Allahabad High Court
Tejinder Kaur Bedi vs Kalpana Sharma on 26 November, 2025
Author: Rohit Ranjan Agarwal
Bench: Rohit Ranjan Agarwal
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Reserved on 14.11.2025
Delivered on 26.11.2025
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
S.C.C. REVISION NO. 136 of 2025
Tejinder Kaur Bedi
..Revisionist(s)
Versus
Kalpana Sharma
..Opposite Party(s)
Counsel for Revisionist(s)
:
Akashi Agrawal, Rahul Agarwal
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)
:
Abhinav Gaur, Vibhu Rai
Court No. - 36
HONBLE ROHIT RANJAN AGARWAL, J.
1. This revision filed under Section 25 of Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, 1887 (hereinafter called as the Act of 1887) assails the order dated 27.08.2025 passed by First Additional District and Sessions Judge, Gautam Buddh Nagar in S.C.C. Case No. 6 of 2024 rejecting the application Paper No. 14C filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC read with Section 151 CPC and application 16C filed by defendant-revisionist under Section 8 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter called as the Act of 1996).
2. Facts, leading rise to the present revision, are that defendant-revisionist and plaintiff-respondent entered into a lease deed/rent deed on 22.01.2011 for a period of 11 months starting from 15.03.2011 to 14.02.2012. According to lease deed, rent of Rs.27,000/- was payable in respect of the property leased out along with furniture and fixture, which was payable by 19th day of every month. It was further agreed that if lessee decides to stay at the premises then the lessor will charge escalated rent which will be 8% more of the rent at every 11 months.
3. According to revisionist, another rent agreement was executed between the parties on 02.12.2014 for a period of 11 months. The landlord-respondent on 05.03.2024 gave notice for vacating the premises in question as period of lease had come to an end. As the property was not vacated, S.C.C. Suit No. 6 of 2024 was filed. The tenant-revisionist filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC on 24.03.2025 claiming that suit was not maintainable before Judge Small Cause Court and in view of Section 2(c)(vii) of Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (hereinafter called as the Act of 2015), the suit was to be tried by commercial court. An application under Section 8 of the Act of 1996 was also filed with the prayer that lease deed contained provision for arbitration and, thus, the matter be referred for arbitration. Both these applications were tried together by court below and by order impugned dated 27.08.2025, they were rejected. Hence, the present revision.
4. Learned counsel for the revisionist submitted that it is a commercial dispute as the agreement executed was in respect of the property let out for manufacturing purpose and, thus, is covered under definition of Section 2(1)(c)(vii). It was also contended that explanation to Section 2(1)(c) provides that a commercial dispute shall not be ceased to be a commercial dispute merely because it involves action for recovery of immovable property. According to her, once the property was let out for commercial purpose and the agreement provides for that, the case has to be sent to commercial court and Judge Small Cause Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain it.
5. She further submitted that Section 8 of the Act of 1996 requires that where an arbitration clause exists in a contract, the matter has to be referred for arbitration and the court cannot proceed. Reliance has been placed upon the decision of Apex Court rendered in case of Brij Raj Oberoi vs. Secretary, Tourism and Civil Aviation Department and another, (2022) 17 SCC 81; judgment of Calcutta High Court in case of T.E. Thomson & Company Limited vs. Swarnalata Chopra Nee Kanpur and another, 2025 SCC OnLine Cal 5076 and Maharshi Commerce Limited vs. Rajiv R. Balani & others, CS/3/2019 IA No. GA/6/2022, decided on 10.11.2022 and judgment of this Court in case of Mamta Kapoor and another vs. Vinod Kumar Rai, 2024 (165) ALR 895.
6. Sri Vibhu Rai, learned counsel appearing for landlord-respondent submits that the term of contract had come to an end as it was only for a period of 11 months which was executed on 22.01.2011, starting from 15.03.2011 to 14.02.2012. According to him, there is no dispute involved as to property leased out to the revisionist. Moreover, once the contract had come to an end, suit for eviction was filed which is maintainable before Judge Small Cause Court. Reliance has been placed upon the decision rendered by co-ordinate Bench in case of Anoop Maheshwari vs. Thomas T. Kurian, S.C.C. Revision No. 157 of 2024, decided on 19.11.2024 and decision of Delhi High Court rendered in case of Mukesh Khurana vs. Rahul Chaudhary, FAO 200/2024 & CAV 286/2024 & CM Appl. 36461-36462/2024, decided on 09.07.2024.
7. I have heard respective counsel for the parties and perused the material on record.
8. The short point for consideration is whether proceeding before Judge Small Cause Court is maintainable in view of contract between the parties coming to an end and application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC as well as Section 8 of the Act of 1996 was not maintainable.
9. It is an admitted case of tenancy agreement having arrived between the parties in the year 2011. A lease deed to this effect was executed on 22.01.2011 which became effective from 15.03.2011 to 14.02.2012. It is case of landlord that this agreement was never renewed or extended but revisionist-tenant continued to hold over the property and paid rent in view of Clause (iv) of agreement of the year 2011.
