 which is the date on which the Law Department granted permission for filing of the appeal. There is absolutely no explanation whatsoever for the period between 12.09.2019 to 07.02.2020 with reference to any date or document as to what transpired in the interregnum therein. The permission of the Law Department was received from the State Government by the Directorate of Higher Education vide letter dated 19.02.2020. The Regional Higher Education Officer, Lucknow vide his letter dated 24.02.2020 requested the Chief Standing Counsel of the High Court at Lucknow to take appropriate action for filing the special appeal, however, the appeal has been filed on 06.08.2020. For this period i.e. between February, 2020 to August, 2020, it is said that this delay was on account of Covid pandemic. Learned counsel for the opposite parties says that this was one High Court where online hearing of appeals, writ petitions etc were taking place. He has placed before us a Circular issued by the High Court regarding functioning of the Court during Covid-19 pandemic, according to which, it was decided to permit physical filing of new cases before the High Court at Lucknow on all working days w.e.f. 03.06.2020. This was in partial modification of the direction/ guidelines issued on 13.03.2020, 16.03.2020, 10.04.2020 and 22.05.2020. Prior to 03.06.2020, online filing of cases were permitted and hearing was also taking place online. We distinctly remember it to be so. Affidavit of the State does not disclose this fact. In any case, even if this period from February, 2020 to August, 2020 is ignored for a moment though it is not possible to do so for the reasons given hereinabove, there is absolutely no explanation as to why the appeal could not be filed prior to February, 2020. Lame excuses have been put forth without any documentary proof. No details have been given.
4. We have gone through the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court dated 12.09.2025 rendered in Civil Appeal No.11794 of 2025 'Shivamma (Dead) By LRS vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors' wherein the law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression "sufficient cause" must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bonafide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. We are of the opinion that these latter observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court apply on all its fours to the facts of this case. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed hereinabove. Preference of such appeal with inordinate delay certainly prejudices the rights of the opposite parties under the judgment impugned herein. Therefore, this is also relevant factor to be taken into consideration in view of the judgment in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra).
5. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether "sufficient cause" has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of "sufficient cause" cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.
6. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterised by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of A.P.' reported in (2011) SCC Online SC 403 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a "sufficient cause" for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.
7. Learned counsel for the State has relied upon a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of 'Inder Singh vs. the State of Madhya Pradesh' reported in 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 339, however, we find that this judgment has been considered in the subsequent decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) which we have already discussed hereinabove. Based on the discussion made hereinabove, we find the pleadings in the affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay to be inadequate, insufficient and casual. The cause shown to explain the delay is not at all sufficient. We are not inclined to condone the delay in filing the appeal which is inordinate and not satisfactorily explained.
8. Accordingly, the application seeking condonation of delay is dismissed. Consequently, the special appeal is also dismissed.
(Rajeev Bharti,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.)
October 17, 2025
Shanu/-