10. On the contrary, revisionist claimed that another agreement for 11 months was executed between the parties in the shape of lease deed dated 02.12.2014. It is also not in dispute that notice to quit the premises was given by landlord on 05.03.2024 on the ground that the term of contract has come to an end and the tenant should vacate the premises. The application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is basically on the ground that suit filed under the provisions of the Act of 1887 was not maintainable before Judge Small Cause Court and the case would lie before commercial court in view of the Act of 2015 as it relates to a commercial dispute.
11. Before proceeding to decide the issue, a cursory glance of provisions of Section 2(1)(c) is relevant for better appreciation of the case, which is extracted hereasunder:-
2. Definitions.(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,
[(a) Commercial Appellate Courts means the Commercial Appellate Courts designated under section 3A;]
[(aa)] Commercial Appellate Division means the Commercial Appellate Division in a High Court constituted under sub-section (1) of section 5;
(b) Commercial Court means the Commercial Court constituted under sub-section (1) of section 3;
(c) Commercial dispute means a dispute arising out of
(i) ***
(ii) ***
(iii) ***
(iv) ***
(v) ***
(vi) ***
(vii) agreements relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce;
(viii) ***
(ix) ***
(x) ***
(xi) ***
(xii) ***
(xiii) ***
(xiv) ***
(xv) ***
(xvi) ***
(xvii) ***
(xix) ***
(xx) ***
(xxi) ***
(xxii) ***
Explanation. A commercial dispute shall not cease to be a commercial dispute merely because
(a) it also involves action for recovery of immovable property or for realisation of monies out of immovable property given as security or involves any other relief pertaining to immovable property;
(b) ***
(d)***
(e)***
(f)***
(g)***
(h)***
(i)***
(2)***
12. From perusal of definition of commercial dispute, it is clear that several transactions between the parties have been categorised as commercial disputes in sub-clause (i) to (xxii). Agreements relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade and commerce have been placed at serial no. (vii).
13. The entire thrust of argument from revisionist side is that once an agreement was entered between revisionist and respondent in the year 2011, any dispute relating to immovable property let out for manufacturing purpose would fall under commercial dispute and is only cognizable by commercial court established under the Act of 2015.
14. In the instant case, it is an admitted position between the parties that initial contract was for a period of 11 months commencing from 15.03.2011 to 14.02.2012. This agreement was never extended between the parties and it was only on the strength of oral agreement that tenant-revisionist continued over the property in question. The said contract had come to an end by efflux of time. The claim of tenant-revisionist that another agreement was executed on 02.12.2014 which was for 11 months has been denied by landlord-respondent. If this fact is admitted then too this contract came to an end after a period of 11 months as it is clear from the lease deed which according to revisionist was executed on 02.12.2014. The term of contract of both agreements came to an end by efflux of time. The landlord-respondent had given notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act for vacating the premises on the ground that the contract had come to an end and, thus, tenant was liable to vacate the premises. There is no commercial dispute between the parties as has been alleged by tenant-revisionist. Proceeding for eviction has been initiated solely on the ground that contract has come to an end by efflux of time. Once the contract itself is not in existence and no dispute is there in regard to term of agreement which was executed between the parties, the commercial court would not have any jurisdiction to decide the case between the parties as the aforesaid provision clearly stipulates that commercial court has power to adjudicate only in regard to commercial disputes relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce.
15. In the instant case, there is no dispute raised by any of the parties in regard to agreement which was executed in the year 2011 and period of contract having come to an end in the year 2012 itself.
16. Reliance placed upon the Division Bench judgment of Calcutta High Court rendered in case of T.E. Thomson & Company Ltd. (supra) is of no help to them as question (a) and (b) framed therein was decided in negative. Moreover, the Apex Court judgment relied upon in case of Brij Raj Oberoi (supra) is distinguishable in the present case as in that case the question of renewal of lease was under consideration which is not there in the present case.
17. The co-ordinate Bench of this Court in case of Anoop Maheshwari (supra) had clarified the air in respect to whether the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC would be maintainable in such cases on the ground that the contract had already come to an end and existence of contract is necessary and there being a dispute for referring the matter to commercial court.
18. Similarly, the court below had rightly proceeded to reject application moved under Section 8 of the Act of 1996 as no contract exists between the parties and the lease has already come to an end, the matter cannot be referred to arbitration. For invoking arbitration clause, the contract must subsist between the parties. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that the contract had come to an end way back in the year 2012. The question so framed above stands answered.
19. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I find that no interference is required in the order passed by court below rejecting the application 14C filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC read with Section 151 CPC and application 16C filed under Section 8 of the Act of 1996.
20. The revision fails and is hereby dismissed.
(Rohit Ranjan Agarwal J.)
November 26, 2025
(V.S. SINGH)
